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Introduction 
Cyprus' geographical position, the deep-lying 
bonds which, for two thousand years, have located 
the island at the very fount of European culture and 
civilisation, the intensity of the European influence 
apparent in the values shared by the people of 
Cyprus and in the conduct of the cultural, political, 
economic and social life of its citizens, the wealth 
of its contacts of every kind with the Community, all 
these confer on Cyprus, beyond all doubt, its 
European identity and character and confirm its 
vocation to belong to the Community. ' 
INTRODUCTION 
The Republic of Cyprus today enjoys privileged relations with the European 
Union and is on the threshold of accession. The Association Agreement of 1972, 
the Customs Union in 1988 and finally the application for full membership of the 
EU in July 1990, are the key points in the progress of relations between Cyprus 
and the EU. However, the desired end of this relationship, that of full 
membership, is yet to come. Cyprus hopes to become a full member of the 
European Union within the next enlargement as noted by the European Councils 
1 Commission of the European Community, "The Challenge of Enlargement; Commission 
Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership", Bulletin of the European 
Communities, Supplement 5/93, para. 44. 
i 
Introduction 
It is, indeed, a great task in Corfu (24 June 1994) and Essen (9 December 1994) 2 
to be achieved and justifiably the Government of the Republic of Cyprus has 
considered it as the main axis of its foreign policy. 3 
Compared to the accession of other Member States, Cyprus poses a completely 
new case, mainly due to the complexity of its legal and political order as it stands 
today, and it seeks a special approach. Apart from the common legal problems 
that other Member States faced during their accession to the EU, the Republic of 
Cyprus would have to face additional difficulties due to the complexity of its 
case. 
Thus, the road to full membership might not to be considered an easy one and 
certain matters present certain difficulties to the accession of Cyprus to the EU. 
One of these areas, which Cyprus must thoroughly examine before accession, 
involves the Cypriot constitutional order. The rigid and peculiar character of the 
Constitution of Cyprus and its current functioning, as a result of the refusal of the 
Turkish Cypriots to fulfil their constitutional duties and the de facto division of 
the island, might pose a real problem to the accession of Cyprus to the EU. 
Indeed, Turkey and the so-called "Turkish Republic of the Northern Cyprus" 
insist that the accession of Cyprus to the EU is prevented by the present 
constitution. 4 
2 The European Councils in Corfu and Essen noted that the next phase of the Union's enlargement 
will involve Cyprus (and Malta). This was, also, confirmed in June 1995 by the European Council 
in Cannes. 
3 "The Course of Cyprus Towards the European Union", Speech by the ex Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. Alecos Michaelides before the House of Representatives, 22 February 1996. 
4 See, "Joint Declaration by the President of Turkey and the President of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus", 66' March 1995, as cited at 
http: //www. cypnet. com/. ncyprus/cyproblem/articles/bolum32. html 
2 
Introduction 
The Constitution of Cyprus, as it was formed in 1960, was a result of the Zurich- 
London Agreements providing a compromise political solution to the opposing 
demands of the Greek Cypriot community for enosis (union with Greece) and of 
the Turkish Cypriot community for taksim (partition of the island). It is under this 
constitution that the Republic of Cyprus was established as an independent new 
state, and it is still operated as the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. 
However, due to its austere character, in the sense of limited possibility for 
amendment and its strong bicommunal provisions, it has been considered as one 
of the most rigid constitutions of the world. Apart from its rigid character, its 
current functioning has been severely influenced by the historical and political 
developments that have occurred in the island. In particular, in 1964, after a 
series of intercommunal conflicts, the officers of the Turkish Cypriot community 
refused to exercise their constitutional duties and the constitution itself was under 
threat since, according to its provisions Turkish Cypriot participation is vital for 
the functioning of the Republic. To enable the continuation of the functioning of 
the organs of the Republic, the law of necessity was introduced and since then it 
has become a basic part of the Cypriot legal order. In 1974, after Turkey's 
"invasion" (or "intervention") the island was divided. However, the de facto 
division of the island has been declared illegal by the international community, 
and the attempt to establish a new state in the north of Cyprus has been 
unsuccessful. In fact, the Republic of Cyprus remains the only internationally 
recognised state on the island and its territorial integrity is internationally 
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recognised. Since 1964, then, the constitution of Cyprus, even in a mutilated 
position, has continued to operate, with the assistance of the law of necessity. 
The EU has repeatedly stated that the only recognised state on the island is the 
Republic of Cyprus and the latter has subsequently entered into negotiations for 
accession. The fact that the EU does not consider the solution of the political 
problem of Cyprus as a precondition for accession 5 and that the accession of the 
Republic of Cyprus under the current status is not excluded by the EU, implies 
that prior constitutional analysis of the accession implications is important for 
Cypriot EU membership. 
Therefore, this thesis aims to examine several constitutional problems which 
might arise in regard to Cyprus' accession to the EU. Firstly, it will be examined 
whether the Constitution of Cyprus, as it functions today, provides the power and 
the possibility for the accession of Cyprus to the EU. Parallel to this, it will also 
be examined whether the Constitution presents any restrictions on Cyprus' full 
membership of the EU. Finally, other constitutional issues in regard to Cyprus' 
accession to the EU, like the constitutional mechanisms for the application of 
Community law in the Cypriot legal order and the harmonisation of the Cypriot 
Constitution with the Community legislation, will be examined. 
This thesis opposes those who assert that the Constitution of the Republic of 
Cyprus prevents Cyprus attaining full membership of the EU, and it seeks to 
prove that whatever the constitutional difficulties, the Cypriot Constitution 
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cannot be considered as an obstacle towards the accession of Cyprus to the EU. 
This thesis is also hoped to provide a useful tool for the Republic of Cyprus in its 
examination of the harmonisation of the Cypriot constitutional order to the EU 
legislation. 
The issue of constitutional arrangements for the accession of Cyprus to the EU, is 
a crucial one, and probably the most difficult to deal with. This explains why this 
issue is one of the last to be examined before accession. Current developments in 
the political problem of Cyprus and the possibility of reaching a solution, would 
undoubtedly result in the drafting of a new constitution. However, this is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. This thesis simply examines the situation as it exists 
today, and seeks to prove that even under the current constitution and situation, 
Cyprus has the power to accede to the EU, and that the Community's legislation 
could by additions/amendments to the constitution and by wise judicial 
interpretation of constitutional provisions, be accommodated within the Cypriot 
legal order. 
This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge in that no similar 
publication so far exists and the role of the constitution of Cyprus in regard to the 
accession has not been fully examined to date. The thesis also makes a significant 
contribution in addressing the lack of a detailed analysis of the constitutional law 
of Cyprus. 
5 See, Council Conclusions of the Helsinki Summit, 10th December 1999, para. 9. 
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Because of the lack of previous work in this area, certain difficulties faced the 
completion of the thesis. It was, indeed, a very difficult task to achieve, since 
both the lack of materials on the Constitutional law of Cyprus and the current 
situation in Cyprus presented certain difficulties. Several issues, such as the 
application of the Constitution in Cyprus today, and the introduction of the law of 
necessity as a useful means for the application of the constitution, and also the 
peculiar character of the Cypriot constitution itself, presented even more 
difficulties for the completion of the thesis. 
To overcome the lack of books and articles related to the subject-matter of this 
thesis, published resources were supplemented by interviews and meetings with 
several officials of the Republic of Cyprus. 6 A Questionnaire was also sent to 
officials from the Republic of Cyprus, the EU, Greece, Turkey, the UK and the 
so-called Turkish Cypriot authorities. In regard to the analysis of the European 
legislation, numerous books, articles and web-sites have been used. 
The thesis, is divided into six chapters. 
The first chapter deals with the constitutional background of Cyprus and seeks to 
analyse and provide useful information about the rigid character of the 
constitution. Also, the current functioning and application of the constitution 
since the introduction of the law of necessity is examined. 
6 See, Annex III. 
See, Annex IV 
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In the second chapter, the evolution of the relations between the Republic of 
Cyprus and the EU and the legal impact of their mutual agreements are discussed. 
Also, several other pre-accession issues, as the participation of the Turkish 
Cypriots in the accession negotiations, the political problem of Cyprus, the status 
of the Turkish Cypriot participation in the accession negotiations and the benefits 
expected from accession are examined. 
The third chapter deals with the constitutional procedure for allowing the 
application and implementation of the European legislation in the Cyprus legal 
order. It is examined whether the Constitution of Cyprus provides for the 
accession of Cyprus to the EU and how Community law would be applied in 
Cyprus, in the event of accession. Theoretical analysis is undertaken of the basic 
principles of Community law and their impact on their application on the Cypriot 
legal order. Also, examples of the ways other Member States apply Community 
law on their national legal order are examined, in order to determine whether a 
model exists in the practice of any other state(s) that may provide a means of 
guidance for Cyprus. 
The basic provision of Community law, that of the supremacy of Community 
law, its conflict with the Cypriot constitutional provision for the supremacy of the 
Constitution and the possibility of accommodation of the supremacy of European 
Community law in the Cypriot legal order are analysed in Chapter Four. 
In the fifth chapter, there is an analysis of Articles 170 and 185 (2) of the 
Constitution of Cyprus and Article I of the Treaty of Guarantee, which provide 
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the basic reasons for Turkey's objection for the Cyprus' EU membership. It is, 
therefore, examined whether the provisions of these Articles do, indeed, prevent 
Cyprus from joining the EU. For reasons explained in this chapter, however, it 
seems that those Articles cannot be considered as obstacles towards the accession 
of Cyprus to the EU. 
Finally, Chapter Six deals with the issue of amendment of the constitution of 
Cyprus and the necessity for such an amendment for the accession of Cyprus to 
the EU. The rigid character of the Cypriot constitution imposes certain 
restrictions in regard to its amendment. Therefore, the compatibility of several 
constitutional provisions with the European legislation is examined, and the 
possibility and necessity for the amendment of those Articles is analysed. The 
aim of this chapter is to identify those constitutional provisions which might be 
in conflict with the Community legislation, to examine whether firstly their 
amendment is possible and, if not, to suggest methods of attaining compatibility. 
The thesis ends with a short Conclusion, which highlights its main arguments and 
summarises the author's position on the issue of the legality and feasibility of 
Cyprus' accession to the EU, within the framework of the present Constitution. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS AS IT WAS 
FORMED IN 1960 AND ITS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
It is important, before examining any constitutional issues arising from the 
accession of Cyprus to the EU, to analyse and emphasise the peculiar character of 
the Cypriot Constitution and its main provisions. The Constitution of Cyprus was 
formed in 1960 and as a product of a political settlement has its own very special 
and unique character. A series of historical events influenced its functioning and 
gave more complexity to its already complex character. It is, therefore, very 
important to examine all those historical events which influenced both its 
creation and its evolution. The historical background of the Cypriot Constitution 
is an important starting point for anyone who seeks to study and realise its 
peculiar character. 
1.1 Background of Cypriot constitutional history. 
Cyprus is an island with a very long history and it has always been an attractive 
and an easy target for outsiders. It is the third largest island in the Mediterranean 
Sea and is situated at the north-eastern angle of the Mediterranean eastern basin. 
It is located five hundred miles from Greece and forty from Turkey. It has been 
described as the crossroads of the three continents, Asia, Africa and Europe, and 
the bridge between East and West. Unfortunately, this privileged geographical 
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position of Cyprus has resulted in the passing of many powers over its territory, 
as one conqueror succeeded another. As it was observed by the German 
archaeologist Hirschfeld, he who would become and remain a great power in the 
east must hold Cyprus in his hands. ' 
Excavations in the island have proved that Cypriot civilisation goes back to the 
sixth millennium BC. 2 This long history is full of conquerors who ruled Cyprus 
through the passage of the ages. It has been conquered by most of the major 
powers that had an interest in, or sought control of the Middle East. The Greeks, 
Phoenicians, Assyrians, Persians, Ptolemies, Romans, Byzantines, Franks, 
Luisignans, Venetians, Ottoman Turks and British were some of those who 
exercised their power over the island of Cyprus. Finally, in 1960 Cyprus became 
an independent State and gained its own constitution for the first time in its entire 
history. 3 
Usually, constitutions and constitutional law are the product of a particular 
history, including revolutions and struggles. In Cyprus, the birth of its 
constitution came as a form of political solution rather than as a revolutionary 
demand of the people. This is the reason why the constitution of Cyprus is 
considered as one of the most peculiar among the world's constitutions. 
1 George Hill, "A History of Cyprus", (4 Vols. ), Cambridge University Press, 1940-1952, Voll, 
1. 
3 
Spiridal is A., "A Brief History of Cyprus", Athens, 1963, p. 1. 
3 More information about the history of Cyprus can be found in the CD-ROM Edition "The 
History of Cyprus", http: //www. otenetgr/hoc/. See also, "The Great Cypriot Encyclopaedia" 
Filokypros Ed. 1990. A full bibliography on Cyprus' history is provided in Crawshaw, N., "The 
Cyprus Revolt", George Allen and Unwin, London, 1978. 
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As mentioned above, it is very important, for anyone who wants to study the 
Cypriot Constitution, to focus on the historical background, awareness of which 
is necessary to an understanding of the analytical synthesis, the formation, and 
some of the basic provisions of the constitution. Therefore, before analysing the 
constitution, it would be appropriate here to pay special attention to the events 
which led to its birth. 
Of all the alien rulers mentioned above, only the Greeks and Turks had a 
demographic impact on the Cypriot society. The Mycaenean Greeks colonised 
the island during the second millennium BC, having come to the island as 
merchants and immigrants. They introduced the Greek language and culture, both 
of which have been preserved to this day. In 1571, Cyprus was conquered by the 
Ottomans and the Turkish-Muslim population settled on the island. Herein lies 
the origins of bicommunalism in Cyprus. Cyprus, together with mainland Greece 
and other Greek islands, remained under Ottoman rule for more than four 
centuries. In 1821, Greece started the liberation struggle, and gradually several 
parts of Greece attained independence. A similar struggle for liberation was 
attempted in Cyprus as well, without success. A number of Orthodox Bishops in 
Cyprus were hanged by the Ottoman authorities, having been accused of 
supporting the revolution. The question of the incorporation of Cyprus into the 
Greek State was raised soon after 1830, but it did not become possible and 
Cyprus remained under Ottoman rule until 1878.4 
4 Ibid. 
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In 1878, the Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey 
with respect to the Asiatic Provinces of Turkeys was signed, in return for 
Britain's undertaking to defend Turkey against any attack by Russia. According 
to this Treaty, Cyprus was to be administered by Britain. In particular, on 4`h June 
1878, Turkey consented "to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and 
administered by England" to enable her to make the necessary provision for 
executing her engagements under the Treaty. By an Annex to this Convention 
signed at Constantinople on 1" July 1878 between the same contracting parties, 
the conditions under which England would occupy Cyprus were laid down and a 
provision was made that if Russia restores to Turkey Kars and other conquests 
made by her in Armenia during the last war, the Island of Cyprus will be 
evacuated by England and the Convention of 4`uJ June 1878 will be at an end. By 
an additional Article signed at Constantinople on 14th August 1878, the High 
Contracting Parties agreed that for the term of occupation and no longer, full 
powers were granted to Great Britain to make Laws and Conventions for the 
Government of the island and to regulate its commercial and consular relations 
and affairs. Therefore, technically, Cyprus remained under Ottoman 
sovereignty, though administered by Britain as a sort of protectorate. 
On 5t' November 1914, Great Britain, by an Order-in-Council of that date, 
unilaterally annexed Cyprus because the Ottoman Empire had entered the First 
World War on the side of Germany against Great Britain. Following the war, 
Turkey signed the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, whereby it accepted the status of 
s See Alastos, D., " Cyprus in History", Zeno Publishers, London, 1976, at p. 302. 
6 Tomaritis, C., "Cyprus and its Constitutional and other Legal Problems", Nicosia, 1968. 
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Cyprus as a Crown Colony of Great Britain. According to Article 20 of that 
Treaty, Turkey hereby recognises the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by 
Britain on the 5: h of November, 1914. Moreover, by Article 16, Turkey renounced 
any right or title over Cyprus and by Article 27 divested itself of the exercise of 
any power or jurisdiction in political, legislative or administrative matters over 
the nationals of Cyprus. 
In 1925, Cyprus became a Crown Colony and by Letters Patene and an Order- in- 
Council introduced a new administrative system. The first change was the 
substitution of the High Commissioner by a Governor and the creation of a 
Legislative Council as provided by clause VIII of the Letters Patent 1925, but 
power of legislation by Order in Council was reserved to the Crown. This sort of 
administration was suspended in 1931, after a violent uprising was harshly 
suppressed by the British, so that from then until 1960, Cyprus was governed by 
decree. Nevertheless, the inter-war period was marked by the rise of nationalist 
liberation movements in" Cyprus, as in other colonies. Greek Cypriots, who 
constituted 81% of the island's population, 8 led the nationalist liberation 
movement in the name of enosis, or union with Greece. 
As Kitromilides observes, a movement of national consciousness-raising and 
national assertations grew that culminated in a political vision of national 
emancipation through union with Greece. 9 Britain was obviously not willing to 
7 Cyprus Gazette, IF" May 1925, Notification No. 252. 
8 According to the 1960 census the population of Cyprus was 577615, out of whom 448857 were 
Greeks (81.1%), 104350 were Turks (17.9%) and 24408 others. (Source: Public Information 
Office (PIO), Cyprus). 
9 Kitromilides, P., `From Coexistence to Confrontation; The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict' in 
Attalides, M. (ed. ), "Cyprus Reviewed", Nicosia, 1977. 
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give Cyprus to Greece; therefore, on 1s` April 1955, an armed revolt begun in 
Cyprus, led by EOKA. At this point Britain invited both Greece and Turkey to a 
Tripartite Conference to attempt to solve the Cyprus problem, thus marking the 
beginning of Turkey's active participation. The Tripartite Conference failed but 
in 1959 another followed. 
On 5th February 1959, negotiations were launched in Zurich between Greece and 
Turkey regarding a solution to the Cyprus issue. On 11th February 1959, the basic 
structure of a new state, that of the Republic of Cyprus, was laid down at Zurich 
by the Greek and the Turkish governments. These documents, drawn up in 
French, became known as the Zurich Agreement. The Zurich Agreement 
represented a compromise between the Greek Cypriot community which was 
aiming to unite with Greece, the Turkish Cypriot community which was pressing 
for the partition of the island, and Britain's sovereignty over certain parts of 
Cyprus. 
The Agreement reached at Zurich was subsequently, on the 19th February 1959, 
incorporated in the London Agreement1° signed by the Foreign Ministers of Great 
Britain, Greece and Turkey and Archbishop Makarios on behalf of the Greek 
Cypriot community and Dr. Kuchuk on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community. 
A Memorandum was also signed by the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, Greece 
and Turkey. 11 
10 Conference on Cyprus, Cmd. 679. See also the statements made at the time in Cmd. 680. 
11 The documents annexed to the Memorandum are listed as: A-Basic Structure of the Republic of 
Cyprus (RC), B-Treaty of Guarantee, between the RC and Greece, the UK and Turkey, C-Treaty 
of Alliance between the RC, Greece and Turkey Known as Zurich Agreements, D-Declaration 
made by the Government of the UK on February 17,1959, E-Additional Article to be inserted in 
the Treaty of F-Declaration made by the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers on Feb. 17,1959, 
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The resultant Zurich-London Agreements12 were composed of three Treaties. The 
Draft Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus recognised 
the independence of Cyprus and British strategic interests were safeguarded in 
the form of two sovereign bases. The Treaty of Alliance was a defence treaty 
between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey whereby the three parties undertook jointly 
to defend the Republic of Cyprus. To that effect, the Treaty of Alliance provided 
for the permanent stationing of Greek and Turkish troops in Cyprus. Finally, the 
Treaty of Guarantee was a pact between all four signatories whereby the UK, 
Greece and Turkey undertook to ensure the independence, territorial integrity and 
security of Cyprus and to prohibit any activity tending to promote directly or 
indirectly either union ... or partition of the island (Article I). It provided 
for 
consultation between the three guarantor powers in order to resolve any situation 
resulting from the non respect of the Agreements and, failing such consultation 
and concerted action, each guarantor power then had the right to act separately to 
restore the status quo. The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus was actually 
based on these two Agreements. 
G-Declaration by the Representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities on Feb. 19, 
1959. 
12 See Alexandrakis, M., Theodoropoulos, V. and Lagakos, E., "To Kvnpiaxö, 1950-1974" [The 
Cyprus Problem, 1950-1974], 2°d Edition, Athens, 1987. See also Papadimitri, P., "17apamc1)v1a 
Zvprpmvubv Zvpi s Aovbivod" [The Zurich-London Agreements: Behind the Scenes], Nicosia, 
March 1978. For further bibliography look at Chrysostomides, K., "To Kp6roc vjs K67rpoo ato 
dieOvesdtxaio" [The State of Cyprus in International Law], Sakkoulas Ed., 1994, p. 472. A very 
interesting analysis of the historical events leading to the Zurich Agreement is provided by 
Christopher Hitchens, "Hostage to History - Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger", Verso, 
London-New York, 1998, pp 29-50 and by Ioannis D. Stefanides, "Isle of Discord, Nationalism, 
Imperialism and the Making of Cyprus Problem", New York University Press, 1999. 
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That Constitution was drafted by an ad hoc Joint Constitutional Commission, 13 
composed of representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities, the Greek 
and Turkish governments and was assisted by a neutral legal adviser, a Swiss 
professor of constitutional law in the University of Lausanne. The task of the 
Commission was to draft the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and it had in 
its work to have regard to and scrupulously observe the points contained in the 
documents of the Zurich Conference and had to fulfil its task in accordance with 
the principles there laid down. '4 
The Constitution was signed at Nicosia on 16th August 1960, by the then 
Governor of Cyprus on behalf of the British Government, Archbishop Makarios 
on behalf of the Greek Cypriot community and Dr. Kuchuk on behalf of the 
Turkish Cypriot community. 's On 16th August 1960 the Queen of England 
declared Cyprus as an independent country and the constitution came into force 
the same ay. 16 
On 21" September 1960 Cyprus became a member of the United Nations and on 
24`h May 1961 a member of the Council of Europe. Moreover, on 15th February 
1961 the House of Representatives, after an agreement between the leaders of the 
two communities and the British Foreign Secretary, by 41 votes to 9 decided that 
the Republic of Cyprus should become a member of the Commonwealth. 
13 It was created under Part VIII of the London Agreement. 
14 See Agreed Measures in Part VIII of Cmd. 679, at p. 15. 
t5 By Order-in-Council S. I. 1368/1960 made under the Cyprus Act, 1960. 
t6 Cyprus Act, 1960 section 1; Also, the Republic of Cyprus Order-in-Council S. I. 1368/1960 
appointed the 16`h day of August 1960, as the day for the day coming into operation the 
Constitution. 
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Compared to other Constitutions, the Constitution of Cyprus is considered to be 
amongst the most complicated, with 199 Articles and six Annexes. Most scholars 
supporting the Greek Cypriot position argue that the Constitution was inherently 
unworkable and that it was imposed upon Cyprus by outside powers. On the 
contrary those who support the Turkish Cypriot position believe that it was a fine 
Constitution and that it might have worked, had the two communities shown a 
greater willingness to co-operate. 
1.2 Outline of the 1960 Constitution. 
As Professor S. A. De Smith has observed: 
The Constitution of Cyprus is probably the most rigid in the 
world. It is certainly the most detailed and (with the 
possible exception of Kenya's Constitution) the most 
complicated. It is weighed down by checks and balances, 
procedural and substantive safeguards, guarantees and 
prohibitions. Constitutionalism has run riot in harness with 
communalism. The government of the republic must be 
carried on, but never have the chosen representatives of a 
political majority been set so daunting an obstacle course 
by the constitution makers. '7 
The peculiarity of the Constitution of Cyprus is based on two leading principles 
which permeate the entire constitutional structure. The first principle is the % 
" De Smith, S. A., "The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions", Stevens, London, 1964, p. 
285. 
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communal dualism in both the legal and political order. 18 The Constitution 
provided for the establishment of a bicommunal state and aimed at regulation 
and protection of the interests of the two communities with reference to their 
ethnic origin, language, cultural traditions and religion. 
The second principle, that of partial communal autonomy, aimed at ensuring the 
participation of each community in the exercise of government and avoiding the 
domination of the larger, Greek Cypriot community, in administrative matters. 
The constitution institutionalised communal dualism in all spheres of 
government. Article 1 declares the State of Cyprus to be an independent and 
sovereign Republic, having a Greek President and a Turkish Vice President who 
are elected separately by their respective communities. The following Articles of 
Part I (General Provisions), Articles 1-5, go on to define the two communities. 
Under the Constitution the Greek Cypriot community is comprised of all citizens 
of Greek origin, including those whose mother tongue is Greek and those who 
share Greek cultural traditions or are members of the Greek Orthodox Church 
(Art. 2.1). The Turkish community is comprised of all citizens of the Republic 
who are of Turkish origin, whose mother tongue is Turkish, who share Turkish 
cultural traditions or who are Muslims (Art. 2.2). Citizens of the Republic who 
did not come under the above provisions were given three months to exercise the 
option of becoming, for constitutional purposes, members of the Greek or 
Turkish community. Moreover, Art. 3 provides equal status to the Greek and 
Turkish languages. According to this article, all executive, legislative and 
"Papademetriou, G., "To ZbvrayparzKd Ilp6ßa. pa vjc Kvirpta4c driuoKpaTiac" [The 
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administrative acts and documents are to be drafted in both languages, while 
judicial proceedings are to be conducted and judgments drawn up in the language 
of the parties concerned. 
Part II of the constitution, Articles 6-35, provides the Fundamental Rights and 
Liberties. In particular, Articles 6-28 enumerate the general rights and freedoms 
of individuals, whereas Articles 18-34 enumerate those rights and freedoms 
which are derived from membership in either of the two communities. Like Art. 5 
of the Treaty of Establishment, Part H of the Constitution sets out a broad range 
of human rights provided by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and its Protocols. Like many modem 
constitutions, that of the Republic of Cyprus provides for individual duties of 
citizens, such as the duty to contribute to the public burden (Art. 24.1) and the 
duty to perform military service (Art. 10.3(b)) in addition to individual rights and 
liberties. 
Part III, Articles 36-60, defines the Executive Branch. It provides the structure of 
the Council of Ministers and the powers given to the President and the Vice 
President of the Republic. The Council of Ministers is composed of seven Greek 
Cypriot Ministers and three Turkish Cypriot Ministers (one of whom is to hold 
one of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, of Defence, or of Finance). The 
President is entitled to select and appoint (and terminate) the seven Greek 
Cypriot Ministers, whereas the Vice President is entitled to select and appoint 
(and terminate) the three Turkish Cypriot Ministers. 
Constitutional Problem of the Republic of Cyprus], Sakkoulas Publications, Athens, 1995, p. 5. 
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The President should be the Head of the State, enjoying the authority to receive 
the credentials of diplomatic envoys and to represent the Republic in all its 
official functions (Art. 37). The Vice President as Vice Head of the State, is 
entitled to be presented at all official functions (Art. 39). Although the President 
and the Vice President are not granted power, except on specific matters 
stipulated in Art. 47,49, where they have a right to act either jointly or 
separately, they do not enjoy the right to wield the Executive power. For this 
reason they are responsible for establishing the Council of Ministers (Art. 46). 
Therefore, it is the Council of Ministers which enjoys all the residue of executive 
power other than that specifically reserved for the President and the Vice 
President of the Communal Chambers. 
However, the President and the Vice President of the Republic each have the 
right of the final veto or to recommit Council decisions (as well as of laws or 
decisions of the House of Representatives). The veto provisions imply a dual 
Executive, again reflecting strongly the bicommunal structure of the Constitution. 
Part IV and Part V of the Constitution, Articles 61-85 and 86-111, define the 
structure of the Legislative power of the Republic. The House of Representatives 
(Art. 61-85) and the two Communal Chambers (Art. 86-111) compose the 
Legislative Branch. The House of Representatives is bi-communal, based on a 
fixed ratio of 70: 30 Greek and Turkish Cypriots respectively. It is elected by 
means of separate communal rolls. It is also bi-communalist in function, since 
committees also have to conform to the 70: 30 fixed ratio. Most decisions of the 
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House require a simple majority but, in certain areas (such as electoral law, 
municipalities and taxes) the two communities are accorded separate communal 
majority votes. 
The Communal Chambers exercise legislative powers with regard to all religious, 
educational and cultural matters, personal status and the courts dealing with civil 
disputes relating to personal status and religious matters; and with regard to the 
imposition of taxes to provide for the needs of the institutions dealing with these 
matters. Again the fixed numerical representation and the fragmentation of 
legislative powers demonstrate the strong bi-communal nature of the 
Constitution. 
Parts VI, VII and VIII of the Constitution, Articles 112-151, cover the Public 
Service and Armed Forces. The numerical ratio 70: 30 is applied to the 
composition of the public service as well. A ten-member Public Service 
Commission is to be set up to implement this provision. The ratio, of the 
composition of the Army, however, has to be 60% Greek Cypriot and 40% 
Turkish Cypriot. The Security forces are to be divided between the police and the 
gendarmerie in the ratio 70: 30. These fixed numerical ratios illustrate further the 
strong bi-communal nature of the Constitution. In some instances, this strongly 
bi-communal concern is carried to what may be considered an extreme. For 
example, Art. 154(5) requires that in any coroner's inquiry, the coroner be of the 
same ethnic group as the deceased. 
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The administration of justice is exercised by the island's separate and 
independent judiciary. Part IX and Part X of the Constitution, Articles 133-164, 
deal with the Judicial Branch which consists of the Supreme Constitutional Court 
(Art. 133-151) of the High Court and the Subordinate Courts (Art. 152-164). The 
Supreme Constitutional Court is composed of a Greek Cypriot, a Turkish Cypriot 
and a non Cypriot judge, the ex officio president of the Court, who are appointed 
jointly by the President and the Vice President of the Republic. It adjudicates on 
all matters of constitutionality of legislation referred to it by the President of the 
Republic or arising in any judicial proceedings, including claims that any law or 
decision of the House of Representatives of the Budget is discriminatory. It 
adjudicates also on matters of conflict of power between state organs and 
questions of interpretation of the Constitution in cases of ambiguity. The 
Supreme Court is the final Appellate Court in the Republic and has jurisdiction to 
hear and determine appeals. It is also vested exclusively with Administrative Law 
judicial review powers. 
The High Court - composed of a Turkish Cypriot, two Greek Cypriots and a non 
Cypriot judge - determines jurisdiction in matters concerning the two 
communities. If members of the two different communities are in civil or 
criminal dispute, the High Court must determine the composition of the Court to 
hear the case and it must include judges from both communities. Each 
Communal Chamber provides for the establishment, composition and jurisdiction 
of communal courts of original and appellate jurisdiction which deal separately 
with civil disputes relating to personal status and religious matters within each 
community. 
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Part XI, Articles 165-168, empowers the two communities to collect taxes as the 
Communal Chambers see fit. Part XII, Articles 169-178, covers miscellaneous 
provisions including International Treaties, the division of radio and television 
time between Greek and Turkish broadcasts, and the continuation of separate 
municipalities (Art 173-178). Each of the five largest towns had been divided 
into Greek and Turkish municipalities following the 1955 revolt and communal 
violence. The Constitution maintained the division, at least temporarily, until the 
President and the Vice President would within four years, examine the question 
of whether or not this separation of municipalities shall continue. This issue of 
separate municipalities proved to be one of the historical stalemates which led to 
the breakdown of the Constitution in 1963. 
The last Part XIII, Articles 179-186, incorporates the Zurich-London Agreements 
so that they have constitutional force and cannot be altered without the agreement 
of all four parties. Article 182 enumerates some forty eight provisions known as 
the "basic Articles" which may not be altered either, including among others, the 
provisions relating to the executive final veto, the separate majority vote in the 
House of Representatives, the 70: 30 ratio in the House of Representatives and in 
the Public Sector and the 60: 40 ratio in the Army. 
Finally, Articles 187-199 provide in detail for the transfer of sovereignty from the 
United Kingdom to the Republic of Cyprus by specifying that all former services, 
compensations and protection afforded by the government will be carried on 
without interruption. The first articles specify the time-limits and the inter- 
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transmission period provisions, for the smooth transition from a Crown Colony 
to the Republic of Cyprus. Furthermore, the last Articles provide for the 
continuation of services like public funds (e. g. the Widows' and Orphans Pension 
Fund) and the protection of the rights of those who were employed in the Public 
Service before 1960. 
13 Constitutional Peculiarities. 
The Constitution of Cyprus has been widely criticised as a problematic one, not 
only because of the manner in which the Constitution was granted, but also for 
some of its contents, notably those ruling out amendment, which seem to offend 
fundamental principles of public law. 
Many academics and politicians agree that the 1960 Constitution was unsound 
and seriously defective in terms of political balance and functional capacity. 
Professor De Smith suggested that one who is unaware of the political 
background would justifiably wonder whether the Constitution of Cyprus is the 
product of a discussion between a constitutional lawyer and a mathematician. 19 
Even the UN mediator called it an "oddity' . 2Ö 
According to P. Polyviou : 
19 Supra note 17. at p. 282. 
20 Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/6253. 
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The 1960 Constitution failed to provide a sound framework 
for the government of the Republic, and is open to 
numerous objections... it is strikingly (and what is more 
important unnecessarily) undemocratic and inequitable, 
and not simply anti-majoritarian ... 
21 
One of the first criticisms against the Constitution is the procedure of its 
creation. The criticism has been raised that its formation was against the 
democratic principle whereby the constituent power belongs to the people. It has 
been said that the Constitution did not emanate from the will of its people. It 
became operative and was virtually forced upon the will of the people... 22 The 
fact that during the Zurich negotiations there was no Cypriot representation, is 
the basis upon which one could support the proposition that the Constitution was 
a "granted one", i. e. it was conferred upon the people of Cyprus rather than 
created by them. The ex-Attorney General of Cyprus called it a "constitution 
octroyee"23. The term "constitution octroyee" is an old one and it was used, as 
the well-appreciated ex-Attorney General explains, in order to describe a 
Constitution as of the nature which in monarchical times of the past centuries 
the monarch condescended to grant his people, but is not consistent with the 
new prevailing democratic principles under which the constituent power is 
vested in, and is exercised by, the people. 24 Professor De Smith also stated that, 
the Constitution was in fact largely dictated by outside forces. 25 
21 Polyviou, P. G., "Cyprus, Conflict and Negotiation, 1960-1980", Holmes & Meier Publishers, 
New York, 1980 at p. 21. 
u Clerides, P., " The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and the Provisions for the Review of 
the Laws by the Courts" Nicosia, 1983, p. 1. 
23 Tornaritis, C., " Cyprus and its Constitutional and Other Legal Problems", Nicosia, 1980, p. 
39. 
24 Ibid., at p. 39. 
25 De Smith, S. A., "Constitutional and Administrative Law", Penguin Books, 4th Ed., 
Harmondsworth, 1981. 
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The fact that the constitution did not emanate directly from the people, and there 
was no opportunity for them to express an opinion through their ad hoc elected 
representatives, or to accept it by a referendum, lends further support to the view 
that the constitution of Cyprus is a conferred one. It has also been argued that 
since the President and the Vice President were not invested at the time when 
the Treaties were signed, they could not have treaty making power. However, it 
could be argued that the authority of the President and the Vice President of the 
Republic to conclude these Treaties, was ex-post-facto recognised by the 
Treaties were considered as validly concluded and as operative and binding on 
the Republic as from the date on which they have been signed. 26 
Even the leader of the Greek Cypriot community and the first president of the 
Republic of Cyprus mentioned that the Constitution which resulted from the 
Zurich-London Agreements was against the free will of the people of Cyprus. 
Notably, Archbishop Makarios stated: 
These Agreements, however, have not been the result of the free 
expression of the will of the people of Cyprus. They were imposed 
upon them from outside. Rejection of the Agreements would have 
meant denial of independence and increased bloodshed. 27 
It follows from the above that there is a strong belief that this constitution was 
not a free one, but an imposed one. Strictly speaking, the 1960 Constitution was 
not the will of the majority of the people of Cyprus. However, bearing in mind 
26 Supra note 23, at p. 40. 
27 Extracts from his speech at the Conference of non-aligned countries at Cairo on October, 9'h, 
1964, in Supplement No. 28 of Cyprus Today, at p. 6. The Archbishop had many reservations 
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that the formation of the Constitution was a part of a political solution, one can 
realise the reasons why the will of the majority was undermined. 
The recognition of the existence of two communities and the strong bi-communal 
character of the Constitution, appears to be the cause of many political and legal 
problems. One could justifiably argue that the strong bi-communal character led 
to separatist rather than uniting sentiments between the two communities. P. 
Clerides comments: 
The Constitution of Cyprus was dominated by the concept 
of community. The executive, legislative and judicial 
authority was in a variety divided. Those who designed and 
laid the foundations of the Constitution share the blame for 
the after effects. The Turkish Cypriot leadership, supported 
in their intransigence by Turkey, misused the checks and 
balances provided in the Constitution with the sole aim of 
implementing a partitionist policy. 28 
On the other hand, Professor Fortshoff stated that the Greek Cypriots do not 
want the participation of Turks in the administration, and deem the status of an 
ordinary minority fitting for Turks. 29 
The last two quotations illustrate the separatist notions of the two communities, 
which are the result of the strong bi-communal character of the Constitution. 
The lack of any unifying measures resulted in suspicion and mistrust between 
the two communities and as J. Joseph mentioned, although the conflicting 
before signing the Agreements, but he overcame them in a spirit of trust and goodwill towards the 
Turkish community and its leaders. See statement in IV of Cmd. 680 at p. 6. 
28 Supra note 22 at p. 2. 
29 The Turkish Cyprus Cultural Association, "The Historical Background of Cyprus and the 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" Ulus Offset, 1984, p. 23. 
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ethnopolitical goals of enosis [union with Greece] and partition were ruled out, 
no measures were taken to promote integrative politics cutting across ethnic 
boundaries 30 
There have also been many arguments against some provisions of the 
Constitution and its functionality has been called into question. It has been 
argued that it limits the sovereignty and the independence of the state. 
According to Art. 1 of the Constitution the State of Cyprus is an independent 
and sovereign Republic. However, Professor Svolos supports the view that: 
So long as, in principle, the Constitution cannot emanate 
otherwise than from the free will of the bearer of the 
constituent power, and this is in every state its people, 
whenever by an International Treaty, the Constitution of 
any country is determined either wholly or basically by 
such Treaty or the Constitution is submitted to the prior 
approval of organs of a foreign state acting in the 
performance of international treaties, then there is a 
dependence of such state, to a greater or lesser extent, on a 
foreign power or generally there is a restriction of its 
independence. 31 
Moreover, the Treaty of Guarantee could be considered as a limitation of the 
independence of the Republic of Cyprus. Article 181 of the Constitution (based 
on point 21 of the Zurich Agreement) provides constitutional power to the 
Treaty of Guarantee. According to Art. IV of the Treaty, the guaranteeing 
powers reserved the right to take action in case of disturbance of the state of 
affairs created by the Treaty, for the purpose of its restoration. By this provision, 
30 Joseph, J., "Cyprus Ethnic Conflict and International Concern", MacMillan Press Ltd, 1997, p. 
37. 
31 Svolos, A., "£ovrayparmd dircazo" [Constitutional Law], Athens, 1971, p. 117, as translated in 
English by C. Tornaritis. 
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there is a certain limitation over the independence of Cyprus and as Tornaritis 
observes, the provisions of that Treaty cannot be supported as reasonable 
restrictions of independence usually undertaken by international conventions 
freely entered into by, and not imposed on, a state as they not only restrict but 
practically destroy the independence of Cyprus. 32 
In the case Austro-German Customs Union, 33 the International Court analysed 
the definition of the term "state's independence". In this case, reference was 
made to the independence of Austria and it was defined as the existence of a 
separate state which is not under the power of others or other States. The belief 
was also expressed that a state would not be, legally speaking, independent, if it 
was dependent on another power (state). Practically, the independence of a state 
is limited if other states reserve the right to intervene in its internal affairs and 
block by any means the function of its organs. According to this definition, then, 
one could rightly argue that the independence of Cyprus is limited by the power 
the Treaty of Guarantee provides to the guaranteeing powers. 
Article 182 of the Constitution has also been criticised as a limitation of the 
sovereignty and the independence of the Republic. According to Art. 182 there 
are specific Articles of the Constitution (Basic Articles) which cannot, in any 
way, be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal. This is a very 
strict provision which imprisons the will of the people or, better, of the 
constituent power, forever, no matter how obstructive and injurious to the 
32 C. Tornaritis "The Legal Aspects of the Question of Cyprus", Nicosia, 1971 Revision, at p. 13. 
33 P. C. I. J. Series A/B 41(1931). 
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normal functioning of the State such articles were proved to be. The term 
"Constitution" is defined by Cooley34 as not the beginning of a community nor 
the origin of private rights; it is neither the foundation of law nor the incipient 
state of government; it is not the cause but consequence of political and personal 
freedom; it grants no rights to the people but is the creature of their power, the 
instrument of their convenience, designed for their protection in their enjoyment 
of their rights and powers which they possessed before the Constitution was 
made. The power, then, to create a constitution, i. e. the constituent power, 
derives and depends on the free will of the people. 
Moreover, in consequence of its internal independence and territorial integrity, 
a state can adopt any constitution it likes, arrange its administration in any way 
it thinks fit, enact such laws as it pleases, organise its forces on land and sea, 
build and pull down fortresses and opt for any commercial policy it likes and so 
on. 35 Tornaritis also stated that Art. 182 is not only contrary to the accepted 
principles of public law and to current constitutional practice but also offends 
against the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations 36 
According to Art. 1.2 of the Charter, one of the purposes of the United Nations 
is to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self determination of the people. 
34 Cooley, T. M., "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which Rest Upon the Legislative 
Power of the States of the American Union", Union N. J, Lawbook Exchange, Reprinted edition, 
1998, at pp. 68-69. 
35 Oppenheim's International Law edited by H. Lauterpacht, "International Law, A Treatise", 8th 
Vol., 1955-1962, p. 87. 
36 Supra note 23 at p. 40. 
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The 1960 Constitution has also been criticised as unworkable. Much of the 
criticism has been directed towards the administrative structure and. in particular 
the relationship between President and Vice President. Article 1 states that the 
State of Cyprus is a republic with a presidential regime. However, certain 
powers of the President are limited because of the Vice President's veto right. 
According to Art. 50, the President and the Vice President have a separate or 
conjoint right of final veto on any law or decision of the House of 
Representatives concerning foreign affairs, certain questions of defence and 
security. According to P. Polyviou, the constitution supposedly establishes a 
presidential regime, but this must be viewed rather sceptically. Perhaps it would 
be more correct to describe it as a vice presidential one, so inflated are the 
powers of the Turkish Vice President and so great the obstructive potential of 
his prerogatives, the final and unqualified veto given to him in the vital areas 
delineated above being but the culmination of this unparalleled constitutional 
generosity. 37 
Finally, the fixed ratio of 70: 30 in the Public Service and 60: 40 in the Army has 
been criticised by the Greek Cypriots as unfair. As mentioned above, the Greek 
Cypriots represented approximately the 80% of the population, while the 
Turkish Cypriots represented only 18%. However, one could argue that this is 
another separatist provision, rather than an unfair ratio, since it is definitely 
inconsistent with Art. 21(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which 
provides for equal opportunities of admission in the Public Service. Justifiably, 
37 Supra note 21 at p. 20. 
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then, one could argue that the legislator's attempt to protect the two 
communities in the island, separated them instead of uniting them. 
Such are the peculiarities of the Constitution of Cyprus and as Professor De 
Smith writes: 
Unique in its tortuous complexity and in the multiplicity of 
the safeguards that it provides for the principal minority, 
the Constitution of Cyprus stands alone among the 
constitutions of the world. Two nations dwell together 
under its shadow in uneasy juxtaposition, unsure whether 
this precariously poised structure is about to fall crashing 
about their ears. 3 
1.4 The uneasy years; the 1963 constitutional crisis and the new status of 
1974 
Soon after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the application of its 
Constitution, huge problems and disputes arose between the two communities. 
There are several views about the reasons for these disputes. Some support the 
belief that it is because of the unworkability of the Constitution and others argue 
that it is because of lack of willingness for co-operation and coexistence 
between the two communities. 9 There is some justification for both views and 
both factors resulted in the tragic evolution of the events in Cyprus. 
38 Supra note 17 at p. 285. 
39 The latter is strongly supported by John Reddaway, in his book "Burdened with Cyprus - The 
British Connection", Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1986. He supports the view that "the responsibility 
for operating it and making it work rested with the Cypriot leaders" (p. 140). However, it seems 
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The first issue to cause "genuine difficulties"40 was the 70: 30 ratio in the Public 
Service. The Greek Cypriots felt that this provision was arbitrary, unjust and 
discriminatory, whereas Turkish Cypriots argued that it was restoring equity in 
the Public Service which had been dominated by Greek Cypriots during the 
British administration. 41 During the period 1960-1963, a large number of 
appointments in the Public Service were disputed on communal grounds and the 
Constitutional Court failed to give a resolution due to its own paralysis by ethnic 
fragmentation and polarisation. Its neutral president, German jurist Ernst 
Fortshoff, found himself caught amidst ethnically polarised factions, and he 
resigned in May 1963. 
After certain complaints by the Turkish Cypriot leader about mis-operation of 
this ratio in the Public Service, the Turkish members of the House of 
Representatives refused to vote for the budget and blocked the tax legislation by 
using their separate majority right. They justified their position by referring to a 
delay in the implementation of other constitutional provisions. Finally, the two 
Communal Chambers acted separately and they imposed their own taxes on their 
respective ethnic groups. That left the state without central control or regulation 
of public financial affairs in a very crucial period for its economy. 42 
Another source of tension between the two communities was the proposal for 
creating a Cypriot Army. This, actually, constituted a major crisis in the 
that he oversimplifies the situation, since, as a matter of fact, the rigid character of the 
Constitution itself might provide certain difficulties on its workability. 
40 Crawshaw, N., "The Cyprus Revolt", George Allen and Unwin, London, 1978, at p. 365. 
41 See Joseph, J., supra note 30 at p. 46. 
42 Supra note 40 at p. 366. 
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executive branch. The question was whether this army, which was provided by 
the Constitution, was to be formed on a separate or a mixed basis. The Greek 
Cypriot Ministers and the President supported an integrated army. On the 
contrary, the Turkish Cypriot Ministers and the Vice President argued that a 
mixed army would not be possible, because of linguistic and religious 
differences. However, the Council of Ministers, in which Greek Cypriots 
constituted the majority, decided that there should be no separation. Then the 
Vice President exercised his veto right. The President reacted by questioning the 
applicability of the right of veto of the Vice President and therefore the plan to 
form a Cypriot Army was abandoned. 
However, the issue which led to the constitutional breakdown of 1963 was the 
provision on separate municipalities. According to Art. 173 of the Constitution, 
separate municipalities were to be created in the five largest towns and the 
President and the Vice President had, within four years of the day of the entry 
into operation of the constitution, to examine the question whether or not this 
separation of the municipalities should continue. Art. 177 provided that each 
municipality should exercise its jurisdiction within a region (of the relevant 
town) the limits of which should be fixed by an agreement between the President 
and the Vice President. According to Archbishop Makarios, since in none of the 
towns concerned did the population live exclusively in ethnic areas, separation of 
municipalities was difficult to bring about without severe detriment to both 
communities. He also criticised the provision as a first step towards partition and 
resisted its implementation. The issue was brought to the Parliament where 
separate majority votes confirmed the deadlock. Each community then followed 
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its own way to implement its view. The President, backed by the Greek Cypriot 
majority of the Council of Ministers, issued an executive order for the 
appointment of unified municipalities. On the other hand the Turkish Cypriot 
Communal Chamber voted a communal law for the creation of separate Turkish 
Cypriot municipalities. Both actions were brought before the Supreme 
Constitutional Court which decided that both actions were unconstitutional and 
void ab initio. 
The result of all these conflicts between the two communities was the inability of 
the state to function properly. By 1963, partly because of the parties' mutual 
suspicion, hostility and absence of good will which made them adopt rigid and 
uncompromising conditions and partly because of the complexity of the 
constitutional arrangements which themselves proved a fertile source of disputes, 
key governmental operations had come to a virtual halt. 43 
Under these circumstances the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, on 
30`h November 1963, proposed by a Memorandum44 to the Vice President an 
amendment of certain provisions of the Constitution. He actually made 13 
proposals for amending Articles which appeared to be problematic for the proper 
functioning of the state. The 13 proposals were: 
1. The right of veto of the President and the Vice 
President to be abandoned. 
43 Supra note 21 at p. 28. 
44 A copy of this Memorandum was given to the three guaranteeing powers for their information. 
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2. The Vice President of the Republic to deputise for the 
President in case of his temporary absence or 
incapacity to perform his duties. 
3. The Greek President of the House of Representatives 
and its Turkish Vice President to be elected by the 
House as a whole and not, as at present, the President 
by the Greek members of the House and the Vice 
President by the Turkish members of the House. 
4. The Vice President of the House of Representatives to 
deputise for the President of the House in case of his 
temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties. 
5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate 
majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House 
of Representatives to be abolished. 
6. Unified municipalities to be established. 
7. The administration of justice to be united. 
8. The division of the Security Forces into Police and 
Gendarmery to be abolished. 
9. The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of 
Defence Forces to be determined by law. 
10. The proportion of the participation of Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the Public 
Service and the Forces of the Republic to be modified 
in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots. 
36 
Chapter One The Constitution of Cyprus 
11. The number of members of the Public Service 
Commission to be reduced from ten to five. 
12. All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be 
taken by simple majority. 
13. The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished 45 
Immediately after the proposals, the government of Turkey reacted by rejecting 
any kind of amendment to the 1960 Constitution. The Vice President of the 
Republic, Dr. Kutchuk, in a subsequent memorandum, accused the Greek 
Cypriot side first of intentionally not implementing those parts of the 
Constitution which had favoured the Turkish community and then of attempting 
to overthrow it completely by the submission of sweeping amendments 46 
Tragic events followed when communal fighting broke out. On 21st December 
1963, bloody clashes occurred between the two communities and Turkey 
threatened armed intervention. Therefore a new Conference between the 
Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom was held in 
London in January 1964, but the attempt to reach a settlement failed. 
In the face of the Turkish threat to invade the island, the Republic of Cyprus 
took the matter to the United Nations. Both the Security Council and the General 
Assembly dealt with the matter. The first step was the formation of a Peace 
Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the appointment of a Mediator, for 
45 Supra note 23 at p. 46. 
46 Supra note 21 at p. 29. 
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the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the 
problem confronting Cyprus in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations having in mind the well being of the people of Cyprus as a whole... 47 
However, all the attempts, between 1963 and 1974, to negotiate a solution in 
terms of bi-communal constitutional arrangements failed. 48 During this period, 
certain constitutional developments occurred due to the abnormal situation 
which had been created. 
After the events of 21" December 1963, the Turkish ministers, the Turkish 
members of the House of Representatives and the Turkish officers refused to 
exercise the duties and the functions of their respective offices. Nevertheless, the 
state could not paralyse its functions, so it carried on under new circumstances. 
The House of Representatives and the Council of Ministers continued to 
function in the absence of the Turkish Cypriots. The House of Representatives, 
as long as a quorum existed, continued to take decisions in accordance with the 
constitutional provisions, and the Ministers had to perform their duties under 
Art. 58. In any case where there was a doubt, the Ministers had to refer the 
matter to the Council of Ministers. 
From July 1963, the Supreme Constitutional Court could not sit because of the 
resignation of its President. The High Court was condemned to inactivity due to 
the resignation of its President in May 1964. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriot 
47 UN Resolution S/5575 of the 4t° and the 130'March, 1964. 
48 See Polyviou, supra note 21, at p. 34-102; See also Chrysostomides, supra note 12 at p. 95-117. 
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Judges ceased to attend to their duties in District Courts in June 1964. Later, 
though, they resumed attending, although at a reduced rate. Therefore, the 
Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law 1964 was enacted, in 
order to allow the continuation of the judicial branch. This stated, Justice should 
continue to be administered unhampered by the situation created and it became 
necessary to make legislative provisions in respect of the exercise of the judicial 
power hitherto exercised by the Supreme Constitutional Court and by the High 
Court until such time as the people of Cyprus may determine such matters. 9 
According to the above Law, a new Court was established, the Supreme Court, 
which replaced the Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court, and 
which would exercise their jurisdiction. It consists of between five to seven 
members and at that time included all the existing members of the previous two 
Courts, under the presidency of its senior member, who at that time happened to 
be a Turk. Future vacancies could be filled by a new appointment of a person 
having the necessary qualifications, by the President of the Republic. 
A new Supreme Council of Judicature was also established for replacing the 
functions of the High Court concerning appointments, promotions, transfers and 
disciplinary control over the lower judiciary. Members of this Council are the 
Attorney General of the Republic, the President and two Senior Judges of the 
Supreme Court, the senior President of a District Court and the senior District 
Judge and a practising advocate of at least twelve years' standing, elected ad hoc 
by the Cyprus Bar Association every six months. 
49 Tornaritis, C., supra note 23 at p. 51. 
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The case of The Attorney General of the Republic v Mustafa Ibrahim 501 
examined the validity of the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Law. The argument was the unconstitutionality of the Law upon the 
ground that it amended the Constitution in contravention of Art. 182. However, 
it was decided that the Law was justified under the law of necessity, in view of 
the abnormal situation prevailing in Cyprus. 51 However, since 2°d June 1966, the 
Turkish Cypriot Judges have refused to attend to the performance of their 
functions. 
Based again on the doctrine of necessity, the transfer of the exercise of the 
competence of the Greek Communal Chamber and the establishment of the 
Education Law of 1965, abolished the Greek Communal Chamber and a 
Ministry of Education was created to be in charge of educational matters 
concerning the Greek community until such time as the people of Cyprus will 
have the opportunity to express their opinion on such matters. 
Furthermore, to enable the smooth running of the functions of the Public Service 
which had been paralysed as well, the Public Service Law 1967 was enacted by 
the House of Representatives. According to this, a new Commission was 
established to exercise the Public Service Commission's functions, as provided 
by the Constitution. The new Commission consisted of five members appointed 
by the President of the Republic. 
50 (1964) CLR 195. 
51 For an extent analysis for the introduction of the law of necessity in the Cypriot legal order, see 
Chapter 1.5. 
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By these means the government of the Republic managed to continue its 
functions in spite of the crisis which had arisen in all the organs of the Republic 
and which threatened the collapse of the state. 
However, the situation in Cyprus was exacerbated by the events of 1974. On 
15th July 1974 a military coup engineered by the Greek junta and its 
representatives in Cyprus, attempted to assassinate Archbishop Makarios and 
managed to take power. Following that, Turkey made use of its right under Art. 
IV of the Treaty of Guarantee and intervened (according to the Turkish view) or 
invaded (according to the Greek view) on 20th July 1974. Shortly thereafter, the 
junta in Athens fell, and the coup in Cyprus failed. Therefore, the Greek Cypriot 
leader of the House of Representatives became acting President. However, on 
1e August, Turkey launched a second "intervention" or "invasion" acting 
against the Security Council Resolutions calling for a cease-fire and troop 
withdrawal (Resolution 353 of 20th August 1974)52. As a result, Turkey 
proceeded to occupy Northern Cyprus. 
Turkey justified its action as a peace operation which, as it claimed, was a 
military intervention to consolidate the Turkish Cypriot enclaves into a unified 
Cypriot zone in Northern Cyprus. 53 On the other hand, the Greek view is that 
52 See also the Geneva Declaration on the 30th July 1974, signed by the Foreign Ministers of 
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, and provided inter alia for the cease-fire. 
53 It has been widely argued whether Turkey as a guarantor power had the power to "intervene" in 
such way. Nevertheless, the strongest argument against the Turkish claims for "peace 
intervention" is the duration of the occupation of the North Cyprus. If it was, indeed, an 
intervention, Turkey should have intervened to restore the order and to leave. However, no 
restoration of the order in the island has since been achieved. For more discussion about the 
illegality of Turkey's "intervention", see, Christopher Hitchens, "Hostage to History, Cyprus from 
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Turkey launched an invasion to divide the island and achieve its long-planned 
aim of partition, and that it performed an illegal occupation of 37% of the 
Cypriot territory. According to Thomas Farr: 
The position of the Greek side on the Turkish invasion in 
1974, argued successfully in European and American 
capitals, is that it was clearly illegal. In the event of a 
breach of the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee, Article 
IV enables each guarantor power (Britain, Greece, Turkey) 
to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state 
of affairs created by the present Treaty, i. e. the 
independence, territorial integrity, security and constitution 
of the Republic. Any ambiguity regarding Turkey's desire 
to re-establish the status quo in its initial invasion of July 
20 was swept away by its second military push to the Attila 
line in August, after Sampson had abdicated in favour of 
Clerides and the Greekjunta (responsible for Sampson and 
the coup) had been overthrown. Partly as a result of this 
argument, the United Nations and most capitals have 
continued to recognise the Greek Cypriot administration as 
the legitimate government of Cyprus, and have honoured 
the economic embargo of the north. 54 
During its 29`h Session, in November 1974, the UN General Assembly adopted 
unanimously resolution 3212 which provided the framework for a solution to the 
Cyprus problem. In its key provision it calls for the respect of the sovereignty, 
independence, territorial integrity and non alignment of the Republic of Cyprus, 
the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from the Republic, the 
cessation of all foreign interference, and the taking of urgent measures for the 
return of the refugees to their homes in safety. The resolution of the General 
Assembly was endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 365(1974) of 
the Ottomans to Kissinger", Verso Publishing, 5`h ed., 1998, pp. 101-120. See also, 
Chrysostomides, K, op. cit., pp. 95-15 1. 
' Farr, T. F., "Overcoming the Cyprus Tragedy: Let Cypriots be Cypriot", 
http: //www. erols. com/mqmq/farr. htni, p. 10. 
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13th December 1974, and thus its implementation became mandatory. Turkey, 
although voted for the resolution, did not comply with any of its provisions. 
On 13 February 1975, the establishment of the Turkish Federal State of Cyprus 
(TFSC) was announced. The Security Council by its resolution 367(1975) after 
recalling its previous resolutions and particularly resolution 365(1974), regretted 
this unilateral action and affirmed that such action should not prejudice the final 
political settlement of the Cyprus problem. The resolution also called for the 
urgent and effective implementation of all parts and provisions of General 
Assembly resolution 3212(XXIX) endorsed by Security Council resolution 
365(1974). However, again, this resolution was not respected. 
On the contrary, on November 15th, 1983, the Turkish Cypriot leader declared an 
independent state calling itself the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" 
(TRNC). The international community condemned this action, describing it as 
null and void and calling for its immediate withdrawal (UN resolution 541/83). 
The lack of international status of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" 
has been consistently reaffirmed by the Security Council, 55 as well as by the 
General Assembly, 56 by the European Court of Human Rights, 57 and national 
courts 58 
ss See, especially, Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1985). 
56 See, GA Res 37/253,16 May 1983. 
57 See, Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) ECHR Ser. A Vol. 310 (1995) 18; Loizidou v 
Turkey (Merits) (1996) 108 ILR 443. For more information see http: //kypros. org/Loizidou. 
58 In the UK, see, Hesperides Hotels Ltd v Aegean Turkish Holidays Ltd [ 1979] AC 508,73 ILR 
9; Rv Minister ofAgriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte SP Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd [1994] 
100 ILR 510; Polly Peck International plc v Nadir (No2) [1992] 4 All ER 769,773; Caglar v 
Billingham [1996] STC (SCD) 152,108 ILR 510. 
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The European Court of Justice, in the Anastasiou I and II cases, 59 refused to 
recognise documents produced by the "TRNC authorities" as legal, since as it 
mentioned, the only officially recognised Government on the island is that of the 
Republic of Cyprus. In Anastasiou I the Court held that any necessary 
certificates for imports from Cyprus, shall not be issued by other than the 
competent authorities of the Republic of Cyprus. Therefore the ECJ refused to 
accept as legal any phytosanitary certificates issued by the "TRNC authorities". 
In Anastasiou II the arising question referred as to whether necessary 
phytosanitary certificates for products exported from the North of Cyprus could 
be issued by Turkey. In this case, although, the Court decided that under certain 
circumstances certificates issued by countries other than the country of origin of 
the product might be accepted, it reconfirmed that in regard to Cyprus the only 
recognised authorities are those of the Republic of Cyprus. 
Up to today, many attempts by many countries and, above all, the United 
Nations' efforts, have not yet provided a solution to the problem of Cyprus. 
Bicommunal negotiations and resolutions adopted by many international 
organisations have not resolved the problem. 60 However, the Republic of Cyprus 
continues to exist and is recognised by the whole international community as the 
only legal government on the island. According to international law principles, 
the occupant may exercise military power on such territory but does not acquire 
sovereignty over it, so the recognised Republic of Cyprus continues to have 
59 Rv Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte SP Anastasiou I (Pissouri) Ltd 
[1994] ECR 1-3087; 100 ILR 510; Rv Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, exparte SP 
Anastasiou II (Pissouri) Ltd, C-219/98, Judgment of 4 July 2000. 
60 See, inter alia, the UN, the Council of Europe, the Commonwealth, the Non Aligned 
Movement and the EU. For more information about the EU position, see Chapter 2.3.3. 
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sovereignty over the occupied area, though it may be temporarily prevented from 
exercising its powers 61 
In the Republic of Cyprus, neither the form nor the structure of government has 
changed. It is still based on a presidential regime and a Council of Ministers still 
operates as the main executive organ. The President is elected by the majority of 
the people and the position of Vice President is temporarily vacant. However, in 
the Council of Ministers, all the posts are filled in the interest of the effective 
functioning of the State. 
The House of Representatives exists and operates under the 1960 constitutional 
provisions, despite the absence of the Turkish Cypriots. As Tornaritis states: 
The present Government of the Republic has no unlawful 
origin as it is based on the constitutional provisions 
adapted to the circumstances as evolved in Cyprus. The 
wilful absence of the Turkish Cypriots from the 
administration of the Republic cannot wreck its proper 
functioning, which has to be carried out on the application 
of the principle salus rei publicae suprema lex, with the 
unavoidable deviation from the strict letter of the 
Constitution, under the law of necessity. Such law was 
considered by the Supreme Court to be engrafted on the 
Constitution of Republic... So, from the international law 
point of view, there can be no doubt that the present 
government of the Republic, controlling its public services, 
performing effectively the usual functions of political power 
and enjoying the confidence of the vast majority of the 
people of the Republic, is the government of the Republic of 
Cyprus and is recognised as such by all the other states, 
except Turkey, and by all international organisations. 62 
61 Supra note 23 at p. 60. 
62 Ibid., at p. 61. 
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1.5 The introduction of the Law of Necessity in the legal order of Cyprus. 
As mentioned above, the Republic of Cyprus has, since 1964, based its legal 
continuation and existence on the law of necessity. In the case Mustafa 
Imbrahim, which established the doctrine of necessity in the Cypriot legal order, 
the Supreme Court held that the proper discharge of the administration of 
justice constitutes a necessity, especially in times of upheaval, such as the 
present, which cannot reasonably be disputed. 63 
The law of necessity derives from the principle "salus populi, suprema lex est' 
which means the safety of the people is the supreme law, and is applied in many 
fields of law. In public law it is considered as the doctrine which in exceptional 
cases is applied in order to avoid the strict application of an existing law, for the 
sake of equity, functionability, continuity and safety of a state. According to 
Professor Manesis' definition, it is the set of founding rules of law, according to 
which those who exercise the executive power are exceptionally entitled to act 
against the ordinary procedure by applying rules necessary for the safety of the 
state. These rules can be set only on a temporary basis, as long as the situation 
remains critical, and they enjoy the same legality as the equivalent rules of the 
appropriate organs, considering that such organs are unable to act properly. 64 
Commenting on this definition, Papafilippou supported the view that Manesis' 
63 Supra note 50. 
"Manesis, A., "Ikpi Avayxao'-wcthv Nöucov, Ai E aipcrixai NopoOerixaf ApuoBzargsai Drys 
EKr cvrw7)q Ecovciac" [Laws of Necessity, The Exceptional Legislative Competence of the 
Executive Power], Athens, 1953, p. 134. 
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definition is a narrow one because it does not include the actions of the 
legislative power. According to him, the definition of the law of necessity 
should cover the cases where, under exceptional circumstances, the legislative 
power is liable to apply amending rules to the Constitution, even if they are 
against its provisions. 5 He also states that the principle of salus populi suprema 
lex est is actually the supreme principle of the constitutional law, 66 so in cases 
where necessity demands action, deviation from certain provisions of the 
Constitution should be accepted. 
The doctrine of necessity has been internationally recognised and it has been 
adapted in the most states' legal order. In Germany, for example, the doctrine 
has been accepted and was embodied in the first democratic Constitution 
(Weimar Constitution) in 1919. According to Art. 48 of this Constitution, the 
President of the State could take any necessary measures for the restoration of 
the order in cases of serious danger to the State, without any consultation by the 
Parliament 67 This was in fact the provision which helped Hitler to abolish the 
constitutional liberties when he was in power. Therefore, stricter provisions 
concerning the operation of the doctrine of necessity have been applied in the 
1949 Constitution of West Germany. In this constitution, the doctrine has been 
accepted bearing the form of necessary legislation. According to Articles 68 and 
81 during the period where the Parliament does not provide a confidential vote 
to the Government (that may last only for six months), the Government is able 
63 Papafilippou, L., "To dfxato nos Aväyxrzs Kai I Zvvraypawa TQ1 cvjv Keapo" [The Law of 
Necessity and the Cypriot Constitutional Order], Nicosia, 1995, p. 3. 
66 Ibid., p. 4. 
67 Ibid., p. 9. 
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to oblige the Parliament to vote for a certain law (described as urgent law) in 
cases where the Federation Council supports this law as well. 
In France, the doctrine of necessity is known as the theory of exceptional 
circumstances. It is founded on the predominance of the concept of public 
interest and the superiority of the safety of the State. According to Conseiller 
d'Etat, Raymond Odent, when the life of the country is threatened the exigencies 
of the moment prevail over the juridical scruples of legality. 68 Moreover, in the 
case Syndicat National des Chemins de Fer de France (18th July, 1913, Rec. 
875)69 it was stated that the doctrine of necessity is the superior law of the 
nation to ensure its existence, to defend its independence and security. This 
doctrine, although it did not exist in the 1875 Constitution, became a judicial 
precedent in order to ensure the state's functioning not only in time of war but in 
periods of riots, floods, and grave epidemics as well. Therefore, a provision 
incorporating the doctrine into the French legal order was made under Art. 11 of 
the 1958 Constitution. 
In Britain, the doctrine of necessity is accepted as well. Although, there is no 
written Constitution, there are principles which recognise this doctrine. A. V. 
Dicey argues that the executive branch shall have the power to act against the 
law in cases of defence of the state and he states that for the sake of legality 
itself the rules of law must be broken. 70 Moreover, L. Wolf-Philips stated that 
" See, Josephides J, Judgment in Imbrahim Mustafa Case, supra note 50. 69 Ibid. 
70 Dicey, A. V., "An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution", Mcmillan Press, 
10th Ed., London, 1960, pp. 411-414. 
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this principle was also accepted when the State was threatened by factors other 
than war referring to Chitty's example of Parliament acting in an illegal manner 
by assembling without Royal summons (the necessity of the case rendered it 
necessary for the Parliament to meet as they did, there being no King to call 
them together and necessity supersedes all law). 71 In Britain also, the 
Government would revert to the prerogative power of the Crown for national 
security and in times of emergency if legal power were not otherwise present. 
In the case of Madjimabuto, 72 however, the British Privy Council refused to 
apply the principle of necessity for recognising the validity of laws passed by the 
Rhodesian regime, justifying its decision on the fact that the status of the 
Rhodesian regime was not recognised and its activities were considered as a 
revolution against the British sovereignty over Rhodesia. Nevertheless, it is 
important to emphasise that in the above case, the Council did not reject the 
existence of the law of necessity, but simply decided that its application was not 
justified. On the contrary, the Council stated that in general there might be a 
principle based on necessity. 73 
The doctrine of necessity is also accepted by the Italian Constitution in certain 
provisions. For example Art. 77 provides: 
1. The Government may not, unless properly delegated by 
the Chambers, issue decrees having the value of ordinary 
laws. 
71 Wolf-Philips, L., " Constitutional Legitimacy; A study of the doctrine of necessity" as cited in 
Chrysostomides, supra note 12 at p. 109. 
n Madjimabuto v Larder Burke (1968) 3 All ER 561. 
73 Ibid., p. 577. 
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2. When, in exceptional cases of necessity and urgency, the 
Government issues, on its own responsibility, provisional 
measures having force of law, it shall on the same day 
submit them for conversion into law to the Chambers 
which, even if they have been dissolved, are expressly 
summoned for that purpose and shall meet within five 
days... 
Moreover, special reference must also be made to the successful application of 
the law of necessity by Canadian Courts. Particularly, in the cases of Reference 
re Language Rights under the Manitoba Act 1870 74 and Bilodeau v Attorney 
General of Manitoba, 75 the law of necessity was described as a basic foundation 
of the constitution. 76 
In the Australian case Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal71 the Australian 
High Court stated that there are, however, two prima facie qualifications of the 
rule [of necessity]. First, the rule will not apply in circumstances where its 
application involves positive and substantial injustice since it cannot be 
presumed that the policy of either legislature or the law is that the rule of 
necessity should represent an instrument of such injustice. Secondly, when the 
rule applies, it applies only to the extent that necessity justifies. 
The application of the law of necessity, therefore, must be very exceptional and 
in cases when, and only when, there is a serious danger for the state and its 
constituents. Such a danger might be a very unpredictable natural disaster 
(earthquakes, floods, epidemics) or social situation (war, sudden economical 
74 (1985) 19 DLR (4`h Ses) 1. 
75 (1986) 27 DLR (4t' Ses) 39. 
76 Supra note 74, at p. 35. 
77 (1990), 93 ALR 435. 
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crisis, famine, etc. ). Its application must be very strict because its misuse 
constitutes a serious danger to the democratic principles. This point has been 
emphasised by all the scholars who have dealt with the issue. 78 All the 
definitions given of the law of necessity are accompanied by a number of 
provisions which emphasise the belief that the law of necessity must be applied 
only in extremely exceptional cases. 
In Cyprus, the application of the law of necessity was justified, as it has been 
stated above, in Attorney General of the Republic v Mustafa Imbrahim79 in 
1964. This is the most important case in Cyprus and deserves particular study 
since all the following cases and legal evolution in Cyprus are based on it. The 
case dealt with the constitutionality of the Law 33/1964, which provided for the 
abolition of the Supreme Constitutional Court and of the High Court, and the 
creation of a new Supreme Court instead. It was challenged by the respondents 
that the Law 33/1964 was not adopted according to the 1960 Constitutional 
provisions; therefore it was unconstitutional and void. The Attorney General, in 
his reply, expressed the view that, although he could not doubt the fact that Law 
33/1964 had not been ratified according to the constitutional provisions, its 
legality was justified by the doctrine of necessity. The decision was held 
unanimously in favour of the appellant, i. e. the Attorney General. 
78 See, particularly, Papafilipou, supra note 65, at pp. 4-8 and pp. 52-58. 
79 Supra note 50. 
51 
Chapter One The Constitution of Cyprus 
In justifying the application of the doctrine of necessity in the Cypriot legal 
order, the Judges explained the abnormal situation in Cyprus whereas, according 
to Vassiliades, J.: 
Greek Judges, lawyers, litigants and public could not have 
access to courts situated within areas held by the armed 
forces opposing the state; and Turkish Judges, lawyers, 
litigants and public had great difficulty in obtaining 
permission from commanders to move out from areas 
controlled by Turkish armed forces in order to have access 
to courts or other places situated within the areas 
controlled by the state government. The causes which 
produced this result, and which prevented or obstructed 
Judges, Greeks and Turks, from regularly attending their 
courts, do not form part of the issues for decision in this 
case. They are causes which the state government, in fact, 
unable to remove, during several months which had 
elapsed between the outbreak of this emergency, in 
December 1963, and the enactment of the new Law, in July 
1964.80 
The Court, after giving examples of the application of the doctrine of necessity 
in other countries, decided that the Law 33/1964 was justifiably enacted 
according to the principle salus populi suprema lex est. Josephides J. mentioned 
the necessary preconditions for applying the doctrine of necessity: 
In the light of the principles of the law of necessity as 
applied in other countries and having regard to the 
provisions of the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus 
(including the provisions of Articles 179,182 and 183), I 
interpret our constitution to include the doctrine of 
necessity in exceptional circumstances, which is an implied 
exception to particular provisions of the constitution; and 
this is in order to secure the very existence of the state. The 
following prerequisites must be satisfied before this 
doctrine may become applicable; 
a) an imperative and inevitable necessity or exceptional 
circumstances; 
b) no other remedy to apply; 
8° Ibid. at p. 212. 
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c) the measure taken must be proportionate to the 
necessity; and 
d) it must be of a temporary character limited to the 
duration of the exceptional circumstances 
A law thus enacted is subject to the control of this court to 
decide whether the aforesaid prerequisites are satisfied, i. e. 
whether there exists such necessity and whether the 
measures taken were necessary to meet it. 81 
Finally, Triantafylides J. explained the reasons for the application of the law of 
necessity in the Cypriot legal order: 
Even if any of the provisions concerned of Law 33/64 were 
to be found to be repugnant to or inconsistent with any 
provision of the constitution, I would again pronounce for 
their valid applicability, in view of necessity which has 
arisen and the temporary nature of Law 33/64, which has 
not been enacted to meet it, at any time when such necessity 
could not have been met by operation of the relevant 
provisions of the Constitution. In such a case necessity 
renders validly applicable what would otherwise be illegal 
and invalid. 
If the position was that the administration of justice and the 
preservation of the rule of law and order in the State could 
no longer be secured in a manner which would not be 
inconsistent with the Constitution, a constitution under 
which the sovereign will of the people could not be 
expressed so as to regulate through an amendment of the 
fundamental law such a situation, then the House of 
Representatives, elected by the people, should be 
empowered to take necessary steps as are warranted, by the 
doctrine of necessity, in the exigencies of the situation. 
Otherwise the absurd corollary would have been entailed, 
viz. that a state, and the people, should be allowed to perish 
for the sake of its constitution; on the contrary a 
constitution should exist for the preservation of the state 
and the welfare of the people. 82 
Following the reasoning used for the support of the above case, many cases have 
subsequently been decided, introducing, thereby, the doctrine of necessity as the 
81 Ibid. at pp. 264-265. 
92 Ibid. at pp. 238-239. 
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most basic constituent of the new legal order in Cyprus. Especially after the 
1974 events, the introduction of the law of necessity in the Cypriot legal order 
has been vital for the continuation of the form of the state as it was prescribed by 
the 1960 Constitutional provisions, without the need for the absolute abolition of 
the 1960 Constitution which would actually cause the fall of the Republic of 
Cyprus and its complete disintegration. 
The Imbrahim Mustafa case has been internationally recognised as one of the 
best examples of the application of the doctrine of necessity at a wider level. In 
the Pakistan case Begum Nusrat Bhutto v The Chief of the Army Staff and the 
Federation ofPakistan83 the President of the Supreme Court mentioned that this 
summing up of the law of necessity by one of the learned judges of the Cyprus 
Supreme Court embodies the true essence of the doctrine, and provides useful 
practical guidelines for its application. Also, the case of Imbrahim Mustafa has 
been discussed in the case of Mitchell and others v Director of Public 
Procecutions and Another84 (in the State of Grenada) and in the case of Mokotso 
& Others v His Majesty King Moshoeshoe II & Others85 in the High Court of 
Lesotho. 
Rightly then, one could support the view that the doctrine of necessity has been 
successfully applied in the Cypriot legal order and has become a basic part of the 
Cypriot legal order. That was probably the only way to achieve the legal survival 
of the Republic of Cyprus, especially bearing in mind the strict provisions of the 
93 PLD 1977 SC 710. 
84 45 (1986) LRC (Cont. ). 
85 CIV/APN/384/87. 
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1960 Constitution. It could be said that since the withdrawal of the Turkish 
Cypriots from all State activity and the events of 1974, the Republic of Cyprus 
owes its legal existence to the wide application of the doctrine of necessity in all 
the branches of the State. The Constitutional Court of Cyprus has, indeed, 
applied the law of necessity in numerous cases in order to justify the potential 
departure from the dictates of the Constitution, resulting from the refusal of the 
Turkish Cypriots to exercise their constitutional duties. As a matter of fact, the 
law of necessity is an element of great importance in the Cypriot legal order, and 
this can be observed by the deep and detailed analysis of the doctrine and its 
application in the cases where the principle of the necessity has been involved. 86 
The non application of the law of necessity in Cyprus, would cause not only 
serious legal problems but political ones as well. The absolute paralysis of the 
86 A detailed analysis of the law of necessity and its application in the Cypriot legal order can be 
found in the judgments of the following cases; Andreas HadjiGeorghiou v The Republic (1966) 3' 
CLR 504, Pantelis Papapantelis and Others v The Republic (1966) 3 CLR 515, Constantinos 
Chimonides v Evanthia K Manglis (1967) 1 CLR 125, Yervant Bagdassarian v The E. A. C. and 
Another (1968) 3 CLR 763, loannis losif v CYTA (1970) 3 CLR 255, Vincent Poutros v CYTA 
(1970) 3 CLR 281, Rita Mesaritou v C. B. C (1972) 3 CLR 100, Polycarpos Ioannides v Police 
(1973) 2 CLR 125, The Republic v Djahit Souleiman (1973) 5 JSC 624, D. Theodorides and 
Others v S. Plousiou (1976) 3 CLR 319, The Republic v. Nicolaos Sampson (1977) 2 CLR 1, 
David Christou and Others v. The Republic (1982) 3 CLR 365, Georghios Apostolides and Other 
v The Republic (1982) 3 CLR 928, Georghios Hadjianastasiou v The Republic (1982) 3 CLR 
1173, Re Georghiou (1983) 2 CLR 1, Andreas Aloupas and Another v National Bank of Greece 
S. A. (1983) 1 CLR 55, Yiannakis Louca v The President of the Republic (1983) 3 CLR 783, 
Mamas Koumi v Mikkos Kotart and Another (1983) 1 CLR 856, Omiros Aristides and Others v 
The Republic (1983) 3 CLR 1507, Costas Makrides v. The Republic (1984) 3 CLR 677, loannis 
Solomou v The Republic (1984) 3 CLR 533, Michael Pastellopoulos v The Republic (1985) 2 
CLR 165, Anastasios Koßeros v The Cyprus Electricity Authority (1985) 3 CLR 394, President of 
the Republic v The House of Representatives (1985) 3 CLR 1466, President of the Republic v 
The House of Representatives (1985) 3 CLR 2224, President of the Republic v The House of 
Representatives (1985) 3 CLR 2202, Andreas Petroudes v The Electricity Authority of Cyprus 
(1985) 3 CLR 2245, President of the Republic v The House of Representatives (1985) 3 CLR 
2801, Loukis Kritiotis v The Municipality of Paphos and Others (1986) 3 CLR 322, Krinos 
Hadjigeorghiou v The Cyprus Tourism Organisation (1986) 3 CLR 1110, Andreas Pavlides and 
Others v The Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (1986) 3 CLR 1332, President of the Republic v 
The House of Representatives (1986) 3 CLR 1439, Agni Hadjidemetriou v The Cyprus Tourism 
Organisation (1986) 3 CLR 1956, Soteris Anastasiades and Another v EAC (1987) 3 CLR 790, 
The Republic v Kyriakos Kyriakou (1987) 3 CLR 1189. See also the following decisions of the 
Cyprus Supreme Court: 4/90,89/89,98/89,17/90,24/90. 
55 
Chapter One The Constitution of Cyprus 
State's functioning and the potential demand for a new Constitution would cause 
the fall of the 1960 Agreements and consequently the political status of Cyprus 
as it was prescribed by the 1960 Constitution would be changed completely. 
This is an aspect which will be treated with particular sensitivity, since any 
proposal for the replacement of the 1960 Constitution with a new one, more 
functionable and suitable for the current situation prevailing in Cyprus, would 
jeopardise the whole existence of the Republic of Cyprus and could potentially 
result in the de jure recognition of the de facto partition of the island. 
However, in regard to the application of the law of necessity, there is always a 
danger in resorting too easily and readily to necessity. The overuse or misuse of 
the doctrine would result in the demolition of the whole legal system; therefore, 
special care must be exercised when the doctrine is applied. The safeguards 
introduced in the above mentioned cases must be highly respected. The law of 
necessity must be always treated as a temporary measure, applied in exceptional 
cases where the state's functioning is in danger. Its application is not intended to 
replace the Constitution, but simply to enable its functioning under exceptional 
necessary circumstances. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THE FRAMEWORK OF LEGAL AND POLITICAL RELATIONS 
BETWEEN CYPRUS AND THE EU; PRE-ACCESSION ISSUES 
This chapter focuses on the development of the relationship between the 
Republic of Cyprus and the European Union, as begun in 1972 by the 
Association Agreement and analyses some important pre-accession issues. The 
legal analysis of the historical evolution of their relations constitutes the basis for 
any examination of their current and future relations. ' The development of their 
relations, also reflects the position of the EU towards Cyprus' accession, which 
appears to be important for analysing various constitutional issues that are going 
to be examined in the following chapters. Also, several other issues, regarding 
the accession of Cyprus to the EU, such as the role of the political problem of 
Cyprus in regard to its accession to the EU, the participation of the Turkish 
Cypriots in the negotiations for accession and the mutual benefits from Cyprus' 
membership, are important to be examined. 
2.1 Historical Analysis. 
Soon after the independence of Cyprus, in 1962, the Republic of Cyprus applied 
for an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community, almost 
1 For a detailed analysis of the evolution of the relation between Cyprus and the EU, see, Ifestos, 
P. and Tsardanides, C., "Ui EXEasrs vjs K(7rpov pe ns Evpaoncaixes Kowöri rec 1972-1990" [The 
relation between Cyprus and the European Communities, 1972-1990], Papazisis Press, Athens, 
1991; and Kranidiotis, Y., "Hporducic yta pia Evpancaix4 17oZirm7)" [Proposals for a European 
Policy], Sakkoulas Publications, Athens-Komotini, 1993. 
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simultaneously with the British application for full membership. The main reason 
for this early application was the fact that the British market, on which Cyprus' . 
trade depended due to the Commonwealth preferences system, would not have 
been as easily accessible with Britain's entry to the Community. However, with 
the freezing of the British application for full membership, the Cyprus 
application remained dormant until 1971 when Britain again applied to join the 
EEC. Therefore, Cyprus entered into negotiations with the EEC in 1971 and 
finally, on 19th of December 1972, an Association Agreement was signed 
between the two parties. However, although the most important reason which led 
Cyprus to seek the Association Agreement with the EEC was the special 
economic benefits vis-a-vis Britain (i. e. the British Commonwealth preferential 
tariffs) which would be jeopardised by the accession of Britain to the EEC, there 
were other reasons for which Cyprus entered into the Association Agreement. 
Firstly, there were political considerations, since the EEC had started to have 
political weight in the international scene, which would help in further improving 
and upgrading Cyprus' international relations and standing. Also, a new trade 
horizon appeared, which would definitely help Cyprus to deal with a new 
important economic entity. 
The Association Agreement came into force on the ist of June 1973 and Cyprus 
was actually the third country in the world to conclude such an agreement with 
the EEC. The Agreement provided for the gradual abolition of trade taxes and 
restrictions by both sides, leading ultimately to a complete Customs Union. The 
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Agreement provided for two successive stages. The first was due to end in mid 
1977, while the second was to last, in principle, for five years thereafter. 2 
The first stage of the Association Agreement expired on the 30`h June 1977, but 
due to the 1974 serious economic upheaval, the second stage could not proceed 
and the normal implementation of the Agreement was delayed. 3 
Therefore, after successive extensions of the first stage, a protocol for the second 
stage of the Association Agreement was signed in Luxembourg on 19th October 
1987, creating the way towards the progressive realisation of a Customs Union 
between the two parties. Under the provisions of the 1987 protocol, which came 
into force on 1" January 1988, the Customs Union between the two parties shall 
be completed by the year 2001 or 2002 at the latest 4 
2 The main provision of the first stage consisted of a reduction by the Community of the Common 
Customs Tariff by 70% on Cypriot industrial products subject to the Community's rules of origin, 
by 100% on carobs and by 40% on citrus fruit. At the same time, Cyprus was permitted to 
continue to benefit from the preferential regime enjoyed in the UK and Irish Republic markets. 
On its part, Cyprus undertook, with some exceptions, mainly due to revenue purposes, gradually 
to reduce its import duties on EEC products by 35% at the start of the fifth year. 
3 Nevertheless, Cyprus signed two financial protocols with the EEC in 1977 and 1985. Both 
protocols were intended for financing the economic and social development of Cyprus. It is 
important to mention that at this stage negotiations were underway between the Commission and 
Cyprus, in order to conclude a third financial protocol which was to be used for financing Cypriot 
productive sectors, to facilitate their adjustment to the new competitive conditions arising from 
the protocol signed for the second stage of the Association Agreement Since 1977, Cyprus and 
the EEC have signed four protocols on financial and technical co-operation providing for a 
financial aid of a total amount of 210 million ECU. (The first and the second protocol were of a 
total amount of 30 and 44 million ECU respectively, the third was 62 million ECU and the fourth, 
covering the period 1994-1998, is for 74 million ECU. This aid includes loans, grants, special 
loans and contributions to risk capital formation. Cyprus also benefited from funds totalling 
600000 ECU from the Community programme "MEDSPA" (Mediterranean Special Programme 
Action) which was used for the financing of three environmental projects in the coastal area. Also, 
it is important to note that part of the resources of the above mentioned financial protocols was 
also used in joint projects, which benefited to the Turkish Community also. (Source: Cyprus 
Public Information Office). 
4 Moreover, the main provisions of this protocol provided for the mutual elimination of all tariffs 
and quantitative restrictions on all manufactured goods and a number of agricultural products; 
mainly potatoes, citrus fruits, vegetables and wine. Besides, Cyprus was progressively to adopt 
the Common Customs Tariff (CCT) of the ECC in order to bring its own customs tariff in line 
with those of the ECC by the end of 1997. 
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Meanwhile, on 4th July 1990, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus 
submitted its application for full membership of the EC. The Government of 
Cyprus was encouraged by the Association Agreement and the close relationship 
developed with the EC and applied for accession to the EC regarding it as the 
core of its foreign policy. This is obvious from the fact that the decision for the 
application for accession to the EC was agreed by all the political parties in 
Cyprus. The accession of Cyprus to the EC was also considered as a catalyst for 
the solution of the political problem of Cyprus and a significant factor for further 
developments related to the political future of Cyprus. On 2nd March 1993, when 
the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus was assumed his duties, he stated 
the following: 
The main axis of our foreign policy is what we call our 
European orientation. By this, we not only mean the 
promotion of our application for accession to the European 
Union and the harmonisation of the structures existing in 
Cyprus with those of Europe, in order to become a full 
member to the European Union, but also the activation of 
the European factor in the efforts to find a solution to the 
Cyprus problem. S 
Also, when President Clerides addressed the House of Representatives on 28`h 
February 1993, he stated that: 
We shall give priority to actions which aim at promoting 
the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. We shall 
undertake every effort to persuade the European Union that 
progress in Cyprus' accession assists in the efforts to solve 
the Cyprus problem. 
s "The Course of Cyprus Towards the European Union" Speech by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Mr Alecos Michailides before the House of Representatives, 22"d February 1996. 
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Therefore, when the Council of Ministers of the EC received the application, at 
its meeting on 17`' September 1990, it noted the application and decided to set 
in motion the procedures laid down in Article 98 of the ECSC Treaty, 237 of the 
EEC Treaty and 205 of the EAEC (Euratom) Treaty, asking the Commission to 
draw up an opinion, as required by these provisions. In June 1992 the European 
Council in Lisbon concluded that relations with Cyprus and Malta would be 
developed and strengthened by building on the Association Agreements and 
their application for membership and by developing the political dialogue. 
Moreover, the European Council during its summit in Edinburgh (12th 
December 1992) requested the Council to continue developing appropriate and 
specific links with Malta and Cyprus, following the lines set out in Lisbon. 
Later, in June 1993, the Council in Copenhagen, considering again the 
applications of Malta and Cyprus, expressed its satisfaction with the 
Commission's intention to present its opinion and emphasised that these 
opinions would be examined promptly by the Council. 
On 30th June 1993, the Commission issued its Opinion on Cyprus' application. 6 
The Commission expressed its recognition of the European character and 
identity of Cyprus and its desire to be a member of the Community, and 
concluded that Cyprus was eligible to be part of the Community. The 
Commission also added through its Opinion that it was ready to start the process 
leading to the island's accession as soon as the prospect of a settlement of its 
6 See Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 5/93, "The Challenge of Enlargement. 
Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership". 
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problem was surer. It also undertook to reassess the situation in January 1995, 
should the intercommunal talks fail to produce a settlement. 
After three months, on 4t' October 1993, the Council endorsed the 
Commission's Opinion and welcomed its positive message, thus reconfirming 
unequivocally that Cyprus is eligible to become a member of the European 
Union. According to its conclusions, the Council stated that: 
The Council supported the Commission's approach which 
was to propose, without awaiting a peaceful, balanced and 
lasting solution to the Cyprus problem, to use all the 
instruments offered by the Association Agreement to help, 
in close co-operation with the Cypriot Government, with 
the economic, social and political transition of Cyprus 
towards integration into the European Union. To that end 
the Council invited the Commission to open substantive 
discussions forthwith with the Government of Cyprus to 
help it prepare for the accession negotiations to follow 
later on under the best possible conditions, and to keep it 
regularly informed of the progress. 
In accordance with the Council's conclusions, substantive talks between the 
Government of Cyprus and the Commission began in November 1993, and were 
successfully completed in February 1995. The major purpose of these talks was 
to allow the Cypriot authorities to familiarise themselves with all the elements 
that constitute the acquis communautaire and to help Cyprus to harmonise its 
legislation and its policies to those of the Community. 
Cyprus has also developed close relationships with the European Parliament. In 
early 1992 the decision was taken for the establishment of the Joint Cyprus-EC 
Parliamentary Committee. This Committee plays a significant role in the closer 
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relations between Cyprus and EU and creates a special link between the Cypriot 
House of Representatives and the European Parliament. This Committee not 
only deals with and discusses issues concerning the relations between Cyprus 
and the EU, but it also adopts recommendations addressed to the European 
Parliament. These recommendations are usually related to the peaceful solution 
of the Cyprus problem and the accession of Cyprus to the EU. The Committee 
is composed of 31 members, 19 of whom are members of the European 
Parliament and 12 are members of the House of Representatives of Cyprus. Its 
inaugural meeting took place in Brussels on 17th March 1992 and, since then, it 
has held several meetings. 
Two of the most important decisions defining the relation between Cyprus and 
the EU were decided during the European Council meetings at Corfu and at 
Essen. During the Council's meeting in Corfu in June 1994 the Council 
concluded that an essential stage in Cyprus' preparations for accession could 
be regarded as completed and it also decided that the next phase of enlargement 
of the Union will include Cyprus and Malta. The European Union Summit in 
Essen on the 19th December 1994 confirmed the Corfu conclusion. These two 
conclusions are important not only for the reaffirmation of the Cyprus' 
eligibility for membership, but also for the clear disassociation between Cyprus' 
integration into the EU and the solution of its problem. The political problem of 
Cyprus is not mentioned in either conclusion as a precondition for the accession 
of Cyprus to the EU. 
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On 6`h March 1995, the EU General Affairs Council re-examined the application 
of Cyprus for membership. Based on the reassessment of the situation in Cyprus 
and taking into consideration the latest developments, including the Conclusions 
of the Observer's report, the Council: 
a) reaffirmed the suitability of Cyprus for accession to the 
European Union and confirmed the will of the European 
Union to incorporate Cyprus in the next stage of its 
enlargement; 
b) decided that accession negotiations with Cyprus will start 
six months after the conclusion of the Intergovernmental 
Conference of 1996; 
c) confirmed the intention of the EU to continue supporting 
with all means as its disposal, the efforts of the UN for a 
comprehensive settlement of the question of Cyprus; 
d) decided also to approve concrete proposals for a specific 
strategy in preparation for accession including a 
structured dialogue between Cyprus and the EU. 
The decision for the commencement of accession negotiations six months after 
the end of the IGC was reaffirmed in the European Council meetings in Cannes, 
Madrid and Florence. The decision of 6' March 1995 is considered to be 
extremely important for the progress of the relations between Cyprus and the 
EU, since for the first time a specific date was set down for the beginning of the 
procedures for Cyprus' accession to the EU. 
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The 16th Association Council meeting between Cyprus and the EU, following 
the conclusions of 6`h March, adopted a Common Resolution on the 
establishment of a structured dialogue between the EU and Cyprus and prepared 
on certain elements the strategy for the accession of Cyprus to the EU. 7 
According to the provisions of the structured dialogue, the President of Cyprus 
was invited by the French Presidency to participate in a meeting with the leaders 
of the Fifteen in the Cannes European Council (15-16 December 1995). This 
invitation was welcomed by the Government of Cyprus as a recognition by the 
EU of the special status of Cyprus as a future member of the EU. 
The President of Cyprus has subsequently been invited to all meetings of the 
European Council and participated in meetings concerning the enlargement of 
the EU. Moreover, several other meetings were held between Cypriot Ministers 
and their European counterparts for several issues concerning the accession of 
Cyprus to the EU. 
Almost six months after the end of the IGC, on 31st March 1998, the accession 
negotiations between Cyprus and the EU formally started. These negotiations 
7 On 17i6 July 1995, the General Affairs Council defined the level, frequency and other 
modalities of the structured dialogue between Cyprus and the EU, which are as follows: 
a) meetings between the Heads of State or of Government, on the occasion of the European 
Council; 
b) meetings and talks on ministerial and other levels on issues falling within the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, 
c) meetings and talks on ministerial and other levels (including Committee and Working Party 
levels) on issues of justice and home affairs; 
d) meetings and talks on ministerial or other levels on other subjects of common interest. 
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encompass three stages. The first stage is known as the acquis screening which 
is the analytical examination of the acquis communautaire. The second stage is 
the negotiation itself and the third will be the Treaty of Accession and its 
signing. Of course, before the accession, the ratification of the Treaty will take 
place, but this is not considered as a part of the accession negotiations. 
During the acquis screening, the preparation of substantive negotiations will be 
completed and the following shall be prepared: 
a) Detailed analysis of the acquis communautaire on behalf 
of the EU, in order for the interested parties in accession 
to know exactly their duties as members of the EU; 
b) Presentation by the States interested in accession of the 
degree of their success in harmonisation with the EU 
legislation and standards, and the exact timetable for the 
completion of the harmonisation; 
c) Notification from the interested states of the sectors 
where special difficulties are faced related to the 
harmonisation and which are not expected to be 
harmonised completely up to the day of the accession. 
These sectors will constitute the main subjects of the 
future negotiations and the state would be eligible to ask 
for transitional periods and other special regulations. 
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Finally, on 10th November 1998 the EU announced the commencement of the 
substantive negotiations, which constitute the second stage of the accession 
negotiations. 
2.2 The legal impact of the Association Agreement and the Customs Union. 
The Association Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the EEC was 
actually the first step towards today's privileged relationship between the two 
parties. As mentioned above, Cyprus faced the necessity for closer relations with 
the EEC, especially after the British Application for Accession in 1962. The loss 
to the Cypriot economy would have been tremendously serious after any 
potential accession of Britain to the EEC, since that would result in the abolition 
of the Commonwealth preferential system on which the Cypriot economy was 
highly dependant. In the light of this evolution, the Government of Cyprus 
decided to enter into economic relations with the Community so that the 
unfavourable repercussions from the accession of Britain to the Community 
could be avoided and the normal carrying on of its exports in accordance with its 
economic development could be secured. 
The above aims could not be achieved by the conclusion of a single trade 
agreement with the Community, whilst the accession to the EEC was not 
possible since the status of the Cypriot economy did not fulfil the requirements 
for accession as provided by the Treaty (Article 237). Therefore, the Cyprus 
Government chose the form of association with the Community under Article 
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238 of the Treaty. As a result of the exploratory talks, the Commission 
submitted in July 1971 a report to the Council recommending the 
commencement of negotiations with Cyprus for the purpose of conclusion of an 
Agreement of Association by virtue of Article 238. The negotiations were 
carried out in Brussels in three stages in January, April and December 1972. 
It is important to mention that the internal constitutional crisis in Cyprus led the 
Turkish Cypriot side to question the legality of the Cyprus Government and its 
competence to conclude such an Agreement. However, these allegations were 
refuted by the Cyprus Government. Moreover, it was affirmed that the 
Government. was the only internationally recognised Government of the 
Republic of Cyprus and that the Turkish Cypriot side by its deliberate abstention 
from, and its failure to take part in, the administration could not wreck the very 
existence of the Republic of Cyprus. It was also emphasised that the life of the 
state had to continue and its government to be carried out within the framework 
of the Constitution through the organs provided thereby, even without the 
participation of the Turkish Cypriots, so long as the functioning of such organs 
could be achieved in accordance with the constitutional provisions. In case this 
could not be achieved, then the government ought to be conducted by parallel 
organs created for the purpose, in accordance with the requirements of the law 
of necessity. 8 
The Community, though, recognised the competence of the Government of 
Cyprus to bind the Republic of Cyprus on the international plane, so the 
8 See Chapter One. 
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Agreement could be concluded and be applied. However, it was emphasised 
during the negotiations and was accepted that the advantages derived from the 
Agreement would be for the benefit of the Cypriot people, without any 
discrimination against any of its sections. But as pointed out by the Cyprus 
Government, any discrimination is prohibited by Article 28 of the Cyprus 
Constitution of the Republic. The negotiations, then, were concluded on the 6`h 
December 1972, and the agreed draft of texts had to be approved by the Cyprus 
Government and the EEC, respectively. 9 
Finally, the Agreement was signed at Brussels on 19th December 1972 by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus and the Permanent 
Representative of the Republic to the European Communities on behalf of the 
Republic of Cyprus and by the President of the Council and the President of the 
Commission on behalf of the European Economic Community. 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus emphasised at the signing ceremony 
of the Agreement that the paramount aim of Cyprus in entering into an 
9 The signed agreed texts consist of: 
a) The Agreement establishing the Association between the Republic of Cyprus and the 
European Economic Community, which determines the general framework of the relations 
of the contracting parties together with two Annexes thereto which define the mutual 
concrete concessions on the commercial sector, 
b) The Protocol concerning the definition of the concept of originating products and methods 
of administrative co-operation; 
c) The Final Act and six Declarations set out in the Annex thereto; 
d) The Protocol laying down certain provisions relating to the Agreement establishing an 
Association between the Republic of Cyprus and the European Community consequent on 
the accession of new member states to the EEC and regulating the relations of the 
Government and of the new member states that is to say the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Denmark together with three Annexes annexed thereto: 
e) The final Act and three declarations in the Annexes thereto. 
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association with the EEC was to promote a closer and dynamic relationship with 
the Community. Specifically, he stated that: 
For Cyprus such a course was natural because of history, 
culture and trade; for although geography has placed 
Cyprus at the periphery of continental Europe, she shares 
with Europe centuries of common civilisation, traditions 
and ideals. In fact, Cyprus has been part of the region of 
the Mediterranean, where European civilisation and 
culture were born. The people of Cyprus have always 
followed closely and with great interest the various efforts 
for strengthening of the European ideals and for the 
achievement of European union. 
Moreover, the President of the Commission, in his address, pointed out that 
Cyprus by the signing of the Agreement takes the place that belongs to her 
thanks to the permanence of the cultural ties and faith in the same civilisation 
which unite her with Europe and he emphasised that the purpose of the 
association is to turn the European character of Cyprus into a reality of 
structures and relations by progressive and continued action. The means for this 
will be co-operation between partners equal de facto, though unequal de jure, 
thanks to a contract which has the merit of fully respecting the individuality of 
the signatories. 
In the meantime, however, the then Vice President of the Republic and the 
purported President of the so-called "Turkish Administration" raised the same 
questions in connection with the competence of the Cyprus Government. 
Nevertheless, those representations were not taken into consideration. 
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Concerning the Cypriot legislation, the Association Agreement and the 
negotiations before its signing were made after a decision of the Council of 
Ministers taken by virtue of paragraph (1) of Article 169 of the Constitution 
which is as follows: 
1. Every international agreement with a foreign State 
or International Organisation relating to 
commercial matters, economic co-operation 
(including payments and credit) and modus vivendi 
shall be concluded under the decision of the 
Council of Ministers. 
The agreement was finally approved by the Council of Ministers by a decision 
published under Notification No. 921 in the official gazette of the Republic on 
the 22°d of May 1973 and was put into operation on 1st June 1973. 
The Agreement was concluded for an indefinite period, in contrast with the 
normal trade agreements, which are entered for a definite period being 
renewable on their expiration. The main purpose of the Agreement was to 
consolidate and extend the existing economic and commercial relations between 
the Republic of Cyprus and the EEC. 
The substance of the Agreement was the progressive elimination of obstacles 
regarding the main body of trade both for industrial and agricultural products 
that eventually would lead to a complete Customs Union. A Customs Union 
would be the achievement of the Association Agreement and the wanted 
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conclusion. As rightly observed by Colombo1°, taking into consideration that 
the Economic Community is based on a customs union, an agreement of 
association may be based at the beginning in such union as it was done in the 
case of the first two associations, that of Greece on the Agreement of Athens of 
the 9`h July 1961 and that of Turkey on the Agreement of Ankara of the 19`h 
September 1963. 
This aim would be achieved after a ten-year period that was divided into two 
successive stages. The first one was to be concluded by 30th June 1977 and the 
second one would, in principle, be of a five year duration. During the first stage, 
according to the Association Agreement, certain mutually undertaken 
obligations must be achieved, which actually constituted the preparatory phase 
for further progress towards the final aim. During the second stage, further 
measures which would lead to the further elimination of the obstacles to the 
trade between Cyprus and the Community must be adopted, along with the 
adoption by the Republic of Cyprus of the common tariff system of the 
Community. The contents of the second stage would be negotiated soon after the 
expiration of the first stage. 
The Association Agreement also referred to the establishment of a Council of 
Association. This Council, was to be responsible for the administration of the 
Agreement and to supervise its proper administration. It was to consist of the 
members of the Council and members of the Commission of the European 
Community on the one hand, and members of the Government of the Republic 
10 See Tornaritis, C., "The Agreements of Association and the Association of Cyprus with the 
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of Cyprus on the other. It is important to mention that the establishment of a 
Council is provided only in Agreements of a wider context in which provision is 
made and on the political plane (as in the Agreement of Association of Greece, 
Turkey and Malta) and not in ordinary trade agreements. This emphasizes the 
status of the Association Agreement of 1972. 
Furthermore, according to the Agreement, during the first stage of the 
Agreement, the United Kingdom and Ireland were to continue applying towards 
Cyprus the tariffs in force which would become, so to say, static. If, however, 
the commonwealth preference tariffs were higher than those of the Community, 
Cyprus would enjoy in the UK and Ireland the more favorable tariffs of the 
Community, subject to the application of the Community rules of origin. As 
regards the temporary restrictions, the UK and Ireland were to continue applying 
the status in force or the one applicable by the Community, if the latter was 
more favourable to Cyprus. 
Although the Agreement provided (Article 5.3) that during the eighteen months 
immediately preceding 30th June 1977, negotiations would start for the purpose 
of determining the second stage, in spite of the repeated representations of 
Cyprus to this end, the Community took no steps in this direction until 30 `h May 
1977, when the Council gave the Commission directives to enable it to enter 
into negotiations with Cyprus to determine trade arrangements between the 
Community and Cyprus beyond 30th June 1977. 
European Economic Community". Nicosia, 1977. 
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However, due to certain disagreements which arose during the negotiations, the 
whole procedure lasted until 1987. The actual reason for the delayed 
commencement of the second stage was the events of 1974, which caused severe 
damage to the Cypriot economy and created a new de facto situation in Cyprus. 
Therefore, the Protocol for the second stage of the Association Agreement came 
into force on 1' January 1988 and provides for two phases, the first for a 
duration of ten years (1988-1998) and the second for five years (1998-2003) that 
would be reduced to four. The final aim of this Protocol was the progressive 
implementation within a period of 15 years of a Customs Union between the two 
parties. 
The first phase of this Protocol provides for the progressive abolition by both 
parties of tariffs and quantitative restrictions to trade (with some exceptions) and 
the gradual adoption by Cyprus of the Common External Tariff (CET) for the 
products included in the Protocol. Existing customs duties will be abolished at a 
rate in principle of 9% per annum although for certain products the initial rate 
will be lower and will progressively increase. Agricultural products with the 
exception of temperate products, were included in the Protocol. 
Moreover, Cyprus is committed to abolish its duties on Community industrial 
products, subject to certain exceptions relating to petroleum and other sensitive 
products. The Community, for its part, has already abolished the duties on 
Cypriot industrial products for which duties were applied during the first stage 
of the Association Agreement. 
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The second phase of the Protocol provides for the elimination of all remaining 
restrictions to trade for products included in the Customs Union. Cyprus will 
apply the relevant agricultural policies and mechanisms of the Community for 
those products included in the Protocol and other accompanying policies such as 
competition rules, taxation of products and approximation of laws. 
Although the political significance and importance to Cyprus of the Customs 
Union has to be emphasised, a wider field of activities will be developed which 
will bring Cyprus and the Community closer together. This will become an 
imperative necessity when Cyprus begins preparing itself for the adoption of 
those policies measures and regulations to be applied in the second phase of the 
Customs Union and which will have to be discussed closely with the 
Community. These will be, mainly, as mentioned above, in the areas of 
agricultural policy, competition policy and approximation of Laws. 
It could be argued that Cyprus will be a special case in that respect, as 
harmonisation will inevitably have to take place within the Customs Union. 
Regardless that the harmonisation procedure is the most important activity on 
behalf of the Republic of Cyprus for its accession to the EU, the evolution of the 
relationship between Cyprus and the EU will be radically transformed during the 
progress to the Customs Union as compared to the period of the first stage of the 
Agreement. 
There are also two other areas that will bring Cyprus into a complex and close 
relationship with many countries around the world on account of the Customs 
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Union. The application by Cyprus of Community trade policies for the abolition 
of rules of origin and the application of preferential agreements now existing 
between the EU and third countries (ACP countries, EFTA countries, ASEAN) 
will, undoubtedly, result in a closer and interwoven triangular working 
relationship between the Community and 90 odd countries, with consequential 
political ramifications of importance to Cyprus. 
The second political implication is related to the Cyprus problem itself; it is of 
paramount significance and has great significance for this thesis. The signature 
of the Agreement in October 1987 and its application on the 1' January 1988 
signifies the political support of the Community to Cyprus and its Government 
to go ahead with the Customs Union on account of the division of Cyprus 
caused by the 1974 incidents. This can be considered as a reaffirmation of the 
EU's support to the Republic of Cyprus and its recognition of the Government 
of Cyprus as the only legitimate one with jurisdiction over all the territory of 
Cyprus and all its people. 
The gains expected to accrue to Cyprus by the Customs Union Agreement will 
apply, as stated by the EEC, to its entire population. That implies that the 
Turkish Cypriot Community will be benefited too. Finally, the signing of the 
Customs Union Agreement was accompanied by the Third Financial Protocol 
for Cyprus on 30`h November, 1989. This Protocol amounted to ECU 62 million 
extended over five years. The Agreement was warmly welcomed by the huge 
majority of the political parties in Cyprus and in fact it was considered as a 
preliminary to full admission. 
76 
Chapter Two Cyprus - EU Relations: Pre Accession Issues 
2.3 The Application for Accession and several general pre-accession issues. 
2.3.1 The Application for Accession and developments to date. 
The Government of the Republic of Cyprus on 4t' July 1990 submitted its 
application for full membership of the EU. This application came shortly after 
Malta's application for full membership and the Opposition criticised the 
Government for delaying the application, reflecting the huge interest and desire 
of the political parties in Cyprus for the earliest possible accession of Cyprus to 
the EU. It is important to mention that although in Malta, interest in accession 
had declined, in Cyprus it is still the cornerstone of Government's foreign policy 
and is supported by all the political parties. 
The reason for this strong support is the benefits expected to accrue to the 
Republic of Cyprus from accession to the EU in both political and economic 
spheres. " However, just before the official application, preoccupation with the 
subject resulted in extensive analysis on whether entry should be sought. The 
main arguments for the application were: firstly, that Cyprus is at such a stage of 
development that it can withstand shocks from an incorporation to the EU; 
secondly, that the political and social practices prevailing in Cyprus, as well as 
Cypriot civilisation, historical traditions and values, are in concordance with 
European culture and thought, therefore, since Cyprus belongs to Europe it 
11 For a more detailed analysis of those benefits, see 
http: //www. cypruseu. org. cy/eng/05Lbenefits/questionsl. htm 
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should belong and to any European Union. On the economic side it was argued 
that full entry to the EU would be more advantageous to Cyprus than remaining 
at the level of customs union. Indeed, the latter was argued to be of value only in 
acts as a stepping stone towards eventual membership. It was also argued that 
full admittance to the EU would in the long run benefit the Cypriot economy 
also, by forcing it to overcome its structural inefficiencies. Finally, on the 
political side, it is hoped that entry to the EU will facilitate a just solution of the 
Cyprus problem. The rules and principles regulating political conduct in Europe 
are expected to lead to a solution in harmony with the principles of democracy 
and justice, which would ultimately benefit both Turkish and Greek Cypriots. 
Moreover, Cyprus will be more secure as a member of the EU and its political 
role in the area will be upgraded. 
The Council of Ministers noted the application at its meeting on 17th September 
1990 and decided to set in motion the procedures laid down in article 98 of the 
ECSC Treaty, 237 of the EEC Treaty and 205 of the EAEC (Euratom) Treaty, 
asking the Commission to draw up an opinion, as required by these provisions. 
The Commission's Opinion on the application of Cyprus was issued on June 30, 
1993. In the Commission's view, Cyprus' geographical position, the deep-lying 
bonds which, for two thousand years, have located the island at the very fount of 
European culture and civilisation, the intensity of the European influence 
apparent in the values shared by the people of Cyprus and in the conduct of the 
cultural, political, economic and social life of its citizens, the wealth of its 
contacts of every kind with the Community, all these confer on Cyprus, beyond 
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all doubt, its European identity and character and confirm its vocation to belong 
to the Community. 12 Thus the Commission concluded that Cyprus was eligible 
to become a full member of the EEC. 
The EU Council of Ministers decided that the accession negotiations would start 
six months after the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of 1996, taking into 
account the results of the Conference. It was also declared that the accession of 
Cyprus to the EU should bring security and prosperity to both communities on 
the island. 13 In addition, a pre-accession strategy was formulated. This included 
the establishment of a "structured dialogue", conducted through several 
meetings of ministers, political directors and experts on several issues such as 
Social Policy, Justice and Home Affairs, Financial and Monetary Affairs etc. 
Between 1995 and 1997 many meetings took place. Apart from the useful 
exchange of ideas, this dialogue assisted Cyprus to harmonize its legislation 
policies and practices with the acquis communautaire and be prepared for 
accession. '4 
On 30`h October 1995 the Fourth Financial Protocol was signed which aimed to 
promote the development of Cyprus' economy and the objectives of the 
Association Agreement, to support participation of Cyprus in certain EU 
programmes and to support efforts to promote a general settlement of the Cyprus 
12 Commission of the EC, "The Challenge of Enlargement; Commission Opinion on the 
Application by the Republic of Cyprus jor Membership", Bulletin of the European Communities, 
Supplement 5/93, para. 44. 
13 "Cyprus-European Union; A Brief History" as cited in 
httpJ/www. cyprus-eu. org. cy/eng/briefJiistory. htm 
14 Ibid. 
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problem. 15 The protocol amounted to 74 million ECU. 16 It was agreed that 12 
million ECU in grants would be used for bi-communal projects or projects for 
the benefit of the Turkish-Cypriot community and generally for the unity of the 
island. However, to date, because of the de facto division of the island by the 
Turkish forces, the development of such projects has proved impossible, 
notwithstanding the submission by the government of Cyprus of a number of 
suggestions. '7 
On 15 July 1997, the European Commission issued a study of the impact of 
enlargement on both the EU and the applicant countries. The document, known 
as Agenda 2000, contains useful proposals in relation to the future development 
of the Union policies. '8 According to the "Agenda", the timetable agreed for 
accession negotiations between Cyprus and the EU would allow their 
commencement before the attainment of a settlement of the Cyprus problem. It 
is also stated that if progress towards a settlement is not made before the 
negotiations are due to begin, they should be opened with the government of the 
Republic of Cyprus, as the only authority recognised by international law. 19 
Based on the Commission's proposals included in "Agenda 2000" and the 
results of the IGC, the European Council at Luxembourg (December 1997) 
initiated the enlargement process with the ten applicant countries of Central and 
u Ibid. 
16 50 million ECU in loans from the EIB, 22 million ECU in grants from the European 
Community Budget and 2 million ECU in risk capital from the European Community Budget. 
'7 "Fourth Financial Protocol" as cited in 
http: //www. cyprus-eu. org. cy/eng/08 eu assistance/fourtl_'manciaLprotocol. htm 
18 "European Commission: Agenda 2000" as cited in 
http: //www. cypms-eu. org. cy/eng/07-documents/document003. htm 
19 Ibid. 
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Eastern Europe (CEE) and Cyprus. ° In the enlargement process a special pre- 
accession strategy is provided for Cyprus, encompassing the latter's 
participation in certain programs, projects and agencies. Emphasis is placed on 
the efforts to improve Cyprus' judicial and administrative capacity. The pre- 
accession strategy also includes the provision of technical assistance by TAIEX 
(Technical Assistance Information Exchange Office). 
The Council also decided to convene a European Conference which would bring 
together the EU member states and states which shared its values and external 
and 'internal objectives and are candidates for accession. 21 The participating 
states must accept certain principles which are contained in the Luxembourg 
conclusions. These include commitment to peace, good neighbourliness and 
security, respect for other countries' sovereignty, the integrity and inviolability 
of external borders and the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in the Hague. 
During the European Conference in London, the President of the Republic of 
Cyprus, Mr. Clerides, on behalf of Government, invited the Turkish-Cypriots to 
appoint representatives and to join the Cypriot negotiating team. However, the 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership immediately rejected the invitation and refused to 
participate. 22 
20 Supra note 12. 
21 "The Republic of Cyprus: An Overview" PIO, Nicosia 1999, at p. 7. 
22 Supra note 12. 
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The President of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Robin Cook, stated that: the 
Union believes that Cyprus' accession to the EU should benefit all communities, 
including the Turkish-Cypriot community and help to bring about civil peace 
and reconciliation of the island. 23 
The first stage of the accession negotiations was initiated on P April 1998 and 
involves the analytical examination of the acquis communautaire. The acquis 
today consists of the content, principles and objectives of the Treaties, the 
legislation adopted pursuant to the Treaties and the case law of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), statements and resolutions, joint actions, common 
positions, declarations and conclusions within the framework of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), joint actions and positions, conventions 
signed, resolutions and statements within the framework of Justice and Home 
Affairs, International Agreements concluded by the Community and those 
concluded between the member states concerning the Union activities 24 
The Union's opinion on the eligibility of Cyprus and the decision that the 
accession negotiations will be continued with the only recognised government of 
the Republic of Cyprus indicate that the Cyprus problem should not be 
considered as an obstacle to the final accession. However, an issue of great 
importance is the one concerning the participation of the Turkish Cypriots in the 
whole process. The refusal of the Turkish Cypriots to participate in the accession 
23 Ibid. 
24 "Acquis communautaire" as cited in 
http: //www. cyprus-eu. org. cy/eng/04 negotiationLprocedure/acquis communautaire. htm 
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negotiations, apart from its political nature, is also of great legal interest, 
especially in the light of the Turkish Cypriot arguments. 25 
2.3.2 The issue of the Turkish Cypriot participation in the accession 
negotiations. 
The Union's position with regard to the Cyprus application has been that the 
accession of Cyprus should benefit all communities, including the Turkish 
Cypriots. On this principle, the Republic of Cyprus always favoured the 
participation of the Turkish Cypriot Community in the accession negotiations, 
considering the Turkish Cypriots as citizens of the Republic. As mentioned 
above, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Clerides, issued an 
invitation to the Turkish Cypriot community at the first European Conference 
which was held in London on 12th March 1998. President Clerides stated that the 
issue of Cyprus' accession is a historic challenge, emphasising that the 
enlargement of the European Union will shape the future of Europe. He 
expressed confidence that the accession of Cyprus will greatly benefit both the 
Greek and the Turkish Cypriot communities. Finally, he pledged that, should the 
Turkish Cypriots join the Cyprus team, their positions on all issues would be 
discussed freely, seriously and in good faith and they would be a very important 
u Additionally, it has to be stated that the Turkish Cypriot Community would also be highly 
benefited from such an accession. The benefits to the Turkish Cypriot Community by the 
accession of Cyprus to the EU, might be an additional catalyst for the solution of the political 
problem of Cyprus. See, Kadritzke, N., Turkish Cypriots Dream of Europe, "Le Monde 
Diplomatique", September 1998. 
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element in formulating the positions of the Cyprus team. 6 However the 
invitation was immediately rejected by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership. The EU 
stated that it regretted the Turkish Cypriot community's negative response to 
this offer. It reiterated the importance that it attached to associating the Turkish 
Cypriots with the accession process, in accordance with the conclusions of the 
Luxembourg European Council and affirmed that the Presidency and the 
Commission will pursue the necessary contacts. 7 
The main reason for the Turkish Cypriots' refusal to participate is the 
recognition of the Republic of Cyprus as the sole legitimate government on the 
island28 They consider the Cyprus' application as a unilateral one made by the 
"Greek Cypriot administration". They also point out that their economy is 
regarded by the Union as no-existent and that there is no interest on the part of 
the Union in preparing and aligning the Turkish Cypriot economy with the EU. 29 
The answer to the above argument, that lies on the fact that the EU cooperates 
with the official Government of Cyprus. The "TRNC" is not considered as a 
legal entity and thus, the international community recognises only one state in 
26 Statement by President Clerides relating to Turkish Cypriot participation, 12th March 1998, as 
cited in http: //www. cypms-eu. org. cy/eng/07--documents/document005. htin. Further invitations to 
the Turkish Cypriot Community to participate in the accession negotiations, have been made by 
several other officials of the Cyprus Republic and Greece. See particularly, interviews of the 
Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, G. Papandreou in "ZZjpepwf [Simerini], Cypriot daily 
newspaper, 26/11/1999 and of Mr. G. Vasiliou, Head of the Cypriot Accession Negotiations 
Team, "Simerini", 18/7/1999. The same invitation has repeatedly been made by Mr Y. 
Kranidiotis, ex Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece. See, Kranidiotis, Y., "IIpoon= 
xat Hopcla apoS Eupwnatxij O)oKký pwml" [Dimension and Process towards European 
Integration], "0 PA. 5Oepoc" [0 Fileleftheros], Cypriot daily newspaper, 12/3/1998. 
27 Supra note 12. 
28 M. Ergun Olgun, "European Union for Cyprus? " as cited in 
http: //www. cypnet. com/. ncyprus/cyproblem/articles/bolum3. html 
29 Ibid. 
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Cyprus which consists of two communities. The repeated secession moves by 
the Turkish Cypriots (1963 and 1983) did not have any legal effect on the 
Republic of Cyprus, since secession was not recognised as an exercise of the 
right to self-determination. As a result, under international law and practice, the 
Turkish Cypriots are still regarded as citizens of the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, 
the Union does not directly enter into negotiations with them. 
Nevertheless, it has to be noted that the invitation made to the Turkish Cypriots 
in participating to the negotiations, must, by no means, be considered as an 
indirect recognition of the "TRNC". The legal status of their participation in any 
of the negotiations' stages, must be under the status of representing the Turkish 
Cypriot Community of the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus. 
2.3.3 The political problem of Cyprus in relation to the accession of the 
Republic to the EU. 
As far as the Cyprus problem is concerned, the EU has taken a clear position in 
support of a solution that respects the sovereignty, independence, territorial 
integrity and unity of the country, in accordance to the UN resolutions and the 
High Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979. According to the EU position, the 
status quo imposed by the Turkish military forces in 1974 is unacceptable, as 
well as the military occupation of 37% of the territory of the Republic of 
Cyprus. This was highlighted in the Dublin European Council Declaration (26 
June, 1990) and the Lisbon European Council Conclusions (27 June, 1992) and 
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repeated on several occasions. 0 Also, in a case concerning the 1977 Protocol to 
the 1972 Association Agreement between the EC and Cyprus, the ECJ said: 
While the de facto partition of the territory of Cyprus, as a 
result of the intervention of the Turkish armed forces in 
1974, into a zone where the authorities of the Republic of 
Cyprus continue fully to exercise their powers and a zone 
where they cannot in fact do so raises problems that are 
difficult to resolve in connection with the application of the 
Association Agreement to the whole of Cyprus, that does 
not warrant a departure from the clear, precise and 
unconditional provisions of the 1977 Protocol on the origin 
of products and administrative cooperation... Article 5 
cannot in any event confer on the Community the right to 
interfere in the internal affairs on Cyprus. The problems 
resulting from the de facto partition of the island must be 
resolved by the Republic of Cyprus, which alone is 
internationally recognised. 31 
In addition, the European Parliament has adopted several resolutions concerning 
the Cyprus issue. A resolution adopted on the 15th November 1995 is in favour 
of a just and lasting solution of the Cyprus problem and condemns the illegal 
occupation of the territory of Cyprus. 32 Moreover, since the Turkish actions 
were in direct conflict not only with the UN Resolutions, but also with the letter 
and the spirit of the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement, the EP called on the 
Commission to block immediately all the credits provided by the EU-Turkey 
Financial Regulation in the framework of the MEDA programme. 33 
30 Supra note 21 at p. 7. 
31 Rv Minister ofAgriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte SP Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd (1994] 
ECR 1-3087,3131,3133-4; 100 ILR 258,297-9. 
32 Supra note 28, at p. 37. 
33 Ibid., at p. 38. 
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In the Commission's opinion on the application of Cyprus and in the 
Commission's "Agenda 2000", it is clearly stated that the timetable agreed for 
accession negotiations means that these negotiations could start before a solution 
is found. At the same time, the Union's position is that the solution to the 
Cyprus problem should be a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation, but it is also 
determined to play a positive role in order to promote a peaceful settlement 34 
However, the most important statement on behalf of the EU regarding the 
Cyprus' problem was taken in the Helsinki European Counci135 Paragraph 9 of 
the Presidency Conclusions, reads: 
(a) The European Council welcomes the launch of the 
talks aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the 
Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York and 
expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary - 
General's efforts to bring the process to a successful 
conclusion. 
(b) The European Council underlines that a political 
settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the 
European Union. If no settlement has been reached by 
the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's 
decision on accession will be made without the above 
being a precondition. In this the Council will take 
account of all relevant factors. 
Paragraph 9(b), then, is of paramount importance for the accession of Cyprus to 
the EU, since it clearly states that the solution of the political problem of Cyprus 
should not be considered as a precondition. This decision should be considered 
as a "historic" one in regard to the Cyprus accession to the EU. 36 It is a decision 
34 Supra note 17. 
35 Helsinki, 10th and 11th December 1999. 
36 For more discussion about the importance of the Helsinki Conclusions see, 0 Fileleftheros 
(Cypriot daily newspaper) 19/12/1999, Interview with the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. 
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that was taken in a very crucial period, since many arguments were developed, 
during that period, supporting the view that Cyprus could not join the EU with 
its political problem unsolved. 37 
The question, though, is whether the political problem of Cyprus could present 
as an obstacle towards Cyprus' EU membership. It is, indeed, an issue that 
impedes the smooth accession of Cyprus to the EU, but it cannot be considered 
as an excuse for Cyprus not joining the EU. As the ex British Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Malcom Rifkind has stated, no third 
party should have a veto on whether Cyprus would join the European Union, 
though if a solution was found to the Cyprus problem, it would make 
negotiations easier. 38 The spirit of the statement of Mr. Rifkind is clear, that a 
prior solution should not be considered as a prerequisite for Cyprus' accession. 
On the other hand, no one seems to disagree that a prior solution would make 
things easier. 
The Turkish position, though, as it was expressed by Mr. Karayalcin, is that 
Turkey will continue to be politically and legally opposed to the membership of 
the EU of Cyprus, in whole or in part, before her own accession to the EU as a 
G. Papandreou. See also various articles and reports on the following newspapers' issues: Ethnos 
(Greek daily newspaper) 11/12/1999, Eleftheroypia (Greek daily newspaper) 11/12/1999,0 
Filelefiheros 11&12/12/1999, To Vima (Greek weekly newspaper) 12/12/1999, Politis (Cypriot 
daily newspaper) 11/12/1999. 
37 Before the Helsinki conclusions, officials from France, Holland, Italy and Germany signed a 
common declaration mentioning that the accession of Cyprus to the EU, with its political problem 
unsolved, would pose several problem to the EU and especially in regard to the application of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. This declaration has been expressed as a reservation, on 
behalf of those countries, in regard to the accession of Cyprus to the EU without the prior solution 
of the political problem. See, "Politic", Cypriot daily newspaper, 04/04/2000, at p. 5. 38 Pace, It, "The European Union's Next Mediterranean Enlargement: Challenges and 
Uncertainties" as cited in http: //www. fscpo. unict. it/vademec/jmwp06. htm, pp. 12-13. 
88 
Chapter Two Cyprus - EU Relations: Pre Accession Issues 
full member and that the Council's decision on the membership of Cyprus is an 
unfortunate step which could lead to the permanent division of the island. 39 
However, if a prior solution becomes a prerequisite for Cyprus' accession to the 
EU, Turkey will have an important reason to block efforts towards a solution. It 
seems that the accession of Cyprus to the EU could be a catalyst for a solution to 
the problem and not vice versa. As the Cypriot Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. 
I. Kassoulides, declared, the best way the EU can contribute to the solution of 
the Cyprus problem is to offer Cyprus an unhindered path towards membership. 
Only the context of membership of Cyprus can provide the necessary 
inducements to all sides, including most importantly the Turkish side, to work 
for an early solution. This may thus provide the "missing link" by giving Turkey 
an incentive to work for a solution. 40 The Cyprus Government's position is that, 
if a prior solution is not possible, Cyprus should not be prevented from joining 
the Union. In the event of joining without finding a solution, a higher margin of 
security will be provided, since Cyprus will be a full member of the EU. 1 
Taking into consideration, thus, all the EP resolutions and the official documents 
and conclusions in regard to the Cyprus issue, the position of the Cyprus 
Government seems to be quite reasonable. 
39 Dodd, C., "The Cyprus Issue: A Current Perspective" Huntingdon, Eothen Press, 2°d Ed., 1995 
at p. 20. Also Turkey's ex Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan stated to journalists in Ankara that 
the south of Cyprus cannot join the EU without the permission of Turkey. Europe News Bulletin, 
No 6882, Brussels, December 24' 1996. 
40 Kasoulides, I., "Cyprus on the way to European Union membership", Lecture given at the 
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, 18 May 1999. 
41Kadritzke, N., "Cyprus: Harmonisation with the acquis communautaire in view of the 
accession" Nicosia, Ermogenis Publications, 1997, at pp 8-9. 
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Thus, the Union's position should be considered as the right one as well. 
Accession of Cyprus to the EU before solution could be a basic component in 
the efforts for a solution to the Cyprus problem. This is also supported by three 
recent UN Security Council Resolutions (1062,1092 and 1117). And by this 
implication it can be concluded that the political problem of Cyprus cannot be 
considered as an obstacle towards Cyprus' EU membership. 
Concerning the legal point of the issue, it must be emphasised that accession 
must be the result of a decision taken by the only state competent to do so, i. e. 
the Republic of Cyprus. Allowing Turkey to interfere in this matter would also 
be inconsistent with Article 2(7) of the UN Charter which prohibits interference 
in issues which are within the domestic jurisdiction of another state. Also, since 
the EU does consider the occupation of the northern part of Cyprus as illegal, it 
must not legalise this by not permitting Cyprus to join the Union. 
Of course, referring to a potential accession of Cyprus to the EU with the 
political problem unsolved, it is commonly accepted that many problems, will 
be faced especially regarding the application of Community law. Under these 
circumstances, it seems impossible that implications arising from the Cypriot 
membership of the EU would be applicable to the occupied territory of Cyprus. 
However, bearing in mind, that the Republic of Cyprus would be accepted in the 
EU as the only recognised state over the island of Cyprus, it implies that there 
must be a recognition of the sovereign power of the Republic of Cyprus over its 
whole territory including the occupied area. In other words, it must be clearly 
stated that Cyprus would join the EU as a whole, but due to the illegal 
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occupation of its northern part, any EU membership implications would not 
have effect on this part. 
If this is the case, it is, indeed, the first time where a state with an occupied area 
would join the EU. Thus, the whole issue has to be tackled in a very distinctive 
way so as not to cause political problems which enable the transfer from the de 
facto illegal occupation to a de jure one. 42 This could be achieved by a 
statement, firstly, on behalf of the EU, emphasising the fact that the occupied 
area of North Cyprus is recognised as sovereign territory of the recognised 
Republic of Cyprus and that due to the present situation the application of 
Community law should not have effect on this area. This statement could bear 
the form of a derogation in regard to Cyprus' accession. 
Of course, such a derogation should not be considered as similar to previous 
cases of accession involving derogation. 43 The acceptance of Finland, for 
example, with the exception of the Aland Islands" constitutes a quite different 
42 The accession of Cyprus should by no means result either to an indirect recognition of the 
occupied area or to the legalisation of the political status quo. Referring to the German 
membership, international practice proves that application of an international agreement only to 
certain territory of a State, does not automatically means recognition or acceptance of partial 
sovereignty of the other part of its territory. Before the conclusion of the Fundamental Treaty 
between East and West Germany, in 1972, the 1957 West Germany's membership of the 
Community, had not automatically constituted to the international recognition of the Federal 
Republic of East Germany. See, Chrysostomides, op. cit., at p. 266. 
43 See, among other cases those of Denmark and Greenland, Britain and British Military Bases in 
Cyprus and Finland and Aland Islands. 
44 The autonomous region of the Aland islands lies between Sweden and Finland. When Finland 
declared independence from Russia in 1917 the Swedish speaking people of the Alands were 
attributed by the League of Nations to Finland but a series of principles was established governing 
their autonomy. These were enshrined in the 1921 and subsequent Acts of Autonomy on Aland 
adopted by the Finnish Parliament. Since this date, the status of Aland has often required special 
treatment in Finland's international negotiations, including the EEA agreement. Finland's goal in 
the negotiations, therefore, was that its membership in the EU would also cover the autonomous 
region of the Aland islands. The relations between Aland and Finland are currently regulated by 
the 1991 Autonomy Act. This Act gives to the Aland Assembly extensive legislative powers on 
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case, since the Aland Islands' autonomous status and their exclusion from the 
territory of the Union at the time of the accession of Finland are based on 
international law and therefore are legitimate. The exclusion of the north part of 
Cyprus at the time of the accession would be inconsistent with international law, 
since the current division has been declared illegal by the international 
community. 
Moreover, it is, also, important to mention that according to Community 
legislation there is not any principle implying that the boundaries of territorial 
sovereignty of a Member State shall befall within the territory of application of 
Community legislation. On the contrary, it is possible, as mentioned above, that 
the application of Community legislation to be excluded from certain parts of 
the sovereign area of Member States. Such an exclusion, however, might have a 
temporary effect. Therefore, any future solution of the Cyprus problem would 
end the non application of the Community law on the northern part and would 
permit its application over the whole territory of Cyprus 45 
several fields including the organisation of the Aland Assembly and regional government. The 
Act of Autonomy did not give any treaty making competence to Aland. 
The results of the negotiations are now incorporated in Protocol No. 2 of the Act of Accession. 
This lays out that the provisions of the EC Treaty shall not preclude the application of the special 
status of the islands as relating to the restriction of non Alanders to hold real property without 
permission of the authorities and on the right of the establishment. Aland is moreover considered 
as a third country in relation to certain EU taxation directives. The aim of the measures is clearly 
stated to the maintenance of a viable local economy in the islands but it must not have negative 
effects on the interests of the Union, nor on its common policies. (See James Pond, "EU accession 
negotiations: how they work and what they can do" Seminar on the European Union and Cyprus, 
Nicosia 1-2 June 1995) See also M. Jorna "The Accession Negotiations with Austria, Sweden, 
Finland and Norway. A Guided Tour" (1995) 20 ELRev 131. 
4s It has to be noted that this is not similar to the case of German unification. The unification of 
Germany constituted by two internationally recognised states whereas in regard to Cyprus would 
merely be the end of an illegal occupation of its territory. 
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One could rightly argue, then, that the EU, on the one hand, should not consider 
the political problem of Cyprus as an obstacle for the Cyprus' membership, but 
on the other hand, it should exercise its power for a solution. 46 
Finally, special reference should be made to the repeated statements of ex 
Commissioner Hans van de Broek that Cyprus cannot remain a hostage. During 
his Presentation on Regular Reports to the European Parliament, Mr. Van de 
Broek emphasised that the Commission shares the Council's view that progress 
towards accession and towards a just and viable solution of the Cyprus problem 
will naturally reinforce each other. 47 Equally clear was the answer of the 
Alternate Foreign Minister of France and Acting President of the Council, Mr. 
Michael Barhier, during a press conference at the conclusion of the Association 
Council in June 1995. Answering a question on what would happen if the 
Cyprus problem was not solved, Mr. Barnier said, the train has left the station, it 
cannot be stopped. " 
23.4 Benefits to the EU from the Cyprus' accession; A Challenge to the 
CFSP. 
The Union's environment is changing fast, both internally 
and externally. It must set about adapting, developing and 
reforming itself. Enlargement represents a historic turning 
' According to several recent statements made by the Commissioner dealing with the 
Enlargement of the EU, Mr. Gunter Verheugen, it seems that this is the official position of the EU 
too. See, "Politis", Cypriot daily newspaper, issues 20/3/2000 and 24/3/2000. 
47 Presentation on Regular Reports to the European Parliament, Brussels 4th November 1998 as 
cited in 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/dgla/enlargeldocs/speeches/speec1 98 236. htm 
" Supra note 3, at p. 11. 
93 
Chapter Two Cyprus - EU Relations: Pre Accession Issues 
point for Europe, an opportunity which it must seize for the 
sake of its security, its economy, its culture and its status in 
the world. 49 
The above statement was made by Jacques Santer and it declares the general 
benefits of the next EU enlargement. A stronger and a wider Union remains a 
certain goal for the future development of the European Union. This is a goal to 
be achieved by the next enlargement but also for the Union of the Fifteen the 
benefits of an enlargement will be enormous, not only in terms of prosperity 
within a growing internal market, but also in terms of stability and security. 50 
Concerning Cyprus' accession, the Union could gain some certain geopolitical 
benefits and even some minor economic benefits. Upon membership of the 
European Union, Cyprus will become the EU's key outpost in the eastern 
Mediterranean, serving as a bridge to the Middle East, an area which is 
becoming an increasingly important market. The Middle East is, indeed, an area 
of enormous significance to Europe. Its oil-rich soil, coupled with the prospects 
that a wealthy market holds for the European business in the region, provides 
magnificent opportunities. The geographical proximity of Cyprus to the Middle 
East will become a factor creating a mutual partnership between Europe and the 
Middle East, two different regions of the world that are bound by mutual 
interests. Numerous prospects will lie ahead in such a partnership. In this 
context, Cyprus, a stable prosperous, democratic and reliable European country, 
49 Statement made by J. Santer, President of the Commission, Strasburg, July 16,1997, for the 
establishment of the Agenda 2000. 
S0 "Implications of the next EU-enlargement' by Dr. Franz Fischler, Member of the European 
Commission with responsibility for Agricultural and Rural Development. Philip Morris Institute 
Brussels, 14 October 1998. 
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geographically in an ideal position to serve as a bridge between Europe and the 
Middle East, can become a springboard to this important market. 
However, Cyprus' membership of the EU could also be considered as a 
challenge for the new role that the EU has decided to play in the future. 
According to Prof. Romano Prodi, President of the Commission, in the coming 
years there are several principal and most pressing reasons for raising the profile 
of the European presence in the world. Firstly, there is a major responsibility for 
ensuring monetary stability and stimulating growth; secondly, there must be an 
enhancing of the international dimension of the EU activities in order to restore 
equilibrium to the development of Europe as an economic entity by means of 
Europe as a political entity. 51 Also, the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) of the EU is one of the tasks that seeks for better development and 
establishment in the recent future. 
As mentioned above, it appears that the EU has decided to push forward the 
accession of Cyprus, despite the Turkish Cypriot resistance and refusal to 
participate in the negotiations and despite the political problem as well. Not only 
would a potential accession of Cyprus to the EU bring benefits to the Cypriot 
side but it can also be considered as a unique challenge on behalf of the EU for 
proving the existence of the Union's CFSP (Common Foreign and Security 
Policy). 2 The political problem of Cyprus should not be treated as an obstacle 
51 Speech by Prof. Romano Prodi, Strasbourg, 4`h May 1999, as cited in 
http: //europa. eu. int/commldgla/daily/05-99/bio_99-191. htm 
52 Since 1950 several attempts have been made to develop European integration in the fields of 
defence and foreign policy. These attempts collapsed in 1954 when the French National Assembly 
rejected the European Defence Treaty. Like the European Political Cooperation (EPC) before it, 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union is mostly a codification of existing 
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towards Cyprus' EU membership by arguing that by excluding Cyprus from the 
next enlargement, the Union could easily separate itself from the problem and 
avoid it. It is important for the Union's CFSP development not only to deal with 
regional problems but to confront and solve them as well. 
It has been argued that the CFSP of the Union seems to lack plausibility and that 
there is a strong need for centralisation of the policy, given the change in the 
structure of international relations, especially in Europe. 53 It is true that the 
effectiveness of the CFSP and consequently the role of Europe in international 
affairs has not met expectations. 4 However, this does not mean that the CFSP 
does not actually exist, nor that it should continue to be undermined. There is 
certainly much room for improvement in the years to come. Progress has already 
been made towards institutional developments concerning the future structure of 
the CFSP. 55 
Besides, as Ginsberg rightly observed, the EU enlargement itself is a foreign 
policy action which will lead to further activities, since the EU will have to deal 
practice, since the political co-operation among the EU member-states has evolved over more 
than twenty years. (See Eaton, M. R., "Common Foreign and Security Policy" in O'Keeffe, D. & 
Twomey, P. (Eds. ), "Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty", Chichester, Chancery Law, 1994, at 
p. 215) Article 30 of the SEA created an institution structure for EPC. Later the CFSP established 
in the Maastricht Treaty and constitutes the 2d Pillar. According to Art. J. 1(4) of the TEU (new 
Art. 11) there is an obligation to the Member States to support it actively and unreservedly in a 
spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. The CFSP is to be promoted by systematic co-operation 
and joint action (Art. J. 2(3) TEU (new Art. 12)). For more discussion about the development of 
the CFSP, see, Chapter Six at footnote 32. 
33 Rummel, R., "Beyond Maastricht: Alternative Futures for a Political Union", in Rummel, R., 
(Ed. ) "Towards Political Union: Planning a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the 
European Community", Boulder, Westview Press, 1992, at p. 297. 
54 Jannuzi, G., "Scope and Structure of the Community's Future Foreign Policy", in Rummel, R., 
(Ed. ), ibid., at p. 289. 
55 Peers, S., "Common Foreign and Security Policy 1997", (1997) 17 YEL 539, at p. 539. 
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with the outside world more actively. 56 The European Union appears to be the 
only organised expression of the European will and ability in the field of foreign 
policy. This will must be empowered, though, for more efficient results. The 
promotion of European foreign policy initiatives would be an answer to those 
undertaken by the United States of America which almost led to an American 
monopolisation in the field of international foreign policy and security. 57 
In this respect, the Cyprus case provides an opportunity to promote and improve 
the Union's status in international politics. The EU may achieve greater 
coherence in its foreign and security policy with respect to the Mediterranean 
region and the Cyprus problem specifically. This opinion is expressed in a report 
which has been drawn up on behalf of the European Parliament's Political 
Affairs Committee. 58 According to this report, the Foreign Ministers are called 
on to take steps to promote the resumption of the inter-communal negotiations 
under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary General and to achieve a 
positive influence on the Turkish Government. 
The direct involvement, then, of the EU to the solution of the Cyprus problem 
by accepting the Republic of Cyprus as a member, irrespective of whether or not 
a prior solution of the problem is reached, might be considered as a great 
challenge for the effective establishment of the Union's CFSP. 
56 Ginsberg, it, "Me impact of enlargement on the role of the European Union in the world", in 
Redmont, J. and Rosenthal, G. (Eds. ), "The Expanding European Union: Past, Present, Future", 
London, Lynne Rienner, 1998, at p. 213. 
57 For more discussion about the international effect of the CFSP, see, Sjursen, H., "The Common 
Foreign and Security Policy: New Voice in International Politics? ", Arena Working Papers, No. 
99/34. 
58 Theophylactou, D., "Security, Identity and Nation Building", Aldershot, Avebury, 1995, at p. 
115. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER FOR THE ACCESSION OF CYPRUS 
TO THE EU AND THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE EU 
LEGISLATION IN THE CYPRIOT LEGAL ORDER 
One of the most important issues that all Member States had to deal with was the 
question on how to implement and give effect to European Community 
legislation within their domestic legal order. This is a problem that Cyprus would 
have to arrange before or during the signing of the Treaty of Accession to the EU. 
Therefore, this chapter focuses on the legal mechanisms provided by the 
Constitution of Cyprus which will permit the accession of the Republic of Cyprus 
to the European Union (i. e. signing of a Treaty of Accession) and the 
enforcement of Community legislation by the domestic legal order. Thus, it is 
important to examine whether the Cypriot Constitution provides the power for 
Cyprus to access to the EU and how the relevant European legislation would be 
introduced into the Cypriot legal order. In this connection, special reference is 
made to the general principles of Community law and to the legal effect of 
Community acts on the domestic legal order of its members. Also, special 
reference is made to the absence of the Turkish Cypriots and its consequences on 
the signing of the Accession Treaty. 
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3.1 Article 169 of the Constitution of Cyprus; the legal basis for the 
accession of Cyprus to the EU. 
The starting point for examining whether the Constitution provides the power for 
the Cyprus' accession to the EU is to examine whether there is any specific 
constitutional provision with a direct reference providing for the accession of 
Cyprus to the EU or prohibiting it. In fact, there is no specific article of the 
Constitution referring to the EU, neither providing for, nor excluding, the 
accession of Cyprus to the EU. 
However, Art. 169 of the Constitution provides the power to the Republic of 
Cyprus to conclude international agreements with other states and international 
organisations. Therefore, the analysis of Art. 169 of the Constitution of Cyprus is 
very important since it could provide the legal basis for the accession of Cyprus 
to the EU. 
In particular, Art. 169 reads: 
Subject to the provisions of Article 50 and paragraph 3 of 
Article 57- 
every international agreement with a foreign state or any 
International Organisation relating to commercial matters, 
economic co-operation (including payments and credit) and 
modus vivendi shall be concluded under a decision of the 
Council ofMinisters; 
any other treaty, convention or international agreement 
shall be negotiated and signed under a decision of the 
Council of Ministers and shall be operative and binding to 
the Republic when approved by a law made by the House of 
representatives where upon it shall be concluded; 
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treaties, conventions and agreements concluded in 
accordance with the foregoing provisions of this Article 
shall have, as from their publication in the official Gazette 
of the Republic, superior force to any municipal law on 
condition that such treaties, conventions and agreements 
are applied by the other party thereto. ' 
According to Art. 169, then, the treaty making power of the Republic of Cyprus 
is vested in the Council of Ministers of the Republic. Besides, according to the 
provisions of the Art. 54(b) the Council of Ministers exercises executive power 
on all matters relating to foreign affairs which under Art. 50.1(a)(ii) includes the 
conclusion of international agreements, conventions and treaties. Therefore, it is 
for the Council of Ministers of the Republic to take any decision concerning the 
accession of Cyprus to the EU and to conclude the relevant Treaty of Accession. 
Besides, Art. 169 makes a distinction between two types of international 
agreements. According to Art. 169(1) international agreements related to 
"commercial matters", to "economic operation" and "modus vivendi" are 
concluded under a decision of the Council of Ministers without the need of any 
1 Article 50 of the Constitution of Cyprus provides for the right of the final veto of the President 
and the Vice-President of the Republic on any law or decision of the House of Representatives on 
certain issues (including foreign affairs). Article 57 (3) of the Constitution provides for the right 
of veto of both the President and the Vice-President for decisions related to foreign affairs, 
defence or security, as they are set out in Art. 50, and that this right shall be exercised within four 
days of the date when the decision has been transmitted to their respective office. 
2 The formal procedure provides that international agreements are negotiated and signed under a 
decision of the Council of Ministers by a special delegate or delegates appointed ad hoc, under 
Art. 54, by the Council whose credentials are signed by the President of the Republic as Head of 
the State in accordance with Art. 37(c)(I). 
3 According to Wildhaber, "Traditionally it is said that international law, by way of a 'renvoi' to 
municipal law, leaves it to the states to determine which of its organs or agents shall have the 
power to enter into international agreements. This is portrayed as an emanation of the larger 
principle that states are free to organise themselves however they wish. In terms of traditional 
theory, the `renvoi' can be explained monistically or duastically. Monistically, international law 
delegates to the states authority freely to organise their treaty-making power. Dualistically, 
states determine their internal structure themselves, and international law is concerned only with 
interstate relations. " Wildhaber, L, "Treaty-Making Power and Constitution", Helbing & 
Lichtenhahn, Basel und Stuttgart, 1971, at p. 3. 
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further formality. This type of international agreements which can be concluded 
and come into force without the need for any further implementation might be 
considered as "executive agreements" or "agreements in simplified form". 4 
On the other hand, according to Art. 169(2) any other treaty, convention or 
international agreement is not considered as concluded unless it is approved by a 
law made by the House of Representatives. As Tornaritis rightly observed, 5 the 
drafters of the Constitution used the word "approval", instead of the word 
"ratification" on purpose, to emphasise the fact that this "approval" is a 
prerequisite for the conclusion of the treaty in international law and not a purely 
enabling formality. Therefore, it is after such approval that the letter transmitting 
the instruments of ratification, if and when required, is signed by the President of 
the Republic as Head of the State and sent 6 
Publication in the official Gazette of the signed international treaties and 
agreements remains a constitutional element of the binding force of the treaties. 
This is clearly set out in Art. 169(3) which also provides that such treaties will 
have superior force to any municipal law. 7 The question arising, therefore, is 
whether the "municipal law" refers only to laws made by the legislature or under 
its delegation, or includes the Constitution also. 
4 See Tornaritis, C., "The Treaty Making Power Especially Under The Law of The Republic of 
Cyprus", Nicosia 1973, p. 14. According to Tornaritis the "executive agreements" concluded with 
a relaxation of the traditional rules owing to the urgency and the variety of matters of the ever 
expanding field of international intercourse. 
s Ibid. at p. 15. 
6 Article 37(c)(ii) of the Constitution. 
7 On the condition, of course, that these treaties are applied by the other party thereto. 
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The answer is that the Constitution is not included. As the ex Attorney-General 
of the Republic of Cyprus pointed out, a treaty, convention or international 
agreement concluded and published as provided in Art. 169 shall have superior 
force to any law in force at the time of such publication or enacted subsequently 
but it cannot have superior force to the supreme law, that is to say, the 
Constitution! This is applied, of course, to "self executing treaties", that is, 
treaties which prescribe by their own terms a rule for the executive or for the 
courts or which create obligations for individuals enforceable without legislative 
implementation. With respect to non self executing treaties, such treaties should 
be implemented by an ordinary law having the same force as any other law. 
However, even with respect to self executing treaties which are concluded under 
the provisions of Art. 169(2), the law approving such treaties is an ordinary law 
and therefore is subject to review by the Supreme Court whether it is repugnant 
to or inconsistent with the Constitution, though the Supreme Court in such case 
will no doubt, as the Supreme Court in USA, be very slow to interfere with a 
matter having serious repercussions on the international plane and it will tend to 
reconcile any inconsistency by a restrictive interpretation... 9 
Referring to the Accession of Cyprus to the EU, it is obvious that the Treaty of 
the Accession of Cyprus to the EU will be concluded under the provisions of Art. 
169(2) since it is not just a treaty relating to commercial matters, economic 
cooperation and modus vivendi. In other words, Art. 169 provides the 
' Supra note 4 at p. 17. 
9 Ibid., p. 19. 
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constitutional basis for accession and the power for concluding a treaty with the 
EU. Moreover, in order for the Treaty to be binding on the Republic of Cyprus, 
it is important to mention that such a treaty must be properly concluded in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of Art. 169. 
As Professor Evrigenis has argued, the fundamental issue arising for a State 
willing to become a Member of the Communities is, of course, that of the 
constitutionality of its accession. To be legally binding both upon and within the 
State concerned, the decision to join the Communities must be properly taken in 
accordance with domestic law. Like any international commitment, accession, 
too, is subject to conditions and procedures laid down in the law of the interested 
State with respect to ratification of international agreements and their validity on 
the national level. 10 
The question that arises, then, is whether the present functioning of the Republic 
of Cyprus (with the absence of the Turkish Cypriots from both the Executive, the 
Legislature and the Judicial Bodies) could constitute a problem for concluding a 
Treaty providing for Cyprus' accession to the EU according to the procedures 
laid down by its Constitution. This is the issue which will be examined below. 
10Evrigenis, D., 'Legal and Constitutional Implications of Greek Accession to the European 
Communities', (1980) 17 CML Rev. 157at p. 159. 
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3.2 The absence of the Turkish Cypriots from the relevant bodies of the 
Republic of Cyprus in relation to the conclusion of a Treaty providing 
the accession of Cyprus to the EU. 
It is indeed very important to examine whether the Republic of Cyprus under its 
present formation has the constitutional power to enter into agreement with the 
EU given that the Turkish Cypriots are not exercising their duties as provided by 
the Constitution. One could possibly argue that since, according to the relevant 
provisions of the Constitution, the Turkish Cypriots must participate in the 
Council of Ministers and in the House of Representatives, any decision made by 
the Council itself and any approval made by the House of Representatives might 
be void because of the Turkish Cypriots' absence! 1 However, this is not the case 
because, as it has been explained in the first chapter of this thesis, the Republic of 
Cyprus as it is formed today, has the capacity and the power, based on the law of 
necessity, to act even in the absence of the Turkish Cypriot Community. 
The argument supported by the Turkish side is that the administration in 
Southern Cyprus is only the Government of the Greek Cypriots and they also 
regard as unlawful the assumption by the Greek Cypriots of the role of the 
Republic of Cyprus. 12 This argument in connection with certain provisions of the 
11 The legality of the application of the Republic of Cyprus has been challenged by Ergun Olgun 
on the ground that an administration composed entirely of Greek Cypriots cannot considered to be 
the Government of Cyprus given be the bi-communal character of the 1960 Constitution. 
Therefore, according to this position, the Greek Cypriot Community by itself has no legal 
capacity or authority to make a valid application for membership. Olgun, E., "European Union 
for Cyprus? " as cited at http: //www. cypnet. com/ncyprus/cyproblem/articles/bolum3. html 
12 Statement of the Turkish Government Regarding the Luxembourg Summit (Accession 
Negotiations with Greek Cypriots), 14 December 1997. This view has also been supported by 
Rauf Denktas on the Turkish Cypriot Memorandum Addressed to the Council of Ministers of the 
EC in Respect of an Application for Membership by the Republic of Cyprus (12 July 1990). See 
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Cypriot Constitution, providing for the participation of the Turkish Cypriots in 
the administration, leads to the potential conclusion that the Republic of Cyprus, 
as it is formed today, can neither enter into accession negotiations with the EU 
nor conclude any treaty. According to this assumption then, the conclusion of a 
treaty between the Republic of Cyprus and the EU would be unconstitutional, 
since the procedures laid down by the Cypriot Constitution would be violated. 
According to Art. 1 of the Constitution, the State of Cyprus is a sovereign 
Republic with a presidential regime where the President is a Greek Cypriot and 
the Vice President is a Turkish Cypriot. The Vice President's rights are laid down 
in Art. 38 and according to Art. 46 the executive power is ensured by the 
President and the Vice President whereas it is exercised by the Council of 
Ministers which is composed of seven Greek Ministers and three Turkish. The 
Council of Ministers shall exercise executive power as provided by Art. 54. Also, 
Article 57(3) provides for the right of final veto on the decisions of the Council 
of Ministers to be exercised by the President or the Vice President or even both if 
a decision relates to foreign affairs, defence or security. Moreover, according to 
Art. 50 the President and the Vice President of the Republic, separately or 
conjointly, shall have the right of the final veto on any law or decision of the 
House of Representatives or any part thereof, concerning several issues which 
according to Art. 50(ii) include the conclusion of international treaties, 
conventions and agreements. 
also, statement by Murat Karayalhin, foreign minister of Turkey, on Greek Cypriot application for 
membership to the EU (Turkish Association Council in Brussels) as cited at: 
httpJ/www. cypnet. com/. ncyprus/cyproblem /articles/bolum3l. html. 
and also, "Intercommunal Negotiations and the EUMembership of Cyprus" Section on EU of the 
talking points presented by Rauf Denktas to US Congressman Mike Bilirakis on 29th August 
1995. 
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Furthermore, referring to the composition of the House of Representatives, Art 
62(2) provides that seventy per cent of the number of the Representatives shall be 
elected by the Greek Cypriot Community and thirty per cent by the Turkish 
Cypriot Community. 13 
As it can be observed from the above, the presence of the Turkish Cypriots seems 
to be vital for the functioning of both the Council of Ministers and the House of 
the Representatives. However, since 1963 the Turkish Cypriots have refused to 
fill their posts; the Republic has therefore had to function without their presence. 
The present functioning of the Republic is based on the law of necessity; 
according to its provisions, as they have been interpreted in the Cypriot Courts, '4 
the Republic of Cyprus reserves the legal capacity to act and function, even in the 
present absence of the Turkish Cypriots. As it has been widely explained by the 
Cypriot Courts, the Turkish Cypriot decision to secede from the government did 
not have any impact on the legal status of the Republic of Cyprus under 
international law. The refusal of the Turkish Cypriots to participate in the 
government through its representatives cannot be a reason for which the Republic 
of Cyprus should not legally exist. In fact, the Republic of Cyprus and its present 
government is the only one recognised as the official government of the island by 
all the international organisations including the EU. As the European 
Commission stated in its opinion: 
13 Article 63 provides that the members of the Greek Community shall only be registered in the 
Greek electoral list and the members of the Turkish Community shall only be registered in the 
Turkish electoral list. 
14 For more details about the adoption of the law of necessity in the Cypriot legal order see 
Chapter 1.5. 
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When presenting its application for accession, the 
Government of the Republic of Cyprus, recognised by the 
European Community and its Member States as the only 
legitimate government representing the Cypriot people, 
addressed the Community on behalf of the whole of the 
island. The application was strongly challenged by the de 
facto authorities of the northern part of the island. While 
acknowledging that it would be in the interest of the 
Turkish Cypriot community to form part of the European 
Community, these authorities rejected the right of the 
Government of the Republic of Cyprus to speak for the 
whole of Cyprus in such an approach. They based their 
position on the Guarantee Treaty and the wording of the 
1960 Constitution, which grants the President and Vice- 
President (a Turkish Cypriot) a veto over any foreign policy 
decision, particularly any decision on joining an 
international organisation or alliance that does not count 
both Greece and Cyprus among its members. They 
consider, accordingly, that in the prevailing circumstances 
the Community should not take any action on the 
application. The Community, however, following the logic 
of its established position, which is consistent with that of 
the United Nations where the legitimacy of the Government 
of the Republic of Cyprus and non recognition of the 
"Turkish Republic of the Northern Cyprus " are concerned, 
felt that the application was admissible and initiated the 
procedures laid down by the Treaties in order to examine 
it. 15 
Referring to Art. 50, Professor Mendelson supported the view that the Vice- 
President's veto was but the mechanism by which the Turkish community could 
be assured that the Republic would not join an organisation unless both 
communities agreed. The fact, then, that the "TRNC" expressed its opposition to 
such an accession implies that the Turkish Cypriot community indeed objects. 16 
By this implication, it seems that Prof. Mendelson attempts to interpret the 
13 Commission of the European Communities, `The Challenge of Enlargement. Commission 
Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership', OJEC Supp. 5/93, at pp 
7-8. 
16 "Opinion on the Application of the Republic of Cyprus to Join the European Union" as it was 
drafted by Professor M. H. Mendelson (6 June 1997). 
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"TRNC" opposition as the legitimate Vice-Presidential right of veto on the 
conclusion of international treaties, agreements and conventions. 
However, this does not seem to be the case. Focusing on Art. 50 one could firstly 
note, as a matter of form, that the President's and the Vice President's right of 
veto cannot be exercised in advance of its consideration by the House of 
Representatives. Moreover, as a matter of fact, the provisions of the 1960 
Constitution dealing with the Vice Presidency, along with other provisions for 
Turkish Cypriot representation in the Government of Cyprus, are presently 
inoperative. Despite this, as it has been mentioned above, the international 
community continues to recognise that the Government of Cyprus has the normal 
capacity to represent Cyprus and conduct its foreign affairs. Furthermore, Art. 50 
provides a procedural veto to be cast by the Vice President who obviously must 
have been elected and be effectively performing his functions under the 
Constitution. In this case there is no Vice President but his office remains vacant 
because of the Turkish Cypriots' refusal to participate in the Government. Under 
Art. 50, the right of veto is specifically vested in a Vice President duly elected 
and effectively performing his duties under the Constitution and not generally on 
behalf of the Turkish Cypriot Community. Thus, one could rightly argue that 
since there is no such person as a Vice President, Art. 50 is simply inapplicable. 
The argument, supported by Professor Mendelson, then, appears to be 
inapplicable as well. Since the Turkish Cypriots refused to fill the post of the 
Vice President according to the constitutional procedures, how could one claim 
that the rights of the Vice President, as they are provided by the constitution, 
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could be transferred as general rights of the Turkish Cypriot Community (a 
Community that does not respect and does not exercise its constitutional rights 
and duties)? Such an assumption could simply be described as an irony. 
At this point, it is worth mentioning that, while the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey 
are invoking the provisions of the Art. 50 of the Constitution as a legal obstacle 
to the Cyprus' EU membership, they themselves violated the Constitution by 
refusing to participate in the government in 1963, by proclaiming the "TRNC" in 
1983 and by creating another "constitution"17 in 1985. These acts of the Turkish 
Cypriots are a clear evidence that they do not recognise the Constitution of the 
Republic of Cyprus. If this is so, why do they pose legal arguments based on 
these provisions? The Turkish Cypriot side cannot stress one legal point while 
ignoring the other. 
Concerning Art. 50, particular reference should also be made to Articles 27 and 
46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 27 of the Vienna 
Convention provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of the internal 
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty and accordingly this rule is 
without prejudice to Art. 46. In particular, Art. 46 provides: 
1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be 
bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of 
provision of its internal law regarding competence to 
conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless the 
violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal 
law offundamental importance. 
17 On 7`h May 1985 the ` MNC" created the so called "Constitution of the TRNC". 
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A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to 
any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with 
normal practice and in good faith. " 
As a general rule, then, a breach of internal law is not an excuse for failure to 
comply with international obligations. The basis for challenging the validity of a 
treaty concerns the breach of an internal law as a valid argument only in 
exceptional cases. Only in a case of manifest violation may the state whose 
constitutional rules have been breached rely on the breach to challenge the 
validity of a treaty. As it has been mentioned above, the power of veto, according 
to Art. 50 of the Cypriot Constitution, is vested in a Vice President and not in the 
Turkish Cypriot Community and therefore the absence of the Turkish Cypriot 
Vice President from the present function of the Government of the Republic of 
Cyprus, cannot be considered as a `manifest" violation of Art. 50. This was also 
the position of the EU since the Association Agreement was concluded in 1972 
without considering Art. 50 as an obstacle18 and again in its consideration of 
Cyprus' application for membership there was no negative reference concerning 
Art. 50.19 It seems that this is also the position of the UN, since there has never 
been any reference to Art. 50 of the Constitution in any of the resolutions that 
have been based expressly on the agreement of the Government of the Republic 
of Cyprus 2° 
18 OJEC No L 133/1 (1973). 
19 Supra Note 15. The ECJ referred to the Government of Cyprus as the only official Government 
on the island and recognised its international capacity and powers in the case Rv Minister of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, exparte SP Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd [1994] ECR 13087; 100 
ILR 258. Also, see Chapter Two. 
20 See for example the periodic resolutions extending the mandate of UNFICYP. From the first 
SC Res. 186/1964 to the latest SC Res. 1303/2000. 
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Finally, it has to be said that in the absence of a validly exercised veto according 
to Art. 50, the constitutional authority of the Government of the Republic of 
Cyprus to carry on the foreign affairs of Cyprus is unquestionable. If the 
argument to the contrary was valid, it would definitely be contradicted by the fact 
that since 1963 the Republic of Cyprus has entered into numerous treaties with 
many other States and International Organisations, the validity of which has 
never been challenged, despite the impossibility of applying Art. 50. 
3.3 The accommodation of Community law into the Cypriot legal order. 
3.3.1 The sui generis legal order of the EU and the general principles of 
Community law. 
It is vital, before examining the procedure for the accommodation of Community 
law into the Cypriot legal order, to examine the nature of the EU legislation and 
the effect that would have on the Cypriot legal order. Although it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to provide a detailed analysis of the Community legislation, 
which would be impossible to be achieved in the length of one thesis anyway, the 
basic principles of the Community law must be examined in order to realise the 
impact of the effect of the introduction of European legislation into the Cypriot 
legal order. A rather general, but useful, analysis of the basic principles of the 
Community legislation is necessary, for explaining both the effect and the 
consequences from the introduction of Community legislation into the Cypriot 
legal order. Those basic principles must be firstly introduced to the Cypriot legal 
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order by relevant constitutional arrangements and secondly their effect must also 
be justified by the Constitution. Moreover, it is also important to examine the 
position of the Member State within the Union and the effect of its membership 
on its national legal order. 
From a formalistic point of view, it could be argued that Community law belongs 
to international law since it is to some degree based on treaties concluded 
between sovereign states. Therefore, it could be argued that the conclusion of the 
Treaty of Accession to the EU should follow international law principles. 
However, as regards its content, Community law is a common internal law in the 
Member States, rather than a law between these states, 21 and therefore its effect 
on the member states national order would be significantly different from the 
effect of the signing of usual international treaties. As the ECJ has explained, 
Community law constitutes a new legal order, different from traditional 
international law? 2 The treaties establishing the Communities are characterised 
by the creation of permanent common institutions invested with sovereign 
legislative, executive and judicial powers transferred to them from member 
States in those areas which the latter placed under Community competence. This 
system, according to former Judge of the ECJ, Pescatore, P., is the first attempt, 
on a wider and more systematic scale, to introduce into the structure of an inter- 
state complex new principles of `representativity' apart from the principle of 
representation of States. 23 
21 Kapteyn, P. J. G. and Van Themaat, P. V., "Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities" P Ed., edited and further revised by Laurence W. Gormley, Kluwer Law 
International, 1998, at p. 77. 
u Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, p. 12. 
23 Pescatore, P., "The Law of Integration", Leyden, 1972. For more discussion about the relation 
between International Law and Community Law, see also, Pescatore, P., International Law and 
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In general, as it has been stated in the Preamble to the Treaty establishing the 
EEC, the purposes of the Community are to achieve an even closer union among 
the people of Europe, to promote the economic and social progress of their 
countries by common action, to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe, 
continually to improve the living and working conditions and to meet the 
perceived need for concerted action in order to guarantee steady expansion, 
balanced trade and fair competition. Also, the Preamble calls for a contribution to 
the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade. The objectives of 
the EU as laid down by the TEU24 mark a new stage in the process of European 
integration and highlight the historic importance of the ending of the division of 
the European Continent. They reflect a desire to enhance further the democratic 
and efficient functioning of the EU institutions and to deepen the solidarity 
between the people of Europe. It is stated that the EU aims to establish a 
citizenship common to nationals of the countries and to strengthen their 
economies by establishing an economic and monetary union including a single 
and stable currency. It also aims to promote economic and social progress of its 
people within the context of the accomplishment of the internal market and of 
reinforced cohesion and environmental protection, and to implement policies 
ensuring that these advances are accompanied by parallel progress in other fields 
and the implementation of a common foreign and security policy is also 
envisaged. Finally, the TEU reaffirms the objective of facilitating the free 
Community Law -A Comparative Analysis', (1970) 7 CML Rev. 167; and De Witte, B., 'Rules of 
Change in International Law: How Special is the European Community? ', (1994) 25 Neth. Yb. Int. 
L. 299. 
24 As stated in the Preamble of the Treaty on European Union. 
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movement of persons, while ensuring the safety and security of people, by 
including provisions on justice and home affairs. 
All those purposes mentioned above, must also be adopted as common purposes 
by the Republic of Cyprus in the event of accession. To achieve this, the 
Republic of Cyprus should adjust its domestic law to serve towards those ends as 
well. It is, therefore, well understood that to achieve that would not be a simple 
task and constitutional arrangements have to be made. 
Also, the scope of the Community law can be investigated by special reference to 
particular Articles. According to Art. 2 EC, the Union has as its task the 
establishment of a common market and of an economic and monetary union and 
the implementation of common policies and activities. By these means, it is 
intended to promote a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of 
economic activities throughout the Union, a high level of employment and social 
protection, sex equality, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of 
competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of 
protection and improvement of the environment, improved standards of living 
and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among the 
Member States. 
To achieve these purposes, provision is made in Art. 3 EC for several activities. 
These include the elimination, as between the Member States, of customs duties 
and of quantitative restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of all other 
measures having equivalent effect, an internal market characterised by the 
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abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the freedom of movement of 
persons, services and capital, and a system to ensure that competition in the 
internal market is not distorted. At the same time the pursuit of social and 
economic policies is envisaged. Further developed economic policies have also 
been included in Art. 4 (ex 3a). However, more importantly, Art 3(1)(h) EC 
provides for the approximation of laws of the Member States to the extent 
required for the proper functioning of the common market (legislative 
harmonisation) to take place. According to this provision, then, the differences 
between the laws of the Member States are to be reduced. 
Community solidarity could be considered as one of the fundamental principles 
of the Treaty. According to Art. 10 EC (ex. 5), Member States have a general 
duty of loyalty in consequence of which they are to take all appropriate measures, 
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out 
of the Treaty or resulting from action taken by the Union's institutions. They are 
called upon to facilitate the achievement of the tasks established by the Treaty 
and to abstain from any measure that could jeopardise the attainment of its 
objectives. Art. 10 EC (ex. 5)'has been extensively referred to by the ECJ in its 
interpretations in many areas of Community law. Consequently, it has become 
the legal justification for the doctrine of effectiveness of the Community law. 5 
25 The doctrine of effectiveness is a general interpretative principle which enables the ECJ to 
determine the content of particular provisions of Community law. See, Temple Lang, 
J., 'Community Constitutional Law. Article 5 EEC Treaty', (1990) 27 CML Rev. 645. 
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With a view to the attainment of the objectives laid down by the Treaties, 26 a 
wide range of competence is conferred on the common institutions, amounting to 
a transfer of sovereign powers in specified fields from the Member States to the 
EU institutions. This leads to a gradual loss of the sovereignty of Member States 
in favour of the Union or, more precisely, a participation of Member States in a 
gradually developing Union sovereignty. This transfer of sovereignty constitutes 
the objective of integration, which actually determines the level of the relations 
between the Union and the Member States. 7 However, from a strict legal point 
of view, the Member States continue to define the existence of the Treaties and 
of the Union and also the development towards a more advanced stage of 
integration. 28 Nevertheless, in the framework of these marginal decisions, the 
Member States do not define but co-define the course of the Union. 29 
26 The general objectives of the first three Treaties might be considered as identical (Arts. 2 
ECSC, 2 EC and 1 Euratom). For these reasons, and because the institutional structure and the 
legal order display so many common features, it is justifiable to treat the Communities as a whole. 
Also, the Merger Treaty of 8'' April 1965, established single institutions which were to exercise 
the powers and jurisdiction conferred upon them by each of the three Treaties. According to the 
evolution of the EU the term Treaties is often used to refer to the primary Community Law which 
covers the law set up by the ECSC, EC and Euratom Treaties and agreements and Community 
decisions modifying these three Treaties, such as the decisions on the Community's own 
resources, the First and Secondary Budgetary treaties and the Decision and Act on direct elections 
to the European Parliament; it embraces the Single European Act and the Treaty on European 
Union in so far as they modify earlier Treaties. Under the same conditions, it also embraces the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. It also embraces the decisions and Treaties concerning the accession of the 
UK, Denmark and Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal and Austria Finland and Sweden, as well 
as the Acts of Accession appended thereto in so far as they modify or supplement the earlier 
Treaties. Finally, primary law also covers the Annexes as well as the conventions and protocols 
appended to the Treaties. (See, supra note 20 at pp. 73-75) 
27 For an analysis on how other Member States managed to adapt their policies and systems to the 
demands for European Integration, see, Hanf, K. and Soetendorp, B., (eds), "Adapting to 
European Integration: Small States and the European Union", Longman, 1998. See, also, 
Llorente, F. R., "Constitutionalism in the Integrated States of Europe", The Jean Monnet Working 
Papers, No 5/98, Harvard Law School, 1998, at p. 19-20. 
28 Of course, every Member State reserves the power to decide whether it wishes to continue its 
membership in the Union. 
29 According to Kirchhof, the Member States of the European Union need the Union to carry out 
certain of their tasks, but continue to be the political units which alone legitimate this association 
of States. They each claim a sovereignty of their own, but exercise a part of their sovereignty 
jointly. Such States lay down binding criteria for European integration in their constitutions, 
while they also 'open up' their legal systems to a European law that is, in part, displacing their 
own law. See, Kirchhof, P., `The Balance of Powers Between National and European Institutions' 
(1999) 5 EIJ225. 
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The distinction between Member State and Member State also lies in the mode of 
decision making. In the first case the Member State decides according to its 
constitutional rules (approval of a treaty for example) but in the second case the 
Member State co-decides in the framework of the Union's institutions. 
Thus, membership in the EU would definitely imply transfer of sovereign powers 
or limitation to national sovereignty as it is traditionally conceived. This transfer 
or limitation of sovereignty is clearly understood from the Union's legal order, 
according to which the legislative, executive and judicial powers are exercised 
not only by national but also by Union institutions. The transfer of powers from 
the Member States to the Union could also be characterised as being of an 
irreversible nature. 0 As it has been stated in the case Commission v France31, the 
Member States agreed to establish a Community of unlimited duration, having 
permanent institutions invested with real powers, stemming from limitation of 
authority or transfer of powers from the states to that Community. The powers 
thus conferred could not, therefore, be withdrawn from the Community, nor 
could the objectives with which such powers are concerned be restored to the 
field of authority of the Member States alone, except by virtue of an express 
provision of the Treaty. 
30 Case 7/71, Commission v France [1971] ECR 1003 at 1018. See also Usher, "European 
Community Law and National Law: The Irreversible Transfer", University Association for 
Contemporary European Studies, London 1981. 
31 Ibid, case 7/71. 
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It is therefore well understood, that in case of Cyprus certain sovereign power 
shall be transferred to the EU institutions. The constitutional mechanisms for 
transferring those powers to Community institutions is going to be examined in 
the following section. 
Also, as mentioned above, the Community is provided with its own institutions 
and has legal personality, legal capacity and right of international 
representation. 32 These institutions, as it was stated in the Van Gend en Loos 
case, 33 are to exercise sovereign rights derived from the States. The EU 
institutions are vested with real powers arising from the limitation of competence 
or delegation of certain powers from the national institutions in a way that is 
without precedent in the law of international organisations. 
Of course, referring to the EU field of competence, Art. 5 EC (ex. 3b) provides 
that the Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by 
this Treaty and the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall 
within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can, 
therefore; by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action be better 
achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty. The recently introduced 
32 See, Mortelmans, K., `Community Law: More Than a Functional Area of Law, Less Than a 
Legal System', (1996) 1 LIEI 23 and Lachmann, P., `International Legal Personality of the EC: 
Capacity and Competence', (1984) 1 LIEI3. 
33 Supra note 22, p. 12. 
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principle of subsidiarity seeks to manage the lack of clarity and predictability in 
the division of competences between the Community and the national 
legislatures. However, there is not yet an agreement, when the principle is, 
applied to the Community, as to its scope of application, and to what extent it ties 
the hands of the Community institutions. 34 It is also well argued that there are 
actually two general approaches towards the principle of subsidiarity, one 
centralising and one decentralising. 35 In fact, it could be argued that even the 
recently introduced Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity 
and Proportionality which was attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam, has not 
achieved to eliminate the diversity of the approaches towards the principle, since 
the principle of subsidiarity is still under dispute in regard to its application. 36 
However, although the application of the principle of subsidiarity is still not 
clear, its existence is important for realising the actual existence of the transfer of 
powers (or sovereignty) from the Member States to the Union. It is, generally, to 
be applied where the powers of national institutions and those of the Union 
overlap and their competence is disputable. 
34 Charlesworth, A. and Cullen, H., "European Community Law" Pitman Publishing 1994, p. 48. 
35 Emiliou, `Subsidiarity An Effective Barrier Against the Enterprises of Ambition? ', (1992) 17 
EL Rev. 383, at p. 384. Ibid., at footnote 60 p. 48. 
36 For more discussion about the principle of subsidiarity as developed and applied within the EU, 
see, Duff, A., "Subsidiarity Within the European Community", The Federal Trust for Education 
and Research, London, 1993; Toth, A. G., `A legal analysis of subsidiarity', Steiner, J., 
`Subsidiarity under the Maastricht Treaty', and Emiliou, N., `Subsidiarity: Panacea or fig leaf', all 
included in "Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty", edited by 0' Keefe, D. and Twomey, P. M., 
Chichester. Chancery Law, 1994; Schilling, T., `Subsidiarity as a rule and principle', (1994) 14 
YEL 203 ; De Burca, G., `Subsidiarity and ECJ as institutional actor', (1998) 36 JCMS 217 ; Toth 
A. G., `Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty', (1992) 29 CML Rev. 1079; Emiliou, N., 
`Taking subsidiarity seriously ? The view of Britain', (1995) 1 EPL 564; Palacio, J., `The 
principle of subsidiarity (Guide for lawyers with a particular Community orientation)', (1995) 20 
EL Rev. 355; Harrison, V., `Subsidiarity in Article 3b of the EC Treaty - Gobbledegook or 
Justiciable Principle ? ', (1996) 45 ICLQ 431. 
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As mentioned above, there is a significant difference between the Union and 
other international entities, based on the fact that within the Union there is a legal 
structure that cannot be found in ordinary international treaties. 7 As also 
mentioned above, the treaties establishing the European Communities are 
characterised by the creation of permanent common institutions, invested with 
sovereign legislative, executive and judicial powers transferred to them from the 
Member States in those areas which the latter placed under Union competence. 38 
Additionally, even before the establishment of the EEC, Advocate General 
Lagrange, in the Fedechar39 case argued that the European Court of Justice was 
not an international court but the court of a Community created by six States in a 
model which is more closely related to a federal than to an international 
organisation. More significantly, the distinction between Community law and 
international law was highlighted in the case of Commission v Luxembourg and 
Belgium40, where the Court rejected an argument based on international law, that 
a default by the Commission in its obligations to a Member State had the effect 
of suspending the reciprocal obligations of the latter, and in the cases of 
Defrenne41 and Commission v France42 where the Court subsequently rejected 
the proposition that a default by one Member State suspends the reciprocal 
obligations of other Member States. 
37 Pescatore, P., `International Law and Community Law -A Comparative Analysis', (1970) 7 
CML Rev. 167. Also, see Schermers, H. G., `Community Law and International Law' (1975) 12 
CML Rev. 77. 
38 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] CMLR 425 at p. 455, Case 17/67 Neuman v Hauptzollant 
Hof/Saale [1967] ECR 441, Case 48/71 Commission v Italy [1972] CMLR'699. 
39 Case 8/55 [1954-56] ECR 245. 
40 Cases 90 & 91/63 [1964] ECR 625. 
41 Case 43/75 Gabrielle Defrenne v SA Beige de Navigation Aerienne (Sabena) [ 1976] ECR 455. 
42 Case 232/78 [1979] ECR 2729. 
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Besides, the establishment of a common market implied by the EEC Treaty did 
more than simply create a system of mutual rights and obligations for the 
contracting parties. 3 The participation of individuals in the common market was 
envisaged, since individuals have the opportunity of participating in the Union 
through representation in the European Parliament or the Economic and Social 
Committee. More significantly, in addition to creating mutual rights and duties 
among the Member States (which often happens in traditional international law) 
the EU confers certain rights on individuals as well. Community law regulates a 
conglomerate of mutual rights and duties between the Community and its 
subjects, both Member States and private persons, and among these subjects 
themselves 44 The Member States, then, have limited their sovereign rights and 
have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and 
themselves. 5 For this reason the Court has held that the Community cannot be 
understood as just another international organisation, created by a treaty which 
was a contract between states; rather, it is to be seen as a relationship between the 
Community, the Member States and individual persons and undertakings 46 
In consequence of the above, where a Member State fails to comply with its 
obligations imposed by the EU legislation, then, either the Commission or 
another Member State may give rise to an action before the Court of Justice. 47 At 
the same time, EU legislation is intended to give rights to individuals, which 
national courts are bound to safeguard. As a result, the concepts of "direct 
43 For more information on the development of the legal order within the EU, see Schwarze, J., 
`Concept and Perspectives of European Community Law', (1999) 5 EPL 227. 
44 Supra note 21, p. 78. 
45 Case 6/64, supra note 38, at p. 455. 
46 Supra note 22. 
47 Articles 226 and 227 EC (ex. 169 and 170). 
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applicability" and "direct effect" have been developed within the framework of 
the EU legislation. The development of those principles within the EU margins 
the measure of the effect of EU legislation into national legal systems. 8 Their 
effect on Member States' domestic legislation is very important and therefore it 
is essential to analyse them, to realise the effect that are going to have on the 
Cypriot legal order. 
"Direct effect" describes a provision endowed with sufficient clarity and 
precision to bestow a legal right on a natural or legal person, as against another 
natural or legal person, or a Member State. Establishing direct effect is a matter 
of interpretation, and it is clear that specific provisions of the Treaty, as well as 
specific provisions of regulations, directives or decisions, may be endowed with 
this quality. 49 On the other hand, "direct applicability" is the attribute of a 
regulation which ensures its access, in its entirety, to the national legal order, 
without the need for specific incorporation. 50 
These concepts are often rather confusing. However, a distinction may be made 
between direct effect and direct applicability, in that the former relates to specific 
rights, while the latter refers to an entire legislative act. Direct effect of a 
Community law provision does not mean that the provision becomes part of 
national law. Rather, it means that the rights created by the provision are 
48 A broad analysis of the effect of Community Law and its enforcement by Member States, is 
provided by Bell, A., 'Enforcing Community Law Rights Before National Courts - Some 
Developments', (1994) 1 LIEI 111. 
49 Wyatt & Dashwood, "European Community Law", Sweet & Maxwell, 3'd Ed., 1993, at p. 53. 
50 Ibid., p. 53. For a further analysis of the two concepts see, Winter, 'Direct Applicability and 
Direct Effect: Two Distinct and Different Concepts in Community Law', (1972) 9 CML Rev. 425. 
For a critical analysis of the principle of direct effect, see, Sebba, I., `The Doctrine of Direct 
Effect: A Malignant Disease of Community Law', (1995) 2 LIE135. 
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invocable in national law. Although there is little difference in practice, the 
distinction is important in terms of the special status of regulations under Art. 
249 EC (ex. 189). 
The problem of the direct effect of Treaty provisions is a classic one in traditional 
international law. According to a well established principle of international 
law..., the Permanent Court of International Justice has pronounced, an 
international agreement cannot, as such, create direct rights and obligations for 
private individuals. But it cannot be disputed that the very object of an 
international agreement, according to the intention of the contracting parties, 
may be the adoption by the parties of some definite rules creating individual 
rights and obligations and enforceable by the national courts. 51 In other words, 
in international law the absence of direct effect of Treaty provisions is the general 
rule from which the contracting parties may, however, deviate. 
As a matter of fact, the European Treaties contain such self-executing52 
provisions to a much larger extent than the classical treaties. Moreover, they are 
st Permanent Court of International Justice, Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory 
Opinion, 1928, Series B, No. 15, pp. 17-18. Also, in regard to the effect of Treaties under 
international law, F. G. Jacobs explained that: the effect of international law generally, and of 
treaties in particular, within the legal order of a State will always depend on a rule of domestic 
law. The fundamental principle is that the application of treaties is governed by domestic 
constitutional law. It is true that domestic law may, under certain conditions, require or permit 
the application of treaties which are binding on the State, even if they have not been specifically 
incorporated into domestic legislation. But this application of Treaties as such is prescribed by a 
rule of domestic constitutional law. It is not a situation reached by the application of a rule of 
international law, since such a rule, to have effect, itself depends upon recognition by domestic 
law. Indeed international law is generally uninformative in this area since it simply requires the 
application of treaties in all circumstances. It does not modify the fundamental principle that the 
application of treaties by domestic courts is governed by domestic law. Jacobs, F. G., in Jacobs, 
F. G., and Roberts, S., (eds. ), "The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law", Sweet & Maxwell, 1987, 
at p. xxiv (Introduction). 
S2 Often, the introduction of terms of ratified conventions in internal law has the advantage of 
giving effect on the internal plane to international obligations foreseen by the conventions or 
treaties. It is not, however, always sufficient to assure total execution. The problem of clauses 
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unique in the fact that direct effect is attributed not only to the self executing 
provisions of the treaties themselves, but also (indeed, mainly) to the provisions 
of certain acts of the Union's institutions, without any need for the national 
authorities to intervene in order to render them applicable within the internal 
order. 53 
The principle of direct effect, rightly, has been described as one of the essential 
characteristics of the Community legal order. 54 It is, therefore, well understood 
that in the case of the accession of Cyprus to the EU, the principle of direct effect 
of Community legislation must be constitutionally established within the Cypriot 
legal order. 
which are not self executing is familiar to all systems which follow the rule of automatic 
introduction within the internal order. In fact, treaties are often written in general terms and the 
mere incorporation of the text in the national law would not be sufficient to give them effect if it 
is not accompanied by the adoption by the States concerned of appropriate measures to make 
concrete the norms which could be regarded as incomplete. The automatic incorporation of 
treaties within the internal law is, therefore, on its own, efficient only for self executing norms 
which are called "complete" because they can be transposed as they are on the internal level and 
can be directly applied by national judges. As the Cypriot Constitutional Court stated in the case 
Malachtou v Armefti, (1987) 1 CLR 210, For a treaty to be applicable it must be self-executing. 
Only such provisions of a convention are self executing which may be applied by the organs of 
the State and which can be enforced by the Courts and which create rights for the individuals; 
they govern or affect directly relations of the internal life between the individuals, and the 
individuals and the State or the public authorities. The question whether or not treaties are self- 
executing is influenced by the wording of the convention, its provisions and the relevant 
constitutional law in a given country. Cypriot Courts, then, like those in other countries, apply the 
rule of law embodied in the treaty if certain requirements are satisfied or, in other cases, they only 
recognise a legal situation created by the treaty without applying the rule of law it lays down. If a 
treaty provision is not formulated in a way ensuring its direct application in the domestic law, 
detailed legislative acts have to be introduced and more concrete measures to be taken. 
53 Eassson stated that provisions contained in the Treaty and in secondary legislation, in addition 
to imposing obligations upon the member States, may confer rights and in some cases obligations 
upon individuals which are enforceable at law, `The Direct Effect of EEC Directives', (1979) 28 
1CLQ 319, at p. 319. 
S4 Opinion 1/91, Draft Agreement relating to the creation of the European Economic Area, 
(1991) ECR 1-6079, para. 21. 
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Furthermore, the ECJ saw the principle of direct effect as a valuable means of 
ensuring that Community law was enforced uniformly in all member States. 
Thus, in a series of cases, the ECJ held that many of the Treaty articles, 
including, Art. 28 and 29 (ex. 30-34), on the free movement of goods; Art. 39-43 
(ex. 48-52), on the free movement of persons; Art 141 (ex. 119) and 142 (ex. 
119a) on equal pay; and Art. 81 and 82 (ex. 85 and 86) on Competition law have 
direct effect. 
The question of the direct effect of Treaty Articles was first raised in Van Gend 
en Loos" when a Dutch administrative tribunal in a reference under Art. 234 
(ex. 177), asked whether Art. 25 (ex. 12) was capable of an internal effect. It was 
held, then, that the Treaty could, indeed, confer legal rights on individuals. In this 
ground-breaking judgment, S6 the Court, however, set out three criteria for direct 
effect of articles of the Treaty. Thus, in order for a Treaty provision to have direct 
effect, it must be clear and precise, it must be unconditional or legally perfect, 
and it must not depend on finther implementation by the Community institutions 
or the discretion of Member States. 
In later decisions, the principle of direct effect of articles of the Treaty was 
further developed. In the Lutticke case 57, the Court indicated that it was ready to 
55 Case 26/62, supra note 22. The principle of direct effect of Treaty Articles also upheld in the 
cases 57/65, Alfons Lutticke GmbH v Hauptzollamt Saarluis, [1966] ECR 205; Defrenne v 
Sabena, supra note 44; Waglrave and Koch v Association Union Cycliste Internationale, 36/74, 
[1974] ECR 1405; Comitato di Coordinamento per la Difesa della Cava v Regione Lombardia, 
236/92, [1994] ECR 1. 
56 Graig P. and de Burca G. , "EULaw, Text, Cases and Materials", Oxford University Press, 2°a 
Ed., 1980, p. 165. 
57 Supra note 55. 
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consider direct effect of a Treaty provision imposing a positive duty on the 
member States, in that case, to adjust any tax or imported products to the lower 
rate applicable to domestic products. However, in order for such a provision, 
imposing an obligation to act, to have direct effect, the obligation must not be 
subject in its implementation or effects, to the taking of any measure either by the 
institutions of the Community or by the member States. In other words, as stated 
by the Court in later decisions, 58 it must appear that no discretion is left to the 
Community institutions or to the member States leaving room for alternative 
decisions. A Treaty provision which gives such a discretion has no direct effect 
since it implies the interposition between the rule of Community law and its 
implementation of legal acts implying a discretion. 59 Furthermore, for a provision 
to have direct effect, it should not be made subject to the expiration of a period of 
time. This further condition is obviously of great importance in view of the many 
obligations provided in the Treaty which had to be fulfilled at the end of the 
transitional period. The Court has made it clear that by the end of the transitional 
period, such provisions will have direct effect, provided, as said before, that no 
freedom of action or discretionary power is given to the Community institutions 
or member States as to their implementation or the manner in which they are put 
into effect 60 
S8 Molkerei - Zentrale, 28/67, [1968] CMLR 187; Salgoil SpA v Foreign Trade Ministry of the 
Italian Republic, 13/68, [1969] CMLR 181. 
59 Ibid., Case 28/67. 
60 Van Binsbergen v Board of Trade Association of the Engineering Industry, 33/74, [1975] 
CMLR 298; Pacemakers Case 36/74 [1976] 1 CMLR 320; Reyners v Belgian State, 2/74, [1974] 
CMLR 324; Manghera Case 59/75 [1976] ECR 91. 
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As mentioned above, though, not only Treaty provisions, but also EU secondary 
legislation may have direct effect. This is obvious, of course, for a regulation 
which according to Art. 249 EC (ex. 189) shall be binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all member States. 1 Thus, it was not difficult for the Court 
to decide that regulations have direct effect on account of their nature and of the 
function in the system of Community sources of law and as such can give rise to 
private rights which national courts are bound to safeguard. 62 
Concerning the direct effect of directives, 63 though, several problems have been 
raised. The main problem with directives is that they are binding only upon 
Member States and (to give them the flexibility which is necessary to 
accommodate the wide diversity of the Member States within the Community) 
there is considerable discretion allowed to the national authorities in achieving 
the desired result stipulated by the directive. In effect, Member States are given a 
time limit by which they must have transposed a Community directive into their 
national legislation such that individuals can then rely upon that national 
legislation for the rights intended to be conferred by the directive. Complications 
arise when Member States fail to transpose directives or fail to implement them 
correctly. As individuals are, then, unable to rely upon the directive, it would 
61 The expression direct applicable, used in Art. 249 (ex. 189 (2)), is not synonymous with having 
direct effect in the sense of the Courts decisions under review, and the two expressions do not 
cover each other entirely. See the Opinion of the Commission in Grad Case, 9/70, [1975] ECR 
825. See also Winter, supra note 50, at p. 425. 
62 Politi SAS v Ministero delle Finanze 41/71 [1972] CMLR 60. 
63 For more discussion about direct effect in regard to directives, see, Schermers, H. G., 'No 
Direct Effect for Directives, (1997) 3 EPL 527; Pescatore , P., 'The Doctrine of Direct Effect: An Infant Disease in Community Law', (1983) 8 EL Rev. 155; De Burca, G., `Giving Effect to 
European Community Directives', (1992) 55 MLR 215; Curtin, D., 'The Province of 
Government Delimiting the Direct Effect of Directives in the Common Law Context', (1990) 15 
EL Rev. 195 ; Tridimas, T., `Horizontal Effect of Directives: A Missed Opportunity', (1994) 19 
EL Rev. 621; Lackhoff and Nyssens, `Direct Effect of Directives in Triangular Situations', (1998) 
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appear that they have no redress. However, following the Van Gend en Loos 
decision, and primarily in the Grad 64 case, the ECJ ruled that in situations where 
Member States have breached their obligations, such directives may indeed be 
relied upon. The ECJ, therefore, in understanding the vital importance of correct 
implementation of directives to the effectiveness of the Community, established 
in the Van Duyn65 judgement that directives could be and would be held directly 
effective where possible, even though it could still be considered arbitrary 
whether directives indeed impose a clear, precise and complete obligation. 
However, the decision appeared to be unpopular among the Member States since 
they felt that directives were specifically intended to leave them with choices as 
to how to enact a particular Community obligation and that the Court should not 
allow this to be overridden by individuals pleading the provision of the directive 
itself. Thus, in the next case regarding the issue, that of Ratti66, the Court added a 
more specific line of reasoning which stated that the provisions of the directives 
could not be pleaded directly by individuals before the time limit for 
implementation of the directive had expired. However, after that date, the 
Member States would automatically forfeit any discretion awarded and would be 
estopped from relying on any conflicting national law that would prevent the 
Member State recognising the binding effect of Community law. It is the 
Member States' responsibility to ensure directives are transposed within their 
23 EL Rev. 397; Kinley, D., `Direct effect of Directives: stuck on vertical hold', (1995) 1 EPL 
79. 
64 Grad v Finanzamt Traunstein, 9/70, [1970] ECR 825. 
65 Van Duyn vHome Office, 41/74, [1974] ECR 1337, [1975] 1 CMLR 1. 
66 Publico Ministero v Tuillio Ratti, 148/78, [1979] ECR 1629, [1980] 1 CMLR 96. 
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allotted time limit and they will have to endure the consequences if they fail in 
their actions. 
So far, these cases had only concerned the issue of vertical direct effect; that is of 
individuals enforcing rights against the State. The issue of horizontal direct effect 
was raised in the Marshall67 case where the Court held that a directive could not 
be invoked horizontally, that is, by one individual against another. There are 
various explanations for this restriction upon review for individuals, the primary 
reason being that to allow horizontal effect would remove any distinction 
between regulations and directives. Besides, this restriction could also be seen as 
a lack of care on the part of the ECJ for the rights for individuals as, if one is of 
the view that the main motivating factor behind the ECJ's decision is that of 
Member States compliance, then redress for individuals against individual has no 
effect upon this. 68 
Certainly, then, the establishment of the principle of direct effect within the EU 
legal order, as Charlesworth and Cullen argue, moves Community law into a 
whole new category of international organisation, because it integrates 
international law passed by the Community into national legal systems. This 
means that the ECJ has a role and status which other international courts do not 
67Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority (Teaching), 152/84, 
[1986] ECR 723, [1986] 1 CMLR 688. 
68 Also to allow horizontal direct effect could increase the ECJ's workload with a massive 
increase in litigation. This could probably reduce the effectiveness of the Community, a principle 
the ECJ appear to put before many other issues. For the denial of horizontal effect, see also 
Faccini Dori v Recreb Sri, 91/92, [1994] ECR I-3325, [1995] 1 CMLR 665. 
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have. Without direct effect, it is arguable that the development of the Community 
would have been much slower. 69 
However, after the Marshall case, another important issue was raised concerning 
the interpretation of national law in accordance with obligations arising under 
Community law. Since the ECJ decides whether the provisions of a particular 
directive are capable of direct effect, this could be translated as an exercise of 
interpretation. Moreover, it is up to the ECJ to interpret national law in the light 
of the Community law and to decide whether a Member State has adequately 
implemented Community law. The ECJ also recommended that in any reference 
procedure, national courts should follow that interpretation which will be in 
conformity with Community law. One may, however, with justification, wonder 
to what extent interpretation can be used as a method of Community law 
penetration into national legal systems. 0 
The interpretative obligation, or so called indirect effect, was primarily discussed 
in the cases of Marshall7l, Von Colson72, and Harz73. Instead of focusing on the 
vertical and directive effects of the directives, the Court turned to Art. 10 EC (ex. 
5) which requires that states should take all appropriate measures to ensure 
fulfilment of their Community obligations. They must, therefore, interpret 
national law in such a way as to ensure that the objectives of the directives are 
achieved. The existence of an interpretative obligation, then, is there to safeguard 
69 See, Charlesworth, A. and Cullen, H., supra note 34, p. 95. 
70 Ibid., p. 88. 
71 Supra note 67. 
n Von Colson v Land Nordrhein-Westfallen, 14/83, [1984] ECR 1891. 
73 Harz v Deutsche Tradex GmbH, 79/83, [1984] ECR 1921. 
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the Community rights of those who might be unable to rely on such rights 
because of the limitation on the direct effect of directives as laid down in 
Marshall case. However, in the later case of Luciano Arcaro74 the ECJ did not 
leave it to the national court to decide how far it wished to go in interpreting 
national law in the light of directives. That limit was intended to restrict any 
attempt at gaining benefits of horizontal direct effect. 
Another innovation concerning the effect of Community law, is the principle of 
state's liability for failure to implement Community law. That innovation 
concerned the results of a Member State's failure to implement or fulfil 
obligations deriving from Community law. According to Art. 226-228 EC (ex. 
169-171) an action could be brought before the ECJ by the Commission or a 
Member State against a Member State that had failed to implement Community 
legislation. Under the provisions of these Articles, though, the non 
implementation of Community legislation by a Member State is dealt in a 
Community inter-state level (i. e. the ECJ could fine the Member State for the 
non-implementation) and on the national level it is not provided any remedy. 
Also, in the past, a potential liability of Member States for non-implementation 
was a matter of national law. 75 In 1991, though, the ECJ adopted the principle 
that Member States could be held liable for breach of Community law. That was 
the new principle introduced by the Francovich76 where it was held that 
individuals should receive compensation from the State when the Member State 
74 Criminal Proceedings Against Luciano Arcaro, 168/95, [1996] ECR 1-4705. See, also the 
decision on the recent case of Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v Hartlauer 
Handelsgesellschaft, 355/96, [1998] ECR 1-4799, [1998] 2 CMLR 953. 
75 See, Humblet v Belgium, 6/60, [1960] ECR 5592043; Comet v Procuktschap voor 
Siergewassen, 45/76, [1976] ECR; Russo v ALMA, 60/75, [1976] ECR 45. 
76 Francovich et al. v Italy, 6 and 9/90, [199 1] ECR I-5357. 
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had breached its Community obligation (i. e. liability upon the State for failure to 
implement) 77 The Court based its judgement on Art. 10 EC (ex 5) (duty of 
solidarity) and its doctrine of effectiveness. As the ECJ explained, effectiveness 
requires that individuals must be able to obtain compensation for a breach of 
Community law attributable to a Member State, especially where the full effect 
of Community law is conditional on Member State action. 78 The ECJ, though, 
applied three conditions for the validity of this principle; firstly, the directive 
must confer rights on individuals; secondly, the content of rights must be 
identifiable by a reference to the directive; and lastly, there must be a causal link 
between the breach of a state's obligation and the damage suffered by the person 
affected. Additionally, the Court in the cases of Brasserie du Pecheur79 and 
Factortame (111)80 held that compensation is available in cases of breach of 
Community law even where there is a discretion as to the manner of transposition 
of Community norms, provided that the rule of Community law infringed must 
be intended to confer rights on individuals and the breach must be sufficiently 
r Although the judgment deals only with liability for breach of directives, one could support the 
view that liability would result and for breach of other Community law as well, by basing its view 
on the same reasoning the Court gave in this case. See, Ross, `Beyond Francovich', (1993) 56 
MLR 55. For more discussion, see also, Craig, P., 'Once more unto the breach; the Community 
the State and damages liability', (1997) 113 LQR 67; Smith, F. & Woods, L., `Causation in 
Francovitch: the Neglected Problem', (1997) 46 ICLQ 941; Tridimas, T., `Member State Liability 
in Damages for Breach of Community Law: An Assessment of the Case Law', Oliver, P., `State 
Liability in Damages following Factortame III: A Remedy Seen in Context', and Eechout, P., 
'Liability of Member States in Damages and the Community System of Remedies', all included in 
Beatson, J. and Tridimas , T., (Eds), "New Directions in European Public Law", Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998. Also, for an even more detailed analysis regarding the principle of State Liability, 
see, Lee, I. B., "In search of a theory of State Liability in the European Union", as cited in 
http: //www. law. harvard. edu/programs/Jean Monnet/papers/99/990902. html 
78 Supra note 34, p. 93. 
79 Brasserie du Pecheur SA v Germany, 46/93, [1996] ECR 1-1029, [1996] 1 CMLR 889. 
80 Rv Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. & others (Factortame III), 
48/93, [1996] ECR 1-1029, [1996] 1 CMLR 586. See, also recent cases, Rv Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, exparte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd, 5/94, [1996] 2 CMLR 391 
and Commission v. Belgium, 11/95, [1996] ECR 1-4115, [1997] 2 CMLR 289, Rv HM Treasury, 
exparte British Telecommunications plc, 392/93, [1996] ECR I-1631, [1996] 2 CMLR 217, Rv 
Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Sutton, 66/95, [1997] ECR 1-2163, [1997] 2 
132 
Chapter Three Constitutional Enforcement of EU Legislation 
serious and there must also be a causal link between the state's breach and the 
injured party's loss. Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that the remedy of 
reparation is subject to national law, even though the conditions of liability are 
provided by Community law. Thus, it is for the domestic legal system to decide 
the criteria and the extent of reparation. 81 
The above brief outline of the legal order of the European Union and the brief 
analysis of the legal effects of Community law aim to illustrate the sui generis 
status of the Community legal order, on the one hand, and the effect that has on 
the Member States' national legal order, on the other. This distinctive character 
of Community's legal order demands, as mentioned above, certain limitation or 
transfer of national sovereignty. There is, then, a general obligation on a new 
State when joining the EU to ensure that it can meet the requirements of 
Community law. In particular, it must make provision for the application of 
Community law within its territory. 82 Thus, special arrangements must take place, 
in order for a new Member State to apply the Community law in its own legal 
order 
3.3.2 The introduction and implementation of Community law in the 
Cypriot legal order. 
CMLR 382, Palmisani v INPS, 261/95, ECR I-4025, [1997] 3 CMLR 1356, Bonifaci and Others 
and Berto and Others, 94 & 95/95, [1997] ECR 1-3969. 
81 See, Tridimas, T., `Member State Liability in Damage for Breach of Community Law: An 
Assessment of the Case Law' in Beatson, J. and Tridimas , T., (Eds), "New Directions in European Public LaW', Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998, pp. 27-30. 
92 Hartley, T. C., "The Foundations of European Community Law", 1"' Ed., 1981, at p. 224. 
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The application of Community law in the member States is not merely a problem 
of legal theory. It is rather a practical problem of fundamental importance. The 
fact that Community constitutes a new legal order, for the benefit of which the 
states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and 
subjects of which compromise not only the Member States but also their 
nationals, 83 demands such arrangements, on behalf of the Member States, so that 
the whole effect of the Community's legal order can be applied within the 
national legal order. In other words, joining the EU means a large scale and 
largely irreversible transformation of a nation's substantive law, governmental 
structure and international status. 84 It also means that states merge their identity 
into a larger legal whole, where their law must give way to the law of the Union, 
their legislative body must yield to the legislative machinery of the Union and 
their courts must respect and apply the rulings of the ECJ and the Community 
law as a whole. 
The EU has not, however, specified how Member States should act to achieve 
these goals. As mentioned above, the procedure of accommodating and 
implementing the effects of Community law within the domestic legal order, lies 
upon the Member State itself and its own domestic legal procedures. Thus, each 
Member State, to give effect to the legal implications of its membership in the 
EU, acted according to its own legal rules and procedures and accordingly made 
all the relevant arrangements. In fact, all Member States based their accession to 
83 Firma Molkerei-Zentrale Westfalen Lippe GmbH vHauptzollamt Paderborn, 28/67, [1968] 
ECR 143, at 152. 
84 Regarding the impact of EU institutional structures on Member States, see, Vivien A. Schmidt, 
"The EU and its Member States: Institutional Contrasts and their Consequences", MPIfG 
Working Paper 99/7, May 1999, as sited in 
134 1 
Chapter Three Constitutional Enforcement of EU Legislation 
the EU and its implications, on special provisions provided by their 
Constitutions. 85 
In this case then, Cyprus must rely on its own legal system to give effect to 
Community law and to implement the demands of its accession to the EU. 
However, a brief analysis of the basis on how other Member States dealt with the 
issue, could provide helpful guidance. 86 
In the absence of a written constitution, in the United Kingdom, Community law 
takes effect by virtue of an Act of Parliament (The European Communities Act 
1972). 87 In particular, direct effect of Community law in the UK is made by 
section 2(1) of the European Communities Act, which reads: All such rights, 
powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time created or 
arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures from time 
to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties 
are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United 
http: //www. mpi-fg-koeln-mpg. de/publikation/worldng-papers /wp99-7. html 
85 Generally, the application of EU law in the domestic legal order has been achieved according to 
the monist or dualist conception of international law by the Member State. However, because of 
the special demands of Community law and its distinctive sui generis character, in the most of the 
cases, Member States made further arrangements. In fact, in several cases, special references to 
the EU have been introduced as amendments to the national Constitutions. 
86 English translation of the following national Constitutions is cited in; http: //www. uni- 
wuerzburg. de/law/home. html. 
87 See, Barnard, C. and Greaves, It, `The Application of Community Law in the United Kingdom, 
1986-1993', (1994) 31 CML Rev. 1055. See also, Collins, L., "European Community Law in the 
United Kingdom", Butterworths, 4t' Ed, 1990; Birkinshaw, P., `European Integration and United 
Kingdom Constitutional Law', (1997) 3 EPL 57. It has to be emphasised that Britain is a strictly 
dualist country and therefore the Community Treaties could have no effect in the British legal 
system, unless they were introduced by an Act of Parliament. Lord Denning made that clear, in 
McWhirter v Attorney General [1972] CMLR 882, a case decided after the EC Treaty had been 
signed but before the Act of Parliament. He stated that even though the Treaty of Rome has been 
signed, it has no effect, so far as these Courts, are concerned, until it is made an Act of 
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Kingdom shall be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and 
followed accordingly... 
In Ireland, the Third Amendment to the Constitution, in the form of an addition to 
Article 29 of the Irish Constitution, allowed the country to enter the European 
Union. Art. 29 reads as follows: The State may become a member of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (established by the Treaty signed at Paris 
on the 19th day of April, 1951), the European Economic Community (established 
by the Treaty signed at Rome on the 25`x' day of March, 1957), and the European 
Atomic Energy Community 9established by Treaty signed at Rome on the 25`x` 
day of March, 1957). No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, 
acts done or measures adopted by the State necessitated by the obligations of 
membership of the Communities or prevent laws enacted, acts done or measures 
adopted by the Communities institutions thereof, from having the force of law in 
the State. In Italy, Article 11 of the Italian Constitution made possible the 
application of Community law in Italy. It reads as follows, Italy agrees, on 
conditions of equality with other States, to the limitations of her sovereignty 
necessary to an organisation which will assure peace and justice among nations, 
and promote and encourage international organisations constituted for this 
purpose. Similarly, in Greece, 88 Article 28(2) of the Constitution reads: Powers 
provided by the Constitution may by treaty or agreement be vested in agencies of 
international organisations, when this serves an important national interest and 
Parliament. Once it is implemented by an Act of Parliament, these Courts must go by the Act of 
Parliament. 
88 For more information, see, Skandamis, N., "Evpconanx6 Koivorixd dixaio & E).. Zi v: Kö dixaio 
17poaappoy4" [European Community Law & Greek Law of Adaptation], Sakkoulas Edition, 
Athens-Komotini, 1992. 
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promotes co-operation with other States. A majority of three-fifths of the total 
number of members of Parliament shall be necessary to vote the law sanctioning 
the treaty or agreement. 
In France, the Preamble to the Constitution of 4th October 1958 refers to the 
limitations of sovereignty necessary for the organisation and defence of peace. 
Also, the constitutional amendment of 1992 made a clear reference to the EU in 
Title XV. 89 More specifically, one of the provisions of Title XV, Article 88(2) 
contains a reference to transfer of competences to a permanent international 
organisation. 
In the Netherlands, 90 the provision regulating external relations is made in Art 90 
of the Constitution which provides that the Government should promote the 
development of the international rule of law. Also, Articles 93 and 94 of the 
Constitution, which were introduced in 1953, make special references to the 
possibility of conferring powers on international organisations. It was argued, 
therefore, that the introduction of those provisions aimed to facilitate the 
European integration. 91 In Belgium, also, there is a special constitutional 
provision for transfer of sovereignty. Article 34 of the Belgian Constitution 
provides that the exercising of determined power can be attributed by a treaty or 
a law to international public institutions. Similarly, in Luxembourg, according to 
89 Article 88(1) states that the French Republic participates in the European Community and the 
European Union, and has chosen to exercise certain competences in common with other Member 
States. 
90 Besselink, L. F. M. and Swaak, C. R. A., 'The Netherlands' Constitutional Law and European 
Integration', (1996) 2 EPL 34. 
91 However, as Besselink and Swaak stated that, many constitutional lawyers in the Netherlands 
uncritically state that Arts. 93 and 94 of the Constitution do not apply to EC law. lbid, p. 36. 
137 
Chapter Three Constitutional Enforcement of EU Legislation 
the Luxembourg Constitution (Art. 49 bis), the exercise of the powers reserved 
by the Constitution to the legislature, executive and judiciary may be temporarily 
vested by treaty in institutions governed by international law. 
In Germany, 92 Article 24 (I) (now Art. 23 (I)) of the Basic Law of the Federal 
Republic of Germany was held to be the lever of integration. This Article 
provides that the Federation may, by legislation, transfer sovereign powers to 
international institutlonS 93 
In Austria, 94 according to Article 9(1), the generally recognised rules of 
international law are regarded as integral parts of federal law and according to 
Art. 9(2), legislation or a treaty requiring sanction in accordance with Article 
50(1) can transfer specific federal competencies to intergovernmental 
organisations and their authorities and can within the framework of 
international law regulate the activity of foreign states' agents inside Austria as 
well as the activity ofAustrian agents abroad. 
The constitutional basis for the Spanish accession is embodied in Article 93 of 
the Spanish Constitution which provides: By means of an organic law, 
authorisation may be granted for concluding treaties by which powers derived 
92 See, Kokott, J., 'German Constitutional Jurisprudence and European Integration', Parts I and II, 
(1996) 2 EPL 237 and (1996) 2 EPL 413. See, also, Wulf-Henning Roth, `The Application of 
Community Law in West Germany', (1991) 28 CML Rev. 137. 
93 Referring to Germany, it is important to mention that the Court's jurisdiction played a 
significant role in the application of EU law, since Germany's dualistic concept of international 
law (Art. 59.2 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany). 
9' See,. Seidl - Hohenveldern, H. C. I., Austria and the EEA', (1992) 1 LIE129. Also, according to 
Austrian Constitutional law for an overall amendment of the Constitution a referendum is 
necessary. Therefore, a referendum was held in connection with Austria's accession to the EU. 
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from the Constitution shall be vested in an international organisation or 
institution. It is incumbent on the Cortes Generales or the Government, as the 
case may be, to guarantee compliance with these treaties and with the 
resolutions emanating from the international and supranational organisations 
upon whom the powers have been conferred. 95 In Portugal, the Constitutional 
Laws Nos. 1/89 and 1/92 which are contained in Article 7(5) and (6), regulate the 
Portuguese membership of the EU. 96 Accordingly, Art. 7(5) provides: Portugal 
shall strive to reinforce the European identity and strengthen the European 
states' actions in favour of democracy, peace, economic progress and justice in 
relations between states and Art. 7(6) reads: Portugal may, under conditions of 
reciprocity, while respecting the principles of subsidiarity and taking into 
account the achievement of economic and social cohesion, agree to the common 
exercise of the powers needed to build the European Union. 
In Finland, 97 according to Chapter IIIa (Section 22a), added in 1987 (no. 
570/1987) to the Finnish Constitution, a consultative referendum may be held on 
the basis of an Act of Parliament. Finland, then, based its membership of the EU 
on a referendum (No. 578/1994) and an Act of Parliament (No 1540/1994) 
incorporated the accession Treaty into the Finnish domestic legal order. Finally, 
the basis for the implementation of EU law in the Danish legal order is laid down 
See, Christoph Herbst, 'Austrian Constitutional law and Accession to the European Union', 
(1995) 1 EPL 1. 
9S For more discussion, see, De Noriega, A. E., `A Dissident Voice, The Spanish Constitutional 
Court Case Law on European Integration', (1999) 5 EPL 269. 
96 For more information about Portugal's membership of the EU, see, Carlos Bothelo Moniz, `The 
Portuguese Constitution and the Participation of the Republic of Portugal in the European Union', 
(1998) 4 EPL 465. 
97 See, Rosas, A., `Finland's Accession to the European Union: Constitutional Aspects' (1995) 1 
EPL 166. Also, see, Aalto, P., `Accession of Finland to the European Union: First Remarks', 
(1995) 20 EL Rev. 618. 
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by the Danish Constitution (Grundloven, i. e. the Basic Law) in Section 20 (1) 
which provides that powers vested in the authorities of the Kingdom under this 
Basic Law can by an Act to a more specified extent be handed over to 
international authorities set up by mutual agreement with other states in order to 
promote international law and co-operation. 8 
Finally, in Sweden, 99 Chapter 10 of the Instrument of Government, which 
regulates foreign relations, includes the treaty-making power and provides 
concern for the transfer of national decision making powers to international 
organisations (Art. 5). However, although this provision for a transfer of power to 
international organisations pre-dated the accession of Sweden to the EU, it was 
not considered enough to allow such an accession and therefore an amendment 
with a specific reference to the EU was made (Articles 2-5). Accordingly, then, 
the basic Treaties, acts, agreements and other decisions made before the 
accession of Sweden to the EU have been incorporated as a part of the Swedish 
law under Articles 2 and 4 and all other acts adopted by the EU after the 
accession shall be governed by Art. 3. 
The above-mentioned examples constitute just the basis on which Member States 
placed the introduction of Community law in their national legal order. However, 
it is important to mention that such introduction was not an easy task in all cases. 
" For more information about issues concern Denmark and the EU, see, Hegh, K,. 'The Danish 
Maastricht Judgement' (1999) 24 EL Rev. 80. 
" See, Lysen, G., `Sweden; National Constitutional Law and European Integration', 17 F. LD. E. 
(International Federation jor European Law) Kongress, Berlin 1996. 
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Further legal mechanisms, mainly judicial intervention, were necessary for the 
successful application of Community law in the domestic legal order. 
Nevertheless, from the above examples, the following important remarks could 
be noted. Firstly, a distinction can be made between Constitutions that provided 
for a transfer of power to international organisations, before their accession to the 
EU and those Constitutions which by an amendment made such a provision after 
their accession to the EU; secondly, a distinction can also be made between those 
Constitutions which make special reference to the EU and those which make a 
general reference to international organisations; thirdly, it should also be noted, 
that some Member States did not just base the implementation of Community 
law on Constitutional provisions, but they had to pass further national Laws or 
Acts, to achieve that; and finally, it can be argued that the common ground of all 
these mechanisms is the existence of a national provision enabling the limitation 
(or transfer) of national sovereignty. 
Referring to Cyprus, then, similar methods might be used for implementing 
Community law into the Cypriot legal order. The signing of the Treaty of 
Accession of Cyprus to the EU and the other Treaties establishing the EU, and 
their incorporation in the Cypriot legal order, could be achieved by the procedure 
as described by Art. 169 of the Cypriot Constitution. 
The Treaty of Accession, then, should be negotiated and signed under a decision 
of the Council of Ministers and would be operative and binding on the Republic 
when approved by a law made by the House of Representatives. As Pikis J. 
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stated, ratification by the legislature incorporates the treaty or convention, as the 
case may be, into domestic law by virtue of the legislative power vested in the 
House of Representatives (Art. 61); and if its provisions are self-executing they 
acquire the force of law quite independently of para. 3 of Article 169 or its 
impact on domestic legislation. '°° In this way, the self executing provisions of the 
Treaties would become incorporated into the Cypriot legal order. Of course, as it 
is provided by Art. 169(3) these provisions will have superior force to any 
municipal law. '°' 
Concerning the effect of secondary legislation of the EU (and the non self- 
executing provisions of the Treaties), no reference is made under the Cypriot 
Constitution. As observed above, a mechanism of transfer of national power to 
the institutions of the EU could be the basis for the implementation of 
Community law into the national legal order. In fact, no mechanism for transfer 
of power is provided by the Cypriot Constitution. Following the example of other 
Member States whose constitutions also did not provide for transfer of power, an 
amendment to the Constitution could make the necessary provision. '02 
10° Case Malachtou vArmefti, supra note 52, at p. 211. 
101 In this case, the Constitution of Cyprus is not included in municipal law and therefore it still 
might be considered as superior. The issue of "Supremacy of Cypriot Constitution v Supremacy 
of EU law", is concerned in the next Chapter. The issue of publication of treaties is another 
constitutional requirement under Art. 169(3). From a constitutional law perspective the obligation 
of publication of treaties provides either a means of transformation of treaties into internal law 
(i. e. dualist approach) or a formal requirement (i. e. monist approach). In Cyprus, this is 
considered merely as a formal requirement. (See, Pikis J., Ibid). 
102 The procedure of amending the Constitution of Cyprus is a complicated one. In fact, some 
Articles of the Constitution are considered as basic and cannot by any way be amended (Art. 182). 
This issue is analysed in Chapter Six. 
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An amendment by addition providing for the transfer of powers could be made in 
Art. 169.103 This addition might include a general provision for transfer of 
powers to international organisations or a specific reference for transfer of 
powers to the EU. 
Additionally, one could argue that by following the example of Ireland, another 
procedure might be the enactment of a Law providing for a referendum before the 
addition to Art. 169. Normally, it could be argued that by this procedure, since a 
more democratic step (that of a referendum) is required, less argument about a 
violation of the constitutional procedures would result. Nevertheless, the 
referendum-solution might not be considered as the most successful procedure in 
regard to Cyprus, since the current application of the law of necessity (basic 
element for amending the Constitution as it functions today) is not based on 
referendum results. 104 
However, whatever the constitutional procedures, the role of the Judiciary, for 
establishing the implementation of the European Community law into the Cypriot 
legal order, would be vital. As it has been experienced in the other Member 
States, the will of the national Courts to give effect to the Community law is 
necessary. Cypriot Courts, then, must also be prepared to give effect to the EU 
legislation, since this will establish the incorporation of Community law within 
the Cypriot legal order. The addition to Art. 169 of the Cypriot Constitution, 
providing for the transfer of sovereign power to the EU and its Institutions, must 
103 Article 169 of the Constitution is not considered as a Basic one under the provisions of Art. 
182 and therefore it could be amended. 
104 For more details about the amending procedure of the Cyprus Constitution, see, Chapter Six. 
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be well established and interpreted by the Cypriot Courts. In their attempt to give 
effect to Community legislation in the Cypriot legal order, Cypriot Courts, should 
also be able to realise and understand the principles and the effect of Community 
law and to be prepared for major changes in the domestic legal order. The 
judicial way of giving effect to Community legislation as followed by other 
Member States, should be a useful and wise guidance for Cypriot Courts on the 
implementation of the EU legislation in the Cypriot legal order. The EU 
principles of direct applicability, direct and indirect effect, and the failure to 
implement European legislation must consequently adopted by Cypriot Courts 
and through their decisions must successfully implement them in the domestic 
legal order. 
In other words, the non-problematic application of Community law in the Cypriot 
legal order depends upon the will of the Courts. If the Courts (by the appropriate 
interpretation and will) achieve that, then and only then will the application of the 
EU law be smoothly implemented. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
ARTICLE 179 OF THE CYPRIOT CONSTITUTION AND THE 
PRINCIPLE OF SUPREMACY OF COMMUNITY LAW 
One of the most important constitutional principles of the European Union is 
without doubt the principle of supremacy of Community law. All Member States, 
as a consequence of their accession to the EU, had to give priority to the 
European legislation over national legislation. This has been achieved by various 
methods, used by the Member States, according to their domestic legislation. For 
some Member States that was not a difficult task but others faced significant 
problems in accommodating this principle, mainly due to their own domestic 
constitutional supremacy. The scope of this chapter is to examine whether the 
principle of supremacy of the Community law might be in conflict with the 
Cypriot law. In fact, it deals with Art. 179 of the Cypriot Constitution which 
provides for the supremacy of the Constitution within the Cypriot legal order and 
seeks to examine how this provision is compatible with a future accession to the 
EU. By using the examples of how other Member States managed to 
accommodate the principle of Community supremacy in their national legal 
order, this chapter also seeks to examine how this principle could be 
accommodated to the Cypriot legal order. It is important, therefore, to examine 
the relationship between Art. 179 of the Cypriot Constitution and the principle of 
the supremacy of Community law, and whether there is any conflict between 
them and suggestions as to how Cyprus could accommodate this principle in the 
Cypriot legal order are made. 
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4.1 Article 179 of the Cypriot Constitution. 
According to Art. 179 the Cypriot Constitution, the Constitution is the supreme 
law of the Republic. Specifically the Art. 179 provides: 
1. This constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic. 
2. No law or decision of the House of Representatives or of 
any of the Communal Chambers and no act or decision of 
any organ, authority or person in the Republic exercising 
executive power or any administrative function shall in any 
way be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, any provisions of 
this Constitution. 
This might mean that the Constitution is superior to the EU Treaties and the 
Acts of the Institutions of the EU. In a former case where there was the dilemma 
whether the Constitution is superior to an international agreement, or vice versa, 
the ex-Attorney General of the Republic stated that: 
... a treaty, convention or international 
agreement concluded and published as provided in 
Article 169 shall have superior force to any law in force 
at the time of such publication or enacted subsequently 
but it cannot have superior force to the supreme law that 
is to say the Constitution... though the Supreme Court in 
such case will no doubt, as the Supreme Court in USA, 
to be very slow to interfere with a matter having serious 
repercussions on the international plane and will tend to 
reconcile any inconsistency by a restrictive 
interpretation... l 
1 Tornaritis, C., "The Treaty Making Power Especially Under the Law of the Republic of 
Cyprus", Nicosia, 1973, pp. 17-19. 
146 
Chapter Four Constitutional Supremacy v Supremacy of Community Law 
Therefore, it is quite clear that the constitution must prevail over any 
international agreement being adopted by the Republic. It should be noted that 
every international agreement with a foreign state or international organisation 
relating to commercial matters and modus vivendi is concluded under a decision 
of the Council of Ministers. Any other treaty, convention or international 
agreement is negotiated and signed under a decision of the Council of Ministers 
but is operative and binding on the Republic when approved by a law made by 
the House of Representatives whereupon it is concluded. Treaties, conventions 
and agreements so concluded have, from the date of their publication in the 
Official Gazette of the Republic, superior force to any municipal law on 
condition that they are applied by the other party to the treaty. 2 
The Supreme Court has also highlighted, in several cases, that an adoption of a 
Law may be made "if and only if' such adoption is necessary to bring such Law 
into conformity with the constitution. 
The supremacy of the constitution was reaffirmed in the judgment of the 
Supreme Court in the case of Police v Andreas Georgiades4. It was there held 
that a common law rule of evidence which allowed the admissibility of evidence 
illegally obtained was unconstitutional as being in contravention of Art. 15, 
which safeguards the right to privacy, and Art. 17, which safeguards the right to 
respect for and secrecy of correspondence. It was laid down that the basic rights 
2 Art. 169 of the Constitution of Cyprus. 
3 G. Constantinides v The Republic (1969) 3 CLR 523; and A. Vrahimis v The Republi, (1971) 3 
CLR 104. 
4 (1983) 2 CLR 33. 
147 
Chapter Four Constitutional Supremacy v Supremacy of Community Law 
safeguarded in Part II of the constitution referring to fundamental rights and 
liberties are inalienable and inherent in man, that they are at all times to be 
enjoyed and exercised under constitutional protection and that the Cypriot 
Courts have no discretion to admit evidence obtained or secured in 
contravention of such rights. 
The concept of the inviolability of a `supreme' or `fundamental' or `higher' law 
is characteristic of countries where written constitutions are in force, such as, for 
example the USA. Under such a concept, the legislature has to exercise its 
powers within the limits laid down by the supreme law and any legislative 
measures which offend against it are liable to be declared unconstitutional 
through judicial review. This is a notion unknown in countries where no written 
constitution exists, such as the United Kingdom, where the legislature 
represented by the union of the Queen in Parliament is sovereign. 
One of the sources of this doctrine of supreme law is the case of Marbury v 
Madison5 decided by the US Supreme Court in 1803. In his judgment, Chief 
Justice Marshall said: 
The question whether an act, repugnant to the 
constitution, can become the law of the land, is a 
question deeply interesting to the United States; but, 
happily not of an intricacy proportioned to its 
interest. It seems only necessary to recognise certain 
principles, supposed to have been long and well 
established, to decide it. 
That the people have an original right to establish, 
for their future government, such principles, as, in 
their opinion, shall most conduce to their own 
55 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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happiness is the basis upon which the whole 
American fabric has been erected. The exercise of 
this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, 
nor ought it, to be frequently repeated. The 
principles, therefore, so established, are deemed 
fundamental. And as the authority from which they 
proceed is supreme, and can seldom act, they are 
designed to be permanent. 
From the above extract it appears that Marshall CJ based his doctrine of 
fundamental law on the assumption that a written constitution is the product of 
the exercise of the `original right' of the people to choose what `shall most 
conduce to their own happiness'. He also accepted that, even after the original 
adoption of the fundamental law, such a right can still be exercised again, 
though not frequently. In spite of the view taken by Marshall CJ that it is 
difficult to exercise such a right often, the fact remains that at least 27 
amendments have been made to the Constitution of the United States. 6 
4.2 Challenging the principle of the superiority under Art. 179. 
The constitution of Cyprus contains very rigid provisions for its future 
amendment, which may take place only in certain non basic respects. It affords 
no possibility for amendment as far as the Basic Articles (Art. 182, Annex III) 
6 Officially in the USA, the Constitution has been amended 27 times. However, it could be argued 
that although only 27 amendments have been achieved officially, other amendments have also 
taken place by other forms rather than the official procedure. See, Levinson, S., `How many times 
has the United States Constitution been amended? (a) <26; (b) 26; (c) 27; (d) >27: Accounting for 
Constitutional Change', edited in Levinson, S., "Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and 
Practice of Constitutional Amendment", Princeton University Press, 1995. 
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are concerned. According to Art 182 of the constitution, the basic Articles 
cannot in any way be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal. 
The conventional right of the people of Cyprus to amend or reform their 
constitution is precluded not only by the constitution itself but also by the Treaty 
of Guarantee which specifically provides in Art. 2 that it guarantees, inter alia, 
the state of affairs established by the basic articles of its constitution. The almost 
universal custom of preserving the right to alter or amend the constitution is 
rigidly blocked by the so called unalterable basic articles of the constitution, in 
contrast to other systems such as the US Bill of Rights which provides for such a 
right to be exercised by referendum or plebiscite. 8 
In his treatise on "The Higher Law Background of the American Constitutional 
Law", Professor Corwin, one of the foremost constitutional experts of his 
country, wrote: 
In the first place, in the American written 
constitution, higher law at last attained a form which 
made possible the attribution to it of an entirely new 
sort of validity, the validity of a statute emanating 
from the sovereign people. Once the binding force of 
higher law transferred to this new basis, the notion of 
the sovereignty of the ordinary legislative organ 
disappeared automatically, since there cannot be a 
sovereign law making body which is subordinate to 
another law making body. 9 
7 See, Chapter Six. 
$ Bennett vJackson, 186 Ind. 553,116 N. E. 921 (1917). 
9 Corwin, E. S., "The Higher Law Background of the American Constitution", Princeton, 1963, at 
p. 89. 
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Thus, it is clear that the concept of the inviolability of a supreme law, by its 
very nature, is inseparably related to the premise that the constitution 
embodies the sovereign will of the people which can be exercised at any time, 
even though seldom, in order to amend it. 
Article 179 has formally introduced the concept "of supreme law in the 
constitutional order of the Republic of Cyprus. It is, therefore, useful to 
examine how far the principle behind the Art. 179 corresponds to the realities 
of the Constitution of Cyprus. 
As it has already been mentioned, regarding the basic Articles of the 
constitution, in respect of matters which were incorporated by the Agreement 
in Zurich, no amendment is possible, not even by unanimous consensus of all 
members of the House of Representatives. Thus, it has been deprived of the 
opportunity of representing the sovereign will of the people of the country at 
any given time in the future. '° 
It is reasonably concluded from the foregoing that the Constitution of Cyprus, 
though invested with the sanctity of a supreme law, under Art. 179, is found 
not to be in reality incompatible with the principles which led Marshall CJ to 
propound the doctrine of the supreme law in Marbury v Madison. " 
10 This issue will be addressed in detail in Chapter Six. 
11 Supra note 5. 
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According to Triantafyllides J. in the famous Cypriot case The Attorney 
General v Mustafa Imbrahim and others, 12 it has to be examined whether the 
constitution of Cyprus, being treated as a supreme law under Art. 179, 
prevents in all and any circumstances, the enactment of a law which is 
urgently needed in prevailing circumstances, especially where such 
circumstances have not been foreseen or provided for by the constitution 
itself. He is also of the opinion that: 
Art. 179 is to be applied subject to the proposition 
that where it is not possible for a basic function of the 
State to be discharged properly, as provided for in 
the constitution, or where a situation has arisen 
which cannot be adequately met under the provisions 
of the constitution then the appropriate organ may 
take such steps within the nature of its competence as 
are required to meet the necessity ... 
Even though, the 
constitution is deemed to be a supreme law limiting 
the sovereignty of the legislature, nevertheless where 
the constitution itself cannot measure up to a 
situation which has arisen... in view of the nature of 
the constitution it is not possible for the sovereign 
will of the people to manifest itself... the legislative 
power remains unhindered by the Art. 179, and not 
only can, but it must, be exercised for the benefit of 
the people. 
However, whatever the challenge, Art. 179 is considered to be one of the basic 
Articles of the Cypriot Constitution. Moreover, according to Art. 1 of the Treaty 
of Guarantee, the Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of 
its independence... as well as respect to its Constitution. Therefore, one must pay 
particular attention to whether, and how, a future accession to the EU would 
12 1964 CLR 195. 
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influence the principle of the Superiority of the Constitution of Cyprus as arising 
from Art. 179. 
4.3 The Supremacy of the European Community Law. 
The Community legal order is intended to bring about 
a profound transformation in the condition of life - 
economic, social and even political - in the Member 
States. It is inevitable that it will come into conflict 
with the established order, that is to say, the rules in 
force in the Member States whether they stem from 
constitutions, laws, regulations or legal usage ... 
Community law holds within itself an existential 
necessity for supremacy. If it is not capable in all 
circumstances of taking precedence over national 
law, it is ineffective and, to that extent, non existent. 
The very notion of a common order would thereby be 
destroyed. 13 
The supremacy of Community law over national law, although not expressly 
formulated in any of the Communities' Treaties, is now considered as a basic 
unwritten rule of Community law. This principle has been proclaimed with great 
emphasis by the European Court of Justice. It has been widely applied, 
irrespective of the nature of the Community provision (constitutive Treaty, act 
or agreement with a non member state), or that of the national provision 
(constitution, statute or subordinate legislation). It also applies, irrespective of 
whether the EU provision came before or after the national provision. In all 
cases, the national provision must give way to Community law. 
13 Pescatore, P., L'ordre des Communautes Europeennes, Presses Universitaires de Liege, 2°d Ed. 
1973, p. 227. 
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The basic doctrine of the supremacy of the European Community law was laid 
down by the Court of Justice in Costa v ENEL14 and confirmed and developed in 
later cases. It was emphasised, though, in the cases of International 
Handelsgesellschaft, 15 Simmenthal, 16 and Factortame. '7 In Costa v ENEL, 
quoted above, an Italian law of 6th December 1962 nationalised the Italian 
electricity industry and created Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica (ENEL). Mr 
Costa refused to pay an ENEL electricity bill, on the ground that he objected to 
the Nationalisation Law. Mr. Costa argued that the Nationalisation Law 
contravened both the Italian Constitution and a number of provisions of the EEC 
Treaty. But the Italian Constitutional Court rejected the plea of 
unconstitutionality. In its observations before the Court of Justice, the Italian 
Government argued that the proceedings before the Court were "absolutely 
inadmissible". The essence of the problem, in the Advocate-General's opinion, 
was the coexistence of two (allegedly) opposing legal rules which applied to the 
domestic system, one deriving from the Treaty and one from the national 
legislature. A decision was required as to which rule should take precedence. So 
after reaffirming the independence of Community law, the Court went on: 
The integration into the laws of each Member State of 
provisions which derive from the Community, and 
more generally the terms and the spirit of the Treaty, 
make it impossible for the States, as a corollary, to 
accord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent 
measure over a legal system accepted by them on the 
basis of reciprocity. Such a measure cannot, 
therefore, be inconsistent with that legal system. The 
14 Case 6/64, [1964] ECR 585. 
15 International Handelsgesellschaft v EVGF, 11/70, [1970] ECR 1125. 
16 Simmenthal v Italian Ministry of Finance, 106/77, [1978] ECR 629. 
17 Case C-213/89 Rv Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd [1990] ECR I- 
2433. 
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executive force of Community law cannot vary from 
one State to another in deference to subsequent 
domestic laws, without jeopardising the attainment of 
the objectives of the Treaty set out in Article 5(2) and 
giving rise to the discrimination prohibited by Article 
7. 
... The precedence of Community law is confirmed by Article 189, whereby a regulation `shall be binding' 
and `directly applicable in all Member States' This 
provision, which is subject to no reservation, would 
be quite meaningless if a State could unilaterally 
nullify its effects by means of a legislative measure 
which could prevail over Community law. 
In Simmenthal, '8 the implications of supremacy are more clearly spelled out. It 
actually provides a very good example of the importance of the superiority of 
European law. The facts were simple. Simmenthal imported some beef from 
France into Italy and was made to pay for a public health inspection when the 
meat crossed the frontier. This was laid down by an Italian law passed in 1970, 
contrary to the EEC Treaty and two Community regulations passed in 1964 and 
1968 respectively. Two points were actually raised by the Italian authorities: 
firstly the fact that the national law was passed after the relevant Community 
legislation and secondly, that even if the Italian law conflicted with Italy's treaty 
obligations, it had to be applied in Italian courts until such time as it had been 
declared unconstitutional by the Italian Constitutional Court. The latter point 
was based on the principle of the Italian constitutional law, where questions 
concerning the constitutionality of Italian laws must be decided by the national 
Constitutional Court. 
18 Supra note 16. 
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The European Court held that it was a duty of a national court to give full effect 
to the Community provisions and not to apply any conflicting provision of 
national legislation, even if it was passed after the Community legislation. It was 
also mentioned that there was no need for a domestic provision to be set aside 
either by a constitutional court or by legislature. Moreover, it was emphasised 
that supremacy affected both prior and future legislation. The Court, in this case, 
applied a new basis to the foundations of the supremacy. It based the outcome 
on the reference procedure in Article 234 EC (ex 177). According to Art. 234 
the procedure is only effective, as the Court reasoned, if the answer given to a 
reference is capable of being applied by the national court. In the case where 
European law was not supreme, this would not be possible. The Court asserted 
the obligation of national courts to apply the whole corpus of directly effective 
European law, and it highlighted the fact that in cases where national provisions 
are in contrast with the rights conferred on individuals by the Union, they must 
be overridden in order to give priority to the EU provisions. The Court stated 
that: 
... in accordance with the principles of the precedence 
of Community law, the relationship between 
provisions of the Treaty and directly applicable 
measures of the institutions on the one hand and the 
national law of Member States on the other is such 
that those provisions and measures not only by their 
entry into force render automatically inapplicable 
any conflicting provision of current national law but - 
in so far as they are an integral part of, and take 
precedence in, the legal order applicable in the 
territory of the Member States - also preclude the 
valid adoption of new national measures to the extent 
to which they would be incompatible with Community 
provisions. 
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Indeed any recognition that national legislative 
measures which encroach upon the field within which 
the Community exercises its legislative power or 
which are otherwise incompatible with the provisions 
of the Community Law had any legal effect would 
amount to a corresponding denial of the effectiveness 
of obligations undertaken unconditionally and 
irrevocably by Member States pursuant to the Treaty 
and would thus imperil the very foundations of the 
Community. 19 
According to the above quotation, three major conclusions should be noted: 
firstly, that the Court's statement is limited to Treaty provisions and "directly 
applicable measures of the institutions"; secondly, there is no implication that 
conflicting national provisions are void but they are just "inapplicable"; and 
thirdly, as it is mentioned in the second paragraph, it is concerned not only with 
direct conflicting national legislation, but also with national laws which 
encroach upon the field within which the Community exercises its legislative 
power. 
Regarding the first point, it is clear that a Community provision will prevail over 
any national one in cases where the Community provision is directly effective. 
However, it does not mean that this is applicable only to EU regulations. There 
is no specifying limitation that only regulations are directly applicable. 
Therefore, the principle of superiority can be applied in those cases where 
directives or even Community decisions are considered to be directly effective. 20 
The ECJ has underlined that point in several cases and, according to the existing 
19 Paragraphs 17 and 18 of the judgment. 
20 See Chapter Three. 
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jurisprudence, Community law should prevail over inconsistent national law 
even in certain cases regarding directives and decisions. The Ratti21 and 
Marshall22 cases are both very good examples, where Community law, even in 
the form of directives, prevails over national legislation, provided the right 
contained in the directive is invoked against the state or an emanation of the 
state and satisfies certain conditions23. It is also obvious that a directly effective 
provision in a EC Treaty will prevail over inconsistent national legislation24. 
According to the second point mentioned above, there is a positive obligation on 
Member States to repeal conflicting national legislation, even though it is 
inapplicable. This was laid down in the French Merchant Seamen case 25 where, 
according to the French law, a certain proportion of the crew on French 
merchant ships had to be of French nationality. This was against the provisions 
of the European law, so a case was brought against France, according to the 
proceedings of Art. 226 EC (ex. 169). The French Government argued that since 
the Community law prevailed, the French law was simply inapplicable. 
Moreover, it was said that since the French law was inapplicable there was no 
violation of the Treaty. However, the ECJ decided that a failure to repeal the law 
21 Publico Ministero v Ratti, 148/78, [1979] ECR 1629. 
u Marshall v Southampton and South West Hampshire Area, Health Authority, 152/84, (1986), 
ECR723, [1986] ICMLR486. 
73 As mentioned in the previous Chapter, there is distinction between the vertical and horizontal 
effect of directives As it is mentioned by Advocate General Lenz in his opinion in Paola Faccini 
Dom v Reereb Srl, 91/92, [1994] ECR 1-3325, [1995] 1 CMLR 665, "pursuant to the Court's 
consistent case law, a directive which has not been transposed cannot have direct effect in 
relation between individuals (i. e. horizontal effect)" In the Marshall case the effectiveness of 
directives is limited to vertical relationships (i. e. enforceable rights for individuals as plaintiffs of 
defendants but only against the State). See, also, Foster v British Gas, 188/89, [1990] ECR I- 
3313, Marleasing SA v La Commercial International De Alimentacion SA, 106/89, [1990] ECR I- 
4235, Von Colson v Land Nordrhein- Westfahlen, 14/83, (1984) ECR 1891 and Francovich v 
Italian State, 6&9/90 [1991] ECR I-5357. 
24 See Bresciani, 87/85, [1976] ECR 129. 
25 Commission v France, Case 167/73, [1974] ECR 359. 
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would cause "an ambiguous state of affairs" which would make Community 
seamen uncertain as to the possibilities available to them on relying on 
Community law. 26 Therefore, according to the judgment, France had to repeal its 
law. 
The question to address at this point, is whether European law prevails over 
national legislation even when there is no direct conflict between them. The 
third point mentioned above brings some light to this question. According to that 
point, the power of the member States can be limited even when the conflict is 
indirect or potential. In certain cases, for example, Member States lose their 
power to enter into agreements with third countries, even where there is no 
direct conflict with the provisions of the EU. Art. 6(2) of the ECSC Treaty states 
that, in International relations, the Community shall enjoy the legal capacity it 
requires to perform its functions and attain its objectives. Therefore, any 
agreement between a Member State and a third country may potentially be an 
obstacle to the aims of the Union and consequently against its provisions. 
Moreover, in cases of agricultural issues, the Union has created a common 
organisation of the market as a common measure and the Member States are 
precluded from adopting any measure which might create exceptions or 
undermine it. This applies even in cases where there is no direct conflict. 
In Factortame27 the Court emphasised the obligation to ignore a conflicting 
national law. The basis for the Court's decision was, again, the provisions of 
26 See paragraph 41 of the judgment. 
27 Rv Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd, 213/89, [1990] ECR 1-2433. 
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Art. 10 EC (ex 5) and Art. 234 EC (ex 177), referring to the importance of 
ensuring firstly the effectiveness of Community law in general and secondly the 
reference procedure in particular. Therefore, member States must amend any 
rule which prevents the reference procedure from being effective. In 
Factortame, the applicants, Spanish companies, challenged British legislation 
which limited the possibility of registering a ship as British to persons and 
companies with a genuine connection with the country. The inability of the 
applicants to obtain an injunction against the Secretary of State for Transport, 
due to the then presumed state of the law on injunctions against the Crown and 
its officers, was found to impede an effective remedy. Interim measures were, 
according to the ECJ, applicable because otherwise the case would be useless to 
the applicants because of the losses suffered during the time they could not 
operate their ships. The Court cited Simmenthal 28 and extended the rule to cover 
interim measures. 
It must be added that the full effectiveness of 
Community law would be just as much impaired if a 
rule of national law could prevent a court seised of a 
dispute governed by Community law from granting 
interim relief in order to ensure the full effectiveness 
of the judgment to be given on the existence of the 
rights claimed under Community law. It follows that 
a court which in those circumstances would grant 
interim relief, if it were not for a rule of national law, 
is obliged to set aside that rule. 
That interpretation is reinforced by the system 
established by Art. 177 of the EC Treaty. 29 
28 Supra note 16. 
29 Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the decision. 
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Although in Factortame there was the need for a temporary disapplication of a 
rule of national law pending final determination of the issue in question by the 
ECJ, in other cases there is a requirement to repeal the national law in favour of 
the supremacy of Community law when the incompatibility of EC and national 
law is established. 
As has already been mentioned, the principle of the supremacy of the European 
Community law is also applied in cases where national constitutions' provisions 
are in conflict with it. This was underlined in the case Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft30. The problem in this case was that there was a possible 
conflict between a Community system of export licences for agricultural 
products and human rights provisions of the German Constitution. The applicant 
argued that Community regulation should be invalid due to its conflict with the 
constitution. The ECJ rejected any possibility of Community law being judged 
against national standards, even constitutional ones. In this case, a very good 
analysis was presented of the relationship between the European law and the 
national constitution. It stated that: 
For, in this case, it is not enough simply to speak of 
the precedence' of Community law over national 
constitutional law, in order to justify the conclusion 
that Community law must always prevail over 
national constitutional law because, otherwise, the 
Community would be put in question. Community law 
is just as little put in question when, exceptionally, 
Community law is not permitted to prevail over 
entrenched (zwingende) constitutional law, as 
international law, is put in question by Art. 25 of the 
Constitution when it provides that the general rules of 
international law only take precedence over simple 
30 Case 11/70, [1970] ECR 1125. 
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federal law, and as another (foreign) systems of law 
is put in question when it is ousted by the public 
policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. The 
binding of the Federal Republic of Germany (and of 
all Member-States) by the Treaty is not according to 
the meaning and spirit of the Treaties, one-sided, but 
also binds the Community which they established to 
carry out its part in order to resolve the conflict here 
assumed, that is, to seek a system which is compatible 
with an entrenched precept of the constitutional law 
of the Federal Republic of Germany. Invoking such a 
conflict is therefore not in itself a violation of the 
Treaty, but sets in motion inside the European organs 
the Treaty mechanism which resolves the conflict at 
the political level. 31 
It is important, then, to realise the theoretical aspect of the relationship between 
national constitutional sovereignty and the impact of the European' law on it. 
According to the above quotation, a mere conclusion that European law must 
prevail over national constitutional law simply because the European provision 
came later would put the whole existence of the EU into question, since most of 
the Member States would not have been willing to reject their national sovereign 
constitutional rights so simply. Supremacy is actually binding in terms of legal 
obligation. The doctrine of sovereignty and supremacy of EC Law derives from 
the decisions of the ECJ. 32 
4.4 The relationship between the EU and the national constitutions. 
In this section, a rather jurisprudential approach to the issue is attempted in order 
to highlight the theoretical background of the special relation between the EU 
31 Ibid., paragraph 21 of the judgment. 
32A fact which Lord Bridge observed in Factortame No. 1. See, supra note 17. 
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legislation and the national constitutions. It is important to establish that the 
supremacy of the first does not necessarily mean the inferiority of the latter. 
Therefore, the theoretical analysis of this relationship will provide the basis for 
examining the ground on which national Courts managed to give priority to EU 
legislation. This analysis, might be useful, also, for the Cypriot Courts in their 
attempt of compromising the principle of the supremacy of the Cypriot 
Constitution along with the principle of the supremacy of EU legislation. 
In terms of the Treaties establishing the EU, the relationship between the 
sovereignty of national constitutions and European law, has always been treated 
very carefully, since an absolute and strict treatment would cause several 
problems in the nature of the EU and its relations with the Member States. 
Especially, after the application of the Maastricht Treaty, the interrelation 
between the national constitutional law and the EU sphere of legislation, has 
been under even more extensive and particular review. 
There has been a belief, especially within the European Parliament, that the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU), known as the Maastricht Treaty, constitutes a 
European Constitution. 33 This is in contrast with the usual parallelism of the 
relationship between the primary European law and the national constitutions. 
The Maastricht Treaty, like the Single European Act of 1986 and like all the 
other previous founding treaties, appears to be primarily an international treaty; 
that is, a treaty which had been agreed by sovereign states and which is the 
33 See, Llorente, F. R., "Constitutionalism in the Integrated States of Europe", The Jean Monnet 
Working Papers No. 5/98, as cited at 
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product of intergovernmental conferences. Both the TEU and the Treaty of 
Amsterdam keep all the usual formalities in the manner of their formation and of 
their signing. Also as mentioned in Art. 35.1 of the Single European Act (SEA) 
and as laid down by the Art. 247 of the European Economic Community Treaty 
(EC), the Treaty must be ratified by the Member States according to the 
provisions of their constitutions. It could be argued, then, that the European 
Treaties' "legitimacy" is vested vis-a-vis on the national constitutions. 
It is, therefore, obvious that within the provisions of the Treaties establishing the 
EU the problem of the relationship between the European law and the 
constitutions of the Member States is not clearly resolved. Primary European 
legislation faces the situation in a very careful, compatible and discreet way. It 
seeks to avoid any direct conflict regarding the hierarchy of the two levels of 
legal application, between the primary European law and the national 
constitutions. This is the jurisprudential approach which, to avoid a direct 
conflict, rests the application of the two sources of law (i. e. national 
constitutions and primary European Law) in two different levels. The first level 
is the national constitutions of the Member States, and the second one is the 
primary law of the EU. According to this method, the problem of the 
relationship between the two sources of law is not faced as a hierarchical 
problem between different sets of laws, since they do not exist on the same 
level, and therefore there cannot be any direct comparison concerning legal 
priority or superiority between them. 34 In principle, then, one cannot consider 
http: //www. law. harvardLedu/program. s/Jean Monnet/papers/98/98-5-. html, at p. 29. 
3'Venizelos, E., `H EvvOýull tou Mäaatpgr uat o Eupwnauc6q EvvtayµartxoS Xdipo; ' [The 
Maastricht Treaty and the European Constitutional Order] (1995) 13 CL Rev. 7119. 
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the one inferior to the other. By avoiding this direct conflict, one is able to 
respect both legislations without devaluing either of them. By using the method 
of the two application levels, one cannot simply compare and say which source 
of law is superior. In the case of the UK for example, one can support the belief 
that the application of the supremacy of the European law in Britain is not a 
product of a comparison between British national law and European law which 
finds European law superior to British law, but on the contrary, that it is applied 
in the UK because a national law (Act of Parliament) says so. Therefore, it could 
rightly be argued that superiority of Community law does not necessarily mean 
inferiority of national law. It could rather mean that national law gives priority to 
Community law, by respecting its own legislation and without devaluing its 
power. This theoretical approach, might be a necessary means, also, for Cypriot 
Courts on their attempt to implement the principle of supremacy of Community 
law within the Cypriot legal order. It could be argued that the Cypriot Courts do 
not devalue the power of the national constitution, but merely, decide, through 
the constitution, to give priority to European law. 35 
However, according to the relevant jurisprudence of the ECJ, throughout the 
case law, the problem of the relationship cannot be solved by a `geometrical' 
version of the delimitation of the lower levels of application, such that each legal 
order, national or communal, is considered to cover its own level of application 
so that the European law would have no problem of contrast or of subjection to 
the national constitutions. This jurisprudential method, as it was explained 
above, could, however, be considered as over simplistic. 
35For further discussion, on how the principle of supremacy of the EU legislation could be 
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The whole problem shall be faced then, firstly, on the level of the primary 
European law by reference to the composition, the function and the legal 
products of the Intergovernmental conferences which were held during the 
process (i. e. the negotiations and the construction) of the Treaty, and secondly, 
on the level of the Member States and their constitutions, by referring to it as a 
matter of constitutional policy. It is, therefore, according to this national 
constitutional policy that the supremacy of European Law is accepted. 6 And this 
is proved by the fact that before or during the ratification of the Treaty, the 
national judicial or political authorities do respect the procedure of ratification 
(or even the procedure for amending the Constitution for the purposes of the 
Treaty), which is provided under their Constitutional provisions. 
On the EU level, this approach is considered to be more diplomatic and discreet, 
though on the national level it is considered to be more formalistic. However, 
the result is the abolition of any potential interpretational doubts in a very radical 
way. In this point there is nothing new, since a similar approach was adopted in 
all the critical stages of the communal phenomenon; in the establishment and the 
enlargement of the Communities, in the Single European Act, in the Treaty on 
the European Union and the recently adopted Treaty of Amsterdam. In all the 
above cases, there were special amendments of the national constitutions, or 
even the preparation of new constitutions (e. g. the Greek Constitution) for the 
implemented within the Cypriot legal order, see below. 
36 Llorente, rightly commented on this issue that: Obviously, judges will not be able to respect 
Community law if its validity and its asserted primacy have no basis of support in the 
constitutions they are bound by oath to uphold. See, supra note 33, at p. 15. 
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reception of the communal phenomenon, by respecting all the necessary 
procedures for ratification under the national constitutions 37. However, these 
were not enough to stop the argument about the relationship between national 
constitutions and European law, particularly, during the implementation of the 
Treaties and especially on the area of the protection of the fundamental 
constitutional articles. 8 In addition to this, the great ambitions created by the 
Maastricht Treaty, specifically the creation of the EU and the attempt to codify 
the primary European law, make things different. 
Standing in contrast to the age old theoretical and judicial dispute, firstly and 
primarily about the issue of supremacy and secondly about the issue of the levels 
of application, the Treaty of Maastricht faces the classical problem of the 
relationship methodically. It makes an explicit reference to the main provisions 
of the European Conference for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms39 and the "common constitutional traditions" of the 
37 See Papademetriou, G., "To Zävraypa Kai IJ dtaötxauIa vS Eapanranc c EvozoiijariC" [The 
Constitution and the Procedure for European Integration], Athens, Volume 1,1982, at p. 87 and 
Skandamis, N., "Eopcvnaucd Korvortxd dixaio Kai E. Uiivixö d1icaio 17povappoy4c" [European 
Community Law and the Greek Law of Adaptation], Sakkoulas Publications, Athens, 1992, p. 93. 
38 Most of the national courts have not been prepared to accept the principle of the supremacy of 
Community law with regard to at least some of the provisions of their national constitutions. In 
the German Maastricht case (Brunner v European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57), the German 
Court has made clear that a transfer of powers to the Community and its supremacy cannot affect 
the basic Articles of the German constitutional order. Similarly, the Danish Supreme Court, in the 
Danish Maastricht case (Danish Supreme Court, decision of 6t' April 1998, Case I 361/1997), 
expressly said that the Community cannot be given power to adopt legislation that would be 
contrary to the Danish Constitution. Also, the Italian Constitutional Court considers that 
Community law cannot prevail over the fundamental principles of the Italian Constitution 
(Fortini, Corte Costituzionale, decision No. 183 of 27th December 1973, [1974] 2 CMLR 372 
(para. 21 of the judgment); [1974] RDI 154) and the Greek Council of State in 1997 reserved the 
right not to apply Community law whenever they consider that the EU institutions have exceeded 
their competence. 
39 Art. F par. 2 of the TEU. 
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Member States, as the result of the political and economic interdependence 
between the Union and its Member Statesao. 
Moreover, one could support the view that the TEU created a new ground of 
mutual concessions between the national constitutions and the EU. The national 
constitutions reserve their powerful and austere character and the EU is moving 
towards its goals without considering the national constitutions as a direct 
obstacle. This is why the EU seeks to respect the national constitutional 
procedures, in every step it makes. This balance does not seem to be just a 
coincidence and it was not difficult to achieve, since the constitutional traditions 
of the Member States share similar features because they reveal common values 
and similar institutional, historical and cultural European background 41 This is 
despite their considerable differences. 
In order for the EU to achieve this discreet approach to the national 
constitutions, it did not restrict itself to the ratification procedures according to 
the national constitutions, as the founding Treaties did. It also sought a 
permanent abolition of the existing problematic relationship between the ECJ 
and the national Constitutional Courts. Paragraph 2 of the Art. F of the TEU 
reads: 
The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights, 
signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they 
40 See McCormick, N., "Sovereign, Democracy and Subsidiarity", International Seminar, Law 
School of the University of Salonica, Salonica 16-19/5/1993. 
41 Supra note 34, p. 7129. 
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result from the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States, as general principles of 
Community law. 
The TEU, then, makes a very significant step, which is the legal reference to the 
ECHR and the clear reference to the common constitutional traditions as rules, 
rather than just a simple reference to a common cultural and political 
background. 
By adopting this simple form of legislation by reference, the Treaty promotes the 
common constitutional tradition from a judicial formula, to a provision of the 
basic European law. These common constitutional traditions are probably 
established as a general principle of the European law in a more general and less 
concise way, but as a part of the European primary law with all the relevant 
characteristics of superiority and direct applicability. Therefore, the common 
constitutional traditions are considered to be among the general principles 
common to the laws of the Member States, as they are mentioned in Art. 288 EC 
(ex. 215). 
The question arising here, is whether the provision of the par. 2 of the Art. F of 
the TEU, carries a new arrangement, additional to what the ECJ case law has 
already provided. The legal, or the practical, question is whether a common 
constitutional tradition can be applied at its minimum (i. e. when there is a 
common ground of a protection of a right in all the Member States) or at its 
maximum (i. e. when a right provided only by one national constitution could 
become a part of the EU legal order). This argument helps us to establish and 
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plan a relevant legal consideration for other constitutional aspects in addition to 
Human Rights. The argument, therefore, that the existence of a right in only one 
national constitutional order is enough for it to be considered as a right protected 
by the European law, can be compared with the reasoning of the decision given 
in the case Cassis de Dijon, 42 where a similar approach seems to have been 
taken in justifying the national regulation. 
However, what is defined by the term "common constitutional traditions"? Are 
they the common constitutional solutions of the Member States to a common 
problem? Are they the common codified principles? Are they a common list of 
fundamental rights, where the provision of a right in one national constitution 
only is enough to add this right to the list, or is the list made by the common 
provisions which are included in more than one constitution? Or, are they some 
common constitutional customs? Definitely, the term "common constitutional 
traditions" is something more precise than the definition of the term "tradition" 
itself. 
The view that "common constitutional traditions" can mean a common list of 
fundamental rights, was accepted by the ECJ in the case Nold 1143 and supported 
even more strongly by the Advocate General Warner J. P. in the case IRCA 44 
Therefore, one could support the view that the term "common constitutional 
traditions" refers to the common constitutional background of the Member 
42 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, [ 1979] ECR 649. 
43 Case 4/73, Nold v Commission, [1974] ECR 491; [1974] 2 CMLR 338. 
44 Case 7/76, IRCA, [1976] ECR 1213. 
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States, and although they might be included in different constitutional passages, 
they share some common cultural background 45 
By using this basis for defining the meaning of the common constitutional 
traditions, one could support the view that a common tradition is more powerful 
than the common general principles (principles generaux de droit) included in 
the national constitutions. If this assumption is correct, then the first common 
constitutional tradition is the actual existence of a powerful written constitution 
in the Member States. Of course, the exceptional case of the UK's legal order 
(i. e. the non existence of a written constitution) shall not be subtracted but it 
shall be added to this tradition46. 
Therefore, the EU shows a great respect for national constitutions. It does not 
seek either to compete, or to underestimate their power, but just to arrange their 
coexistence within the EU formula without any struggle for superiority or 
inferiority. 47 All the efforts to put the two legal orders in a direct opposition are 
faced successfully and methodically by the EU legislation. It seeks to smooth 
their relationship by putting them in a parallel coexistence. In spite of potential 
conflicts, the EU does not attempt to abolish respect for national constitutions. 
45 Tomuschat, C., `Europe -a common constitutional space' in De Witte, B. and Forder, C. (eds), 
"The Common Law of Europe and the future of legal education", Kluwer Law & Taxation 
Publishers, Maastricht, 1992, at p. 133 Also see, B De Witte `Community law and national 
constitutional values', (1991) 2 LIEI 1, and Ph. Lauvaux, `Existe-t-il un modele constitutionnel 
europeen? ', (1991) 14 Droits, p. 49. 
46 Supra note 30, p. 7131. 
47 According to Professor Llorente, F. R., European law will continue to lean on the national 
constitutions for its validity. At least for the time being there is no alternative to the doctrine of 
'two different but co-ordinated' legal systems. See, supra note 33, at p. 29. 
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4.5 Accommodating Supremacy to national law. 
Although the principle of supremacy of Community law has been clearly set 
down by the EU and the ECJ, the accommodation of this principle in the 
national systems has not been directed by the EU. As mentioned above, this is 
probably the result of the very careful approach of the EU to its relation to the 
national constitutions. A direct and absolute decision of the EU on how the 
principle of superiority should be adopted by the national constitutions would 
have caused serious damage to the sensitive issue of the relationship between the 
two legal systems. The relationship between the two systems is based on mutual 
respect and of course the EU has no wish to create more problems in this matter. 
The fact that the manner of accommodating the principle of superiority has been 
left to each Member-State's constitutional procedures, shows that the EU does 
not seek to undermine the power of the national constitutions. Therefore, each 
Member-State has followed its own way of accommodating the principle, 
according to its legal order. 
This accommodation has been achieved by several methods used by the national 
legal and judicial systems. Some states managed to accommodate the principle 
in a straight forward way and others used more complex methods. Some states 
tried to make supremacy palatable to the national issue and others tried even to 
avoid the issue. 
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However, there are basically two ways of adopting the principle of supremacy in 
the national system, depending on whether the country follows the monist or the 
dualist conception of international law. In simple terms, the basic thesis of the 
monist approach is that international law and national law are part of one 
world system; they operate in different spheres but are part of the same legal 
structure. 48 The dualist approach is based on the principle that international law 
and national law are two fundamentally separate things; therefore there is not 
one world system into which both can be fitted. According to the first theory, 
then, international treaties can be part of the national law, and they can be 
applied directly by the courts. However, according to the second theory, 
international treaties will be part of the national legislation, only if the national 
legislature passes the appropriate provisions for their adoption. 
The countries that follow the monist conception of international law, therefore, 
already have the appropriate mechanisms for the application of international 
treaties. So, the EU Treaties can be part of the national law and have direct 
effect, since those States are prepared to give direct effect to all treaties with 
suitable provisions. In cases of conflict between the national law and the 
European law, those countries usually recognise the supremacy of the treaty 
provisions. One could support the view, then, that there is no need to amend the 
constitution, since the pre-existing constitutional structure affords the possibility 
of accommodating the EU law. France and the Netherlands are both examples of 
states following this conception and both have express provision in their 
48 Hartley, T. C., "The Foundations of European Community Law", 2°d Ed. 1988, p. 186. 
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constitutions for the direct effect and supremacy of international treaties 49 
However, amendments have been made to accommodate the principle of 
supremacy of Community law. 
However, the fact that this approach considers Community law as a part of the 
international law, could be criticised since it fails to recognise that Community 
law has its own special characteristics which differentiate it from international 
law. In addition to this, there is a less satisfactory operation in the case of 
Community law, since giving effect to the treaty does not necessarily mean 
applying measures made under the treaty. 
On the other hand, countries which follow the dualist concept of international 
law have to make an express provision for the transfer of power to international 
organisations. This provision has to be set down through the country's national 
legislature; and it is not enough for it simply to be mentioned in the treaty. Art. 
24(1) of the German Constitution and Art. 20 of the Danish Constitution provide 
the power for transfer of powers to international organisations. In Art. 66 of the 
Dutch Constitution, there is a similar provision. The Netherlands, then, can give 
effect to the EU legislation under Art. 66 and can apply the Treaties on the basis 
of the monist approach. In Italy and in Greece, the constitutional position 
appears not to be so clear, but the existence of certain Articles has helped the 
adoption of the EU legislation. 
49 Art. 55 of the French Constitution and Art. 66 of the Netherlands Constitution. For more 
discussion on the reception of the principle of the supremacy of Community law by the national 
constitutions of France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, 
Germany, Italy and Denmark, see, Weiler, J., `Supremacy and National Constitutions: Reception 
by the Member States. ', in "Trading In and With Europe: The Law of the European Union", New 
York University, School of Law, as cited in 
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In Italy, for example, Art. 11 of the Constitution authorises the limitation of the 
State's sovereignty in cases concerning the establishment of peace and justice 
between nations. That was actually the basis for the adoption of Community law 
in the Italian legal order. Similarly, in Greece, according to the new Constitution 
of 1974 Art. 28(2) provides that: 
Authorities provided by the Constitution may by treaty 
or agreement be vested in agencies of international 
organisations, when this serves an important national 
interest and promotes co-operation with other states... 
In the case of Ireland, the Irish Constitution was specially amended to provide 
that nothing in it would prevent EU measures from having the force of law. 5° 
The UK passed a simple Act of Parliament since it was not in a position to adopt 
a formal constitutional amendment in the absence of a written constitution. This 
Act of Parliament, the European Communities Act, made a clear provision for 
the direct effect and supremacy of the Community law. However, in neither of 
the two above mentioned cases was there an express reference made to a transfer 
of powers, but something of this nature must have resulted. 
In the following paragraphs, the special problems faced by the Member-States in 
order to accommodate the principle of supremacy in their national legal system, 
will be discussed. 
http: //www. law. nyu. edu/weilerj/Unit4/EU97403. htm 
50 Third Amendment to the Constitution. Further amendments were required to enable Ireland to 
ratify the following European Treaties as well. 
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4.5.1 The case of Belgium. 
The Belgian example provides evidence for the clearest instalment of the 
European legislation in its legal order. The particular case of Belgium, where 
there was no clear position as to whether the State followed the monist or the 
dualist concept, also failed to provide any constitutional provision on whether 
the international treaties should have direct effect and could override national 
law. The decision, then, on how to face the challenge of the EU law, had to be 
decided by the Belgian courts. 
The case Minister for Economic Affairs v Fromagerie Franco-Suisse `Le Ski'51 
confronted the problem. In this case, the respondent had to pay some import 
duties for dairy products, as they were imposed by a number of royal decrees. 52 
However, the ECJ had declared these duties to be contrary to the EEC Treaty. 53 
They were then abolished, but the Belgian Parliament declared that money 
already paid was not recoverable. The respondent claimed recovery of the duties 
he had already paid, before the Belgian Court. The Brussels Cour d'Appel 
decided in his favour, but the Minister appealed to the Cour de Cassation. 54 
The appeal was based on two arguments. The first was that since the Belgian 
Parliament had already ratified the Treaty by a statute, when Belgium joined the 
51 Cour de Cassation, Belgium, 210 May 1971, [1972] CMLR 330. 
52 Enforcement proceedings used by the Commission under Art. 169 EEC. 
53 Commission v Luxembourg and Belgium, Case 90&91/63, [1964] ECR 625. 
54 The highest civil court in Belgium. 
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EEC, the effect of the Treaty in Belgium was dependent on the statute. 
Therefore, since the statute prohibiting the recovery of the money was passed 
subsequent to the Treaty, it prevails over the Treaty, since the later law should 
prevail over the former. The second argument was that the Cour d'Appel had no 
right to annul any Act of Parliament since, according to the Belgian 
Constitution, only Parliament may determine the constitutionality of a statute. 
The Cour de Cassation dismissed the appeal on the ground that the treaty does 
not take effect in Belgian law as part of the statute, but as a treaty in its own 
right. This can be interpreted to mean that Belgium follows the monist approach. 
Therefore, the conflict was not between two statutes, but between a treaty and a 
statute, two fundamentally different things. The Court then stated: 
"The rule that a statute repeals a previous statute in so 
far as there is no conflict between the two, does not 
apply in the case of a conflict between a treaty and a 
statute. 
In the event of a conflict between a norm of domestic law 
and a norm of international law which produces direct 
effects in the legal system, the rule established by the 
treaty shall prevail. The primacy of the treaty results 
from the very nature of international treaty law. 
This is a fortiori the case when a conflict exists, as in the 
present case, between a norm of internal law and a norm 
of Community law. 
The reason is that treaties which have created 
Community law have instituted a new legal system in 
whose favour the Member-States have restricted the 
exercise of their sovereign powers in the areas 
determined by those treaties. " , 55 
55 Supra note 5 1. 
177 
Chapter Four Constitutional Supremacy v Supremacy of Community Law 
Finally, it was decided that since the provision of Community law was violated 
by the royal decrees, Art. 25 EC (ex. 12) was directly effective and despite the 
conflict with the statute, the courts had the duty to uphold it. 
The second argument of the Cour de Cassation was that the Cour d'Appel had 
not annulled the law prohibiting recovery, but simply declared its operation 
suspended to the extent of the conflict. One could argue that there is no 
distinction between the two statements mentioned above; however, the 
significance is that since the country follows the monist approach, the courts 
must have the power to disregard national legislation when it conflicts with a 
directly effective treaty provision. 
This judgment, therefore, was quite helpful in solving the problem of the 
relationship between the national law and the EU law, when a conflict exists. 
The acceptance of the monist approach by the Belgian Court was very 
satisfactory from the point of view of Community law. 
4.5.2 The cases of Germany and Italy. 
Germany and Italy are considered to be countries which pay particular attention 
to the protection of fundamental human rights. Therefore, their constitutions 
give significantly more protection to human rights than those of any other 
Member-State. This has caused many problems and conflicts between the 
domestic law and Community law. 
178 
Chapter Four Constitutional Supremacy v Supremacy of Community Law 
As mentioned before, Germany considered the problem of the relationship 
between its national law and Community law, in the case of International 
Handelsgesellschaft v EVGF. 56 In this case the plaintiff asked for an annulment 
of a decision made by the EVGF based on two Community regulations. Firstly, 
he argued that the regulations were in conflict with the provisions for 
fundamental human rights made by the German Constitution. In this case the 
ECJ ruled that the validity of Community provisions should be determined 
according to the Community law, not national constitutional law, and argued 
that the provisions in question did not violate the Community's concept of 
human rights. Later, the case was brought before the Federal Constitutional 
Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which took the view that Community law 
is neither a component part of the national legal system nor international law, 
but forms an independent system of law flowing from an autonomous legal 
sources? and decided that the two legal systems were independent. 
Considering the substantive issue, the Constitutional Court decided that the 
Community measures in issue were not contrary to the German Constitution. In 
fact the Constitutional Court has never found any community measure to be 
contrary to the German Constitution and after adopting a new approach in 
Steinike & Weinlig58, in 1979, it finally ruled in 1986 that the Community had 
sufficiently developed measures concerning the fundamental human rights, so it 
now meets the requirements of the German Constitution. This was decided in 
"6 Supra note 15. 
 [1974] 2 CMLR 549, paragraph 19 of the judgment. 
58 25th July 1979, [1980] 2 CMLR 531. 
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the Wunnsche Handelsgesellschaft59 case, in which it was also stated that the 
Court would no longer entertain proceedings to test Community measures 
against the human rights provisions of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz). 
In addition, the judgment of the case explains the accommodation of supremacy 
to the national system. 
Article 24(1) of the Constitution makes it possible to 
open up the legal system of the Federal Republic of 
Germany in such a way that the Federal Republic's 
exclusive claim to control in its sphere of sovereignty 
can be withdrawn and room can be given for the direct 
validity and application of law from another source 
within that sphere of the sovereignty. It is true that 
Article 24(1) of the Constitution does not itself provide 
for the direct validity and application of the law 
established by the international institution, nor does it 
directly regulate the relationship between such law and 
domestic law, for example the question of the priority of 
their respective application... 
Article 24(1), however, makes it possible constitutionally 
for treaties which transfer sovereign rights to 
international institutions and the law established by 
such institutions to be accorded priority of validity and 
application as against the internal law of the Federal 
Republic by the internal application-of-law instruction. 
That is what took place in the case of the European 
Community Treaties and the law established on their 
basis by the Community organs by the passing of the 
Acts ofAccession to the EEC Treaty under Articles 24(1) 
and 59(2), first sentence, of the Constitution. From the 
application-of-law instruction of the Act of Accession to 
the EEC Treaty, which extends to Article 189(2) EEC, 
arises the immediate validity of the regulations of the 
Communityfor the Federal Republic and the precedence 
of their application over internal law. 60 
59 22d October 1986, [1987] 3 CMLR 225. The most important developments, in the eyes of the 
Constitutional Court, was the significance given to the constitutions of the Member-States and the 
Joint Declaration of 5 April 1977 of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. 
60 Case judgment paragraph 31. 
180 
Chapter Four Constitutional Supremacy v Supremacy of Community Law 
However, Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG), in its examination regarding the 
application of the Maastricht Treaty in Germany, has made an important 
provision in the famous German Maastricht Case, 61 according to which: 
If European institutions or agencies were to treat or 
develop the Union Treaty in a way that was no longer 
covered by the Treaty in the form that is the basis of the 
Act of Accession, the resultant legislative instruments 
would not be legally binding within the sphere of 
German sovereignty. The German state organs would be 
prevented for constitutional reasons from applying them 
in Germany. Accordingly, the Federal Constitutional 
Court will review legal instruments of European 
institutions and agencies to see whether they remain 
within the limits of the sovereign rights conferred on 
them or transgress on them. 
This case, has been considered of paramount importance in regard to the 
principle of supremacy of European law, since it clearly limits its application, by 
claiming jurisdiction to review the actions of European institutions for ensuring 
that they remain within the limits of their powers and that the basic German 
constitutional rights are not violated. German Courts, in several other later cases, 
have also challenged the principle of supremacy, either firstly, by granting 
interim relief on the ground that German Courts must not apply ultra vices acts 
of the Community62 or secondly, by arguing the primacy of international trade 
law over Community law. 63 
61 Brunner v The European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57. 
62 German Federal Tax Court, Order of 9 January 1996,7 EuZW 126 (1996). See, also, Germany 
v Commission, 280/93, [1994] ECR I-4973. For more discussion on the implications of those 
cases, see, Everling, U., `Will Europe Slip on Bananas ? The Bananas Judgment of the Court of 
Justice and National Courts', (1996) 33 CML Rev. 401 and Reich, N., `Judge-made "Europe a la 
carte": Some Remarks on recent Conflicts between European and German Constitutional Law 
Provoked by the Banana Litigation' (1996) 7 EJIL 103. 
63 T. Port GmbH vHauptzollamtHamburg-Jonas, 364&365/95, [1998] ECR 1-1023. 
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Like the BVerfG, the Italian Constitutional Court took the view that Community 
law is separate from both international law and the internal law of the Member 
States. In the Fortinir case, it stated that Community law and internal law are 
autonomous and distinct legal systems, albeit co-ordination in accordance with 
the division ofpower laid down and guaranteed by the Treaty. 
Nevertheless, it is important to mention that Costa65 and Simmenthal66 were the 
early cases in which the ECJ established the principle of the supremacy, and 
were both referred by the Italian courts. Despite these pronouncements of the 
ECJ, the Italian Constitutional Court, the Core Constitusionale, had not 
enforced Community law which conflicted with the national law. It was 
reluctant to override the Constitution, particularly the provisions concerning the 
fundamental human rights (like Germany), but eventually accepted the rights 
adopted by the Community as a substitute67. Actually, the Cranital case in 1984 
was the first case in which supremacy started to be accepted. In the judgment on 
this case, it was stated that since where is a conflict between a Community 
regulation and national legislation, the constitutional court should disapply 
national law68, relying solely on Community law. It has to be noted here, that 
once a Community regulation existed on a matter, the Italian State was no longer 
competent to legislate (the concept of pre-emption). 
64 Corte Constituzionale, 27 December 1973, [1974] 2 CMLR 372. 
65 Supra note 14. 
66 Supra note 16. 
67 See Charlesworth, A. and Cullen H., "European Community Law", Pitman Publishing, 1994, 
Chapter 6. 
68 Societe Granital v Ministero delle Finanze [1984] 21 CMLR 756; discussed in Gaja, 'New 
Developments in a Continuing Story: the Relationship between EEC Law and Italian Law' (1990) 
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Since, under Article 189 EC, Community regulations were regarded as 
automatically part of national law, but Treaty provisions and directives were not, 
the Granital case could not clearly identify how far the Constitutional court 
would apply the supremacy issue. 
For this reason, in 1985 in Spa Beca v Amministrazione delle Finanze69, it was 
decided that the Italian courts must also disapply national law which was 
inconsistent with ECJ judgments. The decision was, also, supported in 
Provincial di Bolzano v Presidente Consiglio Ministri70. At this stage, the 
constitutional court faced a conflict between national law and Treaty articles as 
far as the equality of treatment of self-employed persons is concerned. As a 
result, the court stated that Article 164 EC required the courts and administrative 
authorities of Member States to recognise the supremacy of directly effective 
Community law. 
4.5.3 The case of France. 
As mentioned above, the accommodation of the supremacy of the EU legislation 
in the French legal order has been achieved under the provisions of Article 55 of 
the French Constitution. Accordingly, Article 55 provides that, treaties or 
agreements that have been duly ratified shall, as soon as they published, have a 
27 CML Rev 83. See, also, PL Petriccione, 'Italy: Supremacy of Community Law Over National 
Law' (1986)11 EL Rev. 320. 
69 See Gaja, ibid. at p. 83-4. 
70 [1989] ECR I-1076. 
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higher authority than statute, provided that the treaty or agreement in question is 
applied by the other party. However, a paradoxical phenomenon occurred, since 
the Cour de Cassation (the highest of the ordinary judicial courts) accepted the 
supremacy of Community law over French law by 197571 whereas the Conseil 
d'Etat (the supreme administrative court) rejected it until as late as 1989. 
There were two kinds of resistance to. acceptance of the principle that 
Community law should prevail: first, because of the doctrine of the separation of 
powers and of the supreme power of the legislative, the courts have traditionally 
no right to verify the constitutionality of legislation, and assessment for 
compatibility with international conventions is treated in the same way as 
assessment for compatibility with the Constitution; secondly, there is a body that 
has this specific function of deciding upon constitutionality, the Constitutional 
Court. 
In particular, in the case of Syndicat General de Fabricants de Semoules de 
France, 72 the Conseil d'Etat concluded that it had no jurisdiction to review the 
validity of French legislation and therefore it could not give supremacy to 
Community legislation. 
The refusal of the application of Community law by the Conseil d'Etat 
continued as late as 1989. In fact, the Conseil d'Etat obstinated the 
establishment of Community law by the development of the so-called "loi- 
71 Administration des Downes v Societe Cafes Jacques Vabre [1975] 2 CMLR 336. 
72 [1970] CMLR 395. 
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ecran" concept, stating that a statute (1oi) established subsequent to a Treaty 
provision acted as a screen (ecran) preventing the administrative courts from 
applying the Treaty provision to administrative acts which were made under the 
authority of the subsequent statute73. 
However, in 1989, the Nicolo case74 the Conseil d' Etat abandoned its isolation 
and moved towards an acceptance of the supremacy of Community law. In the 
Nicolo case the Conseil assessed the legality of a French electoral statute against 
the EEC Treaty and by doing so it seems that it have decided to accept the 
principle of supremacy of Community law. However, the above confusion was 
finally resolved by the case of Boisdet75 in 1991, where the Conseil d' Etat 
reached a decision applying the Community law on the basis of Community law 
itself. 
Another significant step towards the accommodation of the principle of the 
supremacy of Community law in the French legal order, was the ruling of the 
Constitutional Court (Conseil Constitutionnel) regarding the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the necessity for an amendment to the Constitution. In 
that ruling it was also accepted that France could in certain circumstances 
transfer sovereignty to the European Union without a constitutional 
amendment 
76 
73 Judgment of 13th May 1983, SA Rene Moline, Rec. Lebon, 191. 
74 Application of Raoul Georges Nicolo [1990] 1 CMLR 17. 
75 [1991] 1 CMLR 3. 
76 See, Oliver, `The French Constitution and the Treaty of Maastricht' (1994) 43 ICLQ 1, at pp. 
11-16. 
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4.5.4 The case of the United Kingdom. 
The United Kingdom Courts have accepted the full implications of supremacy 
albeit perhaps by a gradual process. 7 The fundamental principle of 
Parliamentary sovereignty, on the one hand, and the dualistic approach to 
international law, on the other, forced Britain to use a different to the other 
Member States approach in order to accommodate the' principle of the 
supremacy of Community law in its own legal order. 
The sovereignty of Parliament states that the legislative power of Parliament has 
no legal limits except that Parliament cannot limit its own powers for the 
future. 78 Also, the dualistic approach of British law towards international law 
implies that international treaties signed and ratified by the UK are not part of 
the domestic law. Thus, for any international treaty to be binding and 
enforceable in the UK, further national legislation has to be passed. 
Therefore, due to those distinctive characteristics of the British legal system, 
British courts decided to apply Community law directly from an Act of 
Parliament79 rather than from Community law itself, since the Act could be 
n For more information about the UK case, see Birkinshaw, P., `European Integration and United 
Kingdom Constitutional Law' (1997) 3 EPL 57. See, also, Craig, P., 'Parliamentary Sovereignty 
in the United Kingdom after Factortame' (1991) 11 YEL 22; Chalmers, D., 'The Application of 
Community Law in the United Kingdom, 1994-1998' (2000) 37 CML Rev. 83. 
78 Moreover, according to Professor Dicey, Parliament has the right to make or unmake any law 
whatever; and further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as having a 
right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament. Dicey, AN., An Introduction to the 
Studyof the Law of the Constitution. MacMillan Press, London, 1960, p. xviii. 
79 European Communities Act 1972. 
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treated as a permission by Parliament to do so. Therefore, Community law will 
always prevail unless Parliament clearly and expressly in a future statute 
overrides Community law. Also, according to Section -2(l) of the European 
Communities Act (1972), the enforcement of directly effective Community law 
in the UK was clearly provided. 
Nevertheless, British courts had to decide whether the application of the 
supremacy of Community law derived from the Community law itself, or it was 
because the Act of Parliament provided so. If the latter occurred, under the usual 
rules of statutory interpretation, legislation subsequent to domestic legislation 
(the European Communities Act) would prevail over it. 
According to Lord Denning in Macarthys Ltd v. Smith80, the application of the 
supremacy of Community law in the British legal order shall be justified by the 
specific provisions made by the European Communities Act. He emphasised, 
though, that if the overriding of Act of Parliament is to be seen as a fulfilment of 
a true Parliamentary intention and if it is clear that the legislative contravention 
of Community law was intentional, then domestic law should prevail. In 
particular, he stated that: 
If the time should come when Parliament deliberately 
passes an Act with the intention of repudiating the 
Treaty or any provision in it or intentionally of acting 
inconsistently with it and says so in express terms then I 
should have thought that it would be the duty of our 
courts to follow the statute of our Parliament. I do not 
however envisage any such situation ... Unless there is 
such an intentional and express repudiation of the 
Treaty, it is our duty to give priority to the Treaty. 
80 [1980] ICR 672 (CA). 
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However, in the later case of Factortame, 81 where the issue of conflict of 
Community and British law was addressed, the ECJ supported the view that the 
English statutory legislation had to be disapplied. The British government 
considered this as a new remedy and subsequently it could not be created by the 
Court. However, the ECJ, replying to the British government, insisted that this 
remedy already existed in the British law and it explained that the purpose was 
to remove a barrier and not to create a remedy. 82 
When the case returned to the House of Lords, Lord Bridge concluded that the 
supremacy of Community law was derived from the Community itself. 
If the supremacy within the European Community of 
Community law over the national law of Member States 
was not always inherent in the EC Treaty it was 
certainly well established in the jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice long before the United Kingdom joined 
the Community... Under the terms of the 1972 Act it has 
always been clear that it was the duty of the United 
Kingdom court, when delivering final judgment, to 
override any rule of national law found to be in conflict 
with any directly enforceable rule of Community law. 83 
However, although for the ECJ Community law must be made effective with a 
superior force, for the British courts it was still not clear whether to apply 
Community law as supreme, if Parliament explicitly derogated from Community 
rules. 84 Moreover, in Duke v GEC Reliance Ltd. 85 a question raised whether the 
$ý Supra note 17. 
82 Supra note 67 at p. 55. 
83 Factortame v Secretary of State for Transport (No2) [1991] All ER 106 at 108 (HL). " Supra note 67 at p. 56. 
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principle of the supremacy of Community legislation could also have effect on 
the non-directly effective Community law. As mentioned above, section 2(1) of 
the European Communities Act provides for the enforcement of the directly 
effective Community law. For this reason, the House of Lords in this case 
refused to interpret a provision of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 in the light 
of the Community's Equal Treatment Directive, since the British legislation pre- 
dated the directive and, therefore, the Act could be seen as implementing 
legislation. 86 Therefore, the House of Lords did not accept to construe national 
legislation consistent with non directly effective Community law. However, 
more recently, in Webb v EMO Cargo Ltd. 87 the House of Lords accepted that in 
principle their Lordships and British Courts will try to construe domestic 
legislation consistent with a non directly effective directive whether the 
domestic legislation came after or preceded the directive. In fact, the House of 
Lords eventually construed the domestic legislation in dispute, consistently with 
the European Court's ruling. 88 
The accommodation, therefore, of the principle of the supremacy of Community 
law in the British legal order, has been primarily achieved by the introduction of 
the European Communities Act in 1972, but the application of this principle has 
been achieved by the continuous rulings of the British courts. The role of the 
national British courts has been of paramount importance in accommodating the 
8S [1988] AC 618. 
S6 Whereas, according to previous rulings, when legislation post-dates Community directives, 
British courts have been willing to interpret it in accordance with Community law. See, Pickstone 
v Freemans plc [1989] AC 66; Litster v Forth Dry Dock and Engineering Co. Ltd [1989] 1 All 
ER 1134. 
87 [1992] 4 All ER 929. 
88 Webb v EMO Cargo Ltd. [1996] 2 CMLR 990; [1994] ECR I-3567. 
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principle of supremacy in the British legal order and this could be used as an 
example of how important and constructive the role of the courts might be in 
accommodating the principle of supremacy in the domestic legal order. 
4.5.5 The case of Greece. 
As mentioned above, the new Constitution of Greece of 1974 provided a special 
provision for assisting the adoption of the Community law and its provisions 
within the Greek legal order. The provision of Art. 28(2) of the Greek 
Constitution constitutes the basis for accommodating the supremacy of the EU 
law into the Greek legal system. Specifically in the case Karellia v Minister of 
Industry89, it was stated that: 
In accordance with the provisions of the Act of 
Accession, and with immediate effect from 1 January 
1981, the provisions of the treaties establishing the 
European Communities constituted part of the Greek 
legal order and took precedence over any other 
conflicting legislative provision, pursuant to Article 28 
of the Constitution. This primacy necessarily also 
covered the provisions of acts of the institutions of the 
Community enacted pursuant to Article 189 of the 
Treaty which, together with the Treaty itself, constituted 
the Community legal order. 
Therefore, for Greece, the necessity of a new constitution after the fall of the 
dictatorship in 1974, and the abolition of the Monarchy in Greece, assisted 
89 Case No 3312/1989. 
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Greece to face this problem, preventing the need for a future amendment or 
regulation. 
4.6 Accommodating the principle of supremacy of Community law in the 
Cypriot legal order. 
The accommodation of the principle of supremacy into the legal systems of the 
Member States, has been achieved by several methods used by the national legal 
and judicial systems. Each member state adopted its own approach for 
accommodating the principle, since, as it was mentioned above, the 
accommodation of the principle is not directed by the EU. The question, arising 
then, is whether and how Cyprus will accommodate the principle of supremacy 
in its own legal system. 
As it has been noted above, following the examples of other Member States, the 
accommodation of the principle to the national system mainly depends on 
whether the country follows the monist or the dualist conception of international 
law. Before suggesting any possible ways according to which Cyprus would be 
able to accommodate the principle of the supremacy of European Law into its 
own legal system, it is important to analyse the relationship between the Cypriot 
Law and International Law. It is important, then, to point out whether Cyprus 
follows the monist or the dualist approach towards the international law. 
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The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus does not make an expressed 
provision for incorporating international law into the legal system of the 
Republic as it is done by other countries' constitutions. 
In Germany, Article 25 of the Basic Law of the German Federal Republic 
provides that the general rules of public international law are an integral part 
of federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and shall directly 
create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory. Moreover, 
Art. 10 of the Constitution of Italy provides that Italy's legal system conforms 
with the generally recognised principles of international law. The legal status of 
foreigners is regulated by law in conformity with international law and treaties. 
A foreigner to whom the practical exercise in his own country of democratic 
freedoms, guaranteed by the Italian Constitution, is precluded, is entitled to the 
right of asylum within the territory of the Republic, under conditions laid down 
by law. The extradition of a foreigner for political offences is not admitted. 
Finally, Art. 28 of the Constitution of Greece (1975) reads, The generally 
accepted rules of international law and its international conventions from their 
ratification by law and in accordance with the terms of each one as regards 
their coming into force constitute an integral part of the Greek internal law and 
have superior force to any internal law. 
According to the provisions of Art. 32 of the Constitution of Cyprus one could 
assume that the legislator's intention, although it is not precisely expressed, 
was to incorporate general international law (private international law, 
customary international law and conventional international law) into the legal 
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system of the Republic. Art. 32 reads as follows: Nothing in this Part contained 
shall preclude. the Republic from regulating by law any matter relating to aliens 
in accordance with international law. Referring on this provision, one could 
assume that international law is part of the Republic of Cyprus 90 
However, on the other hand, in Art. 169, the Constitution makes express 
provision with regard to conventional international law. 91 Tornaritis, 
commenting on Art. 169, stated that the Constitution of Cyprus follows the 
monist theory and considers treaties, conventions and international agreements 
concluded in accordance with the provisions ofArticle 169... 92 
Nevertheless, the question is whether the Constitution is included within that 
"municipal law", as it is mentioned in Art. 169(3). The answer to this question is 
very important, since if the Constitution is part of this municipal law, then 
automatically, as it is provided by Art. 169(3), any treaty, convention and 
agreement concluded would be superior to it as well. If that is the case, then one 
could support the view that European Law, as part of a possible treaty of 
accession of Cyprus to the EU, has superior force to the Constitution and 
therefore Article 179 does not conflict with the principle of superiority. 
The answer, though, seems to be negative. The argument is that if, indeed, an 
international treaty has superior force to the Constitution, that would amount to 
90 See Tornaritis, C., "The Introduction of International Law into the Legal System of Cyprus", 
Nicosia 1987. 
91 The full Article is quoted in Chapter Three. 
92 Supra note 90, p. 17. 
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an amendment of the Constitution without the procedure laid down in Art. 182 
being followed. It could also be argued that since the Constitution of Cyprus is 
considered as one of the most rigid in the world, especially considering 
amending provisions, the legislator's intention was not to include the 
Constitution within the term "municipal law" and by the provision of Art. 179 
intended to give emphasis to the superiority of the Constitution, even over 
international treaties, conventions and agreements. Otherwise, if international 
treaties were supposed to be superior to the Constitution, Art. 182 and generally 
the Constitution itself would have lost their strict character which was actually 
the legislators' intention. One could suppose, then, that the legal structure in 
Cyprus hierarchically is listed as: Constitution superior to international treaties, 
conventions and agreements, and international treaties, conventions and 
agreements superior to municipal law (where municipal law consists of any law 
passed by the organs of the Republic but it does not include the Constitution). 
Although, as Tornaritis suggests, Cyprus follows the monist approach and has 
the appropriate mechanisms for the application of international treaties in its 
legal system, the Cypriot legal system does not recognise the supremacy of 
treaty provisions over its Constitution. Therefore it can be argued, the 
accommodation of the principle of supremacy of the Community Law cannot be 
achieved by following the example of other Member States which adopt the 
monist approach to international law. 
Following the examples of Greece and Italy, or even Ireland's case (see previous 
headings) one could support the argument that the accommodation of the 
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principle of supremacy could be achieved by adding a special provision to the 
Constitution of Cyprus. As mentioned in Chapter Three, an extra provision to 
Art. 169 of the Constitution authorising the limitation of the State's sovereignty 
to cases concerning the establishment of peace and justice between nations or 
providing clearly that nothing in it would prevent EU measures from having the 
force of law, would be the best way of accommodating the principle of EU law 
supremacy along with the whole European legislation within the Cypriot legal 
order. 93 An actual amendment of Art. 179 of the Constitution directly providing 
for the supremacy of Community Law would undoubtedly be restricted by the 
strict rules concerning constitutional amendments, since Art. 179 is considered 
as a basic Article. 94 Therefore, any future interpretation of Art. 179 (i. e. after the 
accession of Cyprus to the EU) should be made parallel to the provisions of Art. 
169. As mentioned above, supremacy of Community law does not necessarily 
mean inferiority of the national Constitution. On the contrary, the two principles 
of supremacy could co-exist theoretically on a parallel level without competing 
each other, and in practice their compatibility is achieved by the national 
principle of supremacy in giving priority, by its own provisions (i. e. 
constitutional provisions for transfer of powers) to the Community. 
Therefore the role of future judicial decisions of the Supreme Court of Cyprus, 
could play the most significant role for the accommodation of the EU supremacy 
to the Cypriot legal order. One could support the view that future judicial 
decisions through the appropriate interpretation of the supremacy of the 
93 See Chapter Three. 
94 See Chapter Six. 
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Constitution under the light of the provisions of Art. 169 of the Constitution, 
could be the best tool for achieving the accommodation of the principle of the 
Community's supremacy to the Cypriot legal order. In most cases, a potential 
conflict between EU provisions and Cyprus Constitutional provisions could be 
avoided by a suitable compromising interpretation of the constitutional 
provisions. When such a compromise is impossible, Art. 179 could also be 
interpreted in such a way that it will not have force over matters concerning EU 
legislation. Thus, it could be achieved by an interpretation stating that the 
Constitution is superior to all municipal laws and international treaties but is not 
superior to EU law, which is considered as a sui generis regime in international 
law. 95 Such an interpretation could also result from a reference to Art. 169, 
which as mentioned in the previous chapter, would provide for the transfer of 
powers to the EU and its institutions. 
As a conclusion, then, taking into consideration the rigid character of the 
Cypriot Constitution, the issue of the accommodation of the European principle 
of supremacy into the Cypriot legal order should be tackled very carefully. Thus, 
the best way of facing the problems would be the addition of an extra provision 
to the Constitution, following the example of Greece and Ireland and the parallel 
to this, interpretation of the Art. 179. 
95 For more discussion about the sui generis character of the Community's legal order, see 
Chapter Five. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
ARTICLES 170 AND 185(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF CYPRUS AND 
ARTICLE I OF THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE: THEIR FUNCTION 
AND APPLICATION IN REGARD TO THE ACCESSION OF CYPRUS 
TO THE EU 
In the last two chapters, there was an examination of the relationship between 
Cypriot Constitutional law and Community law, and how the basic principles of 
the Community legislation could be accommodated in the Cypriot legal order. 
This chapter examines whether the existence of particular provisions of the 
Cypriot Constitution might prohibit the accession of Cyprus to the EU. In 
particular, Articles 170 and 185 of the Constitution and Article I of the Treaty of 
Guarantee are examined. The provisions of those Articles could be considered as 
possible obstacles towards the accession of Cyprus to the European Union 
because of their prohibitions for the political and economic union of Cyprus with 
another state, and the limitation of the most favoured treatment on behalf of 
Cyprus to Greece, Turkey and the UK. It has been officially argued (mainly by 
the Turkish side) that those constitutional provisions could establish the actual 
accession of Cyprus to the EU as unconstitutional. However, this thesis seems to 
support the view that those Articles should not be considered capable of 
preventing the Republic of Cyprus from gaining access to the EU, for certain 
reasons that will be explained below. 
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5.1 Articles 170 and 185 (2) of the Constitution and Article I of the 
Treaty of Guarantee. 
Article 170 reads as follows: 
1. The Republic shall, by agreement on appropriate 
terms, accord most favoured-nation treatment to the 
Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland for all agreements whatever their nature may 
be. 
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not 
apply to the treaty concerning the Establishment of 
the Republic of Cyprus between the Republic, the 
Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland concerning the bases and military facilities 
accorded to the United Kingdom. 
The three States mentioned above were actually the three Guarantor powers so it 
was important for them to have most-favoured-nation (m-f-n) treatment. It was 
also a guarantee that the new state would maintain the best economic relations 
with its guarantor powers. That would serve the Cypriot economy in its early 
stages too. It should also be noted that this Article derives from paragraph 23 of 
the Zurich and London Agreement of 19 February 1959, which provides that 
"The Republic of Cyprus shall accord most-favoured-nation treatment to Great 
Britain, Greece and Turkey for all agreements whatever their nature". 
However, the implication of m-f-n does not prohibit Cyprus from entering into 
economic agreements with other States as well. The Article did not seem to 
intend the economic isolation of Cyprus. It could be argued that the Article was 
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vital, since restricting the most favoured treatment to only one of the Guarantor 
powers would definitely lead to internal problems between the two communities 
and the economic dependence of Cyprus on one of the Guarantor powers. In 
such a case, the independence of the Republic of Cyprus would be seriously 
jeopardised and the future of the 1959 settlement would be under threat. 
The pressing argument, however, is whether Cyprus is eligible for accession to 
the EU since Turkey is not a Member State; whereas Greece and Britain are, and 
whether by this implication Turkey loses the privilege of being accorded most- 
favoured-nation status. 
Article 185 could also be considered as an obstacle towards the accession of 
Cyprus to the EU. It reads as follows: 
1. The territory of the Republic is one and indivisible. 
2. The integral or partial union of Cyprus with any 
other State or the separatist independence is 
excluded. 
According to Article 185 (2) then, one could arguably suggest that the accession 
of Cyprus to the European Union is prohibited by its provisions regarding the 
integral or partial union of Cyprus with any other State. This is an argument that 
could also be stated concerning the provisions of Article I of the Treaty of 
Guarantee. As mentioned in chapter one, the Treaty of Guarantee has 
constitutional force under Article 181 of the Constitution. 
According, then, to Article I of the Treaty of Guarantee, 
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The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the 
maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity 
and security, as well as respect for its Constitution. It 
undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any 
political or economic union with any State whatsoever. 
It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to 
promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any 
other state or partition of the Island. 
Therefore, it is important to examine and analyse those Articles in order to 
decide whether they constitute an obstacle to the accession of Cyprus to the EU. 
It is also desirable, for reasons which will become apparent, to set out the 
situation at the time of the drafting of those Articles. 
The immediate precursor of Article I paragraph 2 was Point 22 of the "Basic 
Structure of the Republic of Cyprus". As mentioned in chapter one, the "Basic 
Structure of the Republic of Cyprus" was initialled by the Greek and Turkish 
Prime Ministers at Zurich on 11 February 1959. According to Point 22, it shall 
be recognised that the total or partial union of Cyprus with any other State, or a 
separatist independence for Cyprus (i. e. the partition of Cyprus into two 
independent States), shall be excluded. 
However, what was the need for such a provision in Point 22, which would later 
come to be an Article of the Constitution? The answer to such a question lies in 
the historical and political facts which resulted in the creation of the Republic of 
Cyprus. It is, indeed, a fact that the creation of the Republic of Cyprus was a 
political settlement given by the three States involved in the Cyprus case in 
1959. The three states were Greece, which represented the Greek Cypriots' 
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rights and demands, Turkey, which represented the Turkish Cypriots' rights and 
demands and the United Kingdom as the colonial ruler. It is also a fact that the 
Greek Cypriots were struggling for enosis, union of Cyprus with Greece, where 
the Turkish Cypriots were objected and supported taksim, a partition of the 
island. It is obvious, then, that a settlement providing for the birth of a new 
sovereign and independent State would exclude both ambitions. ' The 
compromise underlying the Zurich and London Accords of 1959 involved the 
abandonment of both. That is why Point 22 was considered to be quite crucial 
and necessary to be included in the Constitution of the new State (i. e. the 
Republic of Cyprus) having the form of a constitutional article. 
The minutes of the meeting held at the British Foreign Office on 12 February 
1959 shed light on the need of such an Article in Cyprus' Constitution. In this 
meeting, the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, Messrs Averoff and Zorlu, 
reported their Zurich Agreements to the United Kingdom Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs. The Foreign Secretary then asked a number of questions 
concerning the Zurich documents. Referring to Article I of the Treaty of 
Guarantee the following exchange took place. 
The Secretary of State... turned to the Zurich documents 
beginning with the Treaty of Guarantee. Was the second 
paragraph of Article I intended to preclude Cypriot 
membership of all international associations, as for 
1 Ahmed Sheich in his book "International Law and National Behaviour", John Wiley & Sons, 
1974, at p. 265 explains: "Both groups of inhabitants over a long history had managed to 
perpetuate a strong and rich different cultural heritage that continued to make assimilation 
extremely difficult. This became quite apparent at the time of independence from British rule in 
1960 when the Greek Cypriots demanded a union with Greece and the Turkish Cypriots 
demanded a partition of the island. Consequently, the recent cause of tension can be attributed to 
the 1960 national Constitution of this island that was written under the explicit premise that 
neither of the above two demands will be met. " 
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example the Free Trade Area if that ever came into 
existence. 
M. Zorlu explained the paragraph was intended to 
prohibit partition and Enosis (whether with Greece or 
with any other country). M. Averoff agreed; he explained 
that the wording was specifically designed to exclude 
possible Greek devices in the direction of Enosis, such 
as a personal union of Cyprus and Greece under the 
Greek Crown. M. Zorlu and M. Averoff both made it 
clear that there would be no objection to Cypriot 
membership of international associations of which both 
Greece and Turkey were members; e. g., the Postal 
Union and any Free Trade Union. Nor did they exclude 
either Commonwealth membership for Cyprus or 
membership of the Sterling Area. They would, indeed, 
welcome Commonwealth membership... Article I of the 
Treaty of Guarantee could be amended if necessary to 
make clear that neither Commonwealth nor Sterling 
Area membership were excluded. But the final decision 
on such membership would, of course, rest with the 
Cypriots themselves. 
The Foreign Secretary accepted this explanation, and no amendment to Article I 
was found necessary, though in another case an additional article (Art. 3) was 
added to the Treaty of Guarantee to ensure the existence of the British bases in 
Cyprus by both Greece and Turkey. 3 
However, the matter was raised again in the London Joint Committee on 
Cyprus on 19 October 1959. The Committee was responsible for the finalisation 
of the various texts in accordance with the provisions agreed on by the three 
states at Zurich and London. The Committee consisted of representatives of the 
Greek Cypriot Community, the Turkish Cypriot Community, the United 
Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. According to the minutes of the 26`h meeting of 
2 "Record of a Meeting held at the Foreign Office at 4 p. m. on Thursday, February 12,1959" FO 
371/144640, p. 2. 
3 Meeting on the 12 February 1959, FO 371/144640, p. 3. 
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the Committee, the discussion between the British chairman and the senior 
Greek Cypriot representative went as follows: 
Sir Knox Helm then asked if, apart from the proposed 
Article VMr. Rossides accepted the draft text. 
Mr. Rossides replied affirmatively. He then asked the 
meaning of Article I paragraph 2. He presumed it 
referred to union with Greece or Turkey, but it seemed 
rather sweeping, as he supposed that Cyprus could for 
instance join an economic organisation or the 
Commonwealth. 
Sir Knox Helm observed that that was coming near to 
re-examining the wording of the Treaty, and that it was 
perhaps better not to start to try to interpret the various 
Articles. 
M. Roumos said he thought they could all assure Mr. 
Rossides and put on record that it was certainly not 
intended that Cyprus should be precluded from 
membership of the Free Trade Area or multilateral 
organisations. What was meant was that Cyprus should 
not be politically united with Greece or Turkey, or even 
economically in the narrow sense of customs union; but 
that could not really be said in a Treaty. 
M. Bayulken confirmed that the wording did not refer to 
any international organisations, such as F. A. O., 
G. A. T. T, etc. 
Mr. Rossides thanked M. Roumos and M. Bayulken for 
their explanation, and then said that he must reply to Sir 
Knox Helm's remark that he was trying to open 
discussion of the Treaty. When starting, he had said that 
he did not dispute it, and had asked for elucidation... 
His Delegation had received a constructive reply from 
the Greeks and Turks and had thought it proper to raise 
the issue. 4 
Thus, one could rightly argue that the aim of the Article I of the Treaty of 
Guarantee was to prevent both enosis and taksim. However, are these the only 
two occasions where the Article applies? For an accurate answer, more analysis 
is needed and the use of several interpretative methods must be considered. 
4 London Committee on Cyprus, Corrected Minutes of the 26th Meeting of the Committee of 
Deputies, LC (MD), 19th October 1959, p. 6. 
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Additionally, it is important to mention that up to the present, the Republic of 
Cyprus participated in several international organisations and movements and 
concluded numerous economic agreements between other states without 
confronting the above Articles as obstacles. Notably, the Association Agreement 
with the EU and the Customs Union have been signed without facing any 
constitutional problems. Could these be considered, then, as a misconduct and a 
constitutional infringement on behalf of the Republic of Cyprus? If that is the 
case, then, it would seem that the international legal personality and 
independence of Cyprus would be seriously limited. Therefore, it is submitted 
that the generalisation of the Articles mentioned above, is inappropriate, since 
that would cause, as it has already mentioned above, the international isolation 
of Cyprus. 
5.2 Interpreting Article 185 of the Constitution and Article I of the Treaty 
of Guarantee, under the provisions of international law. 
5.2.1 Interpretation methods and tools under international law. 
Whatever the system of public order, whether that of the 
world community in its entirety or of a regional, 
national, or sub-national component of the whole, the 
task of interpretation would appear to be fundamentally 
the same for all types of prescriptions - international 
agreements, constitutions, statutes, precedents, and 
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customary prescriptions - and even for private 
agreements. 5 
As rightly stated above, the task of interpretation is a fundamental one for all 
sorts of prescriptions. Generally speaking, interpretation is called the form of 
activity which aims at explaining and expanding the meaning and a scope of a 
prescription, as well as the outcome of this activity. In stricto sensu 
interpretation denotes the process by which judges ascertain the meaning of the 
words or phrases and elucidate obscurities originally inherent in law, whereas in 
lato sensus it indicates the creative activity of judges in extending or limiting the 
scope of the language, strengthening or weakening its operation, correcting its 
shortcomings, responding to new problems and filling gaps. 
To achieve the task of interpretation concerning treaties, several methods have 
been developed by international law, namely, the textual method, the subjective 
method and the functional method. The textual method is based on the 
presumption that the intention of the parties is reliably expressed in the text so 
that the main task is to read and consecrate its sanctity. According to the Latin 
maxim "in claris non fit interpretatio" (viz. If the text is clear and unambiguous 
it does not require to be interpreted) the textual method concentrates on the 
clarity or ambiguity of the text. 
The lexical element is the first aid to the textual method. The lexical element 
refers to the vocabulary and language used. It has to be detected whether or not 
s McDougal, -M., "The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order", Yale Press, 
1967, p. xi. 
6 Breilimas, A., "Methods of Interpretation and Community Law", North-Holland , 1978, p. 2. 
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the natural ordinary meaning leaves room for another meaning. Moreover, the 
lexical element is assisted by the grammar. Great emphasis is given to the 
meaning of the words in the context of the sentence and how the words are used 
in that context, rather than their isolated meaning. Thus, under the systematic 
technique of interpretation, emphasis has been given to the meaning of words, 
not in isolation but in the context of the paragraphs, articles and the treaty as a 
whole. Several arguments have been advanced in favour of the textual method. 
As Asquith L. J. mentioned, chaos may be obviously resulted if instead of asking 
what the words used to mean, the inquiry extends to what each of the parties 
meant to mean and how and why each phrase came to be inserted. 7 On the other 
hand, as Stamp, J. mentioned, sentences are not mere collections of words to be 
taken out of the sentence, defined separately by reference to the dictionary or 
decided cases, and then put back into the sentence with the meaning which you 
have assigned them as separate words... 8 
The second method of interpretation is known as the subjective method. It 
considers as a starting point the real intention or the presumed intention of the 
original drafters of the treaty. It also considers the expression of those intentions 
to exist in the documentary history of the negotiations (travaux preparatoires). 
This term refers to the extrinsic materials which had a formative effect on the 
final draft of a treaty, such as the record of negotiations preceding the conclusion 
of a treaty, the minutes of plenary meetings and committees of a conference 
which adopted a convention and the successive drafts of a treaty. Although many 
7 Abu Dhabi Oil Arbitration (Petroleum Development) Trucial Coast v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 
ELF, 1951, No. 37, p. 144. 
8 Bourne v. Norwich Crematorium, Ltd. [1967] 2 All ER 576, at p. 578. 
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critics have argued that the a priori use of this method may lead to unacceptable 
results, Lauterpacht argued that to say that the intention is irrelevant and what 
matters is plain words is to divest the task of interpretation of its scientific 
character. Words are an expression of will. That will is not the will of the judge. 
He cannot substitute the intentions. Additionally, Lauterpacht strongly supported 
the recourse to "travaux preparatoires" on the assumption that it provides 
information as to the state of mind of the parties which in turn enables their 
intention to be discovered .9 
Finally, the third method is known as the functional method or the teleological 
one. The emphasis here lies on the function, utility, aim and purpose which the 
treaty has to fulfil, the circumstances in which it was made and its place in 
international life. It, differs from the other methods because, although all the 
methods have recourse to the purpose, the functional method is the only one that 
recognises that the purpose maybe independent of both the text and the intention. 
A criticism has been advanced against the functional construction in that it may 
spill over into judicial legislation and may amount to amendment. On the other 
hand, it has been fervently supported with regard to filling in the gaps in a treaty 
(in the absence of text or intention) or with regard to interpretation of constitutive 
treaties of international organisations and humanitarian treaties. Treaties of this 
type are viewed as "living law", to be interpreted according to contemporary 
standards, thereby facilitating their rapid adaptation to changing circumstances. 
9 Lauterpacht, 'Restrictive Interpretation and Principle of Effectiveness in Interpretation of 
Treaties', (1949) BYIL 48. 
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Besides the three methods of interpretation mentioned above, the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) also deals with the issue of 
interpretation. Basically, it promotes the pursuit of textuality, subject to 
modifications. 10 Such a significant modification in favour of the teleological 
approach has been the inclusion of subsequent practice among the principal 
means of interpretation in Art. 31.3. It favours the view that the starting point of 
interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab 
initio into the intentions of the parties. Lip service has been paid to the subjective 
method in Art. 31.4 providing that, A special meaning shall be given to a term if 
it is established that the parties so intended. In case of discrepancy between the 
various texts, a teleological solution is to be followed if they remain 
irreconcilable after the application of Arts. 31 and 32.11 The main interest of Art. 
33, lies in the fact that it envisages and provides for the case of failure of the 
textual approach. 
10 Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 
Article 31 provides for the general rule of interpretation. It reads: 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose... 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context ... any subsequent practice in 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation... " 
Article 32 provides the supplementary means of interpretation. It reads: 
"Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work 
of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting 
from the application of Art. 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation to Article 
31: leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable. " 
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5.2.2 Interpretation of Art. 185(2) of the Constitution and Art. I of the 
Treaty of Guarantee. 
Bearing in mind the above methods of interpretation and especially with 
reference to Arts. 31-33 of the Vienna Convention, a successful interpretation of 
the relevant Articles can be achieved. The first step is to consider the actual 
language of the treaty provision in its context and in the light of its object and 
purpose. This is actually the process suggested in Arts. 31-33 of the Vienna 
Convention. 
The second paragraph of Art. I consists of two sentences. The first contains a 
commitment by Cyprus itself not to participate, in whole or in part, in any 
political or economic union with any other State whatsoever. The second 
declares that any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union 
with any other State or partition of the island is prohibited. 
According to the text, it should be noted that the lexical element of the word 
"State" is in the singular. Is the term "State" wide enough to include a plural 
version as well, or was the reference to the term as "State" and not "States" 
deliberate? By following the textual method, one could support the strict 
interpretation of the words as they are written in the article, and therefore one 
could insist that the word "State" differs from the word "States" and 
consequently this provision applies only in relation to union with another "State" 
and not with other "States". Moreover, taking into consideration the whole 
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context of the Constitution (indeed, it is legitimate to take as the context of 
paragraph 2 the Constitution itself, to which paragraph 1 refers), one could notice 
that in other articles the plural form has been used instead of the singular. Article 
50 of the Constitution refers to international organisations and pacts of alliance. 
Also, Article 169 of the Constitution refers to international agreements with a 
foreign State or any International Organisation relating to commercial matters, 
economic co-operation... and modus vivendi. Thus, on the one hand, Article I 
paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee refers to "political or economic union 
with any State", whereas on the other hand, the relevant Articles mentioned 
above refer to "international organisations and pacts of alliance" and economic 
co-operation "agreements". That shows that there is a certain distinction between 
cases where the singular was used and cases where the plural was preferred. 
Accordingly, then, one could support the view that what is prohibited by Art. I 
paragraph 2 is union with another state, not co-operation with a group of states in 
establishing a supranational organisation of a political and/or economic character. 
Furthermore, under Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention, the subsequent 
practice of the parties to a treaty is to be taken into account if it establishes their 
agreement as to the interpretation of the treaty. Subsequent practice in the 
application of the Treaty of Guarantee suggests that it has not been regarded by 
the parties as preventing Cyprus from entering into treaties for closer economic 
and political relations with groups of states. The Association Agreement between 
the EEC and Cyprus probably constitutes the best example. As it is mentioned in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis, the Agreement envisages a customs union between 
Cyprus and the EEC (Article 2(3)), and adopts a principle of non-discrimination 
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as between nationals or companies of member states, and also as between 
nationals or companies of Cyprus (Article 5). The Turkish Cypriot side objected 
to the conclusion of the Agreement and Turkey, for its part, expressed concern 
over the possibility of discrimination against the Turkish Cypriot community in 
Cyprus, a concern addressed by Article 5 of the Agreement. The EEC disregarded 
the objections made by the Turkish Cypriot side on the ground that they were 
internal matters for Cyprus. However, and most importantly, neither the United 
Kingdom nor Turkey argued that the conclusion of the Association Agreement 
was a breach of Article 1 paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee or a breach of 
Article 185(2) of the Constitution. In fact, no-one suggested that the Agreement 
indirectly created or envisaged an economic union with any existing member of 
the EEC. 
Finally, by virtue of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, regard can always be 
had to the travauxpreparatoires of a treaty in order to confirm its interpretation. 
As it is mentioned above 12, during the drafting of the Treaty the main use of the 
Art. I of the Treaty of Guarantee was to prevent from any attempt for union with 
Greece, enosis, or partition of the island, taksim. According to the travaux, then 
the Greek and Turkish negotiators of the Treaty assured first the British 
Government and subsequently the Cypriot representatives that Art. I paragraph 2 
of the Treaty of Guarantee would not prevent Cyprus from joining to 
international organisations, including free trade areas, common currency areas 
etc. Therefore, it is clear that the intention of the Article was the prevention of the 
achievement of any possible uncompleted desire of the two communities, by 
12 See section 5.1 of this Chapter. 
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preventing them from achieving union with Greece or partition, together with any 
indirect form of arrangement which might achieve the same end, such as 
"narrow... customs union". It seems clear, then, the intention was not to prevent 
Cyprus from forming a political or an economic union with a supranational 
organisation or Union of States. The travaux of Article I paragraph 2 confirm that 
it means exactly what it says, that the use of the singular term "State" is 
deliberate. 
5.3 Articles 170 and 185(2) of the Constitution and Article I of the Treaty of 
Guarantee as obstacles towards the accession of Cyprus to the EU. 
As indicated above, there are several arguments supporting the view that Article 
170 and 185(2) of the Constitution and Article I of the Treaty of Guarantee, 
provide certain obstacles towards the accession of Cyprus to the EU. In fact, the 
Turkish Cypriot Authorities and Turkey strongly support this view. 
In brief, the main arguments supporting the view that Art. 170 and Art. 185(2) of 
the Constitution and Art. I of the Treaty of Guarantee are obstacles towards the 
accession of Cyprus to the EU, can be listed as follow: 
a) The EU is considered as a state, therefore, according to the lexical 
element of Art. 185(2) and Art. I, the accession of Cyprus to the EU 
(union with another state) is prohibited. 
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b) A possible accession of Cyprus to the EU would be an indirect way of 
achieving enosis with Greece which, according to the teleological 
approach of interpretation of the Art. 185(2) and Art. I is also 
prohibited. 
c) Art. 170 provides for a most-favoured-nation treatment to Greece, 
Turkey and the UK. Therefore, the accession of Cyprus to the EU, 
where Turkey is not a member, is against the provisions of this 
Article. 
According to Necati Monir Ertecon13, the implications of the advantages to the 
Greek Cypriots of EU membership can be summarised as follows: 
First of all the membership of Cyprus in the EU would automatically mean 
removal of barriers between member states (including Greece, which is an EU 
member) and Cyprus. So that would logically be interpreted as the achievement 
of enosis between Greece and Cyprus through the "back door". 
Secondly, the membership of Cyprus in the EU would constitute a violation of 
the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, and therefore would be invalid. 
Thirdly, with the accession of Cyprus to the EU, any special arrangements 
concerning bi-communality, bi-zonality and security would in effect be 
meaningless within an EU context. 
13 Ertecon, N. M., "The Greek Cypriot Eagerness and Agitation for EU Membership - Why? ", see 
http: //www. cypnet. com/. ncyprus/cyproblem/articles/bolum2. html 
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Finally, and more important for the Turkish Cypriots, membership would actually 
bring union with Greece, since Greece is an EU member, while Turkey would 
remain outside. Turkish Cypriots have been resisting union with Greece for years, 
and since Turkey is not a member state of the EU, they point out that there is a 
restriction formally ruled out in the 1960 agreements. 
They also argue that a further legal aspect of this restriction is imposed by the 
international Treaties, which had established the bi-communal 1960 Republic of 
Cyprus, on the membership of the Republic of any international organisations 
and pacts of alliance in which Greece and Turkey are not both members. 14 
In fact this "restriction", imposed by the 1960 Treaties, is particularly highlighted 
by the ex-Foreign Minister of Turkey, Murat Karayalhin, in one of his 
statements. 15 He emphasises that the application by Cyprus for membership in 
the EU is in conflict with the Zurich and London agreements of 1959 and the 
1960 Treaties on Cyprus. The Treaties contain provisions excluding membership 
of Cyprus in international political and economic unions to which Turkey and 
Greece do not both belong. They also contain specific provisions which do not 
allow Cyprus to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic 
union with any state whatsoever. 
14 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Politics & Policy, "The Question of the Membership of 
Cyprus In the European Union, Legal Implications" (http: //turkey. org/turkey/p-cypr08. htm). 
15 Statement by Murat Karayalhin, ex-Foreign Minister of Turkey on Greek Cypriot application 
for EU membership on 6`" March 1995 during the EU - Turkey Association Council in Brussels. 
http: //www. cypnet. com/. ncyprus/cyproblem/articles/bolum3 1. html 
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These specific provisions are included in the second paragraph of Article 1 of the 
Treaty of Guarantee 1960, which states that "the Republic of Cyprus undertakes 
not to participate in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any 
state whatsoever", and it cannot be disputed and proves the intention to maintain 
an equitable balance between the parties concerned. 
They actually argue that as the EU is fast becoming a closely integrated union it 
must be regarded as a compound "State" for the purposes of the said Article. 
Membership of the EU would constitute participation in whole or in part in an 
economic union and at least in part in a political union. So their argument is that 
this would be contrary to the Treaty. This is also mentioned in the Opinion of 
Professor M. H. Mendelson Q. C. 16 where he also makes another important point: 
that to try and escape that fact that it is contrary to the Treaty by arguing that the 
Treaty prohibits only union with a State, not States in plural, 17 would not only 
violate the ordinary meaning of the words, but would also oppose the intentions 
of the Governments who drafted this provision. Professor Mendelson also states 
that the drafters were only prepared to relax this ban if the organisation was one 
in which both Greece and Turkey participated, but such is not the case with the 
EU. 
By Article 1 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Cyprus bound itself "not to 
participate in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever". 
16 "Opinion on the Application of the Republic of Cyprus to Join the European Union" as drafted 
by Professor M. H. Mendelson Q. C (6 June 1997). 
17 Professor Mendelson argues that: the UK's Interpretation Act of 1978 (c. 30), s. 6 provides, for 
instance : "in any Act, unless the contrary appears... words in the singular include the plural and 
words in the plural include the singular. " Similarly section 1 of the Code of the Laws of the 
United States of America: 1 USC, Sect. 1, (1982). 
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Another supporter of that view is Hakki Muiuzade, who is the London 
Representative of the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". 18 He 
strongly supports the view that since Cyprus has bound itself with the Treaty of 
1960 with the sole exception that it is not restricted to union with organisations 
or "union of States" where both Greece and Turkey belong. He also suggests that 
though the Greek Cypriots have applied for EU membership, Britain and Turkey 
have the right to have a veto on Cyprus joining the EU. Britain has a veto, as a 
member of the EU on any new member under ordinary European Union Law, and 
Britain as a party to the 1960 Cyprus Treaty is legally bound by Article 2 "to 
prohibit ... any activity aimed at promoting ... union of the 
Republic of Cyprus 
with any other state". Turkey as a party to the 1960 Treaty also has a veto in the 
sense that she is not willing to release Britain from her treaty obligation under 
Article 2 until Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have settled their differences. 
He also urged the point that under the 1960 International Treaties establishing the 
"Republic of Cyprus", the Greek Cypriot side by itself has no capacity or 
authority, under the rule of law, to make a valid application for the union of 
Cyprus with the EU. 
According to Mr. Ergon Olgun, 19 both Guarantor Motherlands (Greece and 
Turkey) agreed to respect each other's rights and interests vis-a-vis the bi- 
communal Republic. The representatives of Turkey, Greece and the UK mutually 
agreed on 12`h February 1959 that: "the intention was to exclude more favourable 
18 "Cyprus - Two States Or One - Prospects For Membership Of The European Union", a speech 
at Chatham House, London 9`h December 1998, by Hakki Muftuzade, London, Representative of 
the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". 
19 Olgun, M. E., "European Union for "Cyprus "? ", as cited in 
http: //www. cypnet. coml. ncyprus/cyproblem/articles/bolum3. html 
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bilateral agreements between Cyprus and countries other than the Three Powers, 
and also to avoid the possibility of either Greece or Turkey securing a more 
favourable economic position in Cyprus than the other - of Greece for example, 
establishing a kind of economic enosis". The British document of 12th February 
1959 states that the two representatives, Zorlu and Averoff, both made it clear 
that there would be no objection to Cypriot membership of international 
associations of which both Greece and Turkey were members. 
Another point of paramount importance is the one made by Professor M. H. 
Mendelson Q. C. in his Opinion mentioned above. He argues that Article I, 
paragraph 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee by which "the Republic of Cyprus 
undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic 
union with any State whatsoever" declares prohibited all activities likely to 
promote either union with any other State or partition of the Island. In his view, 
membership would amount to participation in whole, let alone in part, in an 
economic union. At that point he is making an interesting parallel with the 
Austro-German Customs Union case (1931), in which the Permanent Court of 
International Justice held that Austria's entry into a customs union with Germany 
would constitute an alienation of its economic independence, contrary to Geneva 
Protocol 1 of 4t' October 1922. 
The supporters of this view argue that in June 1967 the Greek Cypriot legislature 
went so far as unanimously to pass a resolution in favour of enosis, union with 
Greece, so clearly prohibited by Article 185 of the Constitution. By this 
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implication they consider the accession of Cyprus to the EU as an indirect enosis 
between Greece and Cyprus. 
Mr. Rauf R. Denktas, self-styled president of the "Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus" emphasised that the application of Cyprus for membership in the EU is 
open to objection arising from Article 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee and echoed in 
Article 185(2) of the Constitution. 20 
Article 170 is also argued by the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities to be an 
obstacle towards the accession of Cyprus to the EU. The intention of the Article 
was to exclude more favourable bilateral agreements between Cyprus and 
countries other than the Three Powers, and also to avoid the possibility of either 
Greece or Turkey securing a more favourable position in Cyprus than the other, 
and they cite as an example the possibility of Greece establishing a kind of 
economic enosis. The proposed entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU, 
they say, would doubly violate this provision. Firstly, it would tend to encourage 
the kind of economic enosis with Greece, which according to the Agreement is 
prohibited, and secondly, if Cyprus joined the EU, this would result in Greece 
and the UK receiving considerably more favourable treatment than Turkey, 
which is not a member. 
20 Turkish Cypriot Memorandum Addressed to the Council of Ministers of the EU in Respect of 
an Application for membership by the Republic of Cyprus, 12 July 1990, by Rauf R. Denktas. 
httpJ/www. mfa. gov. tr/yayinlar/stat-cyp/Chap3. htm 
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5.4 Articles 170 and 185(2) of the Constitution and Article I of the Treaty of 
Guarantee as non-obstacles towards the accession of Cyprus to the EU. 
Objecting to the above, several other arguments can be developed, supporting the 
view that Art. 170 and 185(2) of the Cypriot Constitution and Art. I of the Treaty 
of Guarantee do not prevent the Republic of Cyprus from acceding to the EU. 
According to Clerides, C. the accession of Cyprus to the EU is not against the 
provisions of Art. I of the Treaty of Guarantee or Art. 185 (2), since it cannot be 
considered as a union with another State, 21 since the EU is not a state22. He 
mentions that according to Professor P. D. Dactoglou the EU is not a state but a 
new entity, neither national nor international. 23 Therefore, neither Art. 185 (2) nor 
Art. I applies on this occasion since their reference to "state" is not broad enough 
to cover the EU. 
The argument about the legal status of the EU has also, on several other 
occasions, been considered irrelevant to the Cypriot application. The general 
21 Clerides, C., `To Kunpuax6 i ucaio uat rl KotvoTtici Ewo tq Tä tl' [Cyprus Law and the 
European Legal Order], EKEM, Working Papers No. 24, May 1993. 
22 See, Antonopoulos, N., "H Kvnpos Kai I Evpmiraua Otxovo iKj Kotvör'! c" [Cyprus and the 
European Economic Community], Nicosia, 1977, pp. 30-31; See also concerning the legal status 
of the EC, Tornaritis, C., "At Zbpcptvviat L'vvUoccvs Kai 77 L'vvösots rrjc KÜnpov pe rrjv EOK" [The 
Association Agreement and the Association of Cyprus with the EEC], Nicosia, 1977, pp. 9-31; 
COSTA v. EKEL (1964) 3 CMLR 425; C. Tornaritis, "H Kotvif Ayopä Kai rj K67rpoc" [The 
Common Market and Cyprus], Nicosia, 1976. 
23 Dactoglou, P. D., "Evpaonatx6 KotvortW Aixato" [European Community Law], Sakkoulas 
Publications, 1979, p. 25, "Eivat opOdrepo va bgOoope ort of Evpanratxhs Kotv6Wes atroreAoGv 
Eva rpiro, xarvocpavec Kai avrotes errs öo avvao7rtopo6 xparaiv, pia vtrepcOvtx4 (&jAa&4 obre 
eOvtxij obre &Ovil) ev6mta nov xa&ire 'Kotvösrjs'. " [It is more accurate if we accept that the 
European Communities constitute a third, new and self-contained, level of States' coalition, a 
supranational (i. e. neither national nor international) union which is called "Community"]. 
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belief is that the EU has its own sui generis24 status and it cannot be considered 
as a state. Although there is a plethora of academic arguments about the legal 
status of the EU, there is no clear argument supporting the view that the EU is a 
state. Indeed, the EU has been established and it cannot be held back, however, 
its future final format remains unpredictable. 25 As Professor Dactoglou 
explained, no complete and final answer has yet been given and probably no 
such answer can be given because the Community is in a permanent state of 
evolution. 26 
Obviously, at the very beginning, those who envisaged and founded the European 
Union had in mind the model of a federal state. According to Jean Monnet, Have 
I said clearly enough that the Community we have created is not at end in itse 
It is a process of change... I have never doubted that one day this process will 
lead us to the United States of Europe. 27 However, this appears to be more 
24 Ibid., at p. 37. See also Wyatt & Dashwood, "European Community Law" Sweet & Maxwell 
1993,3'd Ed., at p. 55, It is the latter conception of the Community legal system, quasi federal yet 
undeniably sui generis, which seems likely to influence the future of the Community. Also Wyatt, 
D., `New Legal Order, or Old' (1982) 7 EL Rev. 147, wrote that the European Economic 
Community is established by an international tribunal, yet the prevailing orthodoxy has it that it 
constitutes a legal order sui generis, to be contrasted from the point of view of legal analysis, 
with traditional public international law. See also Wistrich, Ernest., "The United States of 
Europe" Routledge 1994, at p. 104, It is in this sense that Edward Heath was right to claim 
Europe's political organisation will be sui generis, but there is a little doubt that its development 
will be on federal lines. " See also Fortini [1974] 2 CMLR 386, SPA Comaricola [1982] 19 
CMLR 455, and Wunsche Handelsgesellschaft [1987] 3 CMLR 255. 
25 Lord Denning famously remarked that the (then) European Economic Community Treaty "is 
like an incoming tide. It flows into estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot be held back" (HP 
Bulmer Ltd v Bollinger SS [ 1974] 2 WLR 202, [1974] 2 CMLR 91. 
26 Dactoglou, P. D., "The legal nature of the European Community" in "Thirty Years of 
Community Law" EC Publication 1983, p. 33. See also George, S., "Politics and Policy in the 
European Union" Oxford Press, 1996,3'' Ed. at p. 275, Most analysts of the process of European 
integration long ago abandoned the aspiration to predict what would happen next. " And at 
p. 283. " Does this mean that no predictions can be made about the future of the EC? If by 
predictions is meant the short of positive prediction that neo functionalists made of inevitable 
progress from an initial integrative step to some sort of end-state that would involve something 
vaguely described as the European Union, then probably such hard prediction cannot be made. 
27 Monnet, J., 1978 "Memoirs" (trans. R. Mayne), Doubleday and Company, New York at pp. 
523-524. Also Dactoglou, P. D., supra note 26, at pp. 33-34, mentions that there can be no doubt 
that the political figures who conceived, founded and fashioned the Communities (Jean Monnet, 
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rhetoric than reality. There is a long way to go before a United States of Europe 
will be achieved, if ever. 28 And in a further analysis, even the existence of federal 
elements29 in the Community constitution are not equivalent to seeing the 
Community as a state or super-state. 30 Furthermore, according to P. Dactoglou, in 
reality, the way in which the Community is developing has robbed the federalist 
theory not only of such of its foundations as refer to the current period but also 
of the legal objective directed towards the future 31 
Moreover, additional arguments supporting the view that the EU is not a state 
have been made by J. Caporaso, who insists that the EU may not conform to the 
stereotype of the traditional international agreement, but nor is it a super state in 
the traditional sense of the term. 32 Also, Dactoglou commenting on whether the 
EC could be considered as a state argued, according to this theory, the 
Community is not a state because it does not possess the Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 
Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi, Walter Hallstein) had 
the federal state in mind as a model. Legal writers too (especially German legal writers) 
attributed to the Community a federal nature, or, at all events, federal elements (federalist 
theory) during the early years which followed the conclusion of the Treaties establishing the 
Communities (C. F. Ophuls, E. J. Wohlfarth, G. Jacnicke, H. J. Schlochauer, G. Schwarzenberger, 
G. Heraud, L. Cartou). A good analysis of the development of the federal idea within the EU and 
the distinction between the neofunctionalists and federalists is provided by Pinder, P., "The 
Building of the European Union", Oxford University Press, 1998, P Edition. 
28 Andersen, S. S. and Eliassen, K. A. argue that the model of a federal Europe, a kind of United 
States of Europe, would seem to be too utopian to be realised in the near future. "Making Policy 
in Europe. The Europe jcation of National Policy-making", Sage, 1993, at p. 7. 29 For particular reference to the federal features of the EU see Weiler, J. "Trading in and with the 
EU' at Chapters "Subsidiarity in the EC/ The Evolution of Community Federalism" as it is cited 
in http: //www. law. nyu. edulweilerj/unit5/UnitVI l. htm. See, also, Wistrich, E., "The United States 
of Europe", supra note 24. See also Fischer, T. C and Neff, S. C., 'Some American Thoughts on 
European Federalism' [1995] 44 ICLQ 904. 
30 Charlesworth, A. and Cullen, H., "European Community Law", Pitman, 1994, at p. 42. 31 Supra note 26, at p. 34. However, according to Weiler, J. in "The Community System: The Dual 
Character of Supranationalism", (1982) YEL 267, a different view is supported that there is still 
life in the concept of legal federalism. 
32 Caporaso, J., `The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory and Post- 
Modem' (1996) 34 JCMS 29. He also comments that the EU was treated as supranational state, 
a confederation, an emerging federal union, a concordance system, and a multi-level polity, 
among other things... Today, the study of European integration is moving into a post-ontological 
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that is to say because it does not have universal competence in all spheres... It 
would preferable, however, to avoid the term state, which can give rise to false 
interpretations... 33 The view that the EU is characterised by some degree of 
"statelessness" when compared to member states, is also supported by Andersen 
and Eliassen. 34 Also, according to B. Laffan, the EU could be described as a 
distinctive model of internationalism, 35 compared to other organisations such as 
NAFTA (North Atlantic Free Trade Association), APEC (Asia Pacific Economic 
Co-operation) and ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) which are 
further examples of nations collaborating to fortify internal economic 
relationships by enhancing inter state trade and external competitiveness. Among 
contemporary international systems, the EU is the most advanced, going beyond 
the trade process to institution building, law making and political integration. 
Therefore, it is suggested that to understand the EU, it is essential to abandon the 
idea of evolution towards state or nationhood and recognise that integration is 
fuelled by inter-regional relationships based on common economic and legal 
values rather than the omni-competance of central government. 
The distinctive status of the EU has also been highlighted by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court which describes the EU as a supranational organisation, 
which is separate from the State authority of the Member States, a supranational 
stage and scholars are less concerned with how to categorise than how to explain the process 
and outcome, paying less attention to the 'nature of the beast', at p. 30. 
33 Supra note 26 at pp. 41-42. 
34 Supra note 28 at p. 256. 
35Laffan, B., "The European Union: a Distinctive Model of Internationalism? ", European 
Integration, Vol. 1, No. 18 (10 October 1997), as sited at European Integration On-Line Papers 
(EIOP), httpJ/eiop. or. at/eiop/texte/1997-018. htm 
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system of competences 36 Moreover, commenting on the Maastricht Treaty, the 
Court stated that it establishes a European Union of States which is to be borne 
by the Member States and respects their national identity. It relates Germany's 
membership of supranational organisations, not membership of a European State 
... The exercise of sovereign authority by a union of States which remain 
sovereign and which, at international level, always act by their governments and 
thereby control the process of integration. 37 
Article 88 of the French Constitution focuses on the same point and describes the 
EC and the EU as established by States having freely chosen, pursuant to the 
constitutive treaties of those entities, to exercise certain of their powers in 
common. The French Constitutional Council has gone even further in describing 
the EU as an independent legal order which, although integrated into the legal 
systems of the different Member States of the Communities, does not form part of 
the institutional order of the French Republic. 38 
Therefore, since the present legal status of the EU, which is described as 
possessing a sui generis existence, prevents us from characterising the EU as a 
state, either unitary or federal, Art. 185(2) of the Constitution of Cyprus and Art. 
I of the Treaty of Guarantee cannot provide any obstacles towards the accession 
36 Maastricht Treaty Constitutionality Case (1993) 98 ILR 196, pp. 216-217. In this case, the 
German Supreme Court has invented a new German word, "Staatenverbund", to describe the 
Community. However, according to this definition, the term "Staatenverbund", could be 
translated neither as state nor as international organisation. 
37 Ibid., pp. 221,223 and 225. 
38 Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision No. 92-308 DC , April 1992, Traite sur 
l'Union Europeenne, 
Recueil des decisions 1992,55,62 (para. 34) reprinted in (1992) 93 ILR 338, p. 347. 
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of Cyprus to the EU. Cyprus' membership of the EU would not constitute 
participation in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. 
In opposition to the argument that by the accession of Cyprus to the EU an 
indirect enosis with Greece is achieved, several arguments can be developed 
proving the invalidity of the argument. Firstly, it is important to be mentioned 
that since 1960, when Cyprus gained its independence, the Republic of Cyprus 
has existed and been recognised by the international community as a sovereign 
and independent state, and therefore any argument implying that Cyprus is 
applying for accession to the EU in order to achieve a "back door" enosis with 
Greece would seriously undermine the reliability, the independence, the 
sovereignty and the very existence of the internationally recognised Republic of 
Cyprus. 
As it has already been mentioned above, according to the travaux preparatoires, 
the scope of these Articles was to prevent enosis with Greece or taksim 39 
However, by examining the scope of enosis as it had been developed before the 
1960 arrangements, one would be able to realise that enosis had the meaning of 
union with Greece in the sense that Cyprus would have became a part of Greece. 
Bearing in mind this presumption, it is unreasonable to imply that by the 
accession of Cyprus to the EU Cyprus will become a part of Greece. It sounds as 
unreasonable as if we were to say that by the accession of the Britain to the EU, 
Britain became part of France or Germany. The EU is neither Greece nor France 
39 See Ch. 5.1 and 5.2.2. 
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nor Germany, it is simply the union of these states. 0 Parallel to this, considering 
the Turkish arguments that by the accession of Cyprus to the EU, enosis with 
Greece is achieved, we could also argue that Turkey itself is also a candidate state 
for accession to the EU, but it has never been argued that a possible accession of 
Turkey to the EU would be equal to enosis with Greece. 
The question whether Cyprus' membership of the EU would equal to enosis with 
Greece, can be also tackled by reference to the analogous case concerning 
Austria's accession to the EU. According to Art. 4(1) of the Austrian State Treaty 
of 1955, Austria undertook not to enter into political or economic union with 
Germany in any form whatever. Art. 4(2) amplified that guarantee against 
another Anschluss, in the following terms: 
In order to prevent such union Austria shall not conclude 
any agreement with Germany, nor do any measures likely, 
directly or indirectly, to promote political or economic 
union with Germany, or to impair its territorial integrity or 
political or economic independence. Austria further 
undertakes to prevent within its territory any act likely, 
directly or indirectly, to promote such union and shall 
prevent the existence, resurgence and activities of any 
organisations having as their political or economic union 
with Germany, and pan-German propaganda in favour of 
union with Germany. 
The view taken concerning Austria's application in 1989 for EC membership 
was that membership was not prevented by the provisions of Art. 4 of the State 
40 In the Opinion drafted by Crawford, J., Hafner, G. and Pellet A., "Republic of Cyprus: 
Eligibilityfor EU membership", 24`h September 1997, stated that the EU is not a state, and it is 
inaccurate to describe any individual member state as economically or politically in union with 
other individual member states. In the language of the French Constitutional Council, no 
member state `forms part of the institutional order" of any other member state. Rather, they are 
all linked in and through the Community of the EU. At pp. 6-7. 
225 
Chapter Five Constitutional Prohibitions to Accession 
Treaty! ' The position of the Austrian Government was that Art. 4 was irrelevant 
to the issue of an indirect union with Germany. 42 Neither the EC Commission 
considered Art. 4 of the State Treaty as relevant to Austria's membership 43 
Lernhardt also supported the view that Art. 4, clearly refers to the bilateral 
relationship between Austria and Germany. Membership in an association of 
states could at best be affected by the article if this association were dominated 
by Germany. In the EC, Germany is only one of twelve member-states, without 
coming even closely to having a majority of votes. With complete justification 
each of the present EC members would strictly reject any interpretation of its 
accession as 'Anschluss' with Germany. 1 
Moreover, F. Ermacora supported the view that Austria's accession to the EEC 
would not contradict Art. 4 of the State Treaty, since the prohibition of 
"Anschluss" related to union with a state, not to a supranational community. 
Seidi-Hohenveldern also reached to the same conclusion. 45 Also, as it is pointed 
out in the Opinion, on the question whether EU membership would amount 
indirectly to union with Germany, the question was whether German influence 
or control over the EEC amounted to domination, so as to produce indirectly 
41 Although the matter was discussed following Austria's application. 
42 See the Government's Report to Parliament (111-113 Beilagen zu den Stenographischen 
Protokollen des Nationalrats XVII GP, para. 3.2, reprinted in Economy Extra, 190' May 1989. 
Cited in the Opinion, supra note 40, p. 12. 
43 Sec/91/1590 Final, 1' August 1991, summarised in Bull EC 7/8-1991, p. 81. 
44 Lernhardt, A., "Austria and the European Community. A Guide to Orientation" trans. 
Mansfield, I., Vienna, 1985 as it is cited in the Opinion, supra note 40 p. 13. See also, Weiss, F., 
`Austria's permanent neutrality in European Integration' (1977) 1 LIE! 101, where the author 
supports the view that the sovereignty of a state is neither affected nor transferred 'to any other 
Member State by its accession to the EU. By this assumption, one could reach the conclusion that 
accession to the EU does not mean transfer of sovereignty from one Member State to another and 
therefore the argument that accession to the EU implies direct union with another member state (i. 
e. transfer of sovereign rights to another state) is invalid. 
45 Supra note 40, p. 13. 
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what Art. 4 directly prohibited. Again, the unanimous answer was that it would 
not; on the contrary, the exclusion of Austria from the Common Market, it was 
concluded, would weaken the economic survival capacity of Austria and, 
consequently, undermine the objective of Art. 4(2) of the State Treaty. In the 
event, Austria was admitted to the EU in 1994, without Russian objection and 
with no amendment to Art. 4 of the State Treaty. 46 
Furthermore, although according to Professor Mendelson's Opinion there are 
some interesting parallels with the Austro-German Customs Union case (1931), 
PCIJ Ser. A/B, no. 41, p. 37, in which the Permanent Court of International 
Justice held that Austria's entry into a customs union with Germany would 
constitute an alienation of its economic independence, contrary to Geneva 
Protocol I of 4 October 1922,47 it is important to note that in that case the Soviet 
Union was concerned with Austrian neutrality, 48 and not with Art. 4. In regard to 
the Cypriot Constitution both Art. 185(2) and Art. I of the Treaty of Guarantee 
neither provide for nor imply a Cypriot neutrality, so the case of Cyprus seems to 
be entirely different from the Austro-German Customs Union Case. Hence, any 
similarities between the Cypriot application and the Austrian one are based not 
on the notion of neutrality, but on Art. 4 of the Austrian Constitution. Moreover, 
despite the numerous arguments raised in connection to the Austrian neutrality, 
Austria became a full member of the EU in 1994 without any objection from 
Russia and with no amendment to the Art. 4 of the State Treaty. The case of 
46 Ibid. 
47 Supra note 17, p. 36. 
48 For more information about Austria's permanent neutrality and its connection to the Austrian 
Accession to the EU see; Luif, P., "On the road to Brussels", Braumuller 1995, pp 198-199,238- 
244. See also, Kennedy, D. and Speht, L., `Austria and the European Communities', (1989) 26 
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Austria, then, can be considered as a strong precedent49 for and not against the 
case of Cyprus, proving that references to Anschluss and Enosis are irrelevant to 
their accession to the EU. 
Finally, it is important to mention the view of the British Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office, as Mr. T. Standbrook expressed it, that in 1998 there was 
a legal challenge to Cyprus' EU application which argued that the Treaty of 
Guarantee disallowed the political or economic union of Cyprus with another 
state. This challenge was defeated in the UK courts. We see no legal bar to 
Cyprus' membership of the EU. 5° 
Concerning Art. 170 of the constitution, several other arguments support the 
view that it also does not prevent Cyprus from acceding to the EU (i. e. Turkey's 
non- membership to the EU does not affect its most favoured nation treatment 
under Art. 170 provisions). As a starting point, it is important to mention that 
Art. 170 does not prohibit Cyprus from entering into economic agreements which 
could bring benefits to third countries. The use of the term of "most favoured 
nation" treatment in relation to the three Guarantor powers merely requires that a 
most favoured nation treatment should be extended to each of the guarantors. 
CML Rev. 615; Weiss, F. at supra note 44 and Seidl-Hohenveldern, H. C. I., `Austria and the EEA' 
(1992) 1 LIEl29. 
49 This view is also supported by Chrysostomides, K. in his Article "Nogucd apopkAgata tou 
Kunptaxov" [Legal Issues Concerning the Cyprus Problem], as published in the Cyprus' daily 
newspaper "H r pepM)", Wednesday 21" July 1999. 
so Answer received to the Questionnaire by the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 22°d 
April 1999. (See, Annex IV) 
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However, it is also important to mention that according to the lexical element of 
the Article 170, most favoured nation treatment has only to be extended by 
agreement on appropriate terms. Therefore, the unilateral undertaking in Art. 
170 is conditional and as it has rightly been stated in the Opinion, 51 most 
favoured nation treatment was only to be extended under a subsequent agreement 
with Cyprus; it was to be a matter for the parties to reach agreement, in 
particular, "on appropriate terms" for granting such treatment. It is, then, up to 
the parties to reach such an agreement and, notably, Turkey has never made any 
claim based on Art. 170. 
Additionally, past bilateral trade agreements between Cyprus and both Turkey 
and Greece, not only considered Art. 170 not to be an obstacle towards the 
economic relations between Cyprus and the EU, but clearly envisaged the 
prospect of a future economic relation. According to Art. 1 of the Trade 
Agreement between Cyprus and Turkey of 9 November 1963: 
The above most favoured nation treatment shall not apply: 
... c) to privileges, exemptions 
from taxes (fees), 
preferences or concessions which each of the Contracting 
countries has granted or will grant in the future to other 
countries on account of a present or future participation, 
entry or association by them to a customs union, a free 
trade area or an economic community. 52 
Obviously, the contracting parties of this agreement had in mind the possibility 
of future bilateral agreements with an economic community (presumably the 
51 Supra note 40, p. 16. 
52 Art. 1 of this Trade Agreement refers to most favoured nation treatment to be extended to 
duties or charges of any kind of importation of the goods of either country to the other. 
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EEC) and they cared to make an express provision that the most favoured nation 
treatment obligation is not affected by more favourable treatment extended by 
either state to its partners in a free trade area or economic community. 
Moreover, accession to the EU does not necessarily mean termination of the 
most favoured nation obligations of the entrant to third states. This is actually 
consistent with Article XXN (5) of the GATT. 53 The fact, then, that Turkey 
itself is a member of the WTO and an applicant for EU membership shows that 
Turkey must not only accept these positions but also not consider its most 
favoured nation treatment status in relation to Cyprus to be jeopardised by a 
future accession of Cyprus to the EU. The present relationship between Turkey 
and the EU (Association Agreement, Customs Union, application for EU 
membership and its recent acceptance by the EU as a Candidate Member State) 
makes it clear that Art. 170 of the Cypriot Constitution would not require any 
more favourable treatment to be extended to Turkey in the event of Cyprus' 
accession to the EU. 54 
53 See "The GATT, Uruguay Round; A negotiating History (1986-1992) Vol III: " Documents" 
edited by Terence P. Stewart, Kluwer, 1993, at p. 820. See also, `Understanding on the 
Interpretation of Articles XXQV of the GATT 1994', in WTO, "The Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multirateral Trade Negotiations. The Legal Texts", Geneva, 1994, p. 31. Also 
according to Art. 24 of the GATT an important exception to the non-discrimination provision 
permits regional tariff preference areas such as the EU and NAFTA. This would also enable 
Cyprus to become a member of a regional organisation without being prevented by its m-f-n 
obligation to Turkey. The United States of America for example, reserve their m-f-n obligation to 
China along with their membership to NAFTA (of course, NAFTA is not as a strong organisation 
as the EU). According to Moon B. E., "A member of such a regional organisation may apply a 
tariff schedule more favorable than the most-favored-nation rate to other member countries, but 
these discriminatory arrangements must meet three conditions to be considered GATT legal. 
First, they must lower barriers inside the region rather than raise the others. Second, they must 
completed over a reasonable amount of time. Third, they must cover substantially all products. 
Although no regional arrangement has ever fully met these standards, all have been tacitly 
permitted". Moon, B. E., "Dilemmas of International Trade", Westview Press 1996, at p. 81. 
54 Supra note 40, p. 17. 
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5.5 Conclusion. 
As it has been analysed above, Articles 170 and 185(2) of the Constitution of 
Cyprus and Art. I of the Treaty of Guarantee, may indeed provide sources for 
several arguments concerning the Cypriot accession to the EU, but they do not 
seem to provide any certain obstacles. It is obvious that the particular relevant 
Articles are also influenced by the austere and peculiar character of the 
Constitution of Cyprus, which is actually the main reason for the need of an 
extensive legal analysis and the main source of the development of several 
arguments concerning their interpretation and their application. The fact that 
these Articles are considered as basic Articles" of the Constitution and they 
cannot, in any way, be amended56 necessitates a more theoretical approach 
concerning their implications for the accession of Cyprus to the EU. The lack of 
any power for their amendment prevents us from a practical and more drastic 
approach (amendment) and leads us to the need for an explicit theoretical 
analysis of their interpretation and application. Under these conditions, then, the 
above analysis was important for realising whether these Articles could be 
considered as obstacles towards the accession of Cyprus to the EU. 
ss According to Annex III of the Constitution Of Cyprus Arts. 170 and Art. 185(2) are included in 
the List of Basic Articles of the Constitution. Note that Article 181 which provides for the 
constitutional power of the Treaty of Guarantee is also included in the list of the basic articles. 
56 Article 182 (1) of the Constitution of Cyprus provides that "The Articles or parts ofArticles of 
this Constitution set out in Annex III hereto, which have been incorporated from the Zurich 
Agreement dated 11" February, 1959, are the basic Articles of this Constitution and cannot, in 
any way, be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal. " For more discussion see 
Chapter Six. 
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According to this analysis, then, the arguments supporting the view that Art. 170 
and Art. 185(2) of the Constitution of Cyprus and Art. I of the Treaty of 
Guarantee can block the accession of Cyprus to the EU, appeared to be 
insufficient. In brief, the reasons for the insufficiency of those arguments can be 
listed as follows: 
a) The accession of Cyprus to the EU is not directly prohibited by the 
provisions of the Articles. 
b) According to the lexical element of Art. 185 (2) of the Constitution 
and Art. I of the Treaty of Guarantee, the EU cannot be considered as 
a "state" (in strict sensus); therefore the accession of Cyprus to the 
EU cannot be interpreted as a union with another state. 
c) According to the travaux preparatoires the scope of Art. 185 (2) of 
the Constitution and Art, I of the Treaty of Guarantee was to prevent 
enosis and taksim and not to prevent Cyprus from entering into a 
regional organisation. 
d) The accession of Cyprus to the EU cannot be considered as enosis 
with Greece. 
e) The accession of Cyprus to the EU does not affect Turkey's most- 
favoured-nation treatment as provided for by Art. 170 of the 
Constitution 
It is therefore submitted that the accession of Cyprus to the EU cannot be 
considered as prevented by the provisions of these Articles. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
THE POSSIBILITY AND THE NECESSITY OF AMENDING THE 
CONSTITUTION OF CYPRUS IN REGARD TO THE ACCESSION OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS TO THE EU 
Although some legal and political sources in Cyprus support the view that there 
is no actual need for an amendment to the Constitution for Cyprus' accession to 
the EU, ' there are others who argue that Constitutional amendment not only 
would prevent legal uncertainties but would also be necessary for the accession 
of Cyprus to the EU? Indeed, the way for full EU membership includes also the 
problem of adapting the Constitution to the requirements of the EC Treaties 
before their ratification. Thus, any potential constitutional amendments implied 
by the accession of Cyprus to the EU will be a sine qua non to the ratification 
(approval) of the founding Treaties and the Treaty of Accession. 
This chapter, then, analyses the procedure for amending the Constitution of 
Cyprus and suggests several amendments necessary for the smooth accession of 
Cyprus to the EU and for the relevant harmonisation of Cypriot legislation to that 
of the EU. The importance of this Chapter lies on two factors: firstly, the 
1 See, Clerides, C., `To Kvicpiax6 dixazo Kai i Korvowi a `Evvoprj Tä ' [Cyprus Law and 
European Legal Order], Hellenic Centre of European Studies (EKEM), May 1993, at p. 9. 
2 According to Professor Antonopoulos, in a potential accession of Cyprus to the EU a 
constitutional revision would be necessary. This is justified by the special effect of the European 
legislation on the Cypriot legal order. The fact that the legislative power would be exercised not 
only by the legislative bodies, as provided by the Cypriot constitution, but also by the EU 
institutions and the fact that the judicial power would also be affected, justifies the necessity for 
revision and amendment of the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus. See, Antonopoulos, N., "H K6irpoc 
Kai ?I Evpancaixij OiKOVOpix-4 Korv6n7ra" [Cyprus and the European Economic Community], 
Research Paper, 1977, at p. 33. 
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complex and, under the present circumstances (i. e. the absence of the Turkish 
Cypriots), difficult procedures for amending the Constitution; and secondly the 
necessity to amend particular Articles of this Constitution which are either in 
conflict with the provisions of the EU legislation or could possibly be 
problematic in the future (i. e. after accession). 
6.1 Procedure for amending the Constitution under Article 182. 
Article 182 of the Constitution provides for both the possibility of amending the 
Constitution and the appropriate procedure. It reads: 
1. The Articles or parts of Articles of this Constitution set 
out in Annex III hereto which have been incorporated 
from the Zurich Agreement dated 11th February, 1959, 
are the basic Articles of this Constitution and cannot, in 
any way, be amended, whether by way of variation, 
addition or repeal. 
2. Subject to paragraph 1 of this Article, any provision of 
this Constitution may be amended, whether by way of 
variation, addition or repeal, as provided in paragraph 
3 of this Article. 
3. Such amendment shall be made by a law passed by a 
majority vote comprising at least two-thirds of the total 
number of the Representatives belonging to the Greek 
Community and at least two-thirds of the total number of 
the Representatives belonging to the Turkish 
Community. 
The first point, then, is the clear distinction which is made between the basic 
Articles (non amendable) and the non-basic Articles (amendable). Therefore, 
before amending an Article, it is important to examine whether such an 
amendment is possible. This might be an additional problem in the attempt to 
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harmonise the legal provisions of the Cypriot constitution to be compatible with 
those of the EU. The problem is, first, the limitation of the scope for a general 
amendment of the Constitution and second, the possibility that these basic 
Articles could actually jeopardise the accession of Cyprus to the EU. Therefore, 
an analysis of the effect of these basic Articles, regarding the Cyprus' 
membership to the EU, will be attempted below. 
The second important point which has to be considered is the actual procedure 
for amending the Constitution, bearing in mind the absence of the Turkish 
Cypriot Representatives. Basically, there exist three different views. 3 The first is 
that no amendment to the Constitution is possible at all, because of the absence 
of the Turkish Cypriots. The second is that constitutional amendment is 
possible, but only so as far as it concerns the non-basic Articles, and is based on 
the law of necessity. Finally, the third view suggests that any possible 
amendment depends on the actual necessity for amendment and whether such an 
amendment is justified under the principles of the law of necessity. The third 
view seems to be the most acceptable, since it seems that is also supported by 
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Cyprus. 
3 See, Clerides, C., 'H Auvat6rrjTa Tpononotiioii; tou Euv rdyµaTos un Ku rptaici S Aijpoxpattac', 
[The Possibility of Amending the Cypriot Constitution], Article in the Cypriot daily newspaper 
"A40va", 13/1/1990. 
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6.1.1 Amending the non-basic Articles of the Constitution 
In Plea No. 3/89 of the Autocephalus Church of Cyprus, 4 the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed that, according to Art. 182.3 of the Constitution any potential 
amendment of non-basic Articles depends on separate majorities of Greek 
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Representatives. Therefore, the existence of the 
Turkish Cypriot vote appears to be necessary. It has also been highlighted that 
this provision applies, regardless whether the suggested amendment concerns 
only one or both of the two Communities. 
The Court has also reconfirmed that there is no precedent for a constitutional 
amendment without the participation of both of the Communities, in cases 
where the amendment would affect only one of them. 
More specifically, in this Plea, the Court referred to Ref. 1/865 and noted that in 
that Reference the Court did not reach a decision suggesting that in cases where 
an amendment affected only one of the two Communities, the participation of 
the other Community would not be necessary for achieving it. For example, if an 
amendment concerns only the Greek Cypriot Community, no decision has been 
reached by the Supreme Court to support the view that such an amendment may 
be achieved by the vote of the Greek Cypriot Representatives alone. 
4 29/12/1989. 
S President of the Republic v House ofRepresentatives (1986) 3 CLR 1439. 
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However, Reference 1/86, does not exclude the possibility that such a decision 
could be reached in the future. In fact, such a decision would not be groundless 
if we consider the current conditions in Cyprus. Of course, such a decision 
should be based on and regulated by the principle of the law of necessity. 
More particularly, Ref. 1/86 concerned the possibility of amending Articles 63 
and 66 of the Constitution without the vote of the Turkish Cypriot 
Representatives. The Court in its conclusion noted that to justify any amendment 
of non-basic Articles of the Constitution, regardless of their effect on the 
Communities, the existence of a major reason alone is not enough; those reasons 
must also be justified according to the principle of the law of necessity. 6 
As Pikis J. and Kouris J. mentioned in the above decision, any reference to the 
principle of the law of necessity is justified only when the constitutional order 
and basic functions of the State are in danger. In addition, they emphasised that 
the House of Representatives should not have unlimited power to amend the 
Constitution. 7 
In other litigations, the Supreme Court has referred to the constitutionality of 
Law 95/89 and Law 23/90. Those two Laws provided for the establishment of 
civil marriage and the issuing of divorces by the Family Courts according to the 
first amendment of Art. 111 of the Constitution which originally provided that 
6Ibid., 1444. 
7Ibid., 1446-1450. 
8 Nikolaou v. Kyriakides (1992) 1 CLR 356. In this case the Supreme Court (16/12/92) concerned 
the legal Question No. 282, as it has been referred by the Nicosia Family Court (according to the 
provisions of Art. 144 of the Constitution) related to the References 17/90 and 24/90. 
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these issues were under the exclusive competence of relevant religious 
authorities for each community. The question, then, was whether those Laws 
which had been passed without the presence of the Turkish Cypriots could be 
considered as unconstitutional, since according to the provisions of Article 182, 
any amendment of non-basic Articles demands separate majorities of the Greek 
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Representatives. The Members of the Court, in 
their decision for this case, expressed two different opinions. 
According to the opinion of D. Stylianides J., A. Kouris J., I. Papadopoulos J., I. 
Pogiatzis J. and G. Chrysostomis J., those Laws could not be considered as 
unconstitutional. They supported the view that the absence of the Turkish 
Cypriots could not deprive the House of Representatives from its power of 
making amendments to the non-basic Articles of the Constitution. The potential 
lack of power of the House of Representatives to make amendments would have 
transformed the non-basic Articles to basic ones. If this is to be considered as a 
fact, then, consequently, a basic function of the State, namely the power of 
constitutional revision, is in danger. The power of the House of Representatives 
of constitutional revision is not only an important one but a necessary one, and 
therefore the law of necessity could provide for its continued functioning. The 
power to amend the Constitution serves the smooth adaptation of the 
Constitution to evolving socio-economical changes without interrupting the 
continuation of the Law. 
Moreover, according to their opinion, the law of necessity justifies the power of 
the House of Representatives to make amendments to the Constitution, even in 
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the absence of the Turkish Cypriots, since their absence is self-imposed. Also, 
they emphasised that the Court is obliged to support the continued functioning 
of the Constitutional Institutions of the Republic, especially under the difficult 
situation which exists in Cyprus today. 
On the other hand, the President of the Supreme Court A. Loizou J. and Pikis J., 
Artemis J., Constantinides J. and Nikitas J. expressed the opposite opinion, 
holding that both Laws were unconstitutional, for the following reasons. 
Primarily, they emphasised that the law of necessity seeks to support the proper 
application of the constitutional legal order under extremely special conditions, 
and by no means, seeks to replace and change the existing constitutional 
principles. If the power to amend the Constitution without the vote of the 
Turkish Cypriots was justified by the law of necessity, then the whole legal 
system, as it exists in Cyprus today, would be jeopardised, since the whole 
Constitution could be amended in such a way as to exclude Turkish Cypriot 
participation. In such a case, the law of necessity would have resulted in a 
complete change of the constitutional legal order of Cyprus, and its application 
would definitely have been misused. 
Thus, it is important, before deciding whether an amendment of the Constitution 
is justified by the law of necessity (because of the absence of the Turkish 
Cypriots), to examine its effect. Is the amendment necessary for the continuation 
of the functioning of the State? If this amendment is not successful, is there a 
danger of the collapse of the State? These questions focus on the necessity of the 
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amendment and not on the necessity of amending without the vote of the 
Turkish Cypriots. 
Also, the above mentioned Judges, in their opinion, argued whether the whole 
application of the law of necessity as it exists today in Cyprus, demands 
reconsideration because of its lengthy existence. 9 The application of the law of 
necessity is temporary, whereas the constitution is a permanent element of the 
legal order with a perpetual perspective. Consequently, any amendment of the 
Constitution without the strict application of the provisions of Art. 182, could 
potentially have lead to the total reformation of the constitutional order. In this 
case, it is obvious that the unwise use of the law of necessity for amending the 
constitution could seriously change the very character of the Cypriot 
Constitution. 
According to the above judgments, then, it seems that the House of 
Representatives (as it is constituted today) must be very careful in its decisions 
to amend any part of the Constitution. Any potential amendment must be 
achieved only by reference to Art. 182 of the Constitution and only if the law of 
necessity justifies such an amendment. Accordingly, only the non-basic Articles 
of the Constitution could be amended and only in cases where such an 
amendment is absolutely necessary for the smooth continuation of the 
functioning of the Republic. Basically, on the one hand, the intentional 
withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots must not be allowed to paralyse the 
9 The Law of Necessity was first introduced in the Cypriot legal order in 1964 by the Ibrahim 
Case. (The Attorney General of the Republic v Mustafa Ibrahim (1964) CLR 195. See Chapter 
One. 
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functioning of the House of Representatives, but on the other hand, the House 
of Representatives should not take advantage of this situation to transform the 
Constitution against its prior exceptional character. 
Additionally, it could also be argued that since the House of Representatives still 
functions and still enacts Laws according to the principle of the law of necessity, 
without the participation of the Turkish Cypriots, the same principle could 
justify its power to make amendments as well. In fact, even the Supreme Court 
itself, as it functions today, is a product of a constitutional amendment which 
was achieved without the participation of the Turkish Cypriots. This 
amendment, rightly, is not considered unconstitutional, since it was important 
for the continuation of the functioning of the State and therefore could be 
justified by the law of necessity. 
Thus, for the amendment of non-fundamental Articles of the Constitution, the 
procedure under Art. 182(3) is still valid and should be respected. Any deviation 
from the provisions of Art. 182(3) should be valid only if it is justified by the 
law of necessity. Therefore, one could argue that the absence of the Turkish 
Cypriot Representatives from the amending procedure does not automatically 
give the right to the Greek Cypriot Representatives to amend the Constitution by 
themselves. The power of doing so, according to the present conditions, relies 
on the principles of the law of necessity and only in cases where the law of 
necessity justifies the amendment as absolutely necessary, do the Greek Cypriot 
Representatives have the power to vote for an amendment. 
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Under these circumstances, any necessary amendment of non-basic Articles of 
the Constitution, for the smoother accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the 
EU, should be justified by the law of necessity. This provides us with further 
difficulties, since the strict and limited implementation of the law of necessity 
may not justify all the potential amendments demanded for the implementation 
of the EU legislation into the Cypriot legal order. However, one could rightly 
argue that in cases where a non-fundamental Article of the Constitution is in 
conflict with international conventional obligations of the Republic, the law of 
necessity could justify its amendment. In such a case, not only would there not 
be a major reason for the amendment of the relevant Articles, but also the 
necessity for their amendment would supersede the statuary necessity for their 
non-amendment. 
Therefore, as it appears from the above, any amendment of non-basic Articles of 
the Constitution relevant to the accession of Cyprus to the EU should preferably 
happen after the final negotiations and the signing of the Treaty of Accession. In 
this case, all the necessary amendments could be justified better by the law of 
necessity. 
In addition to this, one could also support the view that a referendum for the 
final signing of the Treaty of Accession and also for the suggested amendments 
of the Constitution could be very helpful for the better application of the law of 
necessity. However, this argument might not be so strong, since the performance 
of a referendum does not necessarily provide the base for the implementation of 
242 
Chapter Six Constitutional Amendments 
the law of necessity. The referendum proposal could possibly pose a danger of a 
future unlimited and unwise use of the law of necessity. 
As a conclusion, then, one could strongly emphasise that the possibility of 
constitutional amendment of non-basic Articles is not excluded from the 
juridical point of view. Any other conclusion, supporting the view that no 
amendment is possible, would definitely cause serious legal problems for the 
accession of Cyprus to the EU and could also assume the prior solution of the 
political problem as a pre-requirement for Cyprus' EU membership. However, 
as mentioned in previous chapters of this thesis, according to the Conclusions of 
the European Council at the Helsinki Summit, the prior solution of the political 
problem of Cyprus is not a pre-requirement for the accession of Cyprus to the 
EU. '° 
6.1.2 Amending the basic Articles of the Constitution. 
The law of necessity, as it has been explained above, could, in some cases, 
provide the power for the constitutional amendment of non-basic Articles. 
However, could the same view be held for the basic Articles of the Constitution 
as well? This is a crucial question to be answered, since it is likely that some 
basic Articles of the Constitution might appear to be problematic in regard to the 
smooth accession of Cyprus to the EU. 11 
10 Helsinki EU Council, Presidential Remarks, 10-11 December 1999, para. 9 (b). 
In Chapter 6.2 there is a selection of some Articles (basic and non-basic) which might be 
problematic with regard to Cyprus accession to the EU. 
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In order to answer this question, firstly it is important to examine the 
constitutional background for the existence of basic (non-amendable) Articles in 
the Constitution of Cyprus. 
As a starting point, it may be noted that Cyprus is not the only State in the world 
with basic (non amendable) Articles in its Constitution. Normally, all written 
constitutions lay down a specific process for the change of the constitution, and 
the more specific the rules, the greater the incidence of constitutional inertia. 
Those special provisions laid down for the change of the Constitution emphasise 
the difference between ordinary law and superior law. The most common 
constitutional approaches to constitutional inertia involve the following 
mechanisms, singly or in combination: a) qualified majorities; b) referendum; c) 
delay, d) confirmation by a second decision and e) confirmation by sub-national 
government. 12 
12 For example, the Italian Constitution requires two positive decisions within both Chambers of 
the National Assembly within three months. The Greek and the Swedish Constitutions stipulate 
that constitutional change needs two positive decisions by two Parliaments, where there have been 
ordinary elections to Parliament in between. The Norwegian Constitution only requires delay (i. e. 
the proposal concerning a change of the Constitution can only be decided after a new Parliament 
has been elected through ordinary elections every fourth year but there must also be a qualified 
majority of two-thirds). In France, for the constitutional change, there is a requirement of a 
majority of 60% in both Chambers of the National Assembly, or a simple majority decision in 
each chamber combined with a referendum. In Portugal, a two-thirds majority is required and 
similarly in Finland. However, the Finnish Constitution requires both delay and confirmation (the 
first positive single majority decision has to be confirmed by Parliament by a second positive two- 
thirds majority decision, with elections having taken place in between, or, if there is no time for 
such a long process, then one five-sixths majority decision in Parliament is enough). The Danish 
Constitution outlines quite a complicated process of constitutional revision. First there must be a 
positive decision in Parliament, then a new positive decision by Parliament and finally 
confirmation by a referendum where there has to be at least 40% of votes for the decision among 
all those eligible to vote, besides of course that yes must defeat no. In the Austrian and Irish 
Constitutions, any constitutional change requires an obligatory referendum in which simple 
majority is enough. A rather complicated process can be found in the Netherlands and Belgium. 
The Dutch Constitution involves delay, confirmation and a qualified majority vote and according 
to the Belgian Constitution there must be a decision that a constitutional revision is needed and 
then Parliament will be dissolved, after which new constitutional provisions may be enacted with 
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However, certain articles may also be laid down in a Constitution that are 
considered unalterable. For example, the 1949 German Constitution (Article 
79.3) rules that: 
An amendment to this Basic Law affecting the 
organisation of the Federation into Lander, the basic 
participation of the Lander in legislation, or the basic 
principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20, is 
inadmissible. 
The German Constitution, then, similarly to the Cypriot, explicitly rules out 
certain changes in the Constitution. More specifically, it gives permanent 
constitutional protection to certain rules about basic rights, a democratic regime 
and the federal nature of the State. 
Similarly, certain limits to constitutional change are also included in the 
Portuguese Constitution. Article 288 of the Portuguese Constitution provides for 
certain limitations on matters of revision and specifies that laws revising the 
Constitution shall respect a list of sixteen matters, while Article 289 provides 
restrictions on the time of revision. 
Also, Article 139 of the Italian Constitution reads: The republican form of the 
State cannot be the subject of constitutional amendment. Norway's Constitution 
imposes limitations that are perhaps more sweeping. After laying out procedures 
for amendment, Article 122 adds: Such amendment must, however, never 
a two thirds majority. However, the most complicated process is probably found in the American 
Constitution, where there are not only qualified majority requirements, but also confirmation and 
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contradict the principles embodied in this Constitution, but merely relate to 
modifications of particular provisions which do not alter the spirit of this 
Constitution. 
From a theoretical perspective, the existence of unalterable basic Articles in a 
Constitution, could justifiably raise several arguments. 13 In particular, for how 
long could "basic" Articles remain "basic", if the will of the people is strongly in 
favour of a change? This is the most important argument against the existence of 
restrictions for amending the Constitution. It is the conflict between the 
principle of democracy, in the sense of the sovereignty of people, versus the 
restraints of a constitution as lex superior. Why should a sovereign legislature or 
a sovereign people choose to restrict its power to make and change the 
constitution in accordance with the will of the majority? 
The answer to this lies, most of the time, in the constitutional background14 of 
the State. Reasons like the existence of minorities and the necessity for the 
outside involvement. 
13 Icahn, R. strongly supported the necessity for constitutional changes since problematics about 
institutions and the faith that we hold in them also changes, as do the individual rights we believe 
are needed to protect fundamental constitutional values. ("The Supreme Court & Constitutional 
Theory, 1953-1993", University Press of Kansas, 1994 at p. 266) See also, Levinson, S. (Ed. ) 
"Responding to Imperfection; The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment", Princeton 
University Press, 1995; with particular reference to Article Eight (Murphy, W. F., `Merlin's 
Memory: The Past and Future Imperfect of the Once and Future Polity') and Article Nine (Vile, 
J. R., `The Case against Implicit Limits on the Constitutional Amending Process'). Also, 
`Symposium; Constitutional Change and Politics in History' edited in The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 
108,1999; pp 1917- 2163] includes several Articles providing arguments about changing the 
American Constitution. Although those Articles refer to the American Constitution, there are 
several interesting arguments with a general effect. 
14 Each constitution is normally a reflection of its historical background. Constitutions have, of 
course, been granted or adopted for many different reasons. New constitutions have marked 
stages in progresssion towards self-government (as in most British colonies before 
independence); they have established a system of government in a newly independent state (as in 
the United States of America in 1787), or in a reconstituted state (such as Malaysia in 1963 or 
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protection of their rights could rightly justify certain restrictions on 
constitutional change. 15 Also, as in the case of Cyprus where the constitution 
was a product of an international agreement for a political solution to a dispute, 
such provisions are guarantors for the respect of the very character of the 
solution. 
Also, as Oliver Cromwell told his several parliaments in every government there 
must be somewhat fundamental, somewhat like a Magna Carta, that should be 
standing and be unalterable... 16 It could be argued that the supreme and 
sometimes the unalterable existence of a constitution is what makes a 
"constitution" a "constitution" and an element which provides stability to the 
state. Although it is not within the scope of this thesis to analyse the various 
constitutional theories and constitutional forms, it is important to mention the 
plethora of constitutional theories which provide' a variety of arguments about 
the existence of rigid constitutions and their effect. What is important to be 
mentioned is that, whatever the constitutional background and form, there must 
be a certain constitutional flexibility. Constitutions should be able to be adjusted 
according to the demands of the time, preferably, though, under a strict process 
Tanzania in 1964 or Germany in reunification in 1990); they have marked a major change in the 
system of government (as in Spain in 1978); they have adopted in order to rebuild the machinery 
of government following defeat in war (as in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949); and they 
have declared a new beginning after a revolution, or after the collapse of a regime (as in France 
in '1791 and in 1958). Brazier, R., "Constitutional Reform, Reshaping the British Political 
System", Oxford University Press, 2°d Ed., 1998, at p. 1. 
15 It has been rightly observed that the principle of democracy could be in conflict with the 
prohibition of a constitutional change. Nevertheless, ... a people could not 
legitimately use the 
democratic process to destroy the essence of democracy - the right of others, either of a current 
majority or minority or of a minority or majority of future generations, to meaningful 
participation in selfgovernments. See, Murphy, W. F., supra note 13, at p. 179. 
16 Friedrich, C. J., "Constitutional Reason ofState", Brown University Press, 1957, at p. 119. 
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which will guarantee the perpetual power of a constitution. 17 Normally, such "no 
change" rules bind the State too closely to already existing constitutional rules. 
Nevertheless, such "no change" rules are clearly set out in the Constitution of 
Cyprus, and whatever the criticisms against them, should be respected. As 
mentioned above, those unalterable Articles exist mainly for the protection of 
the political solution granted to Cyprus and for the protection of the Turkish 
Cypriot community (minority) in relation to the Greek Cypriot community 
(majority). It was a mechanism used by the founders of the Constitution, for the 
mutual respect of both communities, under the political settlement which 
resulted in the birth of the new state: the Republic of Cyprus. 18 
Therefore, it seems that any attempt to amend those non-amendable basic 
Articles would be against the provisions of the Constitution. Any argument 
providing for the application of the law of necessity regarding the amendment of 
the basic Articles would seem equally unsuccessful. As it has already been 
emphasised, the law of necessity is a means for the continuation of the 
functioning of the State, but it by no means seeks the change of the 
constitutional order. It is a temporary device and cannot be used as a tool for the 
change of the nature of the constitution. Article 182.1 of the Constitution 
17 However, according to the Chief Justice of India, a Constitution is only permanent and not 
eternal. (Golak Nath's case, [1967] AIR 1643,1670). This quotation expresses, in a very 
distinctive and successful way, the importance of the ability of a Constitution to be adjusted 
according to the demands of time, while preserving its perpetual character. 
'8 Although, that political condition has been de facto destroyed by the 1974 division of the island 
(presumably, the change of the political nature of the state was one of the main tasks of the 1974 
invasion), de jure, the Constitution is still valid, and the official recognised organs of the Republic 
of Cyprus must respect it. Any disrespect to the existing Constitutional provisions, would 
automatically mean the change of the whole character of the 1960 settlement and therefore the 
current de facto situation would equally be and de jure. 
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explicitly provides that the revisional power of the House of Representatives is 
not extended to the basic Articles which are listed in Annex III of the 
Constitution. 19 
The non-amendable character of the basic Articles of the Constitution should be 
preserved and respected. It is an important task, therefore, to examine whether 
the existence of basic Articles could pose problems in relation to the accession 
of Cyprus to the EU and the application of the EU legislation in the Cypriot 
legal order. However, it is important to mention, that their unalterable character 
does not mean their ab initio incompatibility with the legal obligations placed 
upon the Republic of Cyprus by its potential accession to the EU. 
The problem of the non-amendable basic Articles of the Constitution, then, 
should be faced in a very distinctive but not a facile way. There must be a 
balance between their unalterable character and the State's harmonisation with 
the European legislation. Whenever there is a conflict between those two 
elements, there must be a general formula for facing the problem. There might 
be several proposals as to how to achieve this balance. A proposal suggesting a 
detailed analysis of all the basic Articles and an examination of their 
compatibility with the EU legislation, however, would definitely provide us with 
a particularly useful analysis of any potential incompatibility, though such a 
method would merely result in a temporary solution of the problem. Thus, a 
more general formula providing guidance on how to tackle the problem would 
definitely give a more helpful and permanent solution. 
19 Annex III has been incorporated from the Zurich Agreement dated 11ý' February, 1959. 
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It seems that nothing, concerning their compatibility with the EU legislation, 
could be done before the accession of Cyprus to the EU. After the accession, 
provided that those basic Articles do not prevent Cyprus from acceding to the 
EU, 20 the embodied provisions for the transfer of powers from the Republic of 
Cyprus to the EU might provide a solution to the problem. The amendment of 
the non-basic Article 169 of the Constitution by an addition providing for the 
transfer of powers to the EU would result in the application of the EU law in the 
Cypriot legal order. Also, as it has been explained in Chapter Four, the 
application of the treaty of accession and the EU legislation should have 
superior force. 
As a matter of fact, then, a potential constitutional conflict must be faced with 
regard to the priority to be given to the conflicting Articles. 21 An article might be 
given superior force, not necessarily by the annulment or the inferiority of 
another one, but simply by the latter's non-application. 22 This is a technical 
solution which might be useful with regard to the basic articles' unalterable 
20 As it has been mentioned in Chapter Three there is no Article directly providing against the 
accession of Cyprus to the EU. Basic Article 185(2) seems the only one which might pose a 
constrain on Cypriot membership of the EU, but as it has been analysed in Chapter Five, this is 
not the case. 
21 In Germany, the Bundesverfassungsgericht firstly, proposed reconciliation through structural 
interpretation and secondly, stated that a constitutional provision itself may be null and void is 
not conceptually impossible just because it is a part of the constitution. There are constitutional 
principles that are so fundamental and to such an extent an expression of a law that precedes 
even the constitution that they also bind the framer of the constitution, and other constitutional 
provisions that do not rank so high may be null and void, because they contravene those 
principles. (The Southwest Case, 1 BVerfGE 14 (1951)). Also, the American President Madison 
(see Murphy, W. F., supra note 13, p. 178) referred to two rules of construction, dictated by plain 
reason, as well as founded on legal axioms. Accordingly he pointed out that, firstly, every part of 
the expression ought if possible, to be allowed some meaning, and be made to conspire to some 
common end' and secondly, `where the several parts cannot be made to coincide,... the less 
important should give way to the more important part; the means should be sacrificed to the end, 
rather than the ends to the means. 
22 See, ToulaMalachtou vArmefti, (1987) 1 CLR 217. 
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character and their potential conflict with EU legislation. It is possible, then, that 
after the accession, some articles may become, de facto, displaced but not 
necessarily repealed. 23 It is, therefore, up to the judicial will to give priority to 
the amended Article 169 guaranteeing the constitutional validity of transfer of 
powers to the EU. 
Also, as a matter of law, it is up to the Court to decide whether there is any 
conflict between a basic Article and EU provisions. The Court for deciding 
whether there is a conflict or not, would have to be based on the interpretation of 
the Article. Therefore, a presumable conflict might not always be an actual one, 
if according to the Court's interpretation the scope of the Article is not in 
conflict with the relevant, and seemingly conflicting, provisions. This is the case 
of Article 185(2) of the Constitution where the exclusion of an integral or partial 
union of Cyprus with any other State, could not be interpreted as an exclusion 
for the accession of Cyprus to the EU 24 
Therefore, as a conclusive remark, it could be argued that the difficult task of 
harmonising the basic Articles of the Constitution with the EU legislation 
depends upon successful implementation by the judiciary, after, of course, of the 
signing of the Treaty of Accession. 
23 It is also possible that a provision might be self-destructed by implication. In the American 
Constitution, the prohibition against amending the clause forbidding regulation of the importation 
of slaves self-destructed in 1808. See Murphy, W. F., supra note 13, at p. 175. 
24 See Chapter Five. 
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Referring to Germany, which faced similar problems in adopting the EU 
legislation, because of the existence of inalienable fundamental rights in the 
Constitution (Basic Law), the judiciary provided many arguments in several 
cases on how to face the problem. Although it seems that the German Courts 
appear rather reluctant in renouncing the supreme power of the unalterable 
fundamental constitutional provisions, they managed to find a compromising 
way in the favour, though, of the constitutional provisions. In the Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft case, 25 the German Constitutional Court maintained its 
right to uphold German fundamental rights even in the face of a conflict with 
Community law. In a later case, 26 though, the German Court decided that it 
would no longer examine compatibility between Community legislation and 
German fundamental rights while the Community continues to protect those 
rights adequately. It was an expression of trust on behalf of the German judiciary 
that the European Court would secure the EC legislation to be within the 
provisions of fundamental rights. However, in the famous Maastricht case in 
1993 the German Constitutional Court decided that the European Court has the 
primary responsibility of securing fundamental rights but hinted that if that 
Court failed to carry out the task adequately the German Constitutional Court 
would do so 27 By that way, then, the German Courts on the one hand, reserved 
the right of giving priority to German fundamental rights but on the other hand 
they reconfirmed their compatibility with EU legislation. 
23 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel, 
decision of 29'' May 1974, BVerfUE 37, S. 271; [1974] CMLR 540. 
26 In re the Application of Wunsche Handelsgesellschaft, also known as the Solange II case, 
decision of 22 October 1986, Europaische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift, 1987, p. 1; [1987] 3 CMLR 
225. 
27 Brunner v European Union Treaty [1994] 1 CMLR 57. 
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Nevertheless, it has to be emphasised that, in Germany, the provisions of those 
fundamental rights have not been in a direct clash with the EU legislative 
provisions. Thus, this cannot be the case in Cyprus since the actual provisions of 
some basic Articles of the Constitution may be incompatible with the EU 
legislation. Therefore, it seems that Cypriot Courts have, pro tanto, a more 
difficult task to achieve. 
6.2 Articles of the Constitution lacking compatibility with EU legislation. 
Although, as it mentioned above, the most of the changes of the Constitution 
should take place after the signing of the Treaty of Accession of Cyprus to the 
EU, 28 it is important to confine certain constitutional provisions which appear to 
be problematic in regard to the existing European legislation and might pose 
several problems to its application and effect in the Cypriot legal order after the 
accession. It is not the task to propose their current amendment in order to be 
compatible with the EU legislation, but merely to specify as indications for 
future, after the accession, some necessary amendments (for non-basic Articles) 
and judicial arrangements (for basic Articles). 
28 Any amendments to the non basic Articles of the Constitution, as explained above, should be 
justified by the proper application of the law of necessity. In order for the law of necessity to be 
properly applied there must be a legal basis to justify the necessity. Therefore, any constitutional 
amendments necessary for the harmonisation of the constitutional provisions to Community 
legislation should be made after the signing of the Treaty of Accession, since otherwise, it could 
be argued that by the absence of the signing of the Treaty of Accession, there is not a legal basis 
justifying the necessity. Of course, for preventing any conflict with Community provisions, such 
amendments could be better made after the signing of the Treaty of Accession but before the 
procedure for the approval and the conclusion of the Treaty of Accession. According to Art. 169 
the Treaty ... shall be negotiated and signed under a 
decision of the Council of Ministers and 
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For this reason, it seems necessary to divide the following "problematic" 
Articles into two categories; the non -basic and the basic. 
6.2.1 "Problematic" non-basic Articles. 
Non-basic articles of the Cypriot Constitution which potentially clash with 
certain principles and provisions of EU legislation, and could therefore give rise 
to problems in the event of Cyprus' accession to the EU, include provisions 
related to citizenship, the exercise of executive power, the legislative power and 
elections arrangements, currency and judicial power. The potential difficulties, 
and the measures that would be needed to bring the Cypriot Constitution into 
line with EU legislation, are analysed hereunder, for each of the "problematic" 
articles in turn. 
The first difficulty arises in relation to a provision of the Constitution with 
regard to citizenship and discrimination between sexes. Article 2.7 (a) and (b) 
provide that a married woman and unmarried children under the age of 21 shall 
belong to the husband's/father's Community. This constitutional provision 
might be considered to be in contradiction with the fundamental personal rights 
protected by the EU legislation providing for non sex discrimination. More 
specifically, it might be considered as inconsistent with the principle providing 
for equal treatment of women and men. This principle could be considered as an 
evolving one, since before the ToA the principle was mainly limited to the 
shall be operative and binding to the Republic when approved by a law made by the House of 
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provision of equal pay between the sexes. 29 The ToA, though, definitely 
provides for the general respect of the principle and for the expansion of its 
effect. Additionally, the ECJ has stated that the general principle of equal 
treatment between men and women is a fundamental one in the Community 
legal order. Specifically, the Court, in the case of Defrenne30 originally and more 
recently in the case of pVS, 31 ruled that the elimination of sex discrimination 
was one of the fundamental personal human rights which had to be protected by 
the Community. 
Therefore, in regard to Article 2(7) (a) and (b) of the Cypriot Constitution, an 
amendment would need to be made in order to provide and safeguard the right 
of married women to retain their membership of their Community of origin and 
also to allow to children to belong to their mother's Community, if this is 
desired. Such an amendment would be necessary to give effect to the principle 
of equality between the sexes. 
Several articles in the Constitution dealing with the exercise of executive power 
raise potential problems with regard both to who may exercise such power (Art. 
46) and the manner and scope of its exercise (Arts. 48-50, Art. 54). 
Representatives where upon it shall be concluded. 
29 Actually, it was Article 141EC (ex 119) which established the principle of equal pay between 
sexes. However, the fact that the Treaty of Amsterdam managed to incorporate the Social Policy 
Agreement as part of the Treaty (Articles 136-148) provided a new dimension for the respect of 
the principle of equality between the sexes into a more general effect. The progress of the EU 
legislation has been significant and the principle of equal treatment on grounds of sex has been 
also gradually achieved by the ECJ. Significantly, the amended Article 3 EC provides that in all 
of the Community's activities "the Community shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote 
equality, between men and women". Also, Article 13 inserted by the Treaty of Amsterdam gives 
the Council, amongst others, to adopt legislation to prohibit discrimination between sexes. 
30 Case 149/77, Defrenne v Sabena [1978] ECR 1365, [1978] 3 CMLR 312. See paras. 26-27. 
31 Case C-13/94, PvS. and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR 1-2143. See para. 19. 
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According to Article 46, the executive power is to be exercised by the Cypriot 
Council of Ministers. However, after accession, the EU Council must also be 
vested with power to exercise executive power. The necessary provision could 
be made in care of two ways; either by an additional clause explicitly making 
such a provision, or by reference to the amended Article 169 providing for the 
transfer of powers to the EU. It should, however, be noted that Art. 46 is a basic 
one except for its fourth paragraph. Thus, the earlier paragraphs are non- 
amendable and any addition must be included in paragraph four. 
As to the scope of the executive power, according to Article 48 (d) and (f) and 
Article 49 (d) and (f) the executive power exercised by the President and the 
Vice President of the Republic provides them with a right of final veto on laws 
or decisions of the Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives, on 
matters concerning foreign affairs, defence or security. It is necessary, however, 
that those constitutional provisions should take into consideration any potential 
engagements and obligations towards the EU. Such engagements and 
obligations may derive under the provisions of the European Common Foreign 
and Security Policy32 or with the general principles regulating the external 
32 The Common Foreign and Securirty Policy (CFSP) was included in the TEU under Title V. It is 
an evolution of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) system as it was set out by Article 30 
SEA. The provisions of Title V are by far, though, more obligatory in nature (See, Eaton, in 
O'Keefe and Twouey (eds. ), "Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty", Chichester, 1994). A 
number of changes were made to the second pillar (Title V) by the Amsterdam Treaty, although 
on the whole as far as the structure and the institutional involvement is concerned, it is not 
radically different. According to Article J. 1 (3), there are two means by which the objectives of 
the CFSP are to be achieved. Firstly, by establishing systematic cooperation between member 
States in the conduct of principle, in accordance to Article J. 2 TEU, and secondly by gradually 
implementing, in accordance to Article J. 3 TEU, joint action in the areas where the Member 
States have important interests in common. Moreover, the systematic cooperation may result in 
the Council defining common position if it deems necessary (Art. J. 2 (2)), which is agreed 
unanimously (Art. J. 8(2)) and binds the Member States (Art. J. 2 (2)). Additionally, according to 
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relations of the EU and its power in negotiating and signing various international 
treaties33. 
In other words, it must be ensured that the power of the veto will not be used to 
renege on or withdraw from such regional commitments. Similarly, certain 
consideration to the EU engagements must also be given in regard to the 
provisions of Art. 50(1) (a) (ii) and (iii) concerning the Presidential and Vice 
Presidential right of veto regarding such foreign affairs matters as the 
recognition of states, the establishment of diplomatic and consular relations 
Article J. 2 (3) Member States must coordinate their action. Although, unanimity is the general 
rule, the Council may by unanimous vote, when adopting joint action or at any stage during its 
development, decide that certain matters will be decided by qualified majority (Art. J. 3 (2)). Also 
Declaration 27 annexed to the TEU notes the agreement that Member States will, to the extent 
possible, avoid preventing a unanimous decision where a qualified majority exists in favour of 
this decision. Also an amendment made by the ToA (Article 23) refers to the possibility that a 
Member of the Council may abstain from a vote and make a formal declaration ensuring that 
that Member State is not obliged to apply the decision even while accepting that it commits the 
Union, and that State must not obstruct Union action based on that decision. (See, Craig, P. and 
De Burca, G., "EU Law; Text, Cases and Materials", Oxford University Press, 2"d Ed., 1998, at 
p. 41). 
33 The EU is conferred with certain treaty-making powers as a result of the extension of its legal 
personality (Art. 281 EC (ex. 210) provides for the legal personality of the Community) from the 
internal legal sphere to the international legal sphere (See, Charlesworth, A. and Cullen, H., 
"European Community Law", Pitman Publishing, 1994, at p. 63). The European Court, in Case 
6/64, Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 1441, at 1159, referred to the Community's capacity of 
representation on the international plane. Additionally, Articles 133 and 310 EC (ex. 113 and 
238) provide for the treaty-making powers granted to the Community. The Community, 
therefore, is granted with the right to negotiate any tariff agreements with non-EU members and 
treaties relating to its common commercial policy (Art. 133 EC). Finally, Article 310 EC provides 
for the conclusion of association agreements with non Member States of the EU, or international 
organisations, by establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, 
common action and special procedures. Also, Articles 302-304 EC (ex. 229-231) provide for the 
establishment and maintenance of relations with international organisations, like the United 
Nations, GATT, the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. A further development concerning the external relations of the EU was made by the 
ECJ in ERTA case (Case 22/70, Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263) by developing the 
doctrine of parallelism, which states that the Community's international relations power should 
co-extensive with its internal legislative powers. The Court has also decided that the Community's 
external relations power arises not only from an express conferment by the Treaty , 
but may 
equally arise from other provisions of the Treaty, from the Act of Accession and from measures 
adopted within the framework of those provisions. (Kramer Case, 3,4 & 6/76 [1976] ECR 1279; 
[1976] 2 CMLR 440). Additionally, in Opinion 1/76, Draft Agreement Establishing a European 
Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels [1977] ECR 741, the Court clarified that the 
Community may enter into international commitments not only by an express attribution by the 
Treaty, but, also, implicitly from its provisions. ( See, Charlesworth, A., and Cullen, H., op. cit., 
at p. 64-68). 
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with other countries and the interruption of these relations and, also, the 
conclusion of international treaties, conventions and agreements with third 
countries (non members of the EU). 
The other "problematic" Article with regard to the exercise of executive power 
is Article 54, whereby the Council of Ministers shall exercise executive power 
in matters including foreign affairs (Art. 54(b)), consideration of Bills to be 
introduced to the House of Representatives by a Minister (Art. 54(f)) and 
making of any order or regulation for the carrying into effect of any law as 
provided by such law (Art. 54 (g)). Firstly, then, in concern to Art. 54(b) there 
must be a general reservation which will take into consideration any obligations 
towards the EU. Then, in regard to Art 54(f), EU regulations must be excluded 
since they will be directly applicable in domestic law. Special reference might, 
however, be made in relation to EU directives which could be implemented in 
domestic law via decrees of the Council of Ministers. Finally, concerning Art. 
54(g) it should specified that for EU matters, any order or regulation could come 
directly from the Ministers. 
Another area in which the existing constitutional provisions will be inconsistent 
with European provisions or inadequate to cope with the European dimension of 
political activity in Cyprus is that of electoral activity. Article 63(1) provides for 
the right of Cypriot citizens to be registered as electors in either the Greek or the 
Turkish electoral list. However, according to Article 19 EC (ex 8b) European 
citizenship gives the right of electing and being elected in municipal and 
communal elections to all citizens of the EU. Also, according to Article 19 EC 
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citizens of the EU have the right of electing and being elected in elections for 
the European Parliament. Therefore, an amendment, most probably by addition, 
would need to be made to Article 63.1, in order to safeguard for both Cypriot 
and other EU Member States' citizens the electoral rights deriving from 
European citizenship 
Similarly, Article 64 of the Constitution, providing for the elections of the 
House of Representatives, must also be amended in order to include European 
Parliament elections as well. 34 Additionally, the title of Part N of the 
Constitution should be changed to "The House of Representatives and the 
European Parliament" in order to reflect the expanded scope of political rights to 
which it refers. 
A problem may also arise in relation to Article 119 which makes provisions 
concerning the issuing and administration of currency laws of the Republic. 
There is a need, however, to ensure that the currency policy of the Republic is in 
line with that of the EU. This can be provided explicitly by means of an addition 
to Article 119. 
The greatest number of non-basic Articles which may be "problematic" in 
relation to Cyprus accession to the EU, are to be found amongst the provisions 
relating to judicial power. In general terms, the issues raised in this regard 
concern the need for EU law to be explicitly included amongst the areas in 
which the relevant courts have jurisdiction, and the potential, in addition to the 
34 As provided by Article 20 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
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existing arrangements, for matters to be brought before the ECJ. Also, the 
Cypriot Courts should adopt, when possible, the duty of interpreting national 
law in the light of the EU legislation. 35 
Article 136 provides that, the Supreme Constitutional Court shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate finally on all matters as provided in the 
ensuing Articles. However, one of the effects of Cyprus' membership to the EU 
would be the necessary transfer of judicial power to the ECJ. A possible 
amendment might be enforced in order to provide that any decision of the 
Supreme Court on issues concerning the EU legislation and policy, could be 
referred to the ECJ 36 
Article 140, provides for the right of the President and the Vice President of the 
Republic to refer to the Supreme Court for its opinion the question as to whether 
any law or decision or any specified provision thereof of the House of 
35 See, for example, Case 32/74, Haaga [1974] ECR 1201, para. 6, Case 11/75, Impresa 
Construzione Comm Quirino Mazzalai v Ferrovia del Renon [1976] ECR 657 and Case 270/81, 
Felicitas Rickmers-Linie v Finanzamt Hamburg [1982] ECR 277. Also, for the duty of 
interpretation in regard to the EU directives, see above, Chapter Three. 
36 Certain national judicial power must be transferred to the ECJ. The ECJ must also have a 
superior force to national courts. Moreover, according to Article 234 EC (ex 177) a preliminary 
ruling procedure allows the ECJ to rule on questions of interpretation and validity of Community 
law which have been arising in proceedings before national courts and tribunals. Article 234 
provides a mechanism whereby any questions of interpretation or validity of Community law from 
Member States can be ruled upon before they return their judgement thus ensuring they are 
applying the correct law. The power to make a reference to the Court of Justice under Art. 234 
belongs to any court or tribunal of a Member State, however, it is not necessary for an institution 
to be specifically classified in these terms (for the general criteria regulating the locus standi, see, 
Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v Bundesbaugesellschaft Berlin mbH, 54/96, [1997] 
ECR I-4961, [1998] 2 CMLR 237). Normally, such a reference to the ECJ is discretionary as far 
as the decision of the relevant national court is not final (without an appeal being available). In 
regard to the supreme courts of the Member States, such a reference is considered as compulsory, 
since the cases which get to the House of Lords are substantial cases of the first importance... [in 
comparison to] lower courts... [that] may not be worth troubling the European Court about. 
(Lord Denning in Bulmer vJ Bollinger SA [1974] 3 WLR 202). For more discussion about Art 
234, see, Weatherill, S. and Beaumont, P., "EU Law", Penguin Books, 3'X1 Ed., 1999, pp. 314- 
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Representatives is repugnant to or inconsistent with any provision of the 
Constitution. This right should be extended, also, for EU legislation which is not 
going to be passed through the House of Representatives. 
In a similar view, Article 141(1) reads: The President or the Vice President of 
the Republic may, at any time prior to promulgation of any law imposing any 
formalities, conditions or restrictions on the right guaranteed by Article 25, 
refer to the Supreme Constitutional Court for its opinion the question as to 
whether such formality, condition or restriction is not in the public interest or is 
contrary to the interests of his Community. Within this provision, too, it must be 
ensured that for issues regarding interpretation of European legislation, the 
Supreme Constitutional Court, as the supreme court of Cyprus, should make 
compulsory reference to the ECJ, according to the provisions of Article 234 EC 
(ex. 177) 37 
Additionally, in Article 145 which confers the exclusive jurisdiction upon the 
Supreme Court to adjudicate finally on any election petition with regard to 
elections of the President and the Vice President, or of members of the House of 
Representatives or of any Communal Chamber, an addition must be 
incorporated in order to make reference to elections for members of the EP as 
well. 
356; Craig, P. and De Burca, G., "EULaw; Text, Cases and Materials", Oxford University Press, 
2°d Ed., 1998, pp. 406-452. 
37 Ibid. 
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Moreover, Article 152(1) provides that: The judicial power, other than that 
exercised under Part IX by the Supreme Constitutional Court and under 
paragraph 2 of this Article by the Courts provided by a communal law, shall be 
exercised by a High Court of Justice and such inferior courts as may, subject to 
the provisions of this Constitution, be provided by a law made thereunder. As it 
has already been mentioned, there must be a certain transfer of judicial power on 
behalf of the Republic of Cyprus to the ECJ. Therefore, the exercise of the 
judicial power would not only be vested on the Cypriot Courts provided by Art. 
152(1), but by the ECJ as well. An amendment to this Article, then, should be 
done, by making special reference, in order for the EU legislation and the ECJ to 
be included within this provision. Although, it might be additionally argued that 
this is implied by the amendment made to Art. 169, which would provide for the 
transfer of powers and sovereignty to the EU and its institutions. 
A similar problem arises, finally, with regard to the scope of Article 155(1) 
which provides that: the High Court shall be the appellate court in the Republic 
and shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine, subject to the provisions of 
this Constitution and of any Rules of Court made thereunder, all appeals from 
any court other than the Supreme Constitutional Court. Special reference must 
also be made in order the High Court to have jurisdiction to hear and determine, 
not only subject to the constitutional provisions and the rules made thereunder 
but also subject to European legislation. 
The Constitution also contains certain arrangements with regard to the 
municipalities which are incompatible with EU principles and law, as they 
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maintain separation between the Greek and the Turkish Communities, thereby 
limiting individuals' rights of participation in elections and their ability to apply 
on equal terms for granting of licences and permits. 
According to Article 173(2), then, the Council of the Greek municipality in any 
town shall be elected by the Greek electors of the town and the Council of the 
Turkish municipality by the Turkish electors. However, as mentioned above, 
according to the EU legislation providing for European citizenship, European 
citizens have the right to elect and be elected in all municipal elections. Thus, 
this Article should be amended in order to provide the right to all European 
citizens to elect and to be elected in those municipal elections. 
Finally, Article 175 provides that no licence or permit shall be issued to any 
person by a municipality in any such town not belonging to the Community of 
such municipality. This might be considered as a discriminatory provision which 
denies citizens the opportunity to live and work on equal terms in the place of 
their choice and is clearly opposed to the basic principle of the EU providing for 
non-discrimination among European citizens, on the ground of nationality. 38 In a 
similar way, Article 176 (a) and (b), also, makes discriminations among the five 
municipalities in the island. Therefore, this Article, too, must be amended to 
accord equal rights and status to all, in compliance with the EU principles of 
non-discrimination. 
38 According to the provisions of Article 12 EC (ex. 6), any discrimination on grounds of 
nationality within the scope of the Treaty is prohibited. 
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6.2.2 "Problematic" basic Articles. 
Although, as mentioned above, the basic Articles of the Constitution cannot be 
amended, it is important to examine some of the potential problems which 
derive from those unalterable constitutional provisions in regard to the 
application of the EU legislation in the Cypriot legal order. The fact that, 
especially at this stage before the accession, there is a little space for action, 
limits any attempt at the stage of a mere confinement of those "problematic" 
basic Articles. As also mentioned above, their harmonisation with the legal 
effect of Cyprus' EU membership is an extremely difficult task which could be 
achieved only after the signing of the Treaty of Accession. Such a harmonisation 
will depend, mainly, on successful judicial interpretation and the recognition and 
implementation of the precedence of EU legislation over national law, in the 
Cypriot legal order. 
The confinement and the examination of those Articles, might not constitute a 
radical solution to the problem, but at least will serve as a basis for solving it. 
The first basic Article which might be in contrast with the EU provisions is 
Article 4 of the Constitution, concerning the flag of Cyprus and its use. 
According to Art. 4.2,3 and 4, along with the Cypriot flag, the flags of Greece 
and Turkey might be also used in certain occasions. However, after the 
accession of Cyprus to the EU, the use of the flag of the EU would also be 
permitted. Although one could argue that this is not such a crucial problem, the 
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Court should approve it, probably by interpreting the use of the EU flag in 
Cypriot territory not inconsistent with the scope of this constitutional provision. 
Indeed, such an interpretation seems to reflect the reality, since that provision 
was actually introduced to balance the demands of the two Communities to use 
their original flags; Greek and Turkish. It does not seem that the purpose of this 
provision was to exclude the use of the flag of the EU. 
Another Article, though, which could also be "problematic" is Art. 61. 
According to Article 61, the legislative power of the Republic shall be exercised 
by the House of Representatives in all matters except those expressly reserved to 
the Communal Chambers under its Constitution. This is, of course, a more 
important provision, than Article 4, and it could pose much more crucial 
problems to the application of EU law in Cyprus. As mentioned above, 39 one of 
the basic effects of the application of the EU legislation derives from the 
principle of direct applicability. Accordingly, then, directly applicable EU 
legislation (especially the EU Regulations) shall be introduced in the Cypriot 
legal order without the necessary prior action on the part of the House of 
Representatives. The question is one of transfer of legislative power to the EU 
organs. This Article should, however, be interpreted in conjunction with Article 
169 which will provide the constitutional basis for the transfer of powers to the 
EU. It is up to the Court, then, to decide whether the provisions of Article 61 
could be operated along with the provision of Article 169 providing for the 
transfer of Cyprus. It could also be argued, that this Article provides for the 
exercise of the legislative power of the Republic within the Republic; a fact that 
39 See Chapter Three. 
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will continue in effect even after the accession; but it does not prohibit the 
transfer of part of this power (as an amended Article 169 would provide) to a 
supranational organisation. This could also be achieved by an Act of the House 
of Parliament based on Article 169, recognising the transfer of legislative power 
and giving effect to European legislation, similar to the UK example of the 1972 
Act of Parliament providing for the application of EU legislation in Britain. 
Article 123(1) of the Constitution might also be considered as being against the 
EU legislation. This Article provides for the 70: 30 ratio between the Greek 
Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots in the public service. It could, therefore, be 
considered as a provision that discriminates among EU citizens. 0 Thus, the fact 
that after the accession of Cyprus to the EU, not only Cypriot citizens but other 
European citizens, as well, might be able to be employed in certain posts of the 
public service, would definitely pose problems in the application of this 
provision. The introduction of this provision was, of course, aimed at the 
protection of the Turkish Cypriot Community and it was a part of the political 
solution given to the Cyprus question by the Zurich Agreement. So, the 
40Article 39.2 EC (ex 48.2), specifies the abolition of any discrimination, based on nationality 
between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other 
conditions of work and employment. This is an amplification of the basic Treaty rule forbidding 
any discrimination on grounds of nationality within the scope of the Treaty, which is contained in 
Art. 12 EC (ex. 6). However, according to Art. 39.4 (ex. 48.4) Art. 39 shall not apply to 
employment on public service. The provision, though, of Art. 39.4 is not a precise one, since the 
term `public service' is not the same in all Member States. The level of expansion (or limitation) 
of the term public service has been differently understood by Member States and the level of its 
application constitutes a threat towards the principles of the European citizenship. Thus, the 
Commission in 1988 published a document in the Official Journal ( [1998] OJ C72/2)on the scope 
of the provision of the Art. 39.4 providing some guidance on the sorts of state functions which it 
considered would or would not fall within that provision. Those which probably would included 
the armed forces, police, judiciary, tax authorities and certain public bodies engaged in preparing 
or monitoring legal acts, and those which would not included nursing, teaching, and non-military 
research in public establishments. See Craig P. and De Burca G., EU Law; Text, Cases and 
Materials, Oxford University Press, 2°d ed., 1998, pp. 684-691. 
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fundamental character of this provision seems rather difficult to harmonise with 
the EU provisions. However, it is again up to the Court to resolve the matter by 
giving priority to EU legislation, which would probably result in the non- 
application of Article 123(1), rather than its repeal. As explained above, some 
Articles might become de facto displaced but not repealed. Additionally, the 
wording of Article 123(2) providing for quantitative distribution in all grades of 
the hierarchy of the public service so far as this will be possible, might also 
provide an interpretative tool for the Court in giving effect to the European non- 
discriminatory provision. 
Equally, the provision of Article 178 could also be considered as having 
discriminatory effect. Art. 178 provides that with regard to other localities, a 
special provision shall be made for the constitution of the organs of the 
municipalities in accordance, as far as possible, with the rule of proportional 
representation of the two Communities. Similarly, then, this provision must be 
faced in the light of the European principle of non discriminatory provisions, 
based on nationality, among the European citizens. 
Finally, Article 181 provides for the constitutional force of the Treaty of 
Guarantee concluded between the Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, the 
Republic of Turkey and the United Kingdom of Britain. The question arising, 
then, is whether a non member state of the EU (i. e. Turkey) could guarantee the 
independence and territorial integrity of a state member of the EU. This seems to 
be against the provisions of the EU for Common Foreign and Security Policy" 
41 Supra note 32. 
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since Turkey is not a member of the EU. However, it could be argued that the 
current status of Turkey, as a candidate EU member state, could result in the de 
facto respect on the part of Turkey of the European Union's territory. Also, this 
provision might also be considered as de facto non-applicable, since Turkey by 
the 1974 invasion and current occupation of the north of Cyprus is not in a 
position to be claimed as a guarantor of the Republic of Cyprus. 
63 Conclusion. 
As a conclusive remark, it could be noted that the unalterable character of the 
basic Articles of the Constitution of Cyprus would definitely pose serious 
problems to the application of Community law in Cyprus; however, those 
problems must not be considered as insuperable obstacles excluding the 
accession of Cyprus to the EU. These obstacles, as noted above, could be 
overridden by a wise compromise and interpretation on the part of the Cypriot 
Courts. 
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CONCLUSION 
As mentioned in the introduction to the thesis, the purpose of this thesis was to 
provide an examination and analysis of constitutional issues raised by the 
potential accession of Cyprus to the EU. It sought firstly to prove that the 
Constitution of Cyprus itself, and its current application, cannot be considered as 
obstacles towards the accession of Cyprus to the EU and secondly to examine 
how Community legislation might be introduced and applied parallel to the 
Cypriot constitutional provisions. 
The fact that the EU does not consider the prior solution of the political problem 
of Cyprus as a precondition for the Cypriot accession implies that there is a 
possibility for Cyprus to accede the EU with the present constitution in force. 
Therefore, accession itself and the application of the implications from such an 
accession must be based on the present constitution. 
As it has been examined in Chapter One of the thesis, the current functioning of 
the constitution of Cyprus is mainly based on the application of the law of 
necessity. According to the Cypriot Courts, the law of necessity justifies the 
continuation of the functioning of the Republic of Cyprus, even in the absence of 
the Turkish Cypriots, and the constitution cannot be paralysed because of the 
deliberate absence of the Turkish Cypriots. However, this thesis emphasised the 
need for the wise use of the law of necessity, since its application is only to be 
considered temporary and not unlimited, for its misuse could pose a serious threat 
to the very character of the constitution. Changing the character of the 
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constitution is by no means the purpose of the application of the law of necessity. 
As indicated, the law of necessity is to be used only in exceptional circumstances. 
In examining the development of relations between the Republic of Cyprus and 
the EU, it has been shown that the significant effort on behalf of the Republic of 
Cyprus and its achievement in harmonising most of its legislation and its 
standards with those of the EU, enables the inclusion of the Republic of Cyprus 
within the next enlargement of the EU. However, the beginning of the accession 
negotiations should not be influenced by the absence of the Turkish Cypriots. As 
it has been stated, the Turkish Cypriots, even though they were invited to 
participate in the negotiations, refused. The issue of their non participation 
should not to be considered as an obstacle to the completion of the negotiations, 
since the Government of the Republic of Cyprus is the only recognised 
government on the island and it is the only body responsible for the conclusion of 
an accession agreement. Regarding this issue, attention has also been drawn to 
the fact that the EU must be very careful in her dealings with the Turkish Cypriot 
participation, in order that the illegal de facto division of the island should not 
acquire a de jure status. 
Regarding the possible impact of the political problem of Cyprus on its accession 
to the EU, the EU position to the issue (i. e. that the prior solution of the political 
problem is not to be considered as a precondition for accession) is considered to 
be the right one. Of course, the prior solution of the political problem would 
facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the EU, but on the other hand, the prior 
accession to the EU might act as a catalyst for the solution of the problem. It is 
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also argued that the non accession of Cyprus to the EU because of the non 
solution of the political problem, would effectively make the Republic of Cyprus 
a hostage to the will of Turkish foreign policy. In regard to the application of the 
Community legislation, in the event of the accession of Cyprus with the political 
problem unsolved, it has been suggested that a derogation could be issued 
providing for the temporary non application of Community legislation in the 
occupied area of Cyprus. It is emphasised, though, that such a derogation must be 
accompanied by a strong declaration on the part of the EU of the recognition of 
the impartial territorial sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. Without such an 
additional declaration, a derogation could result to the division of the island 
becoming permanent and no further attempt and pressure for a solution to be 
carried. On the other hand, it is also argued that the possible accession of a 
divided Cyprus on the EU could be a unique challenge for the practical 
establishment of the CFSP of the EU. The recent failure of the actual application 
of the CFSP might be changed to success if Member States manage to use their 
influence for a political settlement on Cyprus. 
Referring to the signing of the Treaty of Accession to the EU, it has been argued 
that the Cypriot constitution provides a power for such a step. Specifically, the 
constitution does not contain any special provision excluding accession of 
Cyprus to the EU; on the contrary, Article 169 of the Constitution provides for 
the power of the Republic of Cyprus to enter into international agreements. 
Under the provisions of this Article, the Treaty of Accession might be concluded. 
The issue of the absence of a Turkish Cypriot Vice President from the 
Government and Turkish Cypriot Ministers from the Cypriot Council of 
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Ministers (normally, under the provisions of the Constitution, the Vice President 
could exercise the right of veto on such a decision and the Council of Ministers 
should include three Turkish Cypriot Ministers) should not pose an obstacle to 
the conclusion of the accession agreement since, as it has been made clear by the 
law of necessity, their deliberate absence must not jeopardise the continuation of 
the functioning of the Republic. 
Another issue that has been examined in detail within this thesis, was whether the 
constitutional provisions provide the necessary mechanisms for the application of 
the Community law on the Cypriot legal order. This is a problem faced by all 
Member States and examples of the various ways that other Member States have 
managed to give effect to Community legislation, have been used as a helpful 
guidance for the Cypriot case. For achieving this task, an important transfer of 
sovereignty must be made from the Member States to the EU institutions. 
Similarly to other Member States, in the case of Cyprus, this might be achieved 
by an addition to Article 169 providing for the transfer of power to the EU. As it 
has been noted, Article 169 is not a basic Article of the Constitution and 
therefore is capable of being amended. 
An additional issue addressed in the thesis was the accommodation of the 
principle of supremacy of Community legislation within the Cypriot legal order. 
This is very important to be achieved since the principle of the supremacy of the 
Community law is to be considered as the backbone of the Community's 
legislation. The very existence of the EU is actually based on this principle, since 
this is a major factor for harmonisation and integration to be achieved. The 
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relationship between the provision of the supremacy of the Cypriot Constitution 
(Art. 179) and the Community supremacy was examined and means of 
compromise to avoid the direct conflict between the two principles have been 
suggested. Firstly, it was emphasised that, theoretically, those two principles 
might not be considered to be in a direct conflict, seeking for the supremacy of 
the one over the inferiority of the other. However, practically, the Cypriot 
domestic law must find ways to give priority to the Community legislation. It is 
suggested that the Cypriot Courts could play a major role in the achievement of 
this task. It is upon their wise judicial interpretation that compromising solutions 
could be achieved. Their interpretation might be based on the provisions of the 
amended Art. 169 of the constitution, providing for the transfer of power from 
the Republic of Cyprus to the EU institutions. 
The next issue that was dealt within the thesis, is the constitutionality of Cyprus' 
accession to the EU, having regard to the provisions of Articles 170 and 185(2) 
of the Constitution and Art. I of the Treaty of Guarantee. Articles 185(2) of the 
Constitution and Article I of the Treaty of Guarantee excluding the political or 
economic union between the Republic of Cyprus and another state. 
Consequently, it has been argued by some, that these provisions could act as 
obstacles towards the accession of Cyprus to the EU. However, on the basis of 
interpretative analysis, it has been concluded that the provisions of these Articles 
cannot restrict Cyprus from gaining accession to the EU. According to the 
travaux preparatoires, the scope of this provision was merely to prohibit the 
achievement of enosis (union with Greece) or taksim (partition of the island). It 
does not seem that the aim of the Article was to prevent the Cypriot membership 
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of the EU. Also, by based on a strict legal interpretation of the Articles' 
provisions, it appears that the EU could not be included within their provisions, 
since the wording of the Articles refers to union with another state. Firstly, it is 
argued that according to the wording of the provision, the word state is singular 
(i. e. state) and not plural (i. e. states). Moreover, although some have argued that 
the EU could be considered to have the status of a state, the EU as it stands today, 
cannot in the author's view be considered as a state, since it has its own sui 
generis status, significantly different from the normal meaning of an international 
organisation or of a state. 
In regard to the provision of Article 170 of the Constitution, it is equally argued 
in the thesis, that the accession of Cyprus to the EU is not prohibited. Turkey's 
most favoured nation treatment as provided by Art. 170 would not be affected by 
the Cypriot accession to the EU. As it has been explained in Chapter Five, the 
existing status of the relationship between Turkey and the EU would not 
jeopardise the application of the m-f-n on behalf of Cyprus to Turkey. Moreover, 
the current situation on the island as a result of the Turkish foreign policy, has for 
a long time frozen the application of this provision. 
Finally, in Chapter Six, the necessity for amending the Constitution as a result of 
the Cypriot accession to the EU, and the possibility of such amendment, were 
examined. Accordingly, it has been argued that several amendments to the 
Constitution would be necessary for the smoother application of the Community 
law in the Cypriot legal order. However, amendments can be made only to the 
non basic Articles of the Constitution, as Article 182 provides. Such amendments 
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of the non basic Articles of the Constitution should be justified by the wise 
application of the law of necessity. On the other hand, though, no amendments 
should be made to the basic, non-amendable, constitutional provisions. The law 
of necessity can in no way justify any amendment of basic Articles, since this 
would be a violation of the very character of the Constitution. In regard to a 
potential conflict between a basic Article of the Constitution and an EU norm, it 
is up to the judiciary to find a compromise. As a matter of fact, some non- 
amendable provisions might be de facto non applicable. As it has been explained, 
in such a case, the basic provision is not replaced but merely remains 
inapplicable. According to the conclusion of the thesis, constitutionally talking, 
this is the most difficult problem that Cyprus will face in the event of its 
accession to the EU, but nevertheless, such a problem should not be considered 
as capable of preventing Cyprus' membership of the EU. 
Therefore, as it shown throughout this thesis and the Constitution of Cyprus 
cannot be considered as an obstacle towards accession and any possible 
difficulties provided by the constitution itself cannot be considered as incapable 
of solution. 
In conclusion, then, although there are certain procedural and legal difficulties to 
be faced in connection with Cyprus' accession to the EU, neither the provisions 
of the constitution nor the current political situation in Cyprus prevent such 
accession. Selective constitutional amendments and wise interpretation by the 
courts of the non amendable constitutional provisions would enable Cyprus to 
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accommodate EU legislation within its own legal order, and meet fully the 
obligations arising from its membership. 
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Map of Cyprus 
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ANNEX II 
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS IN CYPRUS (1878 -1999) 
5 November 1878 Cyprus annexed to Great Britain. 
I" May 1925 Cyprus became a British Crown Colony. 
0 April 1955 Armed revolt began by EOKA. 
5 February 1959 Zurich Negotiations commenced. 
11 February 1959 Basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus was laid 
down at Zurich. 
19 February 1959 London Agreement. 
21" September 1960 Signing of the Constitution of Cyprus. 
16t h August 1960 Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus / The 
Constitution came into force. 
215` September 1960 Membership of the UN. 
24 May 1961 Membership of the Council of Europe. 
15t h February 1961 Membership of the Commonwealth. 
30t h November 1963 President Makarios proposed for the amendment of the 
Constitution 
21St December 1963 Intercommunal conflicts began / Turkish Cypriot 
officials refused to exercise their constitutional duties. 
13t h March 1964 Establishment of the UNFICYP. 
10 November 1964 Mustafa Imbrahim Case / Introduction of the Law of 
Necessity. 
19 December 1972 Signing of the Association Agreement with the EEC 
I" June 1973 Association Agreement came into force. 
15t h July 1974 Military coup against President Makarios. 
20 July 1974 Turkish military "intervention" (1st Phase) 
14 August 1974 Turkish military "intervention" (2 Phase) 
17 November 1974 UN GA Res. 3212/1974 
13 th December 1974 UN SC Res. 365/1974 
13 February 1975 Establishment of the "Turkish Federal State of Cyprus" 
(TFSC). 
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30 June 1977 End of the first stage of the Association Agreement. 
15 November 1983 Establishment of the "Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus" (TRNC). 
19 October 1987 Second stage of the Association Agreement 
4 July 1990 Cyprus Application for EU full membership 
17 September 1990 The Council of Ministers (EU) asked the Commission 
to draw an Opinion on Cyprus' application for 
membership 
30 June 1993 The Commission issued its Opinion on Cyprus' 
application 
0 November 1993 Substantive talks between the Government of Cyprus 
and the Commission began. 
6th March 1995 Re-examination of the Cypriot Application / Beginning 
of the procedures for Cyprus' accession to the EU. 
17th July 1995 Definition of the level, frequency and other modalities 
of the structured dialogue between Cyprus and the EU. 
15 December 1995 The President of Cyprus was invited to participate in 
the Cannes European Council. 
31g May 1998 The accession negotiations between Cyprus and the 
EU formally started. 
10 November 1998 Commencement of the Substantive negotiations. 
10 December 1999 Helsinki European Council. (The Cyprus problem not 
to be considered as a prerequisite for accession) 
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ANNEX III 
MEETINGS AND INTERVIEWS 
For the completion of this thesis, meetings and interviews with several officials 
of the Republic of Cyprus have been held between the summer of 1996 and 1998. 
Meetings and interviews during summer 1996 
Mr Alecos Michaelides, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. 
Mrs Leda Koursoumba, Advocate of the Republic of Cyprus. 
Dr Constantinos Lykourgos, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus. 
Dr Nicolas Emiliou, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus. 
Dr Kypros Chrysostomides, distinguished lawyer and author. 
Meetings and interviews during summer 1997 
Mr Alecos Markides, Attorney-General of the Republic of Cyprus. 
Mr Thanos Michael, General Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Cyprus 
Dr Constantinos Lykourgos, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus. 
Mr Christos losephides, Legal Service of the Republic of Cyprus. 
Meetings and interviews during summer 1998 
Mr Demetris Stylianides, ex President of the Supreme Constitutional Court of 
Cyprus. 
Mrs Leda Koursoumba, Advocate of the Republic of Cyprus. 
Dr Kypros Chrysostomides, distinguished lawyer and author. 
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ANNEX IV 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
The following questionnaire was drafted and sent in order to obtain the formal 
opinion of the recipients on issues arising from the accession of Cyprus to the EU. 
The questionnaire was sent to: 
" Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, 
" Office of the Chief Negotiator and Co-ordinator of the Harmonisation Process 
(Cyprus), 
" Major political parties in Cyprus, 
9 British Foreign Office, 
" Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
" Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Turkish Embassy in London), 
9 The "TRNC" Representative in London, 
9 The EU Commissioner for Enlargement (Enlargement Directorate). 
Attached are the responses received. 
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SAMPLE 
Part I 
1. Do you §upport a possible accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU? 
2. Do you think that Cyprus is going to be benefit from such an accession? Why? 
3. Do you think that Cyprus is eligible for accession to the EU? If so, why? 
4. Does the Government of the Republic of Cyprus have the right to negotiate its 
accession to the EU without the opinion of the Turkish Cypriot Community? 
5. Do you consider the political problem of Cyprus as an -obstacle towards its 
accession to the EU? 
Part H (Optional) 
6. Is the Constitution of Cyprus (1960) an obstacle towards the accession to the 
EU? If yes, why? 
7. Which amendments (if any) do you suggest must be made to the 1960 
Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus if Cyprus is to be able to access to the 
EU? 
S. Do you support the view that a new constitution is necessary for enabling 
Cyprus to gain access to the EU? Why? 
9. According to the Art. I of the Treaty of Guarantee "the Republic of Cyprus 
undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic 
union with any State whatsoever". Do you think that the accession to the EU is 
against the provisions of this Article? 
10. How, if at. -A can 
the Turkish Cypriot Community be represented in the 
accession negotiations? 
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RESPONCES 
1. Office of the Chief Negotiator and Co-ordinator of the Harmonisation 
Process (Republic of Cyprus) 
REPUBLIC OF' CYPRUS 
rl 
Office of the Chief Negotiator and Co-ordinator of the Harmonisation Process 
-t i ? +i4v 
Part 1' 
1. Do you tuppon a poaaibk seteseion of Ike Republic aI ('vpns to the Ft'? 
ihre :"a cc n cnsus in Cyprua on . his issue. ic all panics jri. i the puhhc at large support 
ýJsms . wccv sass it, the 
1l 
2. Do row 1hi. A that ('>prus k going to be beacßl from such as accea, ioa? 
Ucfinariý, ( ylYtu, will ltnnedit tmm toining the EU. Ixeth p. ilttiealty un4J cvunumiwUy. 
Histon: allv, culturally. Cy+pevr. Wimp to, the Funipein family. Furlhennare, the 
lnttmaucxtal Jcvck+pmcnt( (gk+attsatwn of the ccvcom , 
dtsmanduºg of tºatnenc to trade, 
ti. 1 rrnier ('vpm. tý acre. %iým t the fl' imtxrntIu 
3. Do you think that Cýproa is cüRibIe for occeeeioa to the Ft ? If +o, why? 
( ýpru%ap'htd to ixtium it nurnt+cr of the Ft" t>rcaurc it hclir cad that it was cligibic Kul 
the decision ku %ontir n tit, itcibtttty was taken b) the LI rtselt by the Commission's A% is of 
Nah I991 ('vpruo i% cirytihk hocau c it ti; a Furupcan ctmntry. meets all the Cc"mh gen 
. n! crna an, to, a high k%-cl of cctw omtc ck kipment. 
4. Do, ' the l; overumevt of the Ktpwbüc of Cyprus have the riot to ie otbtc its accession 
to for Et »ultimo the opinion of the'turtish C)prhN (or: munltp" 
1'hr Ic rnmcnt ,' the Rcp uhlic of Crpru+ Im, the right to nrttutiatc the taland'ti e«e"wm to 
the EIJ. taking into ctmaiderati to the no, of all communities tin the island For this purpose 
the eovemnwnt tun e*tended an imitation to the Turkish t: 'yIwcrt crammunity to aamuratc 
their repro cnt awes to participate in tht Cvpruc negotiating team. 
.. 2 
"21. Aaadrmts. . Sc, "210" . 
1glrajin. "P. ts. Bur 24$)$. "1i. r. ý, n. t vpruý -1,1 . 
4, PXI J "t az: 31-1%, 
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Do you consider the political problem of Cyprus as an obstacle towards its 
accession to the EU? 
C'vpru- will "atttnuc uorkutg towards a lust and stable uiklutt. nt tu the C'yprua problem. 
loping that this wilt it achieved befwe the istand c accessxm to the FU The negotiattntt 
prtxess will continue and c%ery akut will he made to hatmurttsc with the acgws. We du 
hctw c that C%prus will txx he tutimtced due to any olxtaclec ur obp«iirnts raised by a third 
parts. Il' dchgttc all the etYutts made a solution it, the Cyprus problem is not obtained at the 
time of ummian. Cyprus accccston would not entail any insurmountable pnthktnx. 
Acccssnm ut the L u etnment controlled part of Cyprus is anticipated to he much smoother 
than that of other states. 
Cattail PO. wc) ahs 
Advi r-C mirdinatix 
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2. British Foreign Office 
hk- 
Foreign & 
Commonwealth 
OfTire 
Ronthe, f kdU pesn D. p. vunegt 
Load- SW1A 2AL 
tnhrphwor 0171-270 
s2 April 1999 
Christo-9 Pate*1idee 
Un-versity of Hull law School 
Hull 
HUS 7RX 
' 
, 
1. 
Thank you for your letter of 9 Pebruary enclosing some 
questions on Cyprus, answers to which you hope to use in your 
thesis on Cyprus' accession to the EU. I apologise for the 
long delay in replying: it has been an extremely busy time. 
hope the following answers cover not only your questions 
to 5, but also your optional questions. 
1. Do you support accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the 
BUT 
Yea. The EU announced its intention at the Luxembourg 
European Council in December 1997 to open accession 
negotiations with Cyprus. Those negotiations opened on 
3: March 1998. The UK welcomed this, and we hope that Cyprus' 
accession process will continue to make steady progress. 
2. Do you think Cyprus will benefit from accession? Why? 
Yes. Apart from all the obvious economic and social benefits 
of RU membership, the EU made clear at Luxembourg that Cyprus' 
accession should benefit all communities in Cyprus and help 
bring about civil peace and reconciliation. In short, we hope 
that the accession process can act as a catalyst towards a 
political solution in Cyprus. 
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Do you think that Cyprus is eligible for accession? why? 
Yes. It s for the EU to decide who is eligible for 
membership. The UK, an a : member of the EU, supported the 
decision to open accession negotiations with Cyprus. 
In 1996 there was a legal challenge to Cyprus' Et application 
which argued that the Treaty of Guarantee disallowed the 
political or economic union of Cyprus with another state. 
This challenge was defeated in the UK courts. We see no lega: 
bar to Cyprus' membership of the U. 
4. Does the Government of the Republic of Cyprus have the 
right to negotiate its accession to the RU without the 
opinion of the Turkish Cypriot coaninity? 
As you will be aware, in March 1998 President Cler, des made an 
offer to the Turkish Cypriot comunity to participate in 
Cyprus' accession negotiations process. That offer remains; 
we, and the EU as a whole, have urged the Turkish Cypriots to 
take it up. The modalities of a joint negotiating team is of 
course a matter for resolution by the two sides. 
5. no you consider the political problem of Cyprus an 
obstacle to accession? 
The UK has consistently made clear that whilst a political 
settlement in Cyprus is not a pre-condition for EU membership, 
the accession process will be easier it a settlement has been 
reached. The UK hopes the accession of a united Cyprus will 
be possible and will continue to work hard in support of 
efforts to achieve a political settlement. 
. r- .. ý. r, t. t' 
- «I -1 
L 
Standbrook 
Southern Eurcpean Department 
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3. Turkish Embassy in London 
TURKISH EMBASSY 
43. Worm kars 
Lam 11111 IN 
tel.: 0111-313 ISil 
fez.: 1171-313 $IN 
1* "1 i; 1' 
11" GtJ '`17r" f-4, 
I ar+n sor"y ! car a somewhat belated reply to your 
letter of 12 February. 
Iurkey'3 position an the Greer tt. .i ! era1 
application for EU aemte+rshiv is suite clear and there 2s 
anund, ant mater; al Car. this topic. One of the sour"cets to 
roach research mat, *rial is the web -site ') t the Turklen 
Mknist ry of Foreign Affairs (httn: I(www. mfn. gov. t. r ) . and 
its 
CrLSs ratrarences. 
It nas; come to my knowieage that t. hA t. ondon 
Re pra so ntatJ. ve cf the Turkish kepublic of Northern r: yprUS 
(Tt2fn; ) Mr. 1lahkº Muftirzade has sent you an ;. ntormat. ion 
oacO(age an your research topic., Turkey suooorts the TRNC 
pos: tiorv and f-lays a con tructi. re role in seeking a just 
and viable solution to the Cyprus quaestiorº. 
Ker; m Ur* 
C: ounýstr IJOr 
Ffir :, 
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4. DISI (Right Wing Political Party in Cyprus) 
: t+. »F 1 Ir) 1 ': l' LV'IC"MtT ý3fT'ICLý. C---' _e; 'S-7mrJ4 
0. 
DEMOCRATIC WLLJY 
i6 Mar& 19'9£ 
Mr CtVistos P aides 
The Unvww*y r: i Hui 
law Scncz3l 
LIM* 
Dear Mr P®" lK is 
The WwY*'i t: tM luCS,, M, s of Dwt l Of yoU( QUe iorraft we gute ob1Aot . 
undsn, W, s that you wart mat. iW M4i ch could Mlp you n your rwlsorch. W. 
ham ap{xoacxled the FUf r, Pons" to t. t ~ and we wlte mfonned that 
1 i. y have sire" se 1 you am noes. " m1.91. 
our party was the Qrst .a urx*di e the importan of the Esrop. ar onentatiort of 
cur }", qm poll y Nnd tho e! orts of the Go . narrt of Prssidero Ckww to 
athleve the aooession of Cyprtt ID the EU are fury w+PpoMd by ox Pity L*ad. 
Now Mastasiadee 
Wo wish you every Or in you PhD work 
Yours snicWrely 
Dr Andr. sltn Papaabp O. 
D ptonatk AdOsr M the PPs& ivt 
t. ronn 'IP400W Oft I. Slelcou St.. et P. C). boa 1101 1 4O Mk-4014 CrynS. trio-, 4497917 ;. HM 0: 44IM04 
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5. AKEL(Left Wing Political Party in Cyprus) 
ANOPeQTIKO 
5 Maptiou 1999 
Kuptc. 
Xpivro tloTOahon 
(lavemonj io Hull, 
BOEMAL 
AyimrTt K fOTOQ Öfl. 
AAOY 
ETTpauvdRTou E rIS UTTWitpotlc (no tpWt iarO%ÖyIO TTOU ^ tXETE OT JAo Tic 
arrovrfpti croian TO rpoWio MtAATwv rou Kunp. aicoO irK K. E AKEA. 
E4jomt ar1 º1 caS pa Ovion 6AA) PoeýOw xpc«cotc 
r. KoAaroai&X 
WAoc iou nr TiS KE. AKEA 
AKc&d-oS 3 T. b i8'27 t::? '6I21.09 7167$71 
F-nx3i ta oýyý-. y... ný, ",. ý1"ý : ,. «+vwcw o. g.. ti 
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Eupp. rva pc ondpaotl tou 1Bou Euvtbpi. ou tou AREA, nou 
6%. ctiiX6nxe ot)»S 16-19 Nocißpi. ou 1995 ot^ IEutwoi. a, 'µE tnv 
npoiinöOcorl 6t. rr EupwnaikM 'Evi. o gon&S otrv op6A cn. Xuory 
tou Kunpwxoü, cvtäooctal o)o O11pn 1 Kunpog otgv EupwnaLxq 
'! vworl Kot buoopaAL{ovtot o^pavttKES xot. w vLko-oLxovo1LKtS 
xotaxtnocI. S toy /ooü pos, to AREA ci. vaL etoq. µo va 
ouvrIyopiioct untp ti14; ivtatili; tr}c ßünpou otryv EupwnaLKfl 
,! l.. 
AV bcv nuotlUiaµc dtL q KunpoS µnopcC Va tnwOc/n8ci 
and tqv cvtatr trite bcv Ba ouvvyopovoope, und tLS no ndvW 
npoünoBEocLc, unCp tqc cvtatvc. To kupuötcpo dipcaor, ono 
t^v evtaty Ba pnopovoc va cLvau n Katd to buvato 
KOLOXUp&Ofl tIN DO$d CLaS tr1 Kunpou ivavtt. tIre 
ancLX1j tqS ToupKLaq KOL F apolßoLQ anobcitr} Auor tou 
XunpLaxo%J otn 06cn tWV oU WVLWV u*Ti)ou cnLntbou Ual wv 
lpnqPLoucurv too EuµpouXCou Aopaacias. E cvt04LaI1 nopci. a 90 
PnopOÜac VO XC . toupvt1oCL WS KOLa)UtnS vLa ti 
Miarj too 
Kunpuaxou. Auch 8a pnopouoc va oup#cº. und tiv npounÖOcon 
dtt 9 Eupanaticv 'Evwal 8a otcLxct cva (cxd8apo ptjvupa npoc 
trv Toupx Ca Ka(. toy K. Ntcvxtögt 'Ott. jlc t9V cnLtuxn 
xo äAr q WV cvtotL. axwv 6LaRpoyµatctivcýºV, avc{äpt^ta anö 
pL Lott 00 cwa$- Aupivo to Kunpwxo, 9 Kunpt. oi to av Pty 
ýv io paLlO. WC as ttc . Upt. QpXL. oc aC aildl{Agpfl ttIv 
tntKpdrutdi tqS, Rcpt pavoplivJv twv raotcXo, Ewrv cba, rv, 
Ga cvzaX9ci. ctrv 8up. inaixrj 'Evwan. Ec pta tct0LO ncpi. ntwan 
to xattxopcvo cbdyq pot; Ga 6cwpoüvtoL ii pog ti S Eup., nai. xn 
'EVWO^S. Autö, pc to aclpä too, 80 CK3ITJ6CVl. 06L L. S 
niAavötrytcc cuputtprS &LCAvoür. avaywwplorl(z tou 
WcubOKpätOUc nOU CLVQL 0 Q}iEQOC QtÖXoc tr1 TOUpKLxýS 
nacupög. 'Etol, v ToupKLa an ßpeBcL pnpootd oto bi. gipas 
Ei. tc va apoX. prjacl 9 cvtatn Xwpi. c LouS ToupKoxünptouS xal 
pc ctoubCttpwory WV CacxtotLttwv tqq otö wv ci. tc va 
anobcXBci )uan too Eunpwxou oto naaLoL. o LWV oupIVarvV: rv 
UipfXou cntntbou bOL WV ýrrýýL0N WV tou EuµbouXLuu 
AoTaXc i. os . 
AuLA Lil at. ja' bev ouvtptxouv ot. ni. o növw 
npoünoetoc, S. rLa uLo ocLp«i adyous, il tvtatq ttc Künpou 
bcv tXct. onoouvbcßci ono t^ )vors toy Kunpt. oxoü xoL Kät4 
and tttoucc npounoßtocºq ri cvtuLLa*+j nopc*. o bcv Xcttoupycc 
unoßor ev tIxä yt. a tl Xüoq Lou Zunpi. aioü. AVLL6hcta, 11 
caaI1V0KUnpwkh nacupd btXCtoL n. tot. C v. a uno uphoci. S, 
6a Opctt. Ka coticpýpcta n cpycov onciir ött. bcv @a ; Jag; 
cvta(ouv. 
Taoo ctv rv o6otnon tvS sup. maLu c Entponr toy 1993 doo Kai oc b»aa cnCogpa tyypo a ti EupunatKgj "IvwovK 
avayvwp(ittaL n1\4paS q En LXGCljlotflto WK Euipou yLa 
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tvtagr) c8 Kvnpos ycorypoqpLxö. noatt Lud, noÄltlotlxa, 
8coµLxa xaL &)wx; ni. ouv. atä Ucpoc tilt Hup)nrTc xau narlpoL 
6Aa to xpt»tAps-a yKa tvta{n, ncpLaappovoptvwv twv 
OLxovoµLW(JV xpL. tIpI. V (tcAEUtolM, ö{wIZ, avtLpeu. )ni.; OUNC 
npý6>ar%pa ondxatorgq and toug bei uttS tou M6aotpiXt). 
Aoya)x: K n Kunp. aoi brlpoxpatia ixcL to bLxacuvo Va 
bLCtdycL tLS cvtaILaKic bLanpayNoteuocLS xwpi. c tt ovp$wvfl 
yv+: ryI1 tnq toupKOKUnpLaKrjs xoLvdtntaS. And tq otLypt nou 
bLc8v ovay o6sp . CctaL ydvo ºj 
KunpO-axrj DnyoKpat .a KaL 11 
v6pLpn Kußtpvnorj tnc, autrj ct. voL xOL 9 pävq oppdbLa va 
onogOOL{CL to o10v9con tgIC bLanpayµatcutLKI%c trS opd&ac. 
'EXovtoc ö}wc und#rq ttS nOALtLKi npocxtoocts Lou 
sntqpatoS. ^ Kvßfpv^ön tVC KunpLaK' AnpoxpottOS CXCL 
anootciJ c. npöo c )Tor otnv ToupxoxunpLaxrj KoLVdtryta yLo 
oupµctoxf otLc cvta(LOKtc, npdtoon nou n L&LO q Eupwnot. xej 
'Evwan tXCL. Xapaxtnp*ocL uS "VGVVOLöbapT". 'OW-n, q nycoto 
T-1 1c; toupxoxunpt. oxrjs KOLV6tntoq ixet onopp*WcL tnv 
npboxafon, 666tL cxcl. VO nou otgv npaypatLKdtflta cnLb u «cL 
bcv ctvoL zLnotc )Ly%; itcpo and tnv cu ptpouS LOS avayv, JpLon 
LOU qpcvboxpdtouq. Raw anb ttLoLCS ouvOrjxcq CLVQL 
6LcOvovoptxd op8d Kai. noALtLxd cnLßa»6icvo va npo). WºijocL 
n cvta&Laxrj nopc. a, cvW n npdoxhno^ nopoµtVCL avoLXt1. 
Ev noaaoLS q cpi: +tfloq tXc*. anovtg0ci. 'Exouµc naijpq 
cnCyvwon toy ycyovdtoS 6t1- n )uaq tou KunpLaxov @a dvoLyc 
btanaata t^v ndpto tnc tvta[nc. PL'nutd Kos q npoonäOtLä 
pas nptncl- Va ¬ . vat q 
Xuon tou IuspLaxov. 'Opx. c, and to 
otLypn nov tv Auon tqv napcyno6LCc. q ToupxLKu nAcupd, 
cLYOL dbLKO n Evp atKej '6v o vo anaUtci. Avon "Pty tnv 
tvtaIq. Ni. o tttow otäon 9a onopdipuvc oxdµa ncpLoodtcpo 
tts nL8avdtntc4; yta )uoq tou EunpLaKOui, a ou 00 nopcCXe 
tva ent. np6o9cto KCvgtpo otriv 'Aytwpo va napcpro6C(cL t^ 
X1l0^7 'ELO1.90 Onotptnct KOL tl')V tvt &^. 
'OXi, to £üvtayio tou 1960 bcv ouvLotä epn66 o vt. a 
tvcatn. 
Av 11 Xuar nponyinAei. Lflg; cvLO(c. LOLL Oo, 0i161c to vto 
LOvcay{to So nptnei. va cCVOL 6 otuwýrytvo PC tpöno nou va 
cnLtpinct. trw tVtQ F X' pic ncpa. tcppr tponOflO TOCLC. AV R 
fvtatq npoi ygGci ttlq Mio KQtd tqv yvw r µos o ns-o 
Kacriaaýaoq tpßeos ovtýµcu: ºnýonS tou {rltAµatoS 60 civo. 
Poet-x6 el npooAmKn np6voi. aS yw pctooLßoor opµobt. otrju. w cm 
bLcevccq opyovt. oµoic 6p. anpoto-xoü xapaxtrjpa. 'onwc 60 
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vv . tctc, oc wpcc nou unfjpXc tttoLa npdvoLa (n. x. 
raaai. a, rcppavi, a, Itau a, havi. a) bev xpcLaotºixc tu nott 
ncpLOoötcpo, cvxi cm xtjpcS nou bcv unApXc tyLvc npooßnxri 
oto Eüvwypa (n. X. Bt)yLo, 11ouýc3Boupyo, OaaovbLo) xaL 
oXcc npo . prloov XrpLS np6O)ilµa oc ®tonLofl oxcLLxoü vöpou. 
'Bbn UOLOtuto. pLa Vo41Lxf PWM" VLa xdXuen L^s EVLatfIS ataV 
Oo ta9cL il wpo tr}t cu{ALliolir. Lou £uvtaypatoc (äpepo 169 
Lou EuvzdypazoS, dp8pa 26,27,46 tvlc Euvegxrlc try SLcvv^S 
yLa to ALKo. o t. ºv Aic9vwv Tuv8niu: rv, U. ä. 1. By nooc . 
ncpLntwocL, ßao. xd 9a apxOOOC 1La bLatünvoq önwS: "8 
doxnor opO. oytv+. rv ctouoLwv µnopcL va NctapLpoo$c - {: c 
oüµßaor q vdµo at bLaxpatuxovS opvavLOy: ouis', xdtL bº(aob+j 
pcto{u Bc)yLxou x0L rcpuovLxov OpoonovbLOxoü Euvzdypatoc. 
ELiv nopc. a, KaL dnote XpcLätctaL, as nptnCL va µnopouv va 
vivovtaL xaL baxcc tpononoLºjocLc. 
Anävcnon 8 
'6bn q epwt^vrJ anaVtPGgxt. 'OXL, bCV CiVUL anopOCtgtO 
tvo vto ouvtayyo yLo bt. suxdauvon t tvtctnS. 
To dp8po ato onoi. o avoiptpcoLC XprjaLNonoo-rj9gxc an* Lqv 
Tovpxi, o - nov tic "AruxaI CV? 1 yvwvo 16Lon yv. Ototi 
VONLKOUi-bt. cAvoadyOU - npoonÖBT)OC va nrLotL 4LL auto 
onayopcuiCL t^v twat^. d KUnp4-(IK4 ögpoxpoti. a tXc. Ota 
XtPLQ LTK yV41POLCNOCLS 6LCBVOÄ6VWV KlipOus nOU Unoatt 4sOUV 
LO QYtLOCLo. EOL npäypatl, O oionsq toy no flävv Öp6pou, 
on*. S OROQptCL KOL Ond aVarVldp. o}t4VC4; ana Ltd Lupßoo tqc 
BLtvvvK Cp{lnvcu[. LKCS pceöbovc (Xoyt. Kri cpplv6ýa, 
OUOLnpat. Krj cppnvci. o, LOtopLuA cpµgvcia. % An. ) Itav anMc 
KOh. }IÖVo o anohAcLop6c; LÖoo trjS tvwarj j1E L1lv EÄAÖba ooo 
xOL trK bLxotdpryorlS. 'AAJu. iotc, n Eupi. noL ui 'Ew. won bcv 
civaL xpötoS, oAAa sui generis bLaxpotu. xö opyavLoy6c. 
L^pmCo *)(CL otL npoo%A46rl%av va ouppcLdoxouv. Av 
bcxOouiv tvv npdoiTRoq, tbtc 8o npfntt. va oucrtnAoüv to 
sodalities. Ao fl av CnpLOydvo VC ou(ntä c XCntoPtpCLCc 
cvÖdJ bcv ano&XovtoL tfIv np6aK)t ofd. 'Eva nptnc . va cCvaL 
olyoupo1 ALcnpoVpotcuttj c(. voL TI Runp. aiu Anµoupotio KOL 
Kcqli c 6XA ovtotnta. 
5/3/1999 
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5. Dr Kypros Chrysostomides 
DR. K. CH RYSOSTOM I DES & C"-r3. 
LAW OFFICE 
t@ICOMMORA1ING Q. M P%ATMIS A COý 
DA K QVYSO5TOI DES. ADVOCATE 1. LA AGOUSA STIIEET 
FK c» VBOSTOMIDi1 LL S MONK . SAAArt1EN 1006 NCO IA C$ P1t$K4 MXAtM/l NA 04OPM. MA b*ABS to POOOM tlt's. 
A. M TAUADOACS ADVOCATE 16171P1~051A -C 
T STYLIAMOU A(nOCATE 
$ rCd+OMO4 t. a Co. & tBI S 102,777oa0 717Mt6,77 
AK POLYDOf OU U. S FIOS $) ULM 
TYPT" jar) 771939 
A CK0M 1AD(S llA 0. tlm' 1. t AI 
T. a. PS8I. M ACV 
t PANAVrp 10tt u. s ry4DPa6.. LL W E. MW ALUMw 
tl) tchgqea q. s. n 
MP1. AZAB ALrK]CATL tAMlaAC-A f: l ýMOrýcMýyMýWretiýN. e4in. py 
C CONSIAºNTWOU ADVOCATE tUMASSCU & eMft owK, s [TL'LFA) 
1141$ old B . nd 1//Y . Ck 
B 1960 d+ur io, lern 
TN. phOl -32 2 73E 03 06 
Mr CMslos Patsalides T- Iý '32 '* 3113 
`ý,.. (do Professor P. Birkinshaw) 
ff MK , 01731.3ftI3 co/wpu svaO 11 
The UniwrsAy of HUII 
Law School 
Hull HU6 7RX 
United Kingoom 
5° Apt d, 1999 
Dear Chnstos 
do apologise for the delay in replying to yon r letter of 9 February. 1999 and 
the Questionnaire attached Hopefully this has not caused any problems to 
the progress of your thesis 
t enclose my replies to your questions as well as a number of documents that 
may be of assistance to you. 
With my best personal regards and wishing you every success. 
Sinoere4y 
1! 
Ky Chrysastommdes 
INTERNET SITE AT f1TTPir . CHRY80STOWD¬S. COM. CY 
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Part i 
Do you support a possible accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the 
EU, 
Yes without any hesitation 
Do you think that Cyprus is gong to be benefit from such an 
accessioO 
I enclose as Annex 1. the official views on the benefits. I agree with all 
of them and aC 1ionally believe that Cyprus within an enlarged 
Community will be looking for a new individual role to play that of a 
small but compact unit having its problem solved in accordance with 
the pnnciples accepted by all Member States. Its new role can be both 
political as well as economic and social within the organs of the EU 
3 Do you think that Cyprus is ei grble for accession to the EU' if so why? 
No doubt yes. See the `Avis' of the Commission and subsequent 
documents. eg the Agenda 2000 etc We belong to an area which 
historically contributed to the creation of what is today the European 
civilisation culture and values 
Does the Govemment of the Republic of Cyprus have the right to 
negohette its accession to the EU without the opinion of the Turkish 
Cypriot Community' 
Yes Its legitrmate Government ºs entitled to represent the entire State 
(Cl Agenda 2000) A discussion on this point ºs found in the attached 
opinion (Annex If 1. 
5 Do you consider the potitMcai problem of Cyprus as an obstacle towards 
as accession to the EUI 
This it is a matter that will come up perKdºcatty in political discussions. 
From the legal pord of view the problem as such is no obstacle to 
accession Some countries however may raise it and refuse to agree 
to Cyprus' accession If we follow a wise strategy we can overcome 
this hurdle 
Is the Constitution of Cyprus (1960) an obstacle towards the accession 
to the EU' If yes, why > 
Not in my view But see also detailed discussion in Annex 11 
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Which amendments fin any! do you suggest must be made to the 1960 
Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus if Cyprus ,s to be able to access 
to the EU 7 
No substantial amendments are required One provision probably 
must be inserted that EU Law has precedence over domestic law We 
may introduce legislation on the bass of the doctrine of necessity' 
pending constitutional arrangement after a solution without the need 
for formal amendment of the Constitution 
Do you support the view that a new constitution is necessary for 
enabling Cyprus to gain access to the EU'' Why' 
No But a new constitution will be required upon settlement of the 
problem. which will nave to conform with EU standards 
9 According to the Art 9 of the Treaty of Guarantee the Reaubbc of 
Cyprus undertakes not to Participate to whose or in part in any pol tica! 
or economic union with any State whatsoever Do you think that the 
accession to the EU is against the provisions of this Article' 
On this see the Opinion. Annex 11 
10 How if at all. can the Turkish Cypnof Commun, ty be represented in the 
accession negobehonal 
The proposal by President Ctendes outtmes the expected participation 
of Turkish Cypnots in the accession negotiations Annex III 
295 
Bibliography 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
BOOKS 
Alain, V. The Cyprus Problem Has to be Solved by European Initiative. Hellenic 
Information Committee, Athens, 1997. 
Alastos, D. Cyprus in History. Zeno Publishers, London, 1976. 
Alexandrakis, M., Theodoropoulos, V., Lagakos, E. To KvnpiaK6,1950-1974 
[The Cyprus Problem, 1950-1974]. 2"a ed., Athens, 1987. 
Andersen, S. S. and Eliassen, K. A. Making Policy in Europe: The Europeification 
of National Policy-making. Sage, 1993. 
Antonopoulos, N. H Käirpos Kai .l Evpcoraiia Orxovo w Kozvörgs [Cyprus and 
the European Economic Community]. Nicosia, 1977. 
Audretsch, H. A. H. Supervision In European Community Law: Observance by the 
Member States of Their Treaty Obligations: Treaties on International and Supra- 
National Supervision. North - Holland, 2°d ed., 1986 
Baier-Allen, S. (ed. ) Looking Into The Future Of Cyprus-EU Relations. Nomos, 
1999. 
Beatson, J. and Tridimas, T. New Directions in European Public Law. Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 1998. 
Bell, J., Boyron, S, and Whittaker, S. Principles of French Law. Oxford 
University Press, 1998. 
Bernestein, R. and Agel, J. Amending America: If We Love The Constitution, 
Why Do We Keep Trying To Change It? Kansas Press, 1993. 
Black, C. L. Perspectives in Constitutional Law. Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965. 
Bray, R. (ed. ) Constitutional Law of the European Union. Sweet & Maxwell, 
1999. 
Brazier, R. Constitutional Reform: Reshaping the British Political System. 
Oxford University Press, 2°d ed., 1998. 
Bredimas, A. Methods of Interpretation and Community Law. North-Holland, 
1978. 
Burbidge, P. K. N. EC Law: Some Paths Through the Legal Minefield. College of 
Law, Guildford, 1991. 
Caplan, R. L. Constitutional Brinkmanship. Oxford University Press, 1988. 
Charlesworth, A. and Cullen, H. European Community Law. Pitman Publishing, 
1994. 
Chrysomilides, G. S. Associate Status with the EEC and its Implications for the 
Economy of Cyprus. American University of Beirut, Beirut, 1975. 
Chrysostomides, K To Kpdroc vjS K&; cpov oro dzc6vE d ixaio [The State of 
Cyprus in International Law]. Sakkoulas, 1994. 
296 
Bibliography 
Clerides, C. To Kvnpiaxö Aixazo Kai i Ko: vorw Evvourl Tä ii [Cyprus Law and 
European Legal Order]. Hellenic Centre of European Studies (EKEM), May 
1993. 
Clerides, P. The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and the Provisions for 
the Review of the Laws by the Courts. Nicosia, 1983. 
Collins, L. European Community Law in the United Kingdom. Butterworths, 4t` 
ed., 1990. 
Cooley, T. M. A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which Rest Upon the 
Legislative Power of the States of the American Union. Union N. J, Lawbook 
Exchange, Reprint ed., 1998. 
Corwin, E. S. The Higher Law Background of the American Constitution. 
Princeton Press, 1963. 
Craig, P. and De Burca, G. EU Law; Text, Cases and Materials. Oxford 
University Press, 2°d ed., 1998. 
Crawshaw, N. The Cyprus Revolt. George Allen and Unwin, London, 1978. 
Cross Statutory Interpretation. Butterworths, 1976. 
Curtin, D. (ed. ) Lending Cases On The Law Of The European Communities. 
Kluwer Law and Taxation, 6`h ed., 1994. 
Curtin, D. and O'Keeffe, D. (eds. ) Constitutional Adjudication in European 
Community and National Law: Essays for the Hon. Mr. Justice T. F. O'Higgins. 
Butterworth, Dublin, 1992. 
Cygan, A. J. The United Kingdom Parliament and European Union Legislation. 
Kluwer Law International, 1998. 
Dactoglou, P. D. EvpmnazK6 KoivoriK6 Afxa: o [European Community Law]. 
Sakkoulas Publications, 1979. 
Deards, E. and Hargreaves, S. European Community Law: Cases and Materials. 
Blackstone, 2°d ed., London, 1998. 
Dehousse, R. (ed. ) Europe After Maastricht: an Ever Closer Union? Law Books 
in Europe, Munchen, 1994. 
Denktash, R. The Cyprus Triangle. Allen & Unwin, 1982. 
De Smith, S. A. Constitutional and Administrative Law. Penguin Books, 4th ed., 
Harmondsworth, 1981. 
De Smith, S. A. The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions. Stevens, 
London, 1964. 
Dicey, A. V. An Introduction to the Study of the Law on the Constitution. 
Macmillan Press, 10`h ed., London, 1960. 
Dodd, C. The Cyprus Issue: A Current Perspective. Eothen Press, 2' ed., 
Huntingdon, 1995. 
Duff, A. Subsidiarity within the European Community, The Federal Trust for 
Education and Research, London, 1993. 
297 
Bibliography 
Eachout, P., Liability of Member States in Damages and the Community system 
of Remedies, In Beatson, J. and Tridimas, T. (eds. ) New Directions in European 
Public Law. Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998. 
Eaton, M. R. Common Foreign and Security Policy. In O'Keeffe, D. and 
Twomey, P. (eds. ) Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty. Chancery Law, 
Chichester, 1994. 
Ebke, W. F. and Finkin, M. W. Introduction to German Law. Kluwer Law 
International, 1996. 
Emiliou, N. Subsidiarity. Panacea or Fig Leaf. In O'Keefe, D. and Twomey, 
P. M. (eds. ) Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty. Chancery Law, Chichester, 
1994. 
Ertekun, N. M. The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus. K. Rustern, 2" ed., 1984. 
Ertekun, N. M. The Status of the Two People in Cyprus: Legal Opinions. Nicosia, 
1997. 
Evans, J. Statutory Interpretation. Oxford, 1988. 
Filokypros The Great Cypriot Encyclopaedia. Filokypros Editions, 1990. 
Freestone, D. A. C. and Davidson J. S. The Institutional Framework of the 
European Communities. Croom Helm, London, 1988. 
Foot, M. Cyprus and the New Europe. Canon Newham Memorial Lecture, 1990. 
Frid, R. The Relations Between the EC and International Organisations: Legal 
Theory and Practice. Kluwer Law International, 1995. 
Friedrich, C. J. Constitutional Reason of State. Brown University Press, 1957. 
George, S. Politics and Policy in the European Union. Oxford Press, 3'd ed., 
1996. 
Ginsberg, R. The Impact of Enlargement on the Role of the European Union in 
the World, In Redmont, J. and Rosenthal, G. (eds. ) The Expanding European 
Union: Past, Present, Future. Lynne Reinner, London, 1998. 
Hanf, K. and Soetendorp. B. (eds. ) Adapting to European Integration: Small 
States and the European Union. Longman, 1998. 
Hanlon, J. European Community Law. Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1998. 
Hartley, T. C. The Foundations of European Community Law. Clarendon Press, 
1" ed., Oxford, 1981. 
Hartley, T. C. The Foundations of European Community Law. Clarendon Press, 
2nd ed., Oxford, 1988. 
Hartley, T. C. Constitutional Problems of the European Union. Hart Publishing, 
1999. 
Hesse, J. J. and Johnson, N. (eds. ) Constitutional Policy and Change in Europe. 
Oxford University Press, 1995. 
298 
Bibliography 
Heukels, T., Blokker, N. and Brus, M. (eds. ) The European Union After 
Amsterdam: a Legal Analysis. Kluwer Law International, 1998. 
Hill, G. A History of Cyprus. Cambridge University Press, 4 Vols., 1940-1952. 
Hitchens, C. Hostage to History - Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger. 
Verso Publishing, 5th ed., London-New York, 1998. 
Holland, M. Candidates for Europe: The British Experience. Cower, Alershot, 
1986. 
Howe, M. Europe and the Constitution after Maastricht. Nelson & Pollard, 
Oxford, 1993. 
Ifestos, P. and Tsardanides, C. Ot EX&ciq yr K&&cpov pe tic Evpanramc q 
Kotvordres 1972-1990 [The Relation Between Cyprus and the European 
Communities, 1972-1990]. Papazisis Press, Athens, 1991. 
Jocobs, F. G. and Roberts, S. (eds. ) The Effects of Treaties in Domestic Law. 
Sweet and Maxwell, 1987. 
Jannuzi, G. Scope and Structure of the Community's Future Foreign Policy, In 
Rummel, R. (ed. ) Towards Political Union: Planning a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy in the European Community. Westview Press, Boulder, 1992, 
Joseph, J. Cyprus Ethnic Conflict and International Concern. Macmillan Press, 
1997. 
Kadritzke, N. Cyprus Harmonisation with the Acquis Communautaire in View of 
the Accession. Nicosia, Ermogenis Publications, 1997. 
Kapteyn, P. J. G. and Van Themaat, P. V. Introduction to the Law of the European 
Communities, 3'd ed., edited and further revised by Laurence W. Gormley, 
Kluwer Law International, 1988. 
Khan, R. The Supreme Court and Constitutional Theory: 1953-1993. University 
Press of Kansas, 1994. 
Kitromilides, P. From Coexistence to Confrontation: The Dynamics of Ethnic 
Conflict, In Attalides, N. (ed. ) Cyprus Reviewed. Nicosia, 1977. 
Kranidiotis, Y. Hpordcets pa pia Evpcotratxrj Ho2trtxrj [Proposals for a 
European Policy]. Sakkoulas Publications, Athens-Komotini, 1993. 
Laffan, B. Constitution-Building in the European Union. Institute of European 
Affairs, Dublin, 1996. 
Lane, J. Consitutions and Political Theory. Manchester University Press, 1996. 
Lauterpacht, H. (ed. ). International Law, A Treatise. Oppenheim's International 
Law, 8th Vol., 1955-1962. 
Levinson, S. (ed. ) Responding to Imperfection; The Theory and Practice of 
Constitutional Amendment. Princeton University Press, 1995. 
Lewis, A. European Community Law. Tudor, Eastham, 1992. 
Ludlow, P. Preparing For Membership: The Eastward and Southern 
Enlargement of the EU. Centre For European Policy Studies, Brussels, 1996. 
Luif, P. On the Road to Brussels. Braumuller, 1995. 
299 
Bibliography 
Manesis, A. Ilepi Avayxaanxty Nöpcov, As Ecaiperwal NouoOcnxai 
Appoözörjraz rIC E, cr&1zoTuc4Ecovoias [Laws of Necessity, The Exceptional 
Legislative Competence of the Executive Power]. Athens, 1953. 
Markides, K. C. The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic. Yale University Press, 
1977. 
McDonald, R. The Problem Of Cyprus. International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, London, 1989. 
McDougal, L. M. The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order. 
Yale Press, 1967. 
McGoldrick, D. International Relations Law of the European Union. Longman, 
London, 1997. 
Millar, D. Constitutional Issues: The European Parliament and National 
Parliaments. Centre for European Studies, University of Hull, Hull, 1995. 
Miller, A. S. Social Change and Fundamental Law. Greenwood Press, 1979. 
Miller, L. R. Cyprus: The Law and Politics of Civil Strife. Harvard University, 
1968. 
Milward, A., Sorensen, V., Ranieri, R. The Frontier Of National Sovereignty, 
History and Theory 1945-1992. Routledge, 1994. 
Monnet, J. (trans. Mayne, R. ) Memoirs. Doubleday and Company, New York, 
1978. 
Moon, B. E. Dilemmas oflnternational Trade. Westview Press, 1996. 
Moran, M. Sovereignty Divides: Essays On The International Dimensions Of The 
Cyprus Problem. CYREP, Mersin, Turkey, 1998. 
Moussis, N. Handbook of European Union: Institutions and Policies. EDIT- 
EUR, 3d ed., Rixensart, 1996. 
Nascimbene, B. (ed. ) Nationality Laws In the European Union. Butterworths, 
London, 1996. 
Nedjati, L. M. The Cyprus Conflict: A Lawyer's View. A-Z Publications, Nicosia, 
1981. 
Nerhot, P. Law, Interpretation and Reality. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990. 
Owen, R. Essential European Community Law. Cavendish, London, 1995. 
Panteli, S. A New History Of Cyprus From The Earliest Times To The Present 
Day. East-West, London, 1984. 
Papademetriou, G. To Eüvraypa Kai il diacrxaaia r1c Evpcviraixi c EvozcoirimjS 
[The Constitution and the Procedure for European Integration]. Athens, Vol. 1, 
1982. 
Papademetriou, G. To Evvraypanxö Hpöß2ripa rqs KvnpzaK1 cd riuoxpariac [The 
Constitutional Problem of the Republic of Cyprus]. Sakkoulas Publications, 
Athens, 1995. 
Papadimitris, P. HHapamajvza Evucpcvvuirv Zvp1Xjq Aovöfvov [The Zurich-London 
Agreements: Behind the Scenes]. Nicosia, March 1978. 
300 
Bibliography 
Papafilippou, L. To d ixaio zrjs Aväyxris Kai i Zvvraypam Tdý azr7v Kv rpo 
[The Law of Necessity and the Cypriot Constitutional Order]. Nicosia, 1995. 
Pescatore, P. L'Ordre des Communautes Europeennes. Presses Universitaires de 
Liege, 2nd ed., 1973. 
Pescatore, P. The Law of Integration. Leyden, 1972. 
Pinder, J. The Building of the European Union. Oxford University Press, 3`d ed., 
1998. 
Pollard, D. European Community Law: Text and Materials. Butterworths, 
London, 1994. 
Polyviou, P. G. Cyprus, Conflict and Negotiation, 1960-1980. Holmes and Meier 
Publishers, New York, 1980. 
Reddaway, J. Burdened with Cyprus - The British Connection. Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1986. 
Richards, D. A. J. Toleration and the Constitution. Oxford University Press, 
1986. 
Roumeliotis, P. To Aüpio rrls Evpcvmjs [Europe Tomorrow]. Livanis, Athens, 
1992. 
Rummel, R. Beyond Maastricht: Alternative Futures for a Political Union. In 
Rummel, R. (ed. ). Towards Political Union: Planning a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy in the European Community. Westview Press, Boulder, 1992. 
Scandamis, N. Evpmnaixö Koivonxö dixazo & E. Urlviuö dixazo 17poaapuoy4 
[European Community Law and Greek Law of Adaptation]. Sakkoulas, Athens- 
Komotini, 1992. 
Sheikh, A. International Law and National Behaviour. John Wiley and Sons, 
1974. 
Spiridakis, A. A Brief History of Cyprus. Athens, 1963. 
Stanford L. How many times has the United States Constitution been amended? 
(a) <26; (b) 26; (c) 27; (d) >27: Accounting for Constitutional Change. In 
Stanford L. (ed. ) Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of 
Constitutional Amendment. Princeton University Press, 1995. 
Stavropoulos, K. Objectivity in Law. Oxford, 1996. 
Stefanides, I. D. Isle of Discord, Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of 
Cyprus Problem. New York University Press, 1999. 
Steiner, J. Subsidiarity Under the Maastricht Treaty. In O'Keefe, D. and 
Twomey, P. M. (eds. ) Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treat. Chancery Law, 
Chichester, 1994. 
Steiner, J. and Woods, L. Textbook on EC Law. Blackstone, 5th ed., London, 
1996. 
Stephen, M. The Cyprus Question. British-Northern Cyprus Parliamentary 
Group, London, 1997. 
301 
Bibliography 
Stewart, P. (ed. ) The GATT, Uruguay Round; A Negotiating History (1986- 
1992) Vol. III: Documents. Kluwer, 1993. 
Svolos, A. Evvraypanxö dfxaio [Constitutional Law]. Athens, 1971. 
Temple Lang, J. The Duties Of National Courts Under The Constitutional Law 
Of The European Community. University of Exeter, 1987. 
Tenekides, G. Oi Nopixdc dtaazäoelS rov Kvicpiaxov [The Legal Dimensions of 
the Cyprus Problem]. Idryma Mesogeiakon Meleton, Athens, 1988. 
Theophylactou, D. Security, Identity and Nation Building. Aldershot, Avebury, 
1995. 
The Turkish Cyprus Cultural Association. The Historical Background of Cyprus 
and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Ulus Offset, 1984. 
Tomuschat, C. Europe -A Common Constitutional Space. In B. De Witte and 
C. Forder (eds. ) The Common Law of Europe and the Future of Legal Education, 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Maastricht, 1992. 
Tornaritis, C. H Koiv, Ayopä Kai rl Kvnpoc [The Common Market and Cyprus]. 
Nicosia, 1976. 
Tornaritis, C. Cyprus and its Constitutional and Other Legal Problems. Nicosia, 
1968. 
Tornaritis, C. Cyprus and its Constitutional and Other Legal Problems. Nicosia, 
1980. 
Tornaritis, C. The Agreements of Association and the Association of Cyprus with 
the European Economic Community. Nicosia, 1977. 
Tornaritis, C. The Introduction of International Law into the Legal System of 
Cyprus. Nicosia, 1987. 
Tomaritis, C. The Legal Aspects of the Question of Cyprus. Nicosia, 1971. 
Tornaritis, C. The Treaty-making Power Especially under the Law of the 
Republic of Cyprus. Nicosia, 1973. 
Toth, A. G. A Legal Analysis of Subsidiarity. In O'Keefe, D. and Twomey, P. M. 
(eds. ) Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty. Chancery Law, Chichester, 1994. 
Tridimas, T. Member State Liability in Damages for Breach of Community Law: 
An Assessment of the Case Law, In Beatson, J. and Tridimas, T. (eds) New 
Directions in European Public Law. Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998. 
Tsardanides, C. The Politics Of The EEC- Cyprus Association Agreement: 1972- 
1982. Nicosia, 1983. 
Twinning, M. How to Do Things with Rules. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976. 
Usher, J. European Community Law and National Law: The Irreversible 
Transfer. University Association for Contemporary European Studies, London, 
1981. 
Vibert, F. Europe and the Constitution. Charter 88, London, 1992. 
Ward, I. The Margins of European Law. McMillan, Basingstoke, 1996. 
302 
Bibliography 
Weatherill, S. and Beaumont, P. EULaw. Penguin Books, 3d ed., 1999. 
Weiler, J. H. H. The Constitution of Europe: "Do the New Clothes Have an 
Emperor? " and Other Essays on European Integration. Cambridge University 
Press, 1999. 
Wildhaber L. Treaty-making Power and Constitution. Helbing and Lichtenhahn, 
Basel und Stuttgart, 1971. 
Wistrich, E. The United States of Europe. Routledge, 1994. 
Wyatt and Dashwood, European Community Law. Sweet and Maxwell, 3'd ed., 
1993. 
Xydis, S. G. Cyprus: A Reluctant Republic. Mouton, 1973. 
ARTICLES 
Aalto, P., Accession of Finland to the European Union: First Remarks, (1995) 20 
EL Rev. 618. 
Baas, A., The Netherlands in Face of its Community Obligations, 1984-1995, 
(1996) 33 CML Rev. 1107. 
Barnard, C. and Greaves, R., The Application of Community Law in the United 
Kingdom, 1986-1993, (1994) 31 CML Rev. 1055. 
Bell, A., Enforcing Community Law Rights Before National Courts - Some 
Developments, (1994) 1 LIEI 111. 
Besselink, L. F. M. and Swaak, C. R. A., The Netherlands' Constitutional Law and 
European Integration, (1996) 2 EPL 34. 
Birkinshaw, P., European Integration and United Kingdom Constitutional Law, 
(1997) 3 EPL 57. 
Birkinshaw, P. and Ashiagbor, D., National Participation in Community Affairs: 
Democracy, the UK Parliament and the EU, (1996) 33 CML Rev. 499. 
Bonnie, A., The Constitutionality of Transfers of Sovereignty: The French 
Approach, (1998) 4 EPL 517. 
Borzel, T. A., Institutional Adaptation to Europanization in Germany and Spain, 
(1999) 37 JCMS 573. 
Caporaso, J., The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory 
and Post-Modern, (1996) 34 JCMS 29. 
Carter, C. and Scott, A., Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the European 
Nation State: Conceptualising Governance in the European Union, (1998) 4 ELJ 
341. 
Caporaso, J., Regional Integration Theory: Understanding Our Past and 
Anticipating Our Future, (1998) 5 JEPP 1350. 
303 
Bibliography 
Chalmers, D., The Application of the Community Law in the United Kingdom, 
1994-1998, (2000) 37 CML Rev. 83. 
Chryssochou, D. N., New Challenges to the Study of European Integration: 
Implications for Theory-Building, (1997) 35 JCMS 521. 
Clerides, C. F., To Kvnptaxö Dixato uat il Kotvoud Evvo i Tä T [The Law of 
Cyprus and the Community Legal Order], (1990) 17 CLT 160. 
Craig, P., Once More Unto the Breach: the Community, the State and Damages 
Liability, (1997) 113 LQR 67. 
Craig, P., Direct Effect, Indirect Effect and the Construction of National 
Legislation, (1997) 22 EL Rev. 519. 
Curtin, D., The Province of Government: Delimiting the Direct Effect of 
Directives in the Common Law Context, (1990) 15 EL Rev. 195. 
Dashwood A., The Limits of European Community Powers, (1996) 21 EL Rev. 
113. 
Dashwood, A., States in the European Union, (1998) 23 ELR 201. 
De Burca, G., Giving Effect to European Community Directives, (1992) 55 MLR 
215. 
De Burca, G., Subsidiarity and ECJ as Institutional Actor, (1998) 36 JCMS 217. 
De Bellaugue, C., Conciliation in Cyprus?, (1999) 22 The Washington Quarterly 
183. 
De Noriega, A. E., A Dissident Voice, The Spanish Constitutional Court Case 
Law on European Integration, (1999), 5 EPL 269. 
De Witte, B., Community Law and National Constitutional Values, (1991) 2 LIEI 
1. 
De Witte, B., Rules of Change in International Law: How Special is the European 
Community?, (1994) 25 Neth. Yb. Int. L. 299. 
Dehousse, R., Comparing National and EC Law: the Problem of the Level of 
Analysis, EUI Working Paper, No. 94/3, European University Institute, Florence, 
1994. 
Easson, The Direct Effect of EEC Directives, (1979) 28 ICLQ 319. 
Elhermann, C. D., Differentiation, Flexibility, Closer Cooperation: The New 
Provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, (1998) 4 ELJ 246. 
Emiliou, N., Subsidiarity: An Effective Barrier Against the Enterprises of 
Ambition?, (1992) 17 EL Rev. 383. 
Emiliou, N., Taking Subsidiarity Seriously? The View of Britain, (1995) 1 EPL 
564. 
Emiliou, N., State Liability Under Community Law: Shedding More Light on the 
Francovich Principle, (1996) 21 EL Rev. 399. 
Evening, U., The Maastricht Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court and its Significance for the Development of the European Union, (1994) 
14 YEL 1. 
304 
Bibliography 
Everling, U., Will Europe Slip on Bananas? The Bananas Judgement of the 
Court of Justice and National Courts, (1996) 33 CML Rev. 401. 
Evrigenis, D., Legal and Constitutional Implications of Greek Accession to the 
European Communities, (1980) 17 CML Rev 157. 
Fisher, P. and Lengauer A., The Adaptation of the Austrian Legal System 
Following the EU Membership, (2000) 37 CML Rev. 763. 
Fischer, T. C. and Neff, S. C., Some American Thoughts on European Federalism, 
[1995] 44 ICLQ 904. 
Gaja, New Developments in a Continuing Story. The Relationship between EEC 
Law and Italian Law, (1990) 27 CML Rev 83. 
Hakura, F., The Euro-Mediterranean Policy: The Implications of Barcelona 
Declaration, (1997) 34 CML Rev. 337. 
Harrison, C., Subsidiarity in Article 3b of the EC Treaty: Gobbledegook or 
Justiciable Principle? (1996) 45 ICLQ 431. 
Hartley, T. C., Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht 
Agreement (1993) 42 ICLQ 123. 
Hegh, K., The Danish Maastricht Judgement, (1999) 24 EL Rev. 80. 
Herbst, C., Austrian Constitutional Law and Accession to the European Union, 
(1995) 1 EPL 1. 
Herdegen, M., Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court: Restraints for an 
"Ever Closer Union", (1994) 31 CML Rev. 235. 
Hoskins M., Tilting the Balance: Supremacy and National Procedural Rules, 
(1996) 21 EL Rev. 365. 
Jorna, M., The Accession Negotiations with Austria, Sweden, Finland and 
Norway: A Guided Tour, (1995) 20 EL Rev 131. 
Kennedy, D. and Speht, L., Austria and the European Communities, (1989) 26 
CML Rev. 615. 
Kingsbury, B., Sovereignty and Inequality, (1998) 9 EJIL 599. 
Kinley, D., Direct Effect of Directives: Stuck on Vertical Hold, (1995) 1 EPL 79. 
Kirchhof, P., The Balance of Powers Between National and European 
Institutions, (1999) 5 ELJ225. 
Kokott, J., German Constitutional Jurisprudence and European Integration, Part I 
(1996) 2 EPL 23 7 and Part l1(1996)2EPL413. 
Krenzler, H. G., Preparing the EU and its Institutions For Enlargement: Report Of 
the Working Group of the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, RSC 
Policy Paper, No. 99/7, European University Institute, Florence, 1999 
Kyle, K., Squall Hits `Year of Cyprus', (1997) 53 The World Today 43. 
Lachmann, P., International Legal Personality of the EC: Capacity and 
Competence, (1984) 1 LIEI3. 
305 
Bibliography 
Lackhoff and Nyssens, Direct Effect of Directives in Triangular Situations, 
(1998) 23 EL Rev. 397. 
Ladeur, K. H., Towards a Legal Theory of Supranationality - The Validity of the 
Network Concept, (1997) 3 ELJ33. 
Lauterpacht, M., Restrictive Interpretation and Principle of Effectiveness in 
Interpretation of Treaties, (1949) BYIL 48. 
Lauvaux, Ph., Existe-t-il un Modele Constitutionnel Europeen? (1991) 14 Droits 
49. 
Liebich, A., Ethnic Minorities and Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement, 
Eil! JYorking Paper, RSC No. 98/49, European University Institute, Florence, 
1998. 
Llorente, F. R., Constitutionalism in the Integrated States of Europe, Jean Monnet 
Working Papers, No. 5/98, Harvard Law School, 1998. 
Lysen, G., Sweden: National Constitutional Law and European Integration, 17 
F. I. D. E. (International Federation for European Law) Kongress, Berlin 1996. 
Maganaris, E., The Principle of Supremacy of Community Law in Greece: From 
Direct Challenge to Non-Application, (1999) 24 EL Rev. 426. 
Maher, I., Community Law in the National Legal Order: A System Analysis, 
(1998) 36 JCMS 237. 
Mancini, G. F., The Making of a Constitution for Europe, (1989) 26 CML Rev. 
595. 
Mancini, G. F., Europe: The Case for Statehood, (1998) 4 ELJ29. 
Manin, The Nicolo Case of the Conseil d'Etat: Franch Constitutional Law and 
the Supreme Administrative Court's Acceptance of the Primacy of Community 
Law Over Subsequent National Statute Law, (1991) 28 CML Rev. 499. 
Millns, S., The Treaty of Amsterdam and Constitutional Revisions in France, 
(1999) 5 EPL 61. 
Mitnick, E. J., Constitutive Rights, (2000) 20 OJLS 185. 
Moniz, C. B., The Portuguese Constitution and the participation of the Republic 
of Portugal in the European Union, (1998) 4 EPL 465. 
Mortelmans, K., Community Law: More than a Functional Area of Law, Less 
than a Legal System, (1996) 1 LIEI23. 
Muftuker-Bac, M., The Cyprus Debacle: What the Future Holds, (1999) 31 
Futures 559. 
Nicolatos, M. M., Aojn icat Actroupyia toi) Nogtxoß 111 anwiou atv Küirpo 
[Structure and Functioning of the Cypriot Legal Framework], (1993) 11 CLT 
349. 
Nugent, N., EU Enlargement and the "Cyprus Problem", (2000) 38 JCMS 131. 
O'Keeffe, D., The Legal Implications of East Germany's Membership of the 
European Community, (1991) 1 LIEI 1. 
306 
Bibliography 
Palacio, J., The Principle of Subsidiarity (Guide for lawyers with a particular 
community orientation), (1995) 20 El Rev. 355. 
Peers, S., Common Foreign and Security Policy, (1997) 17 YEL 539. 
Peers, S., 1998 Common Foreign and Security Policy, (1998) 18 YEL 559. 
Peers, S., Taking Supremacy Seriously, (1998) 23 EL Rev. 146. 
Pescatore, P., International Law and Community Law -A Comparative Analysis, 
(1970) 7 CML Rev. 167. 
Pescatore, P., The Doctrine of Direct Effect: An Infant Disease in Community 
Law, (1983) 8 EL Rev. 155. 
Petersen, N., National Strategies in the Integration Dilemma: An Adaptation 
Approach, (1998) 36 JCMS 33. 
. 
Petriccione, R., Italy: Supremacy of Community Law Over National Law, (1986) 
11 EL Rev. 320. 
Philippou, V., Cyprus and the European Community, (1991) 18 CLT369. 
Preuss, U. K., The Constitution of the European Democracy and the Role of the 
Nation State, (1999) 12 Ratio Juris 417. 
Ramsey, L. E., Towards a Wider European Union: A Commentary on the Possible 
Accession of Hungary and Poland to the European Union, (1995) 1 EPL 189. 
Rasmussen, H., Denmark's Maastricht Treaty Ratification Cases, Some Serious 
Questions about Constitutionality, (1998) 21 JEI 1. 
Redmond, J., Security Implications of the Accession of Cyprus to the European 
Union, (1995) XXX The International Spectator 27. 
Reich, N., Judge-made `Europe a la carte': Some Remarks on Recent Conflicts 
Between European and German Constitutional Law Provoked by the Banana 
Litigation, (1996) 7 EJIL 103. 
Reich, N., On National Courts, European Law and Constitutions: Dialogue and 
Conflict, (1999) 5 ELJ 154. 
Rosas, A., Finland's Accession to the European Union: Constitutional Aspects, 
(1995) 1 EPL 166. 
Ross, Beyond Francovich, (1993) 56 MLR 55. 
Schermers, H. G., Community Law and International Law, (1975) 12 CML Rev. 
77. 
Schermers, H. G., No Direct Effect for Directives, (1997) 3 EPL 527. 
Schwarze, J., Concept and Perspectives of European Law, (1999) 5 EPL 227. 
Sebba, I., The Doctrine of Direct Effect: A Malignant Disease of Community 
Law, (1995), 2 LIEI35. 
Seidl-Hohenveldern, H. C. I., Austria and the EEA, (1992) 1 LIEI 29. 
Sherlock, A., Self-Executing Provisions in EC Law and Under the Irish 
Constitution, (1996) 2 EPL 103. 
Shilling, T., Subsidiarity as a Rule and Principle, (1994) 14 YEL 203. 
307 
Bibliography 
Sjursen, H., The Common Foreign and Security Policy: New Voice in 
International Politics, Arena Working Papers, No. 99/34,1999 
Smith, F. and Woods, L., Causation in Francovitch: the Neglected Problem, 
(1997) 46 ICLQ 941. 
Snyder, F., EMU Revisited: Are We Making a Constitution? What Constitution 
Are We Making EUI Working Paper, No. 98/6, European University Institute, 
Florence, 1998. 
Snyder, F., Interinstitutional Agreements: Forms and Constitutional Limitations, 
EUI Working Paper, No. 95/4, European University Institute, Florence, 1995. 
Spiermann, 0., The Other Side of the Story: An Unpopular Essay on the Making 
of the European Community Legal Order, (1999) 10 EJIL 763. 
Tantchev, E., National Constitutions and EU Law: Adapting the 1991 Bulgarian 
Constitution in the Accession to the European Union, (2000) 6 EPL 229. 
Temple Lang J., Community Constitutional Law: Article 5 EEC Treaty, (1990) 
27 CML Rev. 645. 
Temple Lang, J., The Duties of National Authorities Under Community 
Constitutional Law, (1998) 23 EL Rev. 109. 
Tornaritis, C., The Customs Union of Cyprus with the European Economic 
Community, (1991) 18 CLT 137. 
Toth, A. G., Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty, (1992) 29 CML 
Rev. 1079. 
Tridimas, T., Horizontal Effect of Directives: A Missed Opportunity, (1994) 19 
EL Rev. 621. 
Tsardanides, C., The EC-Cyprus Association Agreement: Ten Years of a 
Troubled Relationship, 1973-1983, (1984) 22 JCMS 353. 
Tsalakoyannis, P., The European Community and the Greek-Turkish Dispute, 
(1980) 19 JCMS 35. 
Venizelos, E., H Euv0fjxr1 iou MaduTpt t xat il Evpwnawx Evvtaygatnxfj Tä ii 
[The Maastricht Treaty and the European Constitutional Order], (1995) 13 CL 
Rev. 7119. 
Walker, N., Sovereignty and Differentiated Integration in the European Union, 
(1998) 4 ELJ355. 
Ward, I., Community, Nationhood and the Constitutional Imagination, (1999) 19 
OJLS 495. 
Weiler, J. H. H., Europe: The Case Against the Case for Statehood, (1998) 4 ELJ 
43. 
Weiler, J., The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism, 
(1981) 1 YEL 267. 
Weiss, F., Austria's Permanent Neutrality in European Integration, (1977) 1 LIEI 
101. 
308 
Bibliography 
Winter, Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and Different 
Concepts in Community Law, (1972) 9 CML Rev. 425. 
Wright, S., The French Conseil Constitutionnel and Constitutional Reform, 
(1995) 1 EPL 23. 
Wulf-Henning Roth, The Application of Community Law in West Germany, 
(1991) 28 CML Rev. 137. 
Wyatt, D., New Legal Order, or Old, (1982) 7 EL Rev. 147. 
Zuleeg, M., The European Constitution Under Constitutional Constraints: The 
German Scenario, (1997) 22 EL Rev. 19. 
Zum, M., European law and International Regimes: The Features of Law Beyond 
the Nation State, (1999) 5 ELJ272. 
WEB SOURCES 
A History of Cyprus, 
http: //www. windowoncyprus. com/newpagel I O. htm 
Acquis Communautaire, 
http: //www. cyprus- 
eu. org/eng/04--negotiationprocedure/acquis communautaire. htm. 
American Hellenic Institute (The Cyprus Problem), 
httpJ/www. ahiworld. org/cyprusprob. html 
Association European Expression, 
http: //www. ims. gr/ekfrasi/gen/main. html 
Cobb, A. Cyprus 1998: Crisis or Stagnation, Australian Parliamentary Library, 
http: //www. aph. gov. au/library/pubs/bp/1997-98/98bpl7. htm 
Cyprus Conflict Threatens EU, The Age Daily News, 01 April 1998, 
http: //www. theage. com. au/daily/980401/news/news/newsl9. html 
Cyprus Economy, 
http: //www. stockwatch-com. cy/economy 
Cyprus and the Enlargement of the EU (European Parliament), 
http: //www. europarl. eu. int/enlargement/briefings/en/la2. htm 
Cyprus-European Union; A Brief History, 
http: //www. cypms-eu. org. cy/eng/brie]Lhistory/htm. 
Cyprus Mail, 
http: //www. cyprus-mail. com 
309 
Bibliography 
Cyprus Problem, Resource File, 
httpJ/www. cypnet. com/. ncyprus/cyproblem/ 
Cyprus Related Links, 
http: //www. cosmosnet. net/azias/cyprus/problem. html 
Cyprus Research Centre, 
http: //www. pio. gov. cy/keelindex. html 
Cyprus Sources, 
http: //www. spidemet. net/channels/infonews/ephimeris/cyprus/cy_sources. shtml 
Delegation of the European Commission to Cyprus, 
http: //www. ec-eu-delegation. com-cy/ 
Ertecon, N. C., The Greek Cypriot Eagerness and Agitation for EU Membership - 
Why?, 
http: //www. cypnet. com/ncyprus/cyproblenL/articles/bolum2. html. 
Eur-Lex; European Union Law, 
http: //europa. eu. int/eur-lex/index. html 
Europa, 
http: //europa. eu. intl 
European Commission: Agenda 2000. 
http: //www. cyprus-eu. org. cy/eng/07. 
European Integration Online Papers (EIOP), 
http: //eiop. or. at/eiop/eiopl-e. html 
European Union (Enlargement Directorate General), 
httpJ/europa. eu. int/comm/enlargement/index. htm 
European Union Internet Sources, 
httpJ/www. lib. berkeley. edu/GSSI/eu. html#servers 
European Union Issues, 
http: //www. photius. com/thus/eu. html 
European University Institute, 
http: //www. iue. it/ 
Farr, T. F., Overcoming the Cyprus Tragedy: Let Cypriots be Cypriot, 
http: //www. erols. com/mqmq/farr. htm 
Fourth Financial Protocol, 
http: //www. cyprus- 
eu. org. cy/eng/08 eu assistance/fourth financial_protocol. htm. 
310 
Bibliography 
Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http: //www. mfa. gr 
Gordon, P. H., Post-Helsinki: Turkey, Greece and the European Union, The 
Stragetic Regional Report, February 2000, 
http: //www. brook. edu/views/articles/gordon/20000231. htm 
HR - Net (Hellenic Resources Network), 
http: //www. hri. org 
Harvard Law School, The Jean Monnet Chair, 
http: //www. law. harvard. edu/programs/JeanMonnet/index. html 
Hellenic Parliament, 
http: //www. parliament. gr/ 
Hieros Gamos, 
http: //www. hg. org/ 
ICL, Constitutional Documents, 
http: //www. uni-wuerzburg. dellaw/home. html 
International Court of Justice, 
http: //www. icj-cij. org/ 
Internet Law Library, Cyprus, 
http: //www. solent. ac. uk/law/netlawlib/137. htm 
Joseph, J. S., A Mediterranean View of the Next EU Enlargement: The Case of 
Cyprus, paper prepared for delivery at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, 
http: //pro. harvard. edu/abstracts/050/05000IJosephJose. htinl 
Kypros-Net, The World of Cyprus, 
http: /www. kypros. org/ 
Laffan, B., The European Union: A Distinctive Model of Internationalism?, 
European Integration, Vol. 1, No. 18 (10th October 1997), European Integration 
On-line Papers (EIOP), 
http: //eiop. or. at/eiop/texte/1997-018. htm.. 
Lee, I. B., In Search of a Theory of State Liability in the European Union, 
http: //www. law. harvard. edu/programs/JeanMonnet/papers/99/990902. html. 
Legal Research Centre, 
http: //www. legalresearch. ch/ 
311 
Bibliography 
Llorente, F. R., Constitutionalism in the Integrated States of Europe, The Jean 
Monnet Working Papers No. 5/98, 
httpJ/www. law. harvard. edu/programs/JeanMonnet/papers/98/98-5-. html. 
North Cyprus, 
http: //www. north-cyprus. com/ 
Office of the Chief Cyprus-European Union Negotiator, 
http: /www. cyprus-eu. org. cy/ 
Olgun, M. E., European Union for Cyprus, 
http: //www. cypnet. com/. ncyprus/cyproblem/articles/bolum3. html. 
Pace, R., The European Union's Next Mediterranean Enlargement: Challenges 
and Uncertainties, 
http: //www. fscpo. unict. it/vademee/jmwp06. htm. 
Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the UN, 
http: //kypros. orgfUN/index. htm 
Polis, News and Links on EU Affairs, 
http: //195.13.20.69/polisO70399. html 
Presentation on Regular Reports to the European Parliament, Brussels 4`h 
November 1998, 
http: //europa. eu. int/com/dgla/enlarge/docs/speeches/speech_98 236. htm. 
Schmidt, V. A., The EU and its Member States: Institutional Contrasts and their 
Consequences, MPIfG Working Paper 99/7, May 1999, 
http: //www. mpi-fg-koeln. mpg. de/publikation/working-papers/wp99-7. html. 
Speech by Ahmet Erdengiz of the Washington D. C "TRNC" Office, "The Cyprus 
Question", 
http: //www. toad. net/-falMand/mlf/tmctalk. htrnl 
Speech by Prof. Romano Prodi, Strasbourg, 0 May 1999, 
http: //europa. eu. int/comm/dgla/daily/05L99L191. htm. 
Statement by Murat Karayalhin, ex-Foreign Minister of Turkey on Greek Cypriot 
application for membership to the EU (Turkish Association Council in Brussels), 
httpJ/www. cypnet. com/. ncyprus/cyproblem/articles/colum31. html. 
Statement by President Clerides relating to Turkish Cypriot participation, 12th 
March 1998, 
http: //www. cyprus-eu. org. cy/eng/07ý-documents/d. ocument005. htm. 
The Council of Europe, 
httpJ/www. coe. fr/index. asp 
312 
Bibliography 
The Cyprus Government Homepage, 
http: //www. pio. gov. cy/ 
The European Research Papers Archive, 
http: //eiop. or. at/erpa/ 
The European Union; EU-Cyprus Relations, 
http: //www. eurunion. org/legislat/extrel/cyprus. htm 
The Government of Greece, 
http: //www. greece. gov. gr/ 
The History of Cyprus, CD ROM Edition, 
http: //www. otenet. gr/hoct 
The Republic of Turkey, (Turkey. org) 
http: //www. turkey. org/ 
The Turkish Times, 
http: //www. ataa. org/ataa/ttimes/ttimes. html 
Toivanen, 0., Cyprus' Dream - Will the EU-Membership Solve the Cyprus 
Problem, 
http: //www. valt. helsinki. fi/kvtok/1997/2781. htm 
Turkish Cypriot Memorandum addressed to the Council of Ministers of the EU in 
respect of an Application for Membership by the Republic of Cyprus (12th July 
1990), by Rauf R. Denktas, 
http: //www. mfa. gov. tr/yayinlar/stat-cyp/Chap 3. htm. 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Politics and Policy, The Question of the 
Membership of Cyprus in the European Union, Legal Implications, 
http: //turkey. org/turkey/p-cypro08. htm. 
Turkish Position Paper, 
http: //www. toad. net/-falMand/mlf/eucyprus. html 
United Nations, 
http: //www. un. org/ 
Weiler, J., Supremecy and National Constitutions: Reception by Member States, 
The Law of the European Union, New York University, School of Law, 
http: //www. law. my. edu/welerj/unit4/EU97403. htm. 
Weiler, J., Subsidiarity in the EC / The Evolution of Community Federalism, 
New York University, School of Law, 
http: //www. law. nyu. edu/weilerj/unit5/UnitVII. htm. 
313 
Bibliography 
Wilkinson, J. M, Moving Beyond Conflict Prevention to Reconciliation; Talking 
Greek Turkish Hostility, 
httpJ/www. ccpdc. org/pubs/Wilk/wilk. htm 
World Trade Organisation, 
http: //www. wto. org/ 
Xenakis, D. The Mediterranean Role of Cyprus and the European Union's 
Enlargement, 
http: /www. rdg. ac. uk/EIS/research/emetpublications/Xenakis. htm 
NEWSPAPERS 
Chrysostomides, K., Noµixä IIpopkýji a iov Kunpiaxov [Legal Issues 
Concerning the Cyprus Problem], Zip&pzvll [Simerini], 21/07/1999. 
Clerides, C., H AuvaiönjTa Tpononoblrnl; iov Evviäyµatoc njq Kvnptwaý 
Aijgoxpatiac [The Possibility of Amending the Cypriot Constitution], A)4Ocza 
[Alithia], 31/01/1990. 
Europe News Bulletin, No. 6882, Brussels, 24/12/1996. 
Interview with the Chief Cyprus-EU Negotiator, Mr G. Vasiliou, Xjpcpzvi 
[Simerini], 18/07/1999. 
Interview with the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. G. Papandreou, 
Z'qpeprv4 [Simerini], 26/11/1999. 
Interview with the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. G. Papandreou, 0 
cPi vOepoc [0 Fileleftheros], 11/12/1999. 
Kadritzke, N., Turkish Cypriots Dream of Europe, Le Monde Diplomatique, 
September 1998. 
Kranidiotis, Y., Ilpoo7nxcj icat IIopcia ITpo; tv Eupconamx OXoth poxn 
[Dimension and Process towards European Integration], 0 W&TC60epoc [0 
Fileleftheros], 12/03/1998. 
E vOcporunia [Eleftherotypia], Greek Daily Newspaper. 
0 (I)t üOcpos [0 Fileleftheros], Cypriot Daily Newspaper. 
IIoXf, njS [Politis], Cypriot Daily Newspaper. 
Erlµcptvrj [Simerini], Cypriot Daily Newspaper. 
To Bi to [To Vima], Greek Daily Newspaper. 
314 
Bibliography 
To EOvos [To Ethnos], Greek Daily Newspaper. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
"Cyprus on the Way to European Union Accession". Public Lecture by Mr. 
Ioannis Kasoulides, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus. Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, London, 4t` November 1998. 
"Cyprus on the Way to European Union Membership". Lecture by Mr. loannis 
Kasoulides, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus. Swedish Institute of 
International Affairs, Stockholm, 18th May 1999. 
"EU Accession Negotiations: How They Work and What They Can Do". Paper 
presented by Mr. James Pond of the European Commission, Seminar on the 
European Union and Cyprus, Nicosia, 1-2 June 1995. 
"Republic of Cyprus: Eligibility for EU Membership". Opinion drafted by 
Professors J. Crawford, G. Hafner and A. Pellet. 24th September 1997. 
Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, Mr. Ioannis Kasoulides, 
on the Occasion of the First Session of the Intergovernmental Conference for the 
Accession of Cyprus to the EU. Brussels, 3 1s` March 1998. 
Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus, Mr. Ioannis Kasoulides, 
at the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Conference on Accession to the EU. 
Nicosia, 10th November 1998. 
"The Accession of Cyprus to the European Union". Speech by Mr. Theophilos 
Theophilou, Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus. Rheinische Friedrich- 
Wilhelms-Universitat, Bonn, 4th February 1998. 
"The Application of the Republic of Cyprus to Join the European Union". 
Opinion drafted by Professor M. H. Mendelson, 6t' June 1997. 
"The Course of Cyprus Towards the European Union". Speech by Mr Alecos 
Michaelides, ex Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus. House of Representatives, 
Nicosia, 22"d February 1996. 
315 
